Millennium: A History of the Last Thousand Years - PDF Free Download (2023)

MILLENNIUM A history of the last thousand years F E L I P E FERNÁN D E Z - A R M E S TO

SCRIBNER NEW YORK LONDON TORONTO SYDNEY TOKYO SINGAPORE CHARLES SCRIBNER'S CHILDREN Simon & Schuster Inc. Rockefeller Center 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Copyright © 1995 Felipe Fernández-Armesto All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part at any Format. Charles Scribner's Sons First Edition 1995 Published by arrangement with Transworld Publishers Limited SCRIBNER and design are registered trademarks of Simon & Schuster Inc. Designed by Irving Perkins Associates Made in USA 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Cataloging the Library of Congress - Publication Dates Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. Millennium: a history of the last thousand years / Felipe Fernández-Armesto. p. cm. Includes references and index. 1. World history. I. Title. D20.F36 1995 909—dc20 95-18899 CIP ISBN 0-684-80361-5 It is the dead who rule. Look at you, man, how they impose their will on us! Who made the laws? The dead! Who created the customs we obey that mold and shape our lives? The dead! And the titles of our lands? Didn't the dead invent them? When a surveyor draws a line, he begins to line up the dead in some corner; and when you go to court on a matter, the judge looks back on his books until he finds out how the dead decided, and follows him. And all writers, when they want to give weight and authority to their opinions, quote the dead; and the orators who preach and teach, do they not have their mouths full of words spoken by the dead? Well, man, our lives follow grooves that the dead spill with their nails! M. DAVISSON POST, UNCLE ABNER—The Aleph? repeat. - Yes, the place where you are, without getting confused, all the places in the world, seen from all angles. . . He tries to reason.

-But. . . Isn't the basement too dark? - The truth does not penetrate a rebellious understanding. If all the places on earth are in the Aleph, then all the luminaries, all the lamps, all the worshipers of light will be there. - I'll see you right away. J. L. BORGES, THE ALEPH "The Aleph?" I repeat. "Yes, the place where all the places in the world meet without mixing, seen from all possible angles at the same time..." I tried to understand. "But isn't the basement too dark?" “The truth never enters a reluctant mind. If all places on earth are in Aleph, then all sources of light, all lamps, all rays of light are there." "I'll go check right away." CONTENTS PREFACE 11 FOREWORD: PRUNIER'S REVIEW 15 PART ONE: THE SPRINGS OF THE INITIATIVE 25 1 DISCRETE WORLDS: SOME CIVILIZATIONS A THOUSAND YEARS AGO 27 The Kingdom of Sensitivity – The Garden of Islam – The Divided Sky – The Civilization of the Barbarians 2 THE CABIN OF ORTHODOXY: MEDIEVAL EAST CHRISTIANITY 65 The Perfect Barbarians – The Clash of the Two Christianitys – The Business of the Turks – The Rise of the Third Rome – The Mad Planet 3 THE TOWER OF DARKNESS: ISLAM IN THE FIRST HALF OF OUR MILLENNIUM 96 The Iconium Stones – The Serpent in the Garden - The Kingdom of the Zengids - The Fingers of the Khan - The Auspicious Amir - The Limits of Islam - The Vision of Mimbar 4 THE WORLD BEHIND THE WIND: CHINA AND ITS Sung NEIGHBORS A MING 126 The tailed yaks - the countries v n Many umbrellas – The menagerie Ming – The shining dynasty 5 A LITTLE FOREIGNER ASIA: LATIN CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL 151 The stranger in the mirror – The horizons expand Gone – Enemies of Promise – The Divisions of Latin Christianity – The Age of Fool's Gold – The Wandering Spirit 7 CONTENTS PART TWO: RELAXED DOCKS 183 6 TIMID AND RETIREMENT EMPIRE: EXPANDING STATES IN

MEDIEVAL AFRICA AND AMERICA 185 The Mayan Renaissance – The Retrospective Screen – The Black Empires – The AM Empire Built on Sand – The Aztec Memory – The Frustrated Empires 7 THE SCOPE OF CONQUEST: EARLY MODERN IMPERIALISMS 226 The Turtle Army – The Corners of the Carpet - The Color of the Bear - Impossible Empires - The Highway of the World 8 Empire's Touch: Colonization at the Frontiers of the Modern Era 258 These Wonderful Lands - Pioneers - Involuntary Settlers - Indigenous Victims - Points of Contact on the Edge of Empire 9 THE EMBRACE OF EVANGELISM: REFORM AND EXPANSION OF OLD MODERN RELIGIONS 283 The road to Bali – The internal disbelievers – The spiritual achievements of Christianity – The scales of faith 10 THE COMMERCIAL TURRET: TRADE ANCIENT MODERN LONG DISTANCE 309 Chinese Fortunes - Exiles of the Islands - The Venice of the North - The Festival of the Dead - The Irish Era on Madeira THIRD P ART: THE ATLANTIC CRISIS 337 11 THE GLADES IN THE ATLANTIC: CRACKS AND FRACTURES IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 339 The New Canaan — Obvious Truths — The Feathered Serpent — The Yankee Land Creoles — Riding the Crocodile — The Saliva of Democracy 12 BOUNT JOURNEYS: THE REDISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 364 Dandelion Empires — Issues Precious Raw Materials — The Industrious East — The Face of the Tiger — The Industrial West TABLE OF CONTENTS 9 13 THE WIDENING FAILURE: THE SURVIVAL AND REVITALIZATION OF ATLANTIC CONNECTIONS 394 The Age of Elvis - The Habitat of the Blue Flower - Road to America - Economic Imperialism - Leaving America 14 THE MIRROR OF IMPERIALISM: WESTERN REFLECTIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD 423 Broken Images - The Industrial Advantage - Radames' Tomb - The hidden hippopotamus - The party of the cannibals - The distorted mirror LOSS OF TRUST AND EROSION OF THE RICH 45 5 Kingdoms of Certainty – The Ordered Universe – La Obedie ance of the Corpse – The Trapped Monkey – States of Nature – Humans Eat 16 THE STUMPS' Alibis: DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES IN

MODERN WEST 486 The Skeleton of Pessimism—Nervous Disorders—Militant Tendencies—The Struggle Today—Barbarism, Liberty, and Technology—The Private Enemy Marianne's Middle Years - The Grub in the Apple 18 LIVING AFTER EMPIRES: DECOLONIATION AND COUNTER-COLONIA 546 The Aladdin's Hives - The Roots of the Mikongoe Tree - The Strongholds of the Monsters - The Monument to Our Struggle - The Shadow of the Banyan - The Fate of the New Europe - The European Reflection 19 THE LABYRINTH OF GOD: THE RESURRECTION AT THE END OF THE ISLAMIC MILLENNIUM 577 The Face of Lua – The Cycle of Rebirth – Signposts Along the Way – The Eye of Islam 10 CONTENTS PART FIVE: THE PEACEFUL DEFIANCE 601 20 THE WATCHERS IN AWN: MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN 603 The Whale Eaters—The Samurai Revolution—The Floating Kai—A Sign in the World—The Stump of the Golden Pavilion 21 THE RISE OF THE GIANT: MODERNIZATION ELSEWHERE IN EAST ASIA 630 Confucian Kitchen—The Barrel of a Gun—The Hall of One Voice—The Battle of the Devoted Ades—The Sea View r 22 RIDERS OF THE SURFER: THE WHITE PACIFIC 659 The Lost Caravels – The New Mediterranean – Under Open Skies – The Undertow of History 23 THE REVENGE OF THE EAST: ORIENTAL RESILIENCE AND CULTURE WESTERN 688 The Xanadu Coast – The Tao of Science – The Japaneseness of Japan – Silver Columbia EPILOGUE: ALICE'S UNVISITED 111 NOTES 738 TABLE OF CONTENTS 777 PHOTOS CREDITS AND PERMISSION 814 NOTE ON NAMES In the English editions of this book, the Names are given in the forms that most readers find most recognizable. Therefore, transliterates from non-Latin alphabets are not treated uniformly, and diacritics required by strict systems are omitted, except where necessary to avoid ambiguity. PROLOGUE I have a vision of a galactic museum in the distant future where chain mail cans of Diet Coke will share a small display case labeled "Planet Earth, 1000-2000, Christian Era." The last decade of our millennium

possibly underrepresented because much of our significant waste has been biodegraded and forgotten; But visitors see materials from all eras and parts of the world over the past thousand years as evidence of the same quaint and distant culture: tompion totem poles and clocks, ivory netsuke and Nayarit clay, bankers' plastic and Benin bronzes. The distinctions we see when we look back on our thousand-year history from the inside are blurred by the perspective of long time and distance. The chronology will melt like crystals in a crucible, and our assumptions about the relative importance of events will be clouded or cleared by an excruciatingly long flashback. This problem of perspective is painful to me when I reflect on the past from my Oxford point of view. At Oxford University, for example, Cambridge is seen as a weird and strange place, where people put down their napkins when they say goodbye to dessert and where universities are run by small multipurpose committees called "councils" instead of governing. bodies . But these differences, which interest members of the two universities, seem insignificant to outsiders. In a relatively recent survey of Japanese businessmen's opinion of the world's learning centers, Oxford and Cambridge were considered as one. The differences diminish with emotional and physical distance. To cite another example from Oxford, Marx, Engels, and Lenin were often treated as "one" option by impartial examiners of political thought, while for their followers the subtle nuance of their works is a subject of passionate concern and dogmatic dispute. In this book I would like to try to combine at least two disparate perspectives: seeing the millennium from an imaginary distance, with the distance as a future time might see it, "on the way back", with unifying themes and an integral character; and also enjoy Sider In11 12 P R F A C E, recognizing diversity and monitoring mercury, savoring differences from place to place and changes over time. I hope the result suggests that this was truly "our" millennium and that the societies we live in and what little common culture we possess were a product of it at the beginning of the third millennium AD, the experience of the last thousand years. years. Although our way of telling time is conventional, in practice, dates divisible by ten have tremendous power to hold attention and stimulate the imagination. Although the British Heritage Secretary has announced that the next millennium will begin on January 1, 2001, both London's Royal Albert Hall and the Rainbow Room atop the main building of New York's Rockefeller Center have been commissioned for the New Year of 1999, twenty -five years before; As I write 1993, most of London's best hotels are already booked for the same night, and "the Millennium [sic] Society of London and New York," reports the Daily Mail, "are planning a party at the pyramids." The habit of thinking in terms of decades and centuries leads to self-realization.

Delusions and the way people behave, or at least perceive their behavior, actually tend to change accordingly. Decades and centuries are like clock cases in which the pendulum of history swings. Strictly speaking, each day and each moment of each day opens a new millennium; but the proximity of the year 2000 makes the present a particularly—indeed, unique—moment to take stock of our last thousand years of history, to question where it has led us and where we go from here. We must seize the opportunity to look closely at this millennium of ours and characterize it for ourselves, before the initiative falls to the galactic museum owners of the future, who can, with passionate discretion, protect unearthed artifacts through incredible technology, to archaeologists. humanoids with oddly shaped heads. The theme of this book is the fate of civilizations determined (in some prominent cases) by the seas: the change of initiative of the China and Mediterranean seas, the hegemony of the Atlantic, the cultural counter-invasion of the Pacific. Nearly every day while I was in London working on the book, I passed the starting point of the prologue: a symbolic twist of fate location where Madame Prunier's restaurant stood on a conspicuous corner of a major London street, not mistaking the great tradition. of French food, civilizing barbarians from the palate down. Today a Japanese restaurant has been installed here. The tide of the Empire was turned by a tide of Pacific kelp and raw fish. The Rise of the Pacific has become a cliché and no one wants another book about it; but it must be included here as a final example of the change initiatives of our millennium. In the context of this great story, I tried to stipple the broad canvas with a pointillist technique, depicting the past in meaningful detail rather than bold brushwork or heavy impasto. The domination of the Western world that world history books generally attempt to describe or "explain" is henceforth considered neither predetermined nor permanent; I affirm that it was later, weaker and shorter than is commonly believed. Therefore, more space is given to the rest of the world. The depth of cover is not intended to be uniform: the landscape in this book is made up of snowdrifts and thin ice. When the world can't be covered comprehensively, I hope the material is distributed fairly, in line with a new bias in favor of the unusual, that helps even the score. The principles of selection and presentation are explained and justified in the prologue, after which: PART ONE: THE SOURCES OF THE INITIATIVE begins with an overview of some of the different worlds of a thousand years ago. Chapters two through five alternately consider each of the four great civilizations between the 11th and 15th centuries: centuries of crisis and survival for China, total transformation for Islam, forged consciousness and erratic growth for Western Christianity, and darkness and rebirth. for Eastern Christianity. By a variety of dates in the 15th century, all of these civilizations can be characterized as crooked.

for long distance expansion. In PART TWO: THE MAJOR DEVELOPERS, it is seen that the "age of European expansion" did not come in a vacuum, but in an enthusiastic world full of aggressive competitors. Chapter six deals with the dynamic states of Africa and America in what we call the Late Middle Ages. Chapters seven through ten return to the spread of civilizations identified in part one: in conquest, colonization, evangelization, and trade, there were numerous competitors from around the world, and it is argued that Europeans were only slightly behind. in front of others. PART THREE: THE ATLANTIC CRISIS seeks to show that the “Atlantic Civilization” gradually created by European expansion beginning in the 16th century, despite its enormous potential, was extremely fragile in the first three hundred years; but at the same time, a change in resources helped the world experience a brief and turbulent period of Western hegemony after the end of the crisis of Atlantean civilization. Chapter eleven describes the rise and crisis of the Atlantic world; Chapter twelve describes changes in the global distribution of resources, particularly in relation to population, technology, and the natural environment. Chapter 13 traces the restoration of Atlantic unity through mass migration, trade, and military alliances in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Chapter fourteen deals with the political and cultural consequences of Atlantean rule, the scope and limits of Western empires. In PART FOUR: THE CHANGE OF INITIATIVE, chapter fifteen on the ideological undermining of Western supremacy is followed by chapter sixteen by an examination of some of the "local problems" that weakened Western influence in the twentieth century, including the world wars and the war of the West. the Soviet Union, seen here as a weakening of the West, possibly through the elimination of a common enemy. After reviewing some of the failures of Atlantean societies in Chapter 17, Chapter 18 deals with decolonization and what I call "counter-colonization" by former victims of Western imperialism. The survival and revival of Islam is the theme of Chapter Nineteen. In PART FIVE: THE PACIFIC CHALLENGE, we see that we are moving towards a world equilibrium similar to that of a thousand years ago, when the initiative in human affairs belonged to the Pacific coast. Meanwhile, a process of reverse cultural colonization - accumulated over the last two hundred years - is challenging the dominance of the Atlantean tradition. Chapters twenty through twenty-two deal with the modernization of societies in East Asia and the developed "White Pacific." Chapter twenty-three traces Eastern influences on Western thought and science to the present day. I succumbed to a pitifully obvious temptation and included a brief sketch of a possible future in an afterword. In some endnotes, special information and guidance requirements are indicated. But this is a work in consistent self-isolation, written without academic collaborators or professional readers. Just Jim Cochrane and Bill

Rosen, generous publishers, have seen it all. And no one except my wife Lesley has been asked to respond to more than minor patches. Some basic ideas were tested in discussions at the Conference of Anglo-American Historians at the Institute for Historical Research and the NEH Institute of Maritime History at the John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, both in 1992; I made some points more formally in papers or papers I presented at Oxford in 1993 for St. John's College History Society, the Past and Present Historical Society, and a colloquium on historical ecology at the Maison Française. I am grateful to all those who have been my guests or hosts or have provided comments and suggestions on these occasions, in particular David Abulafia, Pascal Acot, Rob Bartlett, Roland Bechmann, Alexandra Bollen, Alistair Crombie, James Seay Dean, Norman Fiering, Robert Finlay, Robin Grove-White, Robert Hall, John Hattendorf, George Holmes, Barry Ife, Martin Jones, Maurice Levy, Ross McKibbin, Patrick O'Brien, Carla and William Phillips, Seymour Phillips, David Quinn, Jeremy Robinson, Joan-Pau Rubies, Peter Russell, Haskell Springer, Joachim Steiber, Zacharias Thundy, Christopher Tyerman, Charles Verlinden, and George Winius. None of them had an opportunity to correct the errors of fact, wording, or judgment that I inevitably made and which I hope readers will help me correct. FFA Oxford - Providence, Rhode Island - Oxford, 1991-1993 Foreword REVISITTING THE POWERS Micro-historians who atomize the big issues of existence doom themselves forever to the status of mini-historians. J. H. ELLIOTT, NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE HISTORY The little things are infinitely the most important. A. CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES I have been here before. Memories recorded through the eyes of children are often amazed at how places seem to shrink, but this corner restaurant on the elegant London street that connects Piccadilly to St James's Palace seemed to have grown. Curiosity dissipated middle-aged inhibitions as I pressed my nose against the tinted glass to peer inside with the alert insolence of a nine-year-old. The room she remembered was tall, narrow, and opulent, adorned with crystal chandeliers. The walls were lined with richly embroidered benches in nondescript cream colors. Heavy silverware lay on thick tables with billowing tablecloths, lavishly fashioned like braided lines of silver across the soldiers' shoulders. My chubby fingertips tingled and tingled, but, embarrassed by such unusual luxury, they touched nothing until the waiter's soporific French mumble soothed them. The location was still the same, and the entrance was still tilted at an odd angle to the street, as if the restaurant was deferentially backing up.

palatial presence. Inside, too, there were currents of continuity: the place still felt drab, cozy, understated, expensive. But nothing that was visible remained unchanged. The room had become low and wide, the tables angular, the tablecloths thin and almost bare, the colors austere, uncompromising. And the team, running nervously with jerky and jerky movements, was now Japanese. The menu still seemed to prefer fish. Madame Prunier, who in her time made the restaurant at this address a revered temple of haute cuisine, used the refined flavors and textures as a canvas for her art; She would no doubt have enjoyed trying the intriguing delicacies on the new menu, such as sushi and sashimi or lobster-stuffed calamari. His specialty was bouillabaisse, which has a hearty parochial reputation among most gourmets, but Madame Prunier's version of that dish was a jewel box of treasures from the world's oceans, with rare pearl corals and crustaceans spilled from the spoon into the creamy silky coffin. covering. For the rest, they served the food à la Escoffier, with ingredients collected with grand gestures and brought to their kitchens with the imperial reach of steamboats. Today, in the same place, you can order a dish called Imperial Tepanyaki, which combines raw fish with steak and shrimp, but it's a different kind of imperialism. Japan's kitchen became an island kingdom of its own, filled only with fish and rice and before that soybeans that the Japanese now import from the United States. Madame Prunier's cuisine was nominally French but in fact global, prepared from distant resources under the command of a globally hegemonic Western elite. In a bold counter-colonization coup, her successor Japanese hers occupied part of the home territory of a white master class. The wrinkled brown brick front of St. James's Palace looms over a street dedicated to the rulers of a world empire; here, in shops that date in part to imperial times, tourists looking to recreate a historical experience can still fill their wine cellars and humidors. Here they can be measured for handmade shoes, club blazers, and old-school ties. Most of the rest of the street is lined with gentlemen's clubs designed to make Realpolitik look civilized. The Carlton Club, the presbytery of nineteenth-century conservatism, had exuded decency since its founding in 1832 by opponents of constitutional reform; but there are also vestiges of pre-imperial Britain in the 18th century, when Saint James's Street was a rowdy neighborhood for lewd aristocrats to gamble or prostitute themselves. White's and Brooks's have gradually grown disenchanted with 19th century respectability, and Boodle's, with its "proverbial serenity", takes the place of a disreputable former gourmet club. Today, the frontier of fun in the sewers has been pushed north and east at Piccadilly Circus, where a thrown stone will hit another counter-colonization phenomenon from the east.

Gerrard Street became Tong Yahn Gai, even the street sign in the CanPROLOGUE 17 tone proclaims it to be Chinese People's Street, bounded by dragon-wing gates. London had an earlier Chinatown, far to the east, which, like larger examples in New York and San Francisco, came into being in the 19th century when white imperialism moved workers from around the world; Old Limehouse was a sinister place where the victims of Victorian detective stories disappeared into the darkness as they descended slippery stairs. More respectfully, in the 1930s, it was the world of the voyeuristic Mr. Wu. Gerrard Street, on the other hand, is a testament to a new era: a newly established Chinese colony established solely on Chinese initiative since the mid-1960s. distant foreign community: would-be businessmen and would-be workers make the Saturday rounds in the morning trade potentially lucrative news; The waiters and cooks spend their days off here until they arrive in Manchester. Local movie theaters, grocery stores, hairdressers, bookstores, taxi drivers, and lawyers provide the extra services Cantonese speakers need to feel at home. While all the restaurants have toned down their hostile stance toward non-Chinese, the joints remain offshore rice paddies of ethnic purity, with doormen serving as border guards. Located incongruously in London, the expensive isolation of the Japanese restaurant and the demotic bustle of the Chinese street are testament to how the world has changed in the last decades of our millennium. Serving the agents of corporate imperialism in the world's largest creditor nation, the Japanese restaurant offers European diners a taste of a culture that has suddenly become world renowned. The Chinese street is an embodiment of popular colonialism, reversing the general direction of the imperial flow in recent history. In the 1980s, Hong Kong, the former home of many Gerrard Street residents, was the first colonial territory in the world to break normal economic ties with the occupying power: in 1990, more investment flowed from Hong Kong to Britain than from United States. the opposite. As we approach the end of our millennium, the Initiative is returning to where it was a thousand years ago, on the shores of the Pacific. By "initiative" I mean the ability of some groups to decisively influence others, and in particular the ability of some races to decisively influence the rest of humanity, through the generation and communication of ideas, the creation or adaptation of technologies and carrying out exploitation and colonization, or aggression. The growing importance of initiative in shaping the world is a hallmark of the last thousand years of world history. Likewise, the increasing dynamics of its changes from one culture to another. In the first millennium AD, in a world torn by divided cultures, initiative was hard to delegate. Folk archaeologists who postulate wild theories of cultural cross-pollination by transoceanic migrants make for funny characters. We are virtually certain to attribute the origin of many sources to China18 FOREWORD

it drove technical innovations, but they were communicated slowly, in ways that we, for the most part, can no longer reconstruct. Even the most frenzied aggression of this millennium—that of the Huns in the fifth century and that of the Arabs in the seventh century—has subsided. For example, the fate of the world did not depend on the relative technical capabilities of China, India, and Rome as it does today on the relative potential of the Atlantic and Pacific economies. The initiative has become more important than ever in our millennium. One way to characterize a period is to compare it with the corresponding periods before and after. A history of the millennium before our own should rightly focus on China, which, contrary to Gibbon's famous assertion, contained "the most beautiful part of the world and the most civilized part of mankind." It was here that most of the world's population lived, and from there radiated the effects of the widest conflicts and the most spectacular technical innovations. A thousand years ago, the balance of the world's resources still weighed heavily in China's favor, among the potentially competitive powers. The potential to decisively influence the rest of the world was in the hands of the Chinese. However, as our millennium has progressed, the balance has shifted and this world-influencing role was filled by the Also-Rans a thousand years ago. The first half of our millennium has been marked by the slow and erratic formation, consolidation and expansion of cultures and civilizations that have come into contact or conflict with each other along the way. The second half began with a period of competition in sprawling arenas. It seems to me that this took longer and was more fiercely contested among more competitors than is generally recognized; but it gradually gave way to what now seems like a brief interval of domination by a Western civilization clustered around the Atlantic and from there controlling, exploiting and shaping the rest of the world. In this book, “Western supremacy” is described as imperfect, precarious, and ephemeral. By the end of the millennium, it is already apparent that the supremacy of the Atlantean civilization has passed and the initiative has shifted again, this time to some highly 'advanced' and tech-savvy Pacific Coast communities typical of California and Japan. . They live on the brink of extinction from war, ecological catastrophe, economic hypertrophy, or seismic upheaval, but for now at least, the future is theirs. The 16th-century Spanish historian who argued that "empire"—the ability to rule the world—moved west by divine decree throughout human history through successive empires before reaching its final resting place in Spain, pointed out that there were no more spaces around the world. . picture. On one level, this book is an attempt to describe and explain these changes in the initiative. The rest of this introduction is as I proceeded: readers who are not interested in the conceptual problems or anxieties of historical methodology can skip the next few pages. Here attractive but superficial cosmic explanations are avoided. In a life largely devoted to reading history

In the books I have never come across a deterministic schema that results from the evidence, or a model of change that doesn't fit the topic like a hat that doesn't fit. In the chapters that follow, I propose that initiative change cannot be understood wholly or primarily in terms of resource movements, quantifiable data, cyclical conflict, pattern or law, or the taut fabric of economic change. Mega explanations, while interesting or culturally significant, are unlikely to be correct. Barring occasional ironies, I try to avoid the historicizing, deterministic, and teleological language that turns history into a theme park overseen by, say, The Rise of Capitalism or The Modern World, leaving the reader smiling at little illusions as if greeting a Mickey Mouse. huge. . The story was supposed to be a zoo full of real creatures, except for the mythical beasts; Merchants, industrialists, and financiers appear in this book, but "capitalism" is not mentioned except in one or two well-defined contexts of strictly limited meaning. There are knights and peasants, but there is no "feudalism". Each case must be analyzed on its merits and each change of initiative understood in its own way. On the other hand, a common thread runs through the labyrinth: the relative performance of rival cultures depends on the self-perception and mutual perception of the peoples involved. History is littered with the ruins of empires whose peoples convinced themselves of decadence and won victories through superior morality. The course of history is influenced less by the events that occur than by the often imaginative and often mistaken constructions that people impose on them. A change in initiative gains power and substance, like the tree in the Berkeley garden, only when it is mentally registered. In writing this book, I have constantly tried not to ask myself, "Why did this or that change happen?" but rather, "Why have people become convinced of the reality of this or that supposed change?" When I confessed with shuffling feet and downcast eyes that I was trying to write a history of the world, a colleague I admired told me there was no such thing, "only the histories of parts of it." Despite some brilliant attempts in recent years, world history remains a discipline in search of a method. The world historian desperately needs the gift of the dervish from The Thousand and One Nights, which gave him the power to see the whole world at once, or the magic of Borges's Aleph, which the protagonist of the tale found in a basement. The diameter "was only an inch or two, but all the space was in it without sacrificing scale. Every thing was infinite because I could see it clearly from every perspective in the universe." Perhaps this omniscience would soon die out when it was achieved, but in writing this book I figured it would be worth imagining what it would be like from time to time. So, from time to time, I walk into the Cosmic Crow's Nest facility and try to give the reader the perspective of what I call the galactic museum keepers of the future, seeing an entire planet, undifferentiated and disdainfully small. Since the museum guards are my invention, I must immediately admit that I allowed myself to attribute a little more interest in what we do to them than they did.

they probably would have if they had been made meat. Without being overwhelmed by the illusion that we can see the world as a whole, we can also try to write world history in terms of the interaction between units of study that we call cultures and civilizations. This technique has a long and respectable tradition that almost all its practitioners have either reluctantly continued or abandoned in disgust. I drew it myself, in what I hope readers will recognize as a highly modified form, with a painful awareness of its limitations. Most attempts fail on the definition of rocks: there is no agreement on what a civilization is. In this book, the term is used without any significant connotation to designate a group of groups - or a set of groups - that are considered a civilization. Even this use leaves unresolved problems of translation - that is, identification of equivalent terms in different languages ​​- and scaling. In practice, when I select a group of individuals for a given test, I rely on what I consider to be common sense to guide me. The story resembles a mosaic made by a monkey, but even that Clio monkey can sometimes get caught composing piece by piece. Stepping back to distinguish the dots, I implicitly acknowledge that when viewed differently, they mix and mingle, making different patterns. To use the metaphor of a distinguished historian, in the "set of sets" of world history, Venn diagrams continually overlap, shift, and expand and contract. Whenever I select some groups of people and some areas of the world for discrete treatment in this book, treating others comparatively or superficially, or omitting them altogether, my criteria are one of desirability, not value. If cultures and civilizations are the tectonic plates of world history, borders meet where they rub against each other and cause spasmodic shifts. The reader of this book, therefore, if he wants to go that far, will find, for example, more about the 13th century in Tunis than in Paris, more about the 16th century in Siberia than in Moscow, more about the 18th century in Sinkiang than in Paris than in Beijing. . The familiar landscapes, the elegant horizons of national histories are blurred; Instead, we join settlers struggling to adapt to unfamiliar surroundings, evangelists breaking down communication barriers, traders opening up new markets, conquerors tackling strange topics. For the purposes of world history, the peripheries sometimes demand more attention than the metropolises. Part of the mission of this book is to rehabilitate the forgotten, including places often ignored as peripheral, people marginalized as inferior, and people relegated to trivia and footnotes. P R O L O G T 21 P R O L O G T 21 Indirectly, this is another way of accumulating even more metropolitan history, since the peripheries have, so to speak, little history of their own: what is recorded and transmitted is usually chosen according to the criteria of importance of the centers. The Hsiung-nu are only known from Chinese annals. We would have known little about the Ranquele Indians if Colonel Mansilla had not taken an interest in them. Children, women, the socially disadvantaged, the sick, the insane, and ethnic minorities had to wait for elite perceptions to change before dissuading historians.

your own. This book is not intended to be a history of what is not important, but rather an attempt to approach what has been conventionally identified as important from new directions. Since importance is a relative term, this is also an opportunity to anticipate the importance you may place on previously neglected areas. It's impossible to be sure what the Guardians of the Galaxy Museum will select, but it will certainly be a different selection than what has been made before. As a partial consequence, no canon of major events is noted in the following pages. To galactic museum owners, events traditionally ascribed to momentous importance, such as the English and American Civil Wars, the European Wars of Religion, the French and Russian Revolutions, will seem parochial. As the trends of our millennium are reassessed and the landscape shifted due to chance survivors and evidence suppression, encounters at Runnymede or Canossa are dwarfed by previously underappreciated events in Makassar or Timbuktu. In this book, where there doesn't seem to be much point in tiring the reader with what is generally important and therefore necessarily known, I bring the unknown closer to the front window while restocking some popular historical goods. Little follows about the Investiture Controversy or the Hundred Years War. The Renaissance is seen from the perspective of Hungary rather than Tuscany, socialism from the perspective of the United States rather than Russia. There is more to the Morocco of al-Mansur than to the England of Elizabeth I. Louis XIV only seems to apologize. This is the only mention of Frederick the Great. A friend suggested Bismarck's claim to inclusion, but it presents a Eurocentric temptation. I'll focus on Okubo Toshimichi, who did similar work and seems to be a comparable character in some ways. I am not summarizing Descartes' thought, I am not acknowledging the achievements of, say, Goethe or, rather to my regret, Mozart or Michelangelo. Such omissions in favor of more obscure examples are not made for reasons of political correctness, and I must say at the outset that I am a strong supporter of the traditional humanist history curriculum in schools and universities. But here there is no room for "core content" where basic knowledge is assumed and where I intend to surprise the reader. I make some simple but critical assumptions, which I must admit: readers are entitled to anticipate the ropes I propose to pull them across the vast and rugged terrain of the last thousand years. First, the story is like Rashomon, the well-known story by Akutagawa Ryunosuke in which seven witnesses describe the murder of a husband from their respective points of view. Conflicting confessions of the woman in the case and of the thief who raped her, while the ghost of the dead, perhaps speaking with the traditional authority of the ghost in the Eastern criminal tradition, remembers the episode as a suicide. Objective truth, while in some sense it certainly exists, is indistinguishable, and the evidence is only evidence of what witnesses say.

Spirit. All historical sources are equally bright beams of prisms. Even statistics are infected by compiler priorities, and the only verifiable statements we can make are statements about sources. As speed and time slow or expand relative to the speed of the viewer, the historical truth seems to spiral into different shapes and forms, depending on the viewing angle. I admire (but not) Immanuel Wallerstein's maxim: "The past can only be told as it really is, not as it was." It must be considered a historian's virtue to wallow gleefully in the seductive contradictions of evidence and, as I try to do in this book, dodge and slide between multiple points of view: the perspectives, for example, of those who experienced the past as it was and the who look back, review and revalue it to meet the needs or justify the prejudices of their own time; and those like my guardians of the galactic museum who will revisit it from a distance inaccessible to us or our predecessors. The aesthetic effect - if the technique could be skilfully applied - would be like a Uccello painting, in which objects disappear or cluster, shorten or emerge in unexpected patterns. Second, the story is chaotic: a turmoil that occurs haphazardly or whose causes are often elusive in practice. It happens quickly, like a snake darting between rocks, being followed in fleeting glimpses and wriggling unpredictably. Even over a period of a thousand years, most genuine phenomena of long-term change, such as topography, climate, and biological evolution, are virtually static, with exceptions that must instead be confronted. History is a state of quasi-equilibrium which, like evolution according to a popular theory, is peppered with convulsive change. Most of the long-term trends and long-term causes commonly identified by historians turn out, upon closer inspection, to be composed of tenuous links or guesses strung between gaps. Perhaps the most striking trend in the historiography of the last generation has been the destruction by revisionists of processes that were previously considered slow in ever shorter chunks. The English Civil War, for example, long regarded by a compound belief of partisanship and hindsight as the culmination of centuries of "progress" toward a teleological end, is now understood by most scholars as best understood in the context of the two or three years PROLOGUE 23 immediately before its eruption. The origins of the French Revolution and World War I were interrupted by similar blades. Economic historians tend to subscribe to gradualism, but even the Industrial Revolution is now seen as a bumpy start, or series of starts, rather than a smooth buildup. The experience of change - unbelievably fast, hardly predictable - in our time has helped narrow the search for long-term trends: empires disappeared like snow on a river; industrialization jumped into unlikely places at the speed of a computer virus; and ideological fashions imitated the readiness with which seams rise and fall. Third, history is a creative art that is best produced with a disciplined imagination.

through knowledge and respect of the sources. To me, while other equally valid standards may be adapted to suit other tastes, the test of a good history book is not so much whether the past is demonstrably reconstructed and convincingly presented, but whether it is convincingly presented and invoked. vividly. Better than many professional practitioners, Doreen Grainger, a fourteen-year-old black girl interviewed by a sociologist sixteen years ago as I write this book, expressed the charm of the subject. "The point of the story," she said, "is that you can somehow be alive when you weren't really alive." and how it looked This book is an attempt to write world history with more intimacy of detail, more complexity of vision, and more vividness of image than is generally attempted in works of comparable scope and scope. I travel the shores of the present in search of remains and remains of the past. I try to use antiquarian trinkets - fragments and physical debris, sometimes fragile - and, where they survive, written sources that I think seem to capture real experience, in the same way that a geneticist would use fragments of DNA to explore the past to clone or at least less less less give the appearance of that. The history of early Ming China, for example, is approached through a look at the animals in the imperial zoo; those of the Spanish Empire in the 18th century through the plants of the Botanical Garden of Madrid. I enter the end of medieval Byzantium under the doors of the Church of Chora and at the same time in the Mayan world, immersing myself with the diving god of Tulum in the stucco that decorates the facade of a temple. Responding to the visible and tangible vestiges of the past that still surround us, unleashes -for those with the proper sensitivity- delicious secretions of intellectual pleasure. It can also contribute to our sense of belonging in the sculpted and designed spaces we have inherited, in the ways of life and in the traditions of thought that we think we can understand. Thus, world history can be comforting and inspiring, helping us to relinquish or even savor our close coexistence in the next millennium and our place in a common showcase in the galactic museum. PART ONE THE DOCKS OF THE INITIATIVE It was the last day of the year 1999 of our era. The pattering of the rain had heralded the night for a long time; I sat with my wife and reflected on the events of the past and the prospects for the next year, the next century, the next millennium. . . . Of course, when I say "sit down" I don't mean a change in attitude, since you use that word in Spaceland; having no feet, we cannot "sit" or "stand" (in the sense of the word) more than one of its soles or soles. "A Square" [EDWIN A. ABBOTT], FIATLAND-. A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS

Chapter 1 DISCRETE WORLDS: SOME CIVILIZATIONS OF A THOUSAND YEARS AGO The Kingdom of Sensuality – The Garden of Islam – The Divided Sky – The Civilization of Barbarians THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF SENSUALITY Like the palace cats, the eyes of Lady Murasaki Shikibu were accustomed to the dark. The dark corridors of the vast complex of imperial buildings in Heian, where a wanderer could be ambushed or lost, was her home territory. The twilight in which Japanese court life was lived in the late 10th and early 11th centuries hid nothing from her view, though the darkness was deep enough to make love stories gone wrong believable. His powers of observation produced The Tale of Genji, which he claims to be the world's first novel: Genjif's intricate realism, captured with Jane Austen's restraint and Proust's depth of reflection, gained a popularity in its day that it never lost. . It also makes it a work of unsurpassed utility for historians as a novel, which faithfully recalls the customs and values ​​of a distant world. Gradually appearing as a modern series, Genji became for many years part of the culture it depicted, captivating and seducing readers, competing for manuscripts of unread chapters, stimulating gossip, and reinforcing particular Heian ideals, ideals who extolled poetry above bravery, beauty. on muscular strength, and valued tangible failure over gross success. 27 28 THE SOURCES OF IN I T I A ​​​​ / T I VE Genji was read by women together in the intimate seclusion of a palace full of secret corners, as in this early twelfth-century illustration of a scene from Chapter 50 (Azumaya, “ The Campo de la Casa del Este"). Century. Ukifune hides in her half-sister's quarters and fixes her hair while she enjoys the story illustrations being read to her by a maid. The landscape screens were magical windows into distant scenes that courthouse inmates, by the sedentary conventions of their way of life, were doomed never to see firsthand. Earlier episodes of Genji illustrations certainly existed, but they have not survived. Murasaki was just one of many court talents. Writing novels, poetry, diaries, and "bedside books" were common forms of entertainment for wealthy and intelligent women, free from financial constraints and still excluded from public life. Without even describing herself, she commented on what she claimed when others saw her: "pretty but shy; cringing at the sight of her; so absorbed in poetry that other people barely exist; leering at the whole world." The evaluation was only partially correct. Instead, Murasaki's literary leanings seem to have increased.

as if he suppressed his interest in his fellow courtiers; but his intensity may have been misinterpreted as malice and his detachment as condescension. That Genji is practically a roman à clef is suggested by one of the characters, who confesses how readers are inspired by "things, good and bad, which they have seen and heard happen to men and women, and which they do not keep". completely for them. Murasaki made the observations of him from a privileged point of view. In 1002, a plague left her at court as a young widow. In 1005, she was in the house of the emperor's favorite consort, Shoshi. There, if her journal is to be believed, she became the most powerful man in Japan, Shoshi's famous Fujiwara no Michinaga, "with his tap-tap-tap on the blinds like the cry of the Kuina bird." -father-in-law of two emperors, uncle and father-in-law of another, uncle of another and grandfather of two. figure of the grand vizier d usurper of executive power. Laden with ceremonies, emperors had to fight for royal power, retiring early, usually in their twenties or thirties. The Fujiwara clan's household servants provided the empire with a functional bureaucracy, while nominal officials were bound by the shackles of ritual. Driven to power by an emperor's affection for his niece, Fujiwara secured his position when his chief rival fell out of favor in a dispute with a former emperor over the favor of a lady. After the early and rapid deaths of three emperors in factional fighting, Fujiwara ruled through his grandson Go-Ichijo (986-1022), who was enthroned at the age of eight. The minister floated in a spiral of enrichment and empowerment and, according to one sour voice, she left "no piece of land for the general public." With a small bag and a large seraglio, the emperors were embarrassingly philanthropic. Imperial lords demoted for reasons of austerity were placed in the Minamoto clan known as Gen-ji, and this is the situation of the hero in Murasaki's story. Prince Genji is excellent in every way, but as a seducer he is nothing short of perfect; therefore, though banished from the throne for his merits, he is capable of breeding a race of emperors. His changing political destiny forms the background of the book; however, it is not primarily a political novel, but a chronicle of the loves and friendships of Genji and the next generation of his family, prefiguring the novel in medieval Japan. The prevailing irony lies not in Genji's reversal of the injustice of the succession, but in the fact that his own inheritance turned out to be the product of infidelity. Yet it is impossible to see Murasaki, with his disdain for Fujiwara's sexual advances and his sympathy for victims of dynastic manipulation, as anything more than a mouthpiece for the ousted brothers of a small but competitively divided political elite. He made his novel a success.

the scandal; to her avid readers, she had a college culture thrill, an anti-establishment air. The "outsiders" of politics were comforted in their world by a value system reminiscent of the cult of British underdogs and a kind of "Dunkirque spirit" that made defeat a virtue. "The nobility of failure" was admired and sometimes idolized in Murasaki's Japan. A previous loser in a power struggle against Fujiwara, whose example may have helped shape the fictional character of Genji, was Sugawara no Michizane, a scholar whom the ambitious Emperor Uda chose to earn a living. Sugawara no Michizane was Heian's ideal hero. , who used his exile to create a cult of contemplative leisure exalted in Chinese verse by a carefully refined melancholy, reminiscent of Ovid's Tristia for Western readers. After his death, he pursued the court. On the occasion described here, he terrified his enemies with thunder and lightning until a Fujiwara clan minister drove him away with a drawn sword. break Fujiwara's monopoly of authority; but a Fujiwara coup in 901 sent him into provincial exile, a fate as bad as death in the intensely urban world of Japan's metropolitan elite, and reduced him to "mere scum floating on the water." For years, he was destined to seek revenge against the ruling clan from beyond the grave, only to be appeased ninety years later by the Fujiwara government's formal proclamation of apotheosis of him. Come to think of it, a cowardly, anemic hero like Genji might have romantic appeal, as if the character of Hamlet might have overtones of James Bond. Another element of Sugawara's story, the theme of supernatural corruption and vengeful persecution, also permeates the atmosphere of Genji. The Japanese imagination in the tenth and eleventh centuries was full of spirits and demons: clumsy goblins in minor tales, personifications of powerful emotions in the most sophisticated literature. In 974, The Demon of Rasho Gate, the authorities are baffled by the mysterious disappearance of several Heian citizens, until a daring young man vows to patrol the danger zone. He is lulled to sleep by the beauty of a young woman who is transformed into a hideous succubus. Escaping just in time, he cuts off her arm, which he keeps as a souvenir until he is taken to heaven by the demon, who returns in disguise. In Genji, the subject is dealt with more subtly, but at least with the same intensity. Genji's jealous lover, Lady Rokujo, projects a hatred so intense that it poisons Genji's affairs with other women and, unabated by Lady's death, her beloved withers and kills, like the budding worm. Discrete Worlds 31 Such is Murasaki's skill that he can weave that sinister thread—the coarse warp of a coarse, primitive thread—with the silken thread of his courtly history, the soft fabric of a delicate comedy of manners. For Genji and his court colleagues move with ballet grace, guided by a yearning for beauty, regulated by a hierarchy of rank, shaped by refined sensibilities. The reigning passion is the weariness of the world, and they are most admirable - their inventor admires them most - when they are saddened by fragile beauty or

touched by the mutability of nature. The ranking rules in Heian make Saint-Simon's Versailles look like a pitched battle. Genji's son dreamed of the day when he would be able to shed the "hateful green cloak" which meant his demotion to the sixth degree of nobility. The emperor's cat was favored with status and adorned with the hairstyle of a middle-class lady. A nurse could tell by the sound of a visitor's cough what level of nobility they belonged to. Much more tension arises in the story from the interaction of different hierarchical levels than from the malevolent influence of the spirit of Rokujo. “Sometimes,” Genji observes, “high-ranking people sink into the most miserable positions; while others of common origin rise to senior officers, put on confident faces, redecorate the interiors of their homes, and consider themselves as good as anyone else." Daughter of a convicted provincial official. The perils of courting in the provinces dominate the sequel. in the generation after Genjis Parvenues can inspire fear or hilarity - the provincial heartthrob partially acclimated to court life is a standard comic book character - while instances of decadent nobility can chill the spines of the palace delicately. manicured: the chancellor's son, disgraced in the capital, a tattered laughing stick, the "barefoot wandering player whom the townspeople call Miss Justice," whose father is "a high official." Murasaki's work, fights for precedence can be delicious , in which carriages of women crashed on streets lined with status symbols at moments of racy and public aculum She taunts the palace residents by banging their heads and cutting off their combs as they pounce on the sleeping policeman at the door. This kind of humor was poignant precisely because it approached fights and competition with deadly seriousness. Even more than her position, Murasaki's characters establish their place in her world through expressions of sensitivity. Her male heroes revel in love through exquisite handwriting, a girl through the "carefree dexterity" of a folded note. According to Sei Shonagon, the court's most accomplished love expert, "a woman's attachment to a man largely depends on the grace of parting with her." It was possible to buy or fight your way to power, but social acceptance depended on the ability to improvise verses, preferably in classical Chinese. The exchange of poetry, wrapped in subtle, sometimes enigmatic images, was the only way for social relationships to escape the constraints of formal conventions and rituals that prohibited explicit expression and obscured the expression of feelings. One of Murasaki's sincere reproaches was not having responded to one of Fujiwara's passes with a properly distanced verse. •« éÊÊÊËmt Daiitoku, King of Wisdom, was often an intimidating deity, even terrifying in earlier performances,

but the sculptors of the eleventh century endowed him with the characteristic virtues of Heian culture: calm, indolent, thoughtful. Discrete Worlds 33 The beauty and sensibility cultivated in the poems –and in their written versions, the way they were molded and folded– was the object of all forms of public display. Only in an archery competition does Genji and his friends come close to the practical values ​​of their European colleagues and contemporaries; His usual skills consist of painting, dancing and mixing perfumes and incense. The cult of the tenderness of feelings is exemplified in Genji by the hero's reluctance to stop courting a princess who, seen up close, reveals herself to be slender and red-nosed, in a kind of pre-incarnation of the Woosters Code or of blood without blood the sophistication that restrained Newland Archer in The Age of Innocence, or the chivalry that forced Wellington to marry Kitty Pakenham after she turned "bloody ugly." In a different context, the same ideal explains the story of how Emperor Ichijo withdrew out of earshot while playing a pop lampoon on his flute addressed to a minister of humble origins. To show sensitivity to the beauties of nature without venturing into the hated provinces, court officials built gardens imitating the "landscape wonders" acclaimed by poets. The trees were carved into fantastic shapes to imitate the wind-bent pines of Amanohashidate. In the Christianity of the time, aristocratic quarrels had to be contained, or at least channeled, through the church. Noble bandits would, at best, be slowly and relentlessly civilized over a long period of time by a cult of chivalry that was always as much an education in arms as an education in the values ​​of the nobility. From this perspective, it seems incredible that a culture exists on the other side of the world where sensitivity and the art of peace have been spontaneously celebrated by a secular elite. So little work has been done and so few sources are available on the lower classes of Fujiwara Japan that it is hard to say how oppressively this empire of sensibilities ruled its subjects. Genji's is a world made of hard-paste porcelain with no earthenware. No lower order invades the ugly; The farmers are so unknown that they only appear as "ghosts". Heian was cut off not only from the rest of the world but also from its own countryside, and the provinces saw models like Sugawara and Genji only in times of exile. For the most part, they were ruled by poorly powdered men, whose faces reminded Sei Shonagon of "the dark land on which the snow has melted in places." Travel income, which fed the court aristocracy, was extorted from a peasantry regularly plagued by famine and disease. Although the imperial army was only ceremonial and led by sinecures, the country was intimidated by the henchmen of the provincial administrators - bands of rude and brave licensed by the authorities, like the peasants of pre-revolutionary Mexico - who would evolve into private armies, the aristocrats. provincials. . In the next century they would challenge and eventually overthrow the central power. However, what is not remarkable is what the court must have for the values

34 THE DOCKS OF THE IN I T I A ​​​​T I VE went unnoticed in the country that must have existed in such refined form. Even in Genji, some characters show impatience with the conventions of courtly behavior. In an appeal to the "spirit of Japan" or a rejection of traditional "Chinese" art like "smile", it is tempting to assume some kind of foreshadowing of the practical and warlike Japan known in a later period. But hindsight is a powerful lens, and all that survives of late tenth and early eleventh century art and literature is remarkably consistent in maintaining the impression of a collective project of self-control. Heian art, like that of the Italian Renaissance, seems to actively reject the emotional debauchery and strenuous jolts of earlier times in favor of restraint and sprezzatura. The style was defined by the traditional criticism of the sculptor Jocho, who decorated the Hojoji Palace for Fujiwara no Michinaga. His divine and heroic, human, realistic and serene images marked the rest of the century. The effects of this taste can be admired, for example, in the Daiitoku in the Boston Museum, with a human head and limbs and a calculated renunciation of terror, or in the carving of Prince Shotoku, made by the sculptor Enkai in 1069 without any hint of devotion. . Genji might have been at home in Gonzaga Mantua, or Castiglione might have been welcome in Heian. THE GARDEN OF ISLAM One might expect Fujiwara's Japan to have been an unrepresentative corner of the world a thousand years ago. Sealed off by introspection and xenophobia, Japan kept all of its children at home, like one of those jealous and possessive mothers so popular in Japanese literature. The fringes of society can be drawn to travel: India was a fitting destination for a rare hermit or magician. But even the most dedicated sinologist of the tenth century could not bear to travel as an ambassador to the country that inspired his poetry and set his cultural standards. The Chinese, who may have been flattered by the imitation, reciprocated the disgust for "a rude and unusual country". The hero of the story of the hollow tree challenged the credulity of his readers by being shipwrecked in Persia. But compared to other courtly cultures of the 11th century, Heian values ​​were not as alien as they seem by Christian standards. A shipwrecked Japanese would have found echoes of his home in the Islamic world, if there really was one. Genji's competitions among princely perfumers are unlike anything in the world of that time more than the recipes for aromatic vinegars and toiletries invented by the gardener of al-Mu'tamid, ruler of Seville. Also with Genji, al-Mu'tamid shared epic good looks, a love of gardening, a talent for poetry, and a homoerotic appetite. Parallels to Discrete Worlds 35 naturally falls apart if pushed too far. Heian's rooms, with their flimsy partitions and sparse furnishings, offered austere dwellings, as far removed from the sybaritic crowd of an Islamic interior as possible. The most noticeable difference was the scale. like everything long and thin

Japan encompasses a wide variety of climate zones, but occupies a relatively small area. Islam was the greatest, that is, the most widespread, civilization the world has ever known until it was superseded by the spread of Latin Christianity in the 16th century. Around the year 1000, Muslims occupied towns in the Algarve and oases in the Sahara. They gathered in large sedentary trading communities, thousands of people, in Daylub and Malabar, Canton and the Malay Archipelago. A continuous strip of territory under Muslim rule stretched from the Duero and the Atlantic through North Africa and the western Mediterranean to the Indus, Jaxartes, and the Arabian Sea. The Syrian geographer al-Muqaddasi, who died around the turn of the millennium, surveyed this world in detail, from Syria to Khurasan, with an unconcerned conviction of its cultural unity and a courtier's prejudices about its basic civility. The Islam that he saw was spread out like a canopy under the tent of heaven, erected as if for a great ceremonial occasion, adorned with great cities in the role of princes; They were attended by chamberlains, lords, and foot soldiers, whose roles were played by the provincial capitals, towns, and villages, respectively. The cities were united not only by the obvious elements of a common culture (worship of the Prophet, profession of the Qur'an, use or knowledge of Arabic, the unifying power of the pilgrimage to Mecca), but also by trade and, in many cases , through mutual political commitments. The rigid political unity that had once characterized Islam was shattered in the tenth century by a kind of political schism: the proclamation of rival caliphates in Spain and Egypt by dynasties that usurped the spiritual authority handed down by the Prophet himself, previously exclusive to those located in Baghdad. In most of Iran and Kurdistan, the caliph's rule became nominal through usurpation or the forced transfer of power to "lesser dynasties". The commander of the faithful turned into "a venerable ghost." Yet a sense of security survived, and travelers could feel at home in Dar a'i Islam or anywhere, to use an image popular with poets, in a garden of Islam, cultivated, walled against the world, yielding to its privileged residents. , tones and flavors of paradise. Changes in agronomy in the Muslim world made the image of the garden particularly apt at the time, as the increasing production of durum wheat, rice, and sugar required cooling watering in summer. Of course, in a civilization that considered itself a garden, gardening was a highly valued art. Literature describing it abounds in 11th and early 12th century Muslim Spain, where a veritable school of court gardeners flourished without precedent in the medieval West. 36 LA I N I T I A ​​​​V TIPS They knew each other and read each other's work. They were concerned with practical agriculture, but more with the low-yield, expensive delicacies that gave prestige to princely tastes. Rainfed agriculture and me? -> * • %Ú 1* ** ! '• *' is • i 'i'' '• \1 Vr '• ••; ^JUj^jjj!,.yJL.. '.; »-iÄ^^sUj^Jfc-i:-L-W-J; 5^ V¿;—H33"-*"3/, Enclosed by the world, enraptured by music, perfumed by trees, refreshed by drink and

Illuminated by conversation, the inhabitants of the Garden of Islam inhabit an earthly paradise, in an illustration of a courtly romance of love intrigues comparable in tone and values ​​to Genji. This is a version of the Western Caliphate; Mahmud of Ghazni also collected lavish manuscripts of love stories. The pastoralism that sustained most of Muslim Spain was ignored in his works. Their common background was royal patronage, their co-education in the lush experimental gardens of powerful foodies in Toledo and Seville, where they were employed on any project that could enhance luxury, from composting to crafting foie gras recipes. They were learned men steeped in esotericism and even occultism. They were keen practical gardeners. Ibn Bassal, who was a gardener in Toledo when it fell to the Christian conquistadors in 1085, wrote almost entirely from experience, but any discoloration under his fingernails was paint, not mold. Gardening is an ephemeral form of monumental art, and only a vague idea of ​​the environments they created for their patrons can be preserved from the Moorish gardens that survived from a later period in Granada and Seville. However, the way of life to which the gardens belonged can easily be imagined with an imagination stimulated by Moorish art, which assumed its most delicate forms and exuberant appearance towards the end of the 10th century. Worldly and ornate, the ruins of a Caliph's palace outside Córdoba exudes a sense of pathos and mutability reminiscent of Heian, though the manicure of the later decadences can be seen simultaneously. The most magnificent of all the chambers was built by 'Abd al-Rahman III in the mid-1950s. It was added as a magnificent audience hall. It reflected worldly splendor: sweeping arched corridors supported by contrasting marble columns and clad in a richly carved stone "skin" laid over the building blocks, while celebrating the caliph's sacred role by using an included mihrab as a midpoint. of the composition. 38 THE SOURCES OF IN I N I T I A ​​​​T I V Meaning of the current restoration. The palace was upheld in a tradition established by deceased predecessors. Each mutation in the Moorish state was celebrated with grandeur and solemnity. The prestige of the rulers demanded that the inherited palaces be demolished and overtaken. When in the year 929 the emir of Córdoba, 'Abd-al-Rahman III, decided to assume the title of caliph, he received a

Palace designed to embody the changed nature of its authority: previously pragmatic, active and personal, its monarchy became withdrawn, sacred and invisible. Once mobile, a traveling prince who relied on his physical presence and military influence to render obedience in distant provinces, he now withdrew behind a vast veil that only privileged servants could penetrate. Henceforth he reigned projecting images of "magnificence" and "fear." Construction of the new palace began in 936 on a sprawling site a few kilometers northwest of Córdoba, which was by far the largest and wealthiest city in the Western world at the time. Ten thousand workers erected four thousand pillars to build it. It housed a slave family of four thousand and growing, and a harem of reputedly six thousand three hundred women; The caravans brought daily thirteen thousand pounds of meat for their sustenance. It was a dome of pleasure and a powerhouse. The catamite-studded ivory coffins of the Caliph, decorated with virtuous carvings, were symbols of the Caliph's favor in 10th- and 11th-century Córdoba, usually bestowed, filled with precious ointment, to commemorate an achievement, the highest deserved honor. It was given to Subh by Caliph alHakam II around the year 960, his Basque concubine of proverbial beauty who became the mother of his heir and the patroness -perhaps the mistress- of Almanzor. Discrete'World's 39 tributary verses engraved at the base of a column, under the nickname "Little Earring". A qadi scolded the ruler for covering a roof with silver and gold. But, despite all the fabrications of debauchery, 'Abd al-Rahman declared that in his life he had only known fifteen days of peace. His palace enjoyed remarkable longevity and did not darken until 979, when a new political revolution reverberated in architecture. The vizier Ibn Abi 'Amir, like Fujiwara no Michinaga in Heian, effectively usurped the authority of a weak figurative ruler. Like his Japanese counterpart, he owed his rise in part to the seraglio's domination of politics: the scandal linked him to the concubine of Caliph Subh, who ran the harem and whose beauty is celebrated in verses that adorn several surviving barrels of perfumes and cosmetic boxes. the previous period. reign, most likely, since modern beauty products are endorsed by screen goddesses. His other defining qualities combined a ruthlessness that made him a strongman and enforcer of successive palace coups with a martial skill that earned him a reputation for his successful attacks against infidels in the north. He received the nickname of Almanzor, the conqueror. His palace was a calculated slight to the dynasty he nominally served. He called it Madinat al-Zahira -Luminous City- in reference to the obscure name of the monument of 'Abd al-Rahman,

it is said that they were minted in honor of a concubine. It was built on an even larger scale than its predecessor in just two years. Its defiant extravagance and striking brilliance are suggested by an illumination in an early eleventh-century Spanish commentary on the Book of Revelation, showing the city of Antichrist burning with apocalyptic flames. The kind of luxury it contained can be glimpsed in the carved fragments of ivory coffins that once contained the yellow salve for the Katamite's buttocks, depicting lifelike carved images, including portraits, in violation of a sacred prohibition. Almanzor died in 1002. His youngest son's clumsy coup attempt in 1008 weakened the center of the state, while invasions eroded its margins. In 1009, Madinat al-Zahira was sacked by Berber mutineers in one of those orgies of destruction that the Moorish chroniclers managed so well: of beasts that were once rooms of luxury and melody. Men like swords, maidens like jewel-studded puppets beneath vaults so magnificent they conjured heaven, all were peppered with the changing times. These elegant abodes became playgrounds of destructive power, more ferocious now than the lion's mouth that roars at the end of the world." and obvious discomfort. The collapse of the Córdoba empire made the defense of Islam in the West shared by ever weaker hands Desire described Córdoba as Babylon approaching the burns of the Last Judgment Babylon was an image of both wealth and paganism: the illustrated text here (Rev 18) reads in part: the linen, purple and scarlet you wore, with all its splendor of gold, jewels and pearls, your vast riches will all be destroyed in a single hour.Worlds 41 In the Islamic world, in Tra In Soxania and Afghanistan, security was threatened during the same period by changes in the fortunes and leadership of the guardian states centered in Bukhara and Ghazni.Although Transoxania was on the fringes of the civilized world, or rather sedentary, it had everything to be a jewel of Islam.According to the geographer Iran's greatest foe of the tenth century, its people "had everything in abundance and depended in vain on the products of other countries." Although nomads and city dwellers are said to "rage deep in their hearts", the hearts of merchants in Bukhara and Samarkand were lodged under enough grease to contain the anger, and the economies of the steppes and cities seem have been complementary. . Calculated to stimulate all the senses, the list of exports from the Al-Muqaddasi region includes soap and brimstone, silk and sable, and silver cloth, exquisitely

Leather goods, ornamental weapons, and valuable sweets. "There is nothing like Bukhara beef, and some kind of melon they have... neither Khorezmian ties, Shash porcelain, and Samarkand paper." Khorezmian watermelons were shipped to Baghdad wrapped in lead and snow. Samarkand paper became the preferred writing medium throughout the Islamic world in the 10th century. For most of the 10th century, the region was ruled by the Iranian (or largely Iranian) dynasty of the Samanids, who , like the other minor dynasties that ruled Iran and the Muslim East, recognized and cultivated the caliph's supremacy without personal inconvenience. . without sacrificing the Islamic identity, the traditional arts and the verses of Persia. According to one account based on the childhood memoirs of a palace official's son, their mid-century capital Bukhara was "the center of splendor, the sanctuary of empire, the meeting place of the age's most singular intellectuals, the horizon of the literary stars of the world and the carnival". of the great scholars of the day." In 976, the Samanids lost control of their mines on the upper Zarafshan River, the source of silver coins valued as far away as Poland and Scandinavia. Power began to fall in hands of generals and chiefs. A disaffected poet, ensconced on the "horizon of literary stars," found himself degenerating into "a cesspool unfit for human life." The final extinction of Samanid power and the retreat of the dynasty to life The splendor of Bukhara did not fade, but it only went to a new princely court on the outskirts of the Samanid world at Ghazni in eastern Afghanistan, to a state founded by one of the Samanid Turkish generals for his ideological arsenal, but his royal models were ubiquitous.sas, and Fardosi's Shah-Nameh was composed under his auspices.The earliest surviving illuminations date from the late thirteenth century.This scene, in which the dying hero Rustam lies finally coming from his treacherous brother Shaghad, it comes from the most original of the many early fourteenth-century versions, the Demotte manuscript in the British Museum. Most of the characters are giants with superhuman strength, but like Western Roland, Rustam is a paragon of innocent nobility, whose innocence exposes him to conquest by hostile cunning. However, caught in his deathtrap, he tricks and kills his own killer. He represents the combination of qualities Mahmud aspired to (human skill allied with divine favor), as well as a warning to would-be traitors in the ruler's retinue. The development of Afghanistan could offer civilized facilities and strong defenses. Herat's orchards stretched a day's walk south of the city, and its brick bridge spanned 26 arches. Ghazni, a little to

north of its current location, it was once an important stopover between the Oxo and Indus valleys before becoming a princely court. The founder of the force was the recalcitrant Samanid client Subuktigin (reigned 977-997), but the founder of his splendor was his son Mahmud (reigned 998-1030). Mahmud ascended the throne over the corpse of a murdered brother, wrested territories from ruined Samanids, and milked vulnerable Indian temples for liquid wealth. He had four hundred resident poets at his court, and a laureate's mouth filled three times with pearls in recognition of a well-crafted eulogy. His palace was decorated with murals in the pre-Islamic tradition, with scenes of hunting and festivities displayed by figures wearing pointed hats and robes of Sogdian silk. The poet Asjadi celebrated the Ghazni ethos - "repentant lips and a lustful heart" - in lines as drunken and bawdy as those of the Archpoet in Pavia. Though supposedly offended by his own ugliness, Mahmud had an eye for beauty of all kinds. However, not all scholars and poets were satisfied with his meticulous and selfish patronage. Fardosi, the author of the Iranian national epic Shah-Nameh, fled from him. Avicenna declined the invitation. Al-Biruni, the most learned man of his time, who anticipated the science of paleontology and the theory of heliocentrism, had to be tried as a prisoner. If the Samanid empire was an empire of silver, the empire of Mahmud was booty; his wealth was plundered abroad, not cultivated or mined at home. His raid on India in 1019 gathered so many captives that prices in Afghan slave markets plummeted to two or three dirhams a head. The story of the jewels he ripped from the belly of the Somnath idol, like the jackpot of a gigantic fruit vending machine, is undoubtedly fiction, but it expresses well the goals and triumphs of his Indian campaigns, though it is an original made tradition. .by itself celebrated as holy wars. Eventually, Mahmud's war elephants were overwhelmed by nomadic cavalry, and his empire was overwhelmed by the weight of numerous Turkic tribes. The tenth-century states of Iran and Eastern Islam were, to some extent, victims of his own success. So deep was the Samanid peace in Transoxania that thousands of ghazis, the professional champions on whose strength the state depended, migrated to the more troubled frontiers of India or Byzantium in the 960s. Mahmud's Indian gold initially assuaged the envy of the nomadic patrons, but more and more woke her up. The future of the region was foreshadowed in the early years of the 11th century in a dream attributed to the Turkish ruler Seljiik, in which fire issued from his penis and sparks from it flew across the globe. The garden of Islam, trampled underfoot by the Turkish helmets, was also fertilized by the passage of the nomadic cavalry. The Turks destroyed the ancient communities and transformed the delicate ecology of Iran and later Anatolia. But the increased force they brought in in terms of manpower and military effectiveness more than made up for their devastation. Likewise, in the Islamic West, Spain received a new infusion of morale and a new army of defenders, two

Generations after the fall of the Cordoba Empire, through invasions from the depths of the Sahara by warrior ascetics. In the East, the newcomers' commitment to Islam was no less intense. Many Turkic tribes converted or at least were asked to convert for generations before settling in the garden. Some of the tenth-century missionaries were hermits and dervishes of dubious orthodoxy, outcasts from the Muslim mainstream, like the Arian bishops who converted the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire. Once inside the fold, most of them humbly submitted to orthodox instruction, and in Baghdad the Seljuks were hailed as Sunni liberators from the yoke of a Shiite regime (see chapter 3). Taken as a whole, the tenth and eleventh centuries were a time of climactic political breakdowns and debilitating shifts in the power of Islam. Late period losses of territory (to Christian adventurers in Spain, to Crusaders in the Levant) were temporary but bitter effects of the displacements caused by these changes. But the losses were offset by gains on other fronts, and Islam emerged refreshed and ready for sustained expansion. THE BROKEN SKY Compared to what it appears to us today, the history of no part of our world, from the perspective of the guardians of the galactic museum, will look so different ten thousand years from now than that of China. From our perspective, China appears to be home to an exceptionally successful imperial experiment that has gone on for more than two thousand years without notable interruption. From China's first "great revolution": the formation of a centralized state and the establishment of a lasting dynasty by peasant Liu Pang in 202 B.C. C., 1949 gave life to the son of Red China. The Han Dynasty Empire, dating from 202 B.C. C., appears on the map along the Yangtze, Huai, Yellow, and West river valleys, stretching from the Great Wall in the north to Annam in the south and Tibet in the west. This essential continuity has endured periods of dislocation and dissolution, such as the typically affected periods of transition from one dynasty to another: the foreign conquests that brought non-Chinese dynasties to power in the 13th and 17th centuries CE; the political convulsions that, for example, bureaucratized the State in the 12th century and abolished the monarchy at the beginning of the 20th century; the economic and demographic changes that shifted the empire's center of gravity from north to south and vice versa; the boom times that absorbed various peoples into the empire and added some unassimilable identities to the slowly merging pack of peoples who consider themselves Chinese. But at some point in the future, Chinese history is likely to.

They do not seem so different from other parts of the world, where imperial experimentation flourished for a time and where the foundations for political unity were laid over a long and uneven historical experience. China's unity can only emerge gradually unlike, say, Western Europe or India or Central Asia or the Arab world, where times of crisis and recovery, division and merger, consolidation and dissolution alternated. A thousand years ago, China emerged from a time of prostration, when the empire contracted and collapsed, and when unity was threatened by the coexistence of two self-proclaimed and mutually recognized "empires" under a divided sky. The rival empire was all the more remarkable, and to Chinese sensibilities even more vexing, because it occupied almost none of China's historic land and because it was ruled by a dynasty of previously despised barbarians from the North Asian wastelands. The Khitans encountered Chinese history in 405-406, perhaps victims of the same steppe cataclysm that drove the Huns west and sent the largest wave of Germanic invaders across the border of the Roman Empire. Without abandoning their nomadic heritage as warriors on horseback, they settled in the Shara Muren Valley and the Liao River Basin to the northwest as roshers and millet farmers, where their proximity to China gradually influenced their thinking. Admired, angry and needy, they looked at China with envy. For half a millennium they were kept in check, but by the early tenth century they were emulators and imitators. The barbaric habits, of course, persisted. Even after intense sinification under the visionary Khan Ye-lii A-pao-chi (died 926), the widow Khatun heaped human sacrifices on her husband's tomb. But by the tenth century, at a time of Chinese weakness, the Khitans had absorbed enough Chinese political philosophy and retained enough traditional barbarian force to challenge the Empire on their own soil and on their own moral grounds. The order of Heaven was as indivisible as Heaven itself. China's identity depended on it. Foreign relations have generally been governed by the comfortable fiction that China is all that matters in the world and the rest of humanity are barbarians clinging to their margins. This principle could be compromised from time to time, and the barbarian kingdoms were more or less close to the unique perfection of China. From time to time, powerful barbarian rulers managed to obtain identical titles from the Chinese or exact treaties on identical terms. Tributes to patrons of equal or even higher status could often be extorted from a court willing to buy collateral, though the Chinese rarely acknowledged that such remittances were anything more than an act of condescension. The idea of ​​the uniqueness of the imperial dignity was so successfully transmitted to China's neighbors that when the Khitans first aspired to it, they suggested not sharing it, but adopting it fully. In 907, the last Tang princes were assassinated and the dynasty died out after nearly three centuries on the heavenly throne. The state founded by

The Usurper, in turn, succumbed in 923. None of the fragmented successor kingdoms into which the old empire was divided could claim the legitimacy that long duration, superior culture, or overwhelming force gave them. The Khitan Khan, A-pao-chi, based his own claims on these three criteria. In 924, he declared that he had been given the order from Heaven. 46 STATEMENTS OF INITIATIVE On the Confucian scale of values, superior insight trumped superior strength. The crouching figures with their caps, furs, fur banners and armored horses are Uyghurs, nomads from the Turkic steppe whom the unarmed and simply dressed General Kuo Tzu-i mercifully placed in the service of China. The scene depicted was supposed to be an episode from the 8th century wars against Tibet. For the 11th-century Sung artist, it represented emotions reversed in the barbaric program of world control espoused by political theorists such as Ou-yang Hsiu. transferred to him. He upheld the traditional rites of imperial dignity; he made the worship of Confucius and the study of the lore of the sages a defining feature of the culture of his court; he was hailed as the "heavenly emperor" who "inherited a legitimate succession of a hundred years." By the year 936, the Khitans had established themselves in the traditional imperial territory between the Great Wall and Peking; and from 946 A-pao-chi's claims were continually upheld, for in that year a khan captured the imperial regalia of the so-called Tsin dynasty, founded by a usurping Turkish general. The Khitans moved in to fill a nature-hated gap in the continuity of the imperial line. There is a compelling parallel to Charlemagne's usurpation of the title of Roman Emperor in AD 800, at a time when the sordid politics of Byzantium seemed to be violating the rules of succession by elevating a woman to the imperial throne. What Charlemagne was to Rome, A-pao-chi was to China: a mildly civilized barbarian, more romain than les romains or plus chinois than les chinois in his exaggerated reverence for imperial traditions. Imperial status was taken seriously in the Khitan court of the 10th and 11th centuries. The Khitan state of Liao had its own civil service, which, selected through an examination of Confucian principles, upheld the legitimacy of the Khitan emperors in Confucian rhetoric. In the mid-11th century, one of the essay questions in the civil service exam required developing the argument that "the state bearing the regalia of empire assumes the legitimate line of succession." The Sung dynasty working for Chao K'uang-yin rose from a usurping general to Emperor Tai-tsu, the "great ancestor" of the Sung dynasty. The spacious golden vermilion bamboo throne with dragon pommels declares his status, but the simplicity of his framing matches the rest of the image: essentially, he is a simple campaign stool. The leader is legitimized by his natural mastery of the Confucian virtues: majestic seriousness, humble simplicity, incorruptible rigor. 48 THE SOURCES OF THE INITIATIVE

in the same period, the rebuilding of ancient China from bases in the Yellow River Valley would certainly respond in kind. A famous essay by his most elegant apologist, Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-1072), argued that legitimacy belongs to the Chinese who made amends and reunified China, putting everything aside. As the Liao were generally more effective militarily than the Sung, the barbarian tribute that flattered the imperial courts was more accessible to the Khitans, who proclaimed the "reunification of the universe" in 1031. Korea was their tributary for most of the 11th century. When Mahmud received Ghazni's tribute in 1024, the Liao took the lead. Faced with irrevocable claims and indomitable power, the Sung were forced to grant equality to the Liao and acknowledge the new bipolarity of the political universe. The founder of the dynasty, Chao K'uang-yin, Emperor T'ai-tsu, was proclaimed a general by his mutinous soldiers in 960, when they were on their way to campaign against the Khitans. Once on the throne, he oriented his policies toward reconciliation with his northern neighbors, partly out of an obsessive fear of the military, which he knew from experience created and removed emperors too easily. The desire to disarm him, or at least the disbandment of the mutinous units and the withdrawal of the dominated generals, was also inspired by the awareness that the former imperial territories were saturated with conflict and anarchy and were ready to unite in the hope of peace and harmony. . . His methods were based on the Confucian doctrine that enemies could be appeased by example and weakened by benevolence more effectively than by force of arms. On a more practical level, he explained that China's reunification should start in the south, where the task is easier, before turning to the northern front, which requires greater strength. In 974, two years before his death, the Liao and Sung were declared "everlasting allies". The wisdom of this policy was tested by his successors, who rejected it and provoked the Khitans into wars ranging from fruitless to disastrous; In 1005, the Sung were forced to return to the Founders' principles after a Khitan invasion demonstrated the futility of a military solution. Shan-yuan's "Sworn Letters" were a rare treat, an equally satisfying treatise for both parties. The Khitans kept their lands within the limits of the Great Wall and thus their cavalry access to all the cities of the northern plain. They received annual payments in the form of silk and silver, which they considered tribute, but which the Sung were able to redefine in face-saving language. The two dynasties were linked by fictitious kinship, in which, for example, Empress Dowager Liao became the "young aunt" of the Sung emperor. The treaty radically changed, or at least changed, the way the two self-proclaimed empires viewed each other. All pejorative connotations such as jung (barbarian) and lu (malicious knave) formerly associated with the Khitan location disappeared from Chinese usage, although derogatory language remained common in everyday court speech. That

The terms "northern dynasty" and "southern dynasty" became the usual meanings for the Liao and Sung, respectively, at both courts and, with some variations, the Sung honored the supposed family connection to their northern neighbors for the rest of their lives. of the century. due favors exchanged on commemorative occasions. The emperor's yellow cloak seemed to have burst at a central seam. Even when the Treaty of Shan-yuan collapsed and hostilities resumed, Sung court politicians knew that the Khitans could not be grouped with the rest of the barbarian world, but with a particular group given their rank, strength, and sophistication. . own qualifying assets. Chao K'uang-yin was right: the threat from China, as always, came from the north, but his chance, as always, lay in the south. His advice to his brother and successor, Chao Kuang-i, was that the restoration of Szechuan was the key to renewing China's greatness. The vast region of Szechuan was the Old West of Sung China, a colonial frontier destined to be sinicized and exploited in a move that greatly increased the Empire's resources and helped shift its center of gravity permanently, a change that would was reflected in its impact. China as a whole. it is comparable to the colonization of Xinjiang and the annexation of Tibet in our time. The millennium began with an auspicious rush of settlers to the southeast, drawn by the salt pits, Sichuan's "sources of greed." Even if the Sung had no ambitions to extend their effective authority in the region, there would have been a competition for control of the salt sources, against the wealthy salt and tea magnates of the plains and against the nomadic chieftains of the forests. bamboo and fir trees. .if as the dynasty grew in strength in political commitment. Regional feudal lords were challenged but not supplanted by the central bureaucracy. In the early 1990s, the recalcitrance of magnates in the distant Sung capital Kaifeng was perceived as an attempt to challenge imperial authority. In 996, the government's attempt to bureaucratize the militias had to be "put to sleep"; In 1005, garrison commanders were prohibited from encroaching on local jurisdiction. Meanwhile, however, the rapid pace of colonization and growing government interest became evident in the administrative reform of 1001, which divided the two Sichuan provinces into smaller units known as routes. The magic that made Szechuan an obedient part of the empire was, malgré soi, cast by tribal chiefs who threatened the stability of the regime. They already had a magical, or at least demonic, reputation, and in local legend they played the part of the Welsh demons who tormented Saint Guthlac in the East Anglian marshes. The Chinese classified the tribes as "raw" or "cooked" based on their attributed ferocity. The fiercest were the Black Tribes, whose ruling caste, the Black Bone Yi, was led by a chief known as the Demon Master. His threat revived the magnates' dormant sense of loyalty to the Sung court. In 1008 and 1013, their plunder reached the border town of Yujing, the Dawson Town salt works in Szechuan, a dangerous community of salt miners and convicts. That

The pacification campaign of the Sung armies in 1014 consolidated political control over the economic spearhead represented by the colonists. Symbol of the new order in Szechuan, the Forbidden Hills were cleared for road and housing construction. The two parts of Szechuan, the romantic desert lands of streams and caves in the mountainous east and the enviable heavenly storehouses in the rich west, have become inalienably Chinese. In 1036, the demon master became a state official. Confined in the north, dispersed in the south, eleventh-century China would be reformed at its core by a revival of ancient ethics and scriptures: a "renaissance" after the chaos of the tenth century, comparable in scope and tone to the Ottonian renaissance. of values ​​and apprenticeships that accompanied the recovery of Latin America from the Viking and Magyar periods (see chapter 5). In Christendom, such a revival depended on the influence of the clergy, a class bound by blood ties and a ritually codified respect for the ruling elite, but whose independence and altruism were guaranteed by an essentially non-hereditary character and accessibility of the ranks of the clergy. the rulers. the clergy by blood.new. In China, the closest equivalent was the official class: the vast civilian army that led the state and, like the Church in Christendom, was the guardian of literary traditions with their messages of purity of style and moral probity. Although the Chinese civil service had been competitively recruited for centuries, in practice families with well-established academic and official traditions controlled access to around 80% of the positions. In itself, this would not necessarily have undermined the integrity of the class as a whole, or even diminished its quality: official appointments often favored promising poor relatives over the sons of the incumbents. High ethical and educational standards, with other inherited advantages, can be passed down from generation to generation of a closed elite. Still, it is an indication of the high value that rulers and their senior officials placed on quality of administration that the trend among the early Sung was toward a more competitive system and a more recruited civil service. Accompanying this trend in the writings of members of the administrative class was a new emphasis on a service code, a doctrine of the responsibility of the rulers' representatives for the benefit of society as a whole. In the mid-11th century, attempts were made to include this doctrine in the recruitment process. In 1043, the threat of a Khitan invasion scared entrenched elements at court who had an interest in the existing examination curriculum to flee to their provincial possessions. Discrete Worlds 51 Tun-huang was an important station on the Silk Road, surrounded by arid deserts where caves protected travelers from the heat. It was also a center for the spread of Buddhism in Central Asia and China: almost five hundred caves are decorated with Buddhist paintings. The converted Chinese merchant shown here brought his family values ​​from Confucianism. His entire family is shown united in prayer at the feet of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara.

Among the temporarily promoted cadres was an officer of exceptional strength and vision, Fan Chung-yen (989-1052). He came from a family with a long history of imperial service, uprooted and impoverished during a turbulent period in the late 9th century. Members of the clan found official employment in the relatively stable southern Chinese coastal kingdom of Wu-yüeh after the collapse of the Tang Empire, but without regaining wealth or social importance. When Fan's father died in 990, he was raised by the clan his mother married into, unaware of his true roots. In his youth he rediscovered his true identity, moved by the awareness that his adoptive brothers could not accept him without reservation. Fan's clan was similarly inhospitable to him at first, and he was allowed to ask the Emperor for permission to retake his paternal name, only on the condition that he did not claim his new relatives. Fan purged the bitterness of this rejection story by delving into the Confucian ethos of the clan. When his success in his exams earned him high office and considerable wealth, he used his patronage to help members of his paternal and adoptive clan, and spent his money helping relatives. poor him. "Virtue," he explained, "has been accumulating from our ancestors for more than a century, but it has borne fruit in me for the first time. Now that I have attained high office, I must enjoy only my wealth and position." honorable, without thinking about my fellow men, how will I face our ancestors in the next life in the days to come, and how will I enter the ancestral temple?" With the same intensity of personal commitment, Fan embraced the entire Confucian tradition of duty. His proposal to reform the civil service exams was to evaluate the social skills of the candidates, as well as their textual command of the classics, and was accompanied by a public education program in the countries. in verse, and to memorize texts. The new test emphasized the intellectual quality of the prose-essay and included questions on ethical standards and moral behavior. Fan suggestions were never implemented, but his principles were influential. . Provincial schools grew at public expense, and under the leadership of Ouyang Hsiu, who presided over the imperial administration in the late 1050s, examinations were conducted in accordance with Fan's directives. it is clear that the movement to which he and Fan belonged was a conscious revival, the aim of which was to revive utopian models from the distant past, in the writings of Confucius and in the alleged practices of early imperial China. Ou-yang Hsiu sought to restore the perfection of "antiquity, when the founders of the three dynasties ruled the world," an ideal age "when rites and music were widespread." His personal culture reconciled him with a type familiar to almost all great courtly societies: urbane, world-weary, with a keen sensibility. The boredom of him would be present in Heian. His most famous essay, written in exile in

1046, celebrates "the joy of the mountains and the water" from the "Pavilion of the Old Drinker". The court that sparkled and sparkled for Fan Chung-yen and Ou-yang Hsiu was boldly built in the middle of the North China Plain. Kaifeng in Honan, near the middle reaches of the Yellow River, was fortunate to have been a neglected backwater during the recent upheavals in Chinese history under Mao and his successors (see Chapter 21). It has largely escaped the ugliness caused by tumultuous progress and chaotic macroeconomic swings elsewhere. It still has an old charm conveyed by old houses, cobbled streets and thatched roofs. During the tourist boom years of the 1980s, the city's old-fashioned artisans developed a lucrative trade in handicrafts and reproductions of Sung paintings. In the 11th century, Kaifeng was almost certainly the largest city in the world. Wrapped in a double curtain of defensive walls, compressed into the square shape in which the Chinese discovered a picture of discrete cosmic worlds. 53 The few remains of the Sung capital beyond the rusting pagoda of 1049, built on the site of a shrine that once housed the relics of the Buddha, give a hint of what it once was: monumental, pompously colourful, unabashedly cosmopolitan. . The motifs printed on the photo tiles are Buddhas, dragons, musicians and the apsaras of the Vedic myth. It had duly housed the court of the Chinese rulers since the 940s, when it was elevated to the capital by the election of a Turkish general who realized that from there, despite its exposed position, he could defend the plain from the interior. Until the 1120s, when the Jürchen nomads looted and burned it, it combined the functions of a courthouse and a shopping center. Subsequent development has destroyed most of the millennial monuments, but the eastern corners of the old city are protected in the south by the 977 Fanta Pagoda, near the railway station, and in the far north by the famous Iron Pagoda. of 1049, which measures almost fifty-six meters. in Kaifeng in the early 12th century and the wonderful trading opportunities brought by the upcoming Spring Festival. Noisy grain boats bring in extra supplies the city needs, and bustling restaurants take center stage. Hundreds of other goods arrive on carts, mules or camels, or on poles slung on the backs of traders. Discrete Worlds 55 once housed relics of the Buddha. Kaifeng was not just a seat of government, but a thriving place of manufacturing and commerce, capable of attracting a community of Jewish settlers from the Middle East whose descendants maintained some identity until the Cultural Revolution of 1964 (see Chapter 21).

His business is depicted in one of the most frequently reproduced paintings for tourists: Chang Tse-tuan's early 12th-century riverside scene at Ch'ingming by Chang Tse-tuan. Chang compresses all of Kaifeng's festive life—artisans, merchants, street vendors, artists, shoppers, and awed crowds—into a 25-meter-long scroll. The crisscrossing structure of the city is traversed by a mighty river, traversed by well-kept thatched-roof streets. No image better reflects the enrichment mood in which the Chinese began our millennium under the newly august Sung dynasty. In retrospect, it seems like a bad start. The Sung were a young dynasty; political stability was unconvincing news; The Mandate of Heaven was divided by the Liao; the means of imperial defense were still insufficient for the task at hand; there was no prospect of easily regaining China's supremacy in the world of the last millennium effortlessly. And yet it was a time of promise. China's advantages are, and always have been, a compact shape and a concentrated workforce. The reunification of the two densely populated valleys of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers reassembled the fundamental pieces of Chinese power and identity. The beginnings of expansion in the south and west showed what China Sung could do with the recovered unity. The revival of Confucianism endowed rulers with the values ​​of an imperial master class at least as urban as that of Heian or Córdoba and perhaps—because it fostered recruitment flexibility in the peripheries—more useful. The threat that contained and reversed the Sung Rebirth came not from a rival great civilization, but from the cold nomadic storms that swept across the northern plain. The Jurchen who would overthrow Kaifeng in the 1120s did not have the refined appearance of the Khitans. They were "pure barbarians," the envoys reported, "worse than wolves or tigers," whose khan's tent was pitched among grazing herds and peopled with savage painted pantomime. According to Ou-yang Hsiu - and he had a long Confucian tradition behind him - civilization would always win encounters with savagery; the barbarian would be humiliated into submission where he could not be coerced; influenced by his example when he could not be controlled by power; distracted by fingertips when he couldn't be hit with his fists; subject to benevolence when he could not be won by war. The experience of the dynasty the author served showed the limitations of this optimistic doctrine. During our millennium, the supposedly most successful civilizations that fought for world domination were also the most badass by Heian, Cordovan, or Kaifeng standards a thousand years ago. THE BARBARIAN CIVILIZATION Around the time that Almanzor died in Cordoba or Lady Murasaki was widowed in Heian, a middle-aged aristocrat joined a religious community in the mountains of Catalonia. From one point of view, it was not surprising that Oliba Cabreta de Cerdanya, Count of Besalú, Lord of

Berguedà and Ripollès must leave the world for the monastery. His family has always been invested in religion. Monks and hermits sponsored by the counts rewarded them by absolving their sins and praying for their wars. Churches and religious communities provided jobs for their unemployed sons and bunks for their unmarried wives. Among Oliba's formative childhood experiences were the inaugurations of his parents' monasteries dedicated to Spanish saints in the heart of the Pyrenees and in Vail del Prat, which he witnessed when he was twelve or thirteen. . His father, during the breaks in a violent secular career, had been a follower of a hermit named Romualdo from the old Cuixà abbey, with whom he undertook a kind of religious flight. Secretly, without informing the Count's vassals or advisers, the two left Catalonia together in 988 for a pilgrimage to the spiritual center of Western monasticism at Monte Cassino. The count never returned. Two years later he died a professed monk after exchanging his helmet for a tonsure. However, Oliba's appointment was a milestone. He was in the prime of his life, with a political role ahead of him. Although he was the third in a family of four brothers, he shared the domain at least in name, and his charter records show him in the active role of counselor. He had his own piece of land, which he divided between a brother and the church upon entering the monastery. He did not join the religion for lack of prospects outside of it, nor was his appointment a change in his political career. Monasteries were engines of power and influence, sometimes commanding great wealth, controlling extensive jurisdiction, and granting valuable patronage. However, Oliba deliberately traded mundane values ​​for spiritual ones. For example, when King Sancho the Great of Navarre asked him for advice on a possible marriage of princesses a few years later, Oliba refused to advise the king. Despite claims that the proposed marriage would guarantee peace, promote the Church, and hasten the "extermination of the Gentiles", Oliba responded that no end justified abominable means. "We ask you," said he, "command us so that we may legally employ you." On the other hand, although the monks always claimed to want to leave the cares of the world behind, the monastery was an extremely ineffective form of isolation from politics. Courts and monasteries were too intertwined—they shared too many common interests—for the distinction to remain pure. The wisdom and knowledge of monks should be at the disposal of the State, just as governments today demand useful research from universities. Oliba's commitment to religion was not the end of his political career, but the beginning of a new one. The reborn statesman quickly became abbot of his monastery and bishop of his diocese. Meanwhile, he increased the demand for his services as a diplomat and adviser on secular conflicts. He time and again he found himself taken out of the environment he had chosen and returned to the environment he rejected. The hardest job of him, but usually the most characteristic

he was supposed to make peace between obsessive enemies, the archbishop and the count of Narbonne. When the archbishop "turned like a demon on the count and made cruel war on him", Oliba moved forward and imposed truces, first on Sundays and holidays, then for longer periods. Eventually, after Oliba's death, the peace broke down and the antagonists returned to their common tactics of terrorizing each other. saw Friezes on the west front of Ripoll Abbey pouring out political lessons to visiting royal patrons. The carvings are worn, but the key to their interpretation is preserved in an illuminated Bible at Ripoll in the 11th century and now in the Vatican Library. Moses, a God-appointed judge, shows testimonials of holiness available to other holders of high political office. He appears and faces the accusations of the Israelis: a Catalan ruler must be accountable to the community. It shows how his prayers bring victory, the medieval church's most precious gift to kings: Solomon responds in kind by administering justice under the influence of divine grace. David is shown in piety—carrying the ark to Jerusalem and dancing before the Lord—and in sin, inflicting a plague on his city and humbling himself in penance. Nathan intervenes in the election and legitimacy of his successor. The message is clear: the ruler behaves in the best possible way to be guided and judged by the Church. Discrete Worlds 59 seek refuge to murder each other's followers and embezzle charity funds for war. It is said that more than a thousand men died on each side. Counselor and world peacemaker, Oliba was the father and friend of his spiritual brothers. Images of fatherhood dominate the monks' writings of him about him, and the tone of his circular obituary about him transcends conventional piety: "He melted our hearts," they say. True son of a father who sought the tradition of Saint Benedict in the cradle of the monks' rule of life, he was a successful reformer. He expelled corrupt nuns from the socially select convent of Sant Joan de les Abadesses after being duly condemned as "the wickedest whores on Venus." He was a promoter of learning, duplicating the already important collection of libraries that he found when he became abbot of Ripoll. These fragments of his life represent the elements of a monk's vocation: charity, discipline, and learning. Oliba, abbot and bishop, had to cultivate them as a basis both for salvation in the other world and for effectiveness in this one. Only a holy man could hope to reduce some of the atrocities of a war like Narbonne. Only an exemplary Christian could scold a king or impose virtually invaluable standards of virtue on Sancho the Great. The face that his monastery presented to the world can still be seen in the weathered remains of the west portal of the monastery church, a work done about a century after Oliba's time, but probably following a design suggested in Oliba's time. the. On one side of the portal, David dances before the ark of the Lord and does penance before the prophet Gad. This was a fitting image to adorn a church that humbled kings and made emperors kneel in contrition in the snow. Above Solomon is crowned, anointed and adorned

wisely; His power and qualities come equally from God or from his intermediary, in this case the prophet Nathan, but by extension also the abbot of Ripoll. On the opposite side, in the middle of a bloody battle scene, Moses prays for victory and brings what is perhaps the Church's most precious gift to a ruler of this world. Trying to subjugate the secular world to spiritual values, Oliba had examples like this, but few effective sanctions. In a typical Metz tale, a monk confronted a count who had stolen church lands. The thief was not afraid: "The king? I don't have a high opinion of him. The Duke of Lorraine? When the monk called him from above, threatening to punish him, he simply lost his temper and had to be protected from violence by his wife. Only a miraculous secondary illness drew his attention to his duty. In practice, Oliba and his colleagues could hardly have expected such an achievement in this often thankless field. They could succeed only when necessary. Impious earls and thirsty archbishops of blood made the West perhaps the least civilized civilization of a thousand years ago, by comparison, Western Europe, with China, Japan, Islam and perhaps India, Southeast Asia and Eastern Christianity, had an elite that most needed the civilizing influence of men like Oliba. also a relatively young civilization. The Sung were inheritors of a concept of China that was over a thousand years old by most accounts. The notion of Japan as a single distinct culture f was formulated in the 5th century AD. Islam was born confident and self-differentiated from the rest of the world. The corner of the planet between the Atlantic and the Elbe touches so little elsewhere that Western Europe mattered little when the great Islamic cosmographer al-Ishtaqri mapped the world in the mid-10th century, with his native Persia lying exactly on the medium. , recognizable until pushed to the edge. The periphery is sometimes a good place to foster an identity, but a Latino-Christian identity that conveyed compassion among Christians whose common language was Latin and whose spiritual capital was Rome was just beginning to take shape. This emerging Western European consciousness belonged to four contexts: resistance to invaders; revival of ancient values; Separation from Eastern Christianity; and better communications in the West. The kingdoms in this part of the world were founded by barbarian invaders from the Roman Empire. It all started, to varying degrees, with the dilemma of Athawulf, the Visigothic chieftain who swore to "eradicate the Roman name", but he married a Roman princess and founded a sub-Roman state. Created between the 5th and 8th centuries, they broke a love-hate relationship with Rome and civilized themselves in the ghostly shadow of the vanished Empire. An Anglo-Saxon poet, looking at Roman ruins, imagined them inhabited by giants. Charlemagne, the most successful Western barbarian king of all time, indulged in self-civilization and listened to The City of God, without being educated enough to read it himself, and

He imitated what he thought was the Emperor Augustus fashion for stockings. But as soon as he proclaimed the renewal of the empire, the annals of his kingdom began to record Viking raids. Charlemagne had pushed the frontier of Christendom in a direction beyond that of the Roman Empire, massacring by force or converting the Saxons; he crushed the last unassimilated barbarians on the western fringes, the Avars, and became incomparably rich from their stolen treasures. Yet for a century and a half after his death in 814, Western Christianity was besieged by new barbarians who threatened his life and character as profoundly as Charlemagne's ancestors had threatened ancient Rome. The Vikings in the north, the Moors in the south, and the Magyars in the east would have to be resisted, assimilated, or defeated if Latin Christianity was to be prevented from being strangled at birth. In the first years of the new millennium, it became clear that the threat had not only been contained, but averted. In the year 1000 AD. C., Magdeburg was first assimilated to Christianity by the Carolingian expansion of the late 8th and early 9th centuries, and by the 10th century it had become an opulent city centered on Ottoman power and expressed in lavish works of art. This panel from the ivory façade of the cathedral's altar shows a pivotal moment of transformation. Christ blesses the church humbly presented by Otto I, which the emperor built from 937 until his death in 974 "of marvelous size" and filled with imported relics and marble columns. Otto's patron Maurice, with Saint Innocent, who was the honoree of the church, holds Otto's small form below his crown as he approaches the cosmic throne, while Saint Peter and other denizens of heaven look on with animated features of interest. . Stephen of Hungary was crowned; Henceforth there would be no more Hungarian rulers, only Christian kings. In 1010, Christian knights sacked Córdoba. Around 1013, the conversion of Saint Olav marked the beginning of the assimilation of the northern homeland of the Vikings to Christianity. In the year that Oliba entered the religion, the historian Radulf Glaber reported that churches were being built and rebuilt in Gaul and Italy "like new white robes for the whole world". He imagined, even hoped, that the Latin Church would spread throughout the world "as Christ and Peter entered the sea." This was a bold hope for besieged ancient Christendom, but a remarkably accurate prediction of the rest of the millennial story. Like other periods of security in Western medieval history, the late 10th and early 11th centuries produced a renaissance: a renaissance in ancient Roman learning and writing. Oliba's brothers might commemorate the death of a count with a parody of Virgil, while an abbess in a Saxon monastery might write implausible dramas in praise of chastity in the style of Plautus and Terence. We can still see academics working to unravel this revival of the past. Gerberto de Aurillac, before becoming Pope, risked denouncing them as magicians to search for classical texts in Spain. He found

Mathematics "is actually very difficult... almost impossible" and when his own logic teacher decided to study arithmetic with him, he was "won over by the difficulty of the art and utterly humiliated by the music." When a classmate recalled his class together, sweat broke out on his forehead as he remembered "how we sweat in math." However difficult the task and however modest the achievements, the impact of this renaissance on the self-image and self-esteem of rulers can be spectacular. A warrior leader from the fringes of Christendom like Otto the Great, Gerbert's patron, might be mistaken for a different Charlemagne, even a different Constantine or Augustus, though he could barely read and spoke no Latin. Sancho the Great also proclaimed himself emperor, although it is not clear what he meant by this. The Holy Empire proclaimed by the grandson of Otto the Great, however, was unequivocal in its message and uncompromising in its demands: in one of the magnificent manuscripts, commemorating his majesty, the emperor had crowned figures from Gaul, Germania and the Slavs. world. tribute to his throne, but they are led by Rome. Even in comparison with the "true" Roman Empire of the first half of the previous millennium, Latin Christianity emerged as a sprawling world stretching between distant horizons. Hands can be exchanged between Scotland and Hungary. Gerbert von Aurillac traveled from Barcelona to Magdeburg. In Merseburg, in East Saxony, the historian Thietmar was well informed about Anglo-Saxon England, Burgundy, and the Lower Rhine; he built fragments on France and was able to consciously animate the Italian national character. The relative peace and security opened up pilgrimage routes to new and faraway destinations. Santiago de Compostela, Discrete Worlds 63 The Ottonian royal images represent an ideal of universal monarchy granted by divine grace, reminiscent of the Chinese idea of ​​the “mandate of heaven” or the Islamic idea of ​​the caliphate. The monarch's relationship with the church and the community contrasts with the humiliating message on the Ripoll façade. This self-image of Otto III. the reflection of a page from his own gospel book was returned to him. Brilliantly adorned, looking hierarchically, he towers over curates who have eyes only for him. The bishop to his right, armed with books, leans against his throne and grasps his cloak like an altar server assisting the priest. In his left hand, the needle layman is armed with sword and spear, cautiously reaching out to help support the weight of his orb, but not daring an unholy touch. 64 THE SOURCES OF THE INITIATIVE Hidden in one of the four corners of the world supposedly penetrated by the apostles, it became a numinous sanctuary in the early ninth century, but began to shine in the mid-tenth century as the focal point of an international community . Travel industry. At the other extreme of Christianity, after the pacification of the Magyars at Lechfeld in 955, Jerusalem began to attract terrestrial pilgrims. More like a modern traveler between nondescript airport lounges, or an 18th-century gentleman moving from lounge to lounge between St. Petersburg and Sans-Souci, an 11th-century pilgrim.

Cross Europe from hostel to hostel or monastery to monastery without going crazy. This fluid growth and increasing integration bucked an important trend. Although Otto III. had a Greek mother and may have dreamed of uniting the eastern and western parts of the former Roman Empire, Eastern Christianity - predominantly Greek, Slavic and Constantinople-inspired - drifted away from the predominantly Latin, German and Roman West. Like China, Christianity began the millennium under a divided sky. Ultimately, it was a separation that brought strength. Each of the two Christianities was more cohesive and therefore perhaps more dynamic without the other. Their attempts at cooperation throughout our millennium - in the Crusades, in resisting the Ottomans, in the "romantic suppression" of the liberal revolution in the 19th century - have generally been disastrous. As I write this, a new spasm of cooperation is renewing the rhetoric about building a “Europe for the Urals” out of the rubble of communism. The precedents, as we will see, are not reassuring. Chapter 2 THE CABIN OF ORTHODOXY. MEDIEVAL EAST CHRISTIANITY The Perfect Barbarians - The Clash of Two Christianitys - The Agreements of the Turks - The Rise of the Third Rome - The Mad Planet THE PERFECT BARBARIANS The men of the Latin West continued to be barbarians for those who called themselves Romans . Even in the closing years of the eleventh century, when the First Crusade first drew large numbers of Westerners to Constantinople, the urban dwellers of the 'second Rome' regarded them with pitiless reverence. The emperor's daughter, Anna Komnena, wrote a light-hearted tale of her own time, full of classical concepts and echoes of Homer, in praise of her father. She glared at the rude and belligerent Latino priests. She described the tall, blond, muscular heroes of the Norman contingent with obvious attraction and feigned contempt. Robert Guiscard, for example, "a braggart famous for the tyrannical soul of him", was "well-proportioned from head to foot" and had a war cry like that of a Homeric hero. "Of course he was no one's slave... for such are great natures, people say, even if they are of humble station." She found him a typical barbarian: cunning, venal, arrogant, deceitful, unfaithful. Scams like his faked death, nailed to a coffin with a dead stinking rooster in 1104 to escape Byzantine justice, filled them with indignation and revulsion. And yet she described his physical beauty with enduring detail and open admiration. Because he was "a marvel to behold...

so that no one would look like him, neither barbarian nor Hellene.” He praised her physical proportions, abdomen, flanks, shoulders, arms, hands, feet, neck, skin, face, hair, eyes, nose, nostrils ("Passages to the breath coming from her heart") and chin "smooth as chalk"). Only his back - somewhat misshapen in his demanding eyes - was not perfect. "Now something sweet appeared in this man, but he was marked by qualities alarming to all. the sides . . . Her soul and his body were such that anger and love welled up in him and they both sought war.” Crusaders like him, who went to Byzantium to help in a joint crusade against the Turks, took on the traditional role of the barbarian hordes inflicted on the Romans for their sins, as the scourge of God, "an incurable disease brought about by fate." . or, to put it more piously, by providence." the disputes over the loot disperse. The parties to this encounter shared important elements of their identity and certain beliefs of common interest. All considered themselves heirs of Rome, although they viewed the legacy differently. Different: They were all Christians, but they belonged to different and increasingly divergent Christian traditions, and they undertook together what was later called the Crusade, an armed pilgrimage.res swept across lands hallowed by the presence of Christ, but now usurped by rulers Muslims for Christian rule, yet they could not agree on strategy or plunder, even under the compulsion of the most terrible oaths sworn over the most sacred relics.Behind these points of contact and conflict are the cultural incompatibilities that can be felt in the speeches of Anna Komnena.Even at the height of Roman power, the eastern part of the empire was predominantly Greek-speaking. By the time of the Crusades, the use of Latin had disappeared even for the ceremonial and legal purposes for which it had once been favored. The Byzantine Empire, as historians call the Eastern Empire in its later phases, thus broke away from the basis of the unity of Western Christianity: the use of Latin as a language of learning, liturgy, and international communication. While the West became a "barbarian empire", the East absorbed or controlled its invaders. When envoys to Constantinople in 968 presented the credentials of the “exalted emperor” Otto I, Byzantine officials were outraged by “the audacity! Designing a poor barbarian creature as the 'Emperor of the Romans'!” Nothing separated the two Christianities of East and West so much as religion. This was also partly a matter of language, since the Greek languages ​​could express theological niceties that could not be expressed in Latin. The untranslatability was the basis of the mutual misunderstanding. Dogmas that started out the same in East and West developed differently in Latin and Greek. But religion is a matter of practice, not dogma, and of conduct, not belief. The differences between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox traditions have accumulated over centuries of relative isolation from each other. The process started or became continuous,

as early as the middle of the sixth century, when the Eastern Churches resisted or rejected the universal primacy of the Pope. Membership in Rome gave the West a basis of common doctrine and common liturgical practice, which gradually took shape until, at the time of the Crusades, Rome had established itself as an arbiter in doctrinal questions, a source of patronage, and a source of power. of liturgy. . use of the Atlantic for the Bug and the Carpathians. The Western Church still embraced enormous diversity, but it was recognizable as a single communion. Meanwhile, certain doctrinal differences had generated controversies between East and West; some doctrinal disputes came and went or were amicably resolved. In 794, however, a Western synod arbitrarily changed the wording of the creed for reasons that probably had less to do with Christianity than with the political relationship between the Byzantine Empire and the Frankish Empire. To this day, the Western Churches - including those now reformed and with no loyalty to Rome - profess their belief that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son", while the Eastern Churches make no mention of the Son, citing the explicit source the Father limits this celestial radiation. No one knows exactly what each formula means or what the exact difference between them is, but that impossible-to-define difference has deadly implications. In the twelve hundred years since the 794 formula was accepted in the West, all attempts to unite the Eastern and Western Churches have failed in these deep shallows. Westerners acted with non-Christian arrogance when they dared to change the creed without the consent of their brethren, just as the Church of England errs today by trying to legitimize the ordination of women without the consent of the Roman and Orthodox communities. But these mistakes are always easier to make than to eliminate. The schism between the Eastern and Western Churches became final in 1054, but since the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, the need for cooperation between Rome and Constantinople evidently no longer interested either. On the arm of a Byzantine cross from this period in the Dumbarton Oaks Museum, an image of the emperor's namesake, Constantine the Great, makes it clear that he is bowing before an icon of Saints Peter and Paul, which was sacrificed or brandished by a dad. . The pope and the emperor wanted to lure or expel the Norman invaders from Italy: the emperor to hold his remaining lands on the peninsula; the Pope to preserve his political independence. Their military alliance had been enthusiastically formed but ineffectively enforced. On June 17, 1053, a Norman army smashed the Pope's German guard and kidnapped the Holy Father, who was begging for forgiveness as a prisoner on his knees. Emperor Constantine the Great bows over a fragment of the arm of a Byzantine silver cross before an icon of Saints Peter and Paul of Rome displayed by Pope Sylvester. the scene has

has been interpreted as an allusion to the introduction of Emperor Isaac I Komnenos into Constantinople by Patriarch Michael Cerularius on 1 September 1057, but the apparent context is that of the disastrous effort in the 1050s to achieve an entente between Rome and the founding of Constantinople. . he would conquer the Normans and make them bearers of the Pope's swords. The captive pope's immediate policy, however, was to "remain true to our mission to liberate Christendom" and maintain the Byzantine alliance until "this enemy nation is expelled from the Church of Christ and Christendom is avenged." In Constantinople, the patriarch Michael Cerularius was equally determined that the alliance should fail, not for the good of the Normans, but for his own and his see's. Rome's claim to universal primacy threatened the authority of other patriarchs. Rome's increasing care in doctrinal formulation and liturgical practice threatened the traditions of the Eastern Churches. When the Emperor became dependent on a Western military alliance, the Church of Constantinople had to submit to the dictates of Rome, as happened later in the Middle Ages when the Orthodox were expelled under the influence of the desperate Turkish threat to submit. . The patriarch prevented such a development by initiating a vulgar exchange of insults with the Latin prelates. In a letter from his spokesperson, the Primate of Bulgaria, it was denounced that the Latin practice was corrupted by Jewish influence. He wrote to the Pope asking for benevolence, but omitting some of the usual courtesy titles; and when the papal legates arrived in Constantinople, he refused to receive them or even to acknowledge their presence. He followed this campaign of provocation by forcibly closing the Latin churches in Constantinople. Pope Leo, who taught himself Greek in the midst of terminal illness, was like most of his lineage too confident to trade the expected rights of the Church for worldly gain. He was determined to face death without dwelling on his principles. He responded in kind to the patriarch's insults and sent an uncompromising mission to Constantinople. His leader, Cardinal Humbert, was known for his theological subtlety, diplomatic skill, and noble principles. All these qualities seemed to leave him at Constantinople. His strategy was to appeal to the emperor over the patriarch's head; but though the emperor had greater influence over the church in his kingdoms than any ruler in the west, he could not coerce the patriarch, and the legate's policy was doomed to failure. Humbert offended politicians with his indifference and clergymen with his arrogance. He denounced a quarrelsome but moderate monk as a "tormented pimp" more suited to a brothel than a monastery. He placed the atonement-seeking emperor in an impossible position by raising the intractable question of the provenance of the Holy Spirit. Thereafter

After waiting in vain for a conversation with the patriarch for three months, he lost his temper and issued a bull of excommunication on the high altar of the Hagia Sophia, "on Michael, neophyte and false patriarch, now known for his heinous crimes." It was too late. Death overtook Umberto's teacher in Rome, consoled by heavenly visions. Therefore, the embassy in Constantinople outlived the source of authority from him. Furthermore, Humbert's bull was flawed. Many of the accusations he leveled against the Greeks (practicing castration, baptizing Latinos, marrying priests, transgressing the commandments, excommunicating the beardless, and misrepresenting the creed) were false or poorly formulated. At the time, it was widely believed that he would soon be canceled or forgotten. In fact, relations between the Eastern and Western Churches never recovered, and intercommunion was never fully or permanently restored. THE BATTLE OF TWO CHRISTIAN MEN Eastern Christendom was ready to snub and challenge the West, perhaps because the millennium had opened so brilliantly for Byzantium and the effect had not yet worn off by mid-century. The emperor who presided at the turn of the millennium, Basil II, can still be seen today in a contemporary effigy detached from the page of his own Book of Hours in the Biblioteca Marciana. He appears to be realistic: a fierce, saintly figure, bearded and armored, accompanied by angels and heavily armed, towering above the trailing barbarian sight, himself as he turns to his book of hours in prayer. Barbarian supplicants crawl to your feet. Unlike Otto III. he doesn't need human helpers. He leans on his own sword as angels crown him and award him a scepter. Cut off from the earth, cut off from desecration, he is censored and haloed. Icons protect you from both sides. The emphasis on divine legitimacy is understandable when one recalls his peasant origins: his victories proved it. The Cabin of Orthodoxy 71 The magnetism of Constantinople exerted its appeal beyond the reach of orthodoxy. The kings of Hungary in the 11th century obtained their legitimacy from the Church of Rome, but still prided themselves on wearing a crown bestowed by Byzantium to King Géza in the 1070s. In the enamels used, Byzantine monarchs appear in central eminence, with the Hungarian king, as a relatively modest supplicant, turning his reverent eyes towards them from below. Time. As the grandson of peasants, he was known to posterity for his victory over the Bulgars at Kleidion in 1014 as the Bulgar Assassin; All the defeated survivors, supposedly fourteen thousand of them, were blinded by his command, except for one in a hundred, one saved.

eye to guide the rest home. Tsar Samuel of Bulgaria, who tried to conquer or control the empire, is said to have collapsed and died when he saw the protesters react. Meanwhile, in Constantinople, ladies leaned out of elegant windows to watch the triumphant procession of the victor. The incorporation of Bulgaria by Byzantium and Basil's peace with the Arabs on the southern front gave the empire virtually ideal configurations, with borders on the Danube and Euphrates beyond which direct rule was considered neither practical nor desirable. Basil tightly tied the outlying provinces to his crown: in Bulgaria through reconciliation, collaborating with a native elite, appointing a native archbishop, and in Greece through oppression, forcing acculturation of Slavic immigrants, and imposing the Greek liturgy. . The empire he bequeathed held sway and commanded respect from afar. The emperor's name was blessed in prayers in Kyiv and Vladimir and in the magnificent but schismatic churches of Ani in Armenia. Although Hungary conformed to the rites of the Latin Church, her kings felt the attraction of Byzantium; As late as the 1070s, Hungary was given a crown depicting the king of Hungary with her eyes fixed on her Byzantine lords. When Basil II died in 1025, Byzantium was the center of Eastern Europe. The treasury was full. The power and potential of the Empire, though not at its height, was very close. The high culture of the metropolis also experienced a period of splendor, a kind of renaissance of humanist scholarship and classical art forms. Byzantine ivory workers, who normally eschewed bawdy pagan themes, were able in a brief dawn to craft delicate confections such as the veroli coffin, in which Europa cavorts beautifully on her bull's back, while her persecutors sulk and mischievously use their fragile stole pots. Neither the glow nor the glory lasted. From within, the empire was weakened by an aristocracy that amassed wealth and privilege in the 10th century and then increasingly used it to impoverish and manipulate the throne. From without, the borders were threatened by new barbarians: the Turks in the east and the Normans in the west, the sons of Seljiik, who breathed fire in his dreams, and Guiscards, "who produced Normandy, but who nurtured all manner of evil." ". Emperors of Basil II's strength and masculinity may have coped, but no others came. The checkered dynastic history of the 11th century can be traced in the album of imperial mosaics that line the upper gallery of the Hagia Sophia and a room that served as a private place of worship for the imperial family within the cathedral. Empress Zoë's failed family portrait reflects her sordid history; the image of her third husband is superimposed on that of her second husband, who murdered her for the first time before a convent, her last husband, Constantine Monomachus, was acquired to recover the throne from which she had been deposed . She called herself the sovereign empress, but she was a frivolous martinette who couldn't do without a man.

Her sister Theodora, who reigned after her from 1055 to 1056, was an altruist, and the rampant paganism carved into the bone and ivory covering of Veroli's coffin captures the spirit of the 11th-century Byzantine "Renaissance" in humanistic scholarship and classicism and art. forms The themes are all savagery tamed by art, love and beauty. Europe, seductive on the back of the bull, challenges the pursuers. Hercules decides to play the lyre, accompanied by playful putti. The centaurs perform the dance of the maenads. The Cabin of Orthodoxy 73 The gallery of the Hagia Sophia served as a private enclosure for members of the imperial family and was adorned with portraits of rulers and their wives in religious postures. The mosaic dedicated to Empress Zoë reveals the questionable complexity of her sexual life. The face of Constantine IX. Monomachus, the husband who presented Christ with a bag full of gold, was transformed to replace the image of her second husband, Michael IV, whom he first used in the murder of her predecessor and then banished to a harassed monastery. of the. The broken letters above his nimbus to the left are clear evidence of incorrect work. unwavering, but her reign, notable for the seventy-year-old lady's refusal to associate any man with her as empress, was loudly reviled as unnatural. According to Patriarch Cerularius, it was a shame for a woman to rule the empire. Theodora was tough and full of character, but too devoted to do the dirty work that was inseparable from the successful statesman of medieval Byzantium. In 1057, a wealthy landowner ascended the throne, confirming the trend of transferring state power to the aristocracy. The tradition of noble duty has been abandoned by an increasingly selfish elite. The aging general Cecaumenus used to advocate an evasive and withdrawn response in times of trouble: "Lock up your daughters as criminals. Avoid parties. Stock up on supplies and look after your own family's interests." This was the era of Byzantine history that inspired Gibbons' memorable disdain for "a degenerate race of princes" and spawned a legend of decadence that has defined the ever-distorted popular image of Byzantium. . In reality, Gibbon was an avid Byzantine. Obvious pleasure lay behind his artificial disgust. The History of the Fall and Fall of the Roman Empire was truly pioneering in Byzantine studies and comprised the most comprehensive history of the Empire available at the time. Although the intrigues, crimes and vices of the court were a good caricatural copy, the story itself appeared in its pages as a tragedy rather than a satire, enlivened by characters who deserve both admiration and contempt. A man of energy and exceptional value; His downfall was the result of two forms of arrogance: haste and arrogance built on success. The Fortifications of Bari - the largest and most magnificent of the Apulian seaside castles -

they were enlarged by Frederick II in the early 13th century and restored after an explosion in 1524. Under these changes it remains essentially a Norman castello, built after the conquest of Byzantium in 1071. Although the Goths, Lombards, Moors, Carolingians and Ottonians They conquered in In the past, this Western outpost always reverted to Byzantine allegiance, but never again. The Cockpit of Orthodoxy 75 In 1069, Romano Diogenes, then a Byzantine general, was awaiting execution for plotting a coup when he was chosen by a widowed emperor to command the empire and its armies at a crucial moment: the Normans invaded Bari, the western capital of Byzantium, while the Turks threatened the emerging kingdom of Armenia. Romano, suddenly taken from the accursed cell to the throne room, embraced the widow and the war with the same sense of duty. Well-directed campaigns by him seemed to turn the tide against the Turks; his energetic measures promised relief to the Normans. But Robert Guiscard, alarmed by the mood of the defenders, scattered or scuttled the task force en route to Bari. On the eastern front, Romanos was tempted to subdue his forces in pursuit of the Turks, whose leader, drenched in funeral salves, turned triumphant and made the captive emperor kiss the ground at his feet. The double defeats of 1071 left the Empire up and down. Romanus was only able to collect a fifth of the ransom from him. However, the barbarians on both flanks did well to leave the empire largely intact to milk future bribes and protection money, and it is doubtful that the Byzantines felt any real obligation to call in the western barbarians to protect them from the saveers. . . East . When it finally arrived, Western aid came in the most unpleasant way. The Crusader troops who appeared in 1097 were part of the popular people whom the Byzantines admired for their piety but resented for their poverty, and they were part of a formidable army hailed for its usefulness but feared for its lack of discipline. According to Anna Komnena, they were "a race under the spell of Dionysus and Eros", among whom those who "made this journey only to worship at the Holy Sepulchre" were outnumbered by predatory enemies whose "aim was to conquer the emperor". dethrone the Emperor and take the capital." In the long run, his words proved prophetic. The tense collaboration between Byzantines and Crusaders that characterized the First Crusade broke down completely in the Second and Third. Crusaders blamed "Greek treason" as responsible for their failure; the Byzantines emerged strengthened in their conviction of superiority over barbaric impiety and historical greed, in which conspiracy theorists framed the crusade's leaders, supporters, patrons, and exploiters as suspects.

The episodes can be experienced outside of St. Mark's Basilica in Venice, filled with the spoils of Byzantium and festooned with the riches of an empire acquired at Byzantium's expense. The great bronze horses above the western gates stomp and snort in victory. Below, a Hercules sacked from Constantinople leads the Ery76 THE DICTATIONS OF THE I N I T I A ​​​​​​​T I VE "Always harnessed to the bloody chariot of victory," the horses of St. Mark's were originally to have formed a team, as is often depicted in the scenes. of Roman triumphs, before Venetian invaders carried them from Constantinople in 1204. A fitting sign of Venice's rise to imperial status at Byzantine expense, they were rebuilt over the west portal of St. Mark's Cathedral, where, according to Petrarch, "They are as if they were alive, they seem to neigh from above and drag their feet." Inspiration to the Venetians and temptation to their enemies, they were also influential models for artists: "incredible, marvelous and perhaps", in the words of Jacopo Sansovino, "the best work in Europe". See page 175. Manthean Boar. On the south side, porphyry-carved Roman emperors guard the treasury, while columns forged by Syrian hands 1,500 years ago lead to the baptistery. The theme of the siege that brought these exotics to Venice is well known, coined by Gibbon's famous description of the sack of the Hagia Sophia, in which self-styled crusaders drank from holy chalices, trampled icons, and a prostitute on the patriarch's throne while their mules and horses were loaded with carved silver and golden carvings, which they tore from the doors and from the pulpit; and when the animals stumbled under the load, they were stabbed by their impatient drivers, and the holy pavement was spilled with their impure blood. " But this was the grim conclusion of an expedition begun with piety and altruism "to help the land on the sea" and for the salvation of the souls of warrior-pilgrims. The crusade was first preached in 1198 by an evangelist disinterested who urged renewed efforts to recapture Jerusalem, which the Third Crusade had left in the hands of the Saracens.The enthusiastic response of the population turned the Pope, the Cis, St. Mark's Square and the Cathedral into the Kunstkammer of the medieval state Venetian, displaying the Empire's finest loot to fill citizens with pride and visitors with fear.Among the loot from the Eastern Roman Empire still lying outside the gates of the treasury of San Marco include Diocletian and his fellow tetrarchs hugging

in solidarity: the gesture perhaps betrays the late 3rd century fear of an empire threatened with dissolution. These porphyry sculptures were almost a thousand years old when Venice acquired them. Tertian's orders and the barons of north-eastern France answer the call. Moved at a meeting in San Marco, the Venetians agreed to carry out the transport at prohibitive cost. When the designated leader died after exhorting his followers to fulfill their vows, a successor was found in the person of a paragon of chivalry, Boniface of Montferrat, a Lombard marquis whose house had already sacrificed many promising young men to the lure of the Levant, either in the Crusades or in the Byzantine service. As the army assembled in Venice, envoys from the Byzantine pretender Alexios IV proposed a detour to Constantinople to install an ally on the imperial throne. Gradually, under the influence of the Crusaders' apparent inability to pay for their passage by other means, and finally under the pressure of starvation and poverty, the group won for fun. When the Crusader fleet sailed from Corfu in May 1203, most of the pilgrims agreed to turn their prows towards the Byzantine capital. Blame for the diversion was widely shared. The cunning, aged and blind Venetian Doge Dandolo behaved like a pre-incarnation of Machiavelli and relished opportunities to manipulate and exploit the Crusade. He added to his original treaty with the Crusader envoys a secret clause specifying Egypt as the destination of the expedition; His reasoning that "nothing could be accomplished by attempting a direct attack on Jerusalem" was reasonable, but his intention was almost certainly dishonest. The Venetians had nothing to gain by attacking Egypt, their lucrative trading partner. Dandolo led the Crusade to undertake a temporary detour to aid Venice in its war against the innocent Christians of Zara, Hungary; He established and maintained payment terms that kept the Crusaders under a constant and unmanageable debt load. When the conquest of Constantinople was completed, he reaped the highest prize: "a quarter and a quarter of a quarter of the entire Romanian Empire" and transformed Venice from a trading city to an imperial capital in one fell swoop. He and his people harbored a longstanding grudge against Byzantium for the abolition of Venetian trading privileges in 1171 and the massacre of the residents of the Venetian quarter in 1184. Boniface of Montferrat also had reason to grudge against Byzantium, where one of his brothers had been. offended and another assassinated by order of an emperor. When Constantinople was in the hands of the Crusaders, he revealed his desire to secure the imperial throne for himself, or at least the fiefdom of Thessalonica. Raising suspicion, he spent Christmas 1201 in Germany.

imperial court together with the pretender Alexios, whose presence is suppressed in all sources that Boniface could influence. The Christmas party was organized by Alexio's brother-in-law, Philipp von Schwaben. He did not participate in the crusade, but was accused of being a behind-the-scenes puppeteer. His correspondence with the Pope revealed that he dreamed of acquiring the Byzantine Empire for himself through marriage. However, realizing that his brother-in-law was a more promising candidate, he sent him to Rome and asked the Pope to support him. The Pope himself, while maintaining an attitude of sublime rectitude throughout the sordid history of the Crusade, was not entirely innocent. He was not above diverting the Crusades to his own ends; In fact, he sent some renegade crusaders who refused to sail from Venice to Apulia for their own bloody business. His orders to spare Christians therefore lacked moral authority, though he was emphatic, especially in allowing the Crusaders to appropriate Christian resources if necessary. When the crusade ended, he was ready to wipe out the treasures and patronage of the Byzantine church. Even the Cistercian order is afflicted by the crusaders' connivance in the crime. The Cistercians took over the popular preaching campaign and all its funds; They made their fortune managing the Crusader lands. They had no particular interest in a trip to Constantinople; Still, keeping the crusade together as a constant concern was vital to them, and Abbot Samson von Loos was perhaps the most eloquent advocate of accommodation in the Crusader camp. Most of the members of the Crusader base were innocent. Even in Corfu, under the constraints of isolation, poverty and starvation, most refused to be diverted to tears "by seeing their masters, their relatives and their friends kneeling before them." They had to attack Constantinople twice: first to install the pretender Alexios, then, before a coup could prevent it, to dethrone him and install a Latin emperor and a Latin church. The myth of the city's invulnerability was shattered, and in fact the Roman occupation lasted only 57 years before one of the surviving Byzantine states mustered enough strength to retake it. Meanwhile, the court of the rightful emperor of the Romans withdrew to a house at Nicaea built of rubble under a wooden roof and clad in alternating bricks and ashlars. With three bay-windowed rooms on the first floor and a monumental external staircase, it was a pleasant residence for a provincial lord, but it was a mighty descendant of the marble halls of Blachernae Palace. Meanwhile, back in Constantinople, the Latin "emperors" found the blachernae too expensive to compete with and moved into a gloomy, cavernous residence in the Prison Gate Quarter. TURKISH BUSINESSES Today this is a derelict and run-down suburb, cut off from Istanbul's former splendor by the incessant traffic on Ataturk Boulevard. The wooden houses are dilapidated and dilapidated, the streets dirty, rarely visited except by

noisy children and an emaciated fruit vendor. The huge monument that dominates the neighborhood is dirty and abandoned. Its dull pink outer walls are sagging with age and enormous weight. The surrounding streets are built on parts of its ruins. It must have been unimaginably large. The central nucleus that still survives today, the Church of the Pantokrator, seems uncomfortable not only because of its sadness but also because of how far it is from its surroundings. It was built in the 1120s by the Byzantine Emperor John II Komnenos and his wife Eirene, a Hungarian princess revered as a saint by his subjects. The couple's faces light up in a mosaic in the Hagia Sophia cathedral, Eirene framed by her fiery red hair, John draped in her golden robe. Calm and sublime, the emperor exudes wealth and self-confidence when he offers a voluminous bag of gold to the figure of Christ. The Church of the Pantokrator would be the most generous of his gifts to Christ and, as it would also be a mausoleum and memorial to his home, the most manifestly selfish. The shipwreck that you see today keeps traces of the greatness that its founders gave it. Marble remains in the apse of the southernmost of the three 80 THE SAYINGS OF THE I N I T I A ​​​​​​T I V The surroundings of a sarcophagus, commonly believed to have belonged to the founder of the Church of the Pantokrator, suggest the abandonment of this suburb it has suffered since it had its great moment in the twelfth century, when it housed the imperial pantheon of communicating ships; the rich marble moldings on the narthex door frames are intact; The restorers discovered the large geometric mosaic on the floor. The classical sarcophagus in which Eirene was buried in 1124 survives and has been brought to the Hagia Sophia. The story of the rise and fall of the foundations reflects the size, crisis, and collapse of the Byzantine Empire from the early 12th century to the mid-15th century. It not only housed the dead of two dynasties, but also escaped from a massive monastery that served as Constantinople's main asylum, hospital, and insane asylum. It was a center of social welfare, a motor of the imperial cult and a school of Byzantine identity from which, in the fifteenth century, the priest Gennadius opposed imperial plans to bow to the primacy of Rome. When the Greek Empire was driven from its own capital by the "pilgrim" conquerors of the Fourth Crusade in the 13th century, the Pantokrator became the palace of the usurping Latin rulers. When the Byzantines recaptured the city in 1261, their Genoese allies burned most of the buildings. The returning monks had an aversion to all things Latin. When Byzantium's last dynasty, the Paleologoi, restored the foundations to its original place of influence, adopting it as their own family mausoleum, it became a rock of orthodox purity in a church that grew ever more amenable in the face of threat. seemingly invincible Turkish conquerors to compromise with potential allies in Western Christianity. Gennadius' Legendary Affection

because the sultan over the pope was widely shared by his fellow citizens, which explains why Istanbul today is a Turkish, Islamic capital and not a Greek or Christian capital. The answer to the old song question: "Why did Constantinople get the works?" is -correctly and according to the same lyricist- "It is nobody's business but the Turks". However, the death of the Greek Empire was long lasting; his symptoms were varied and it would be naive to think that western medicine saved him. The gravity of the Empire's problems and the depth of its identity can be felt in Istanbul's best ancient church, the Church of the Holy Savior in Chora, between the walls of Constantine and Theodosius. Like the Pantokrator, it was a Comnenoi foundation, but its heyday, when it was redecorated with the paintings and mosaics on the walls and vaults that make it famous today, fell in the second and third decades of the 14th century. By this time, the empire's future conquerors had resided in its former territory for more than a generation. Five years after the church's dedication, the nearby city of Bursa became the Ottoman capital; Constantinople was swallowed. The patron who so generously donated the Church of Chora in such desperate times was, in addition to the singular measure of his generosity, a representative Byzantine knight of his time. Theodore Metochites combined the tastes of a scholar with the vocation of a statesman. His career in imperial service culminated in his appointment as Grand Logothete, the current head of the imperial government, in 1321, the year of the inauguration of his new chora decorations. His writings—on devotion, theology, astronomy, and literary criticism—perhaps suffered from the official pretensions of his day. However, they were characterized by sheer abundance and, in their early years, an incessant search for originality and a renunciation of "a work of noble love for good and beautiful things". The undulating domes of the Chora Monastery Church, the Heavenly Abode, are modestly brought together and positioned below the sixth hill towards the walls of Constantinople. The roofscape seen here was altered by alterations in the 18th century, when the present upper wooden dome was raised over the original drum and a minaret was added, which can be seen to the right of this photograph. However, much of the weaving derives from the founding of the Comnenoi in the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The outer narthex, which occupies the foreground of the photograph, and the embankment under a fourth dome, not visible here, were part of the ornamentation program of Theodore Metochites, who commissioned the incomparable mosaics and murals. Threads exhausted by the ancients. The goal of Metochite scholarship, he claimed, was "to behave independently, like the seven planets, and not just observe their movements." As a "slave", he regretted his life as a politician, "driven by ambition". He escaped the dirty confines of it early in his career through works of literature that gave him the hope of immortality on earth; then he directed his efforts to devotion and his gaze to heaven. When he was deposed by a coup in 1328, he sought solace

Religion. In 1330 he became a monk on his own foundation; however, the Chora was for a long time his mental and spiritual refuge. “This monastery,” he explained, “has meant more to me than anything else in the world: to enlighten the character, to raise it above all cares, to make it free and peaceful, and to allow it to function well. His love for the chora was particularly intense, but his feelings were largely parallel and his vocation quite typical. His friend and contemporary Michael Tornikes shared his life's journey from world fame to solitary retirement after a successful military career in the 1320s. paintings celebrating the texts read at feasts of the Virgin and "portraits" of saints whose feasts shared their feasts. "For much applause on earth," reads the inscription, "when all are dead, Tornikes, a man of innumerable victories, the High Constable, who is buried here, will put them all to shame, good friend, a lion is embarrassed. imitate monkeys". This seemingly proud boast is followed by a reverent account of the dead man's virtues, including his royal blood and princely marriage, but the inscription ends: "And leaving his life a splendid example, lies, a poor monk beneath his bones." . According to most of the citizens of Constantinople, the empire depended on the patronage of the Blessed Virgin, who had driven the invaders (Arabs, Russians and Bulgarians) from under the capital's walls and could count on them to repel, if not defeat the tartars and Turks who, by divine permission, devastated other sinful peoples. The Byzantine Empire did not escape the punishment of God's scourge, but it escaped thanks to the intercession of the most powerful of all heavenly protectors. The name chora, meaning heavenly abode, probably alluded to the Virgin's womb, "the vessel of the incomprehensible," as it is called on a mosaic in the narthex. The Metokite decorating scheme brought together the most complete set of Marian images in the world: nineteen distinct scenes from her life precede the Nativity story in the cycle dedicated to her. Her birth is preceded by an announcement like that of the Redeemer himself: she learns to walk on the viewpoints of the inner narthex, she is blessed by the priests, caressed by her parents, suckled by the angels and endowed by divine choice with purple wool, a veil to close the temple. After her recommendation to Joseph, she is left alone in her house. "Look," says the inscription, "I'll leave you in my house while I go to build." Upon her return, Joseph is faced with a human dilemma: Maria has submitted to the census in the extraordinarily voluminous cycle dedicated to her in the narthex of the chora. The Biblical authority of the scene is given in the inscription, which is precisely illustrated: Joseph went "to pay taxes with Mary his wife, who had a great son." Like a Big Logothete in a complex bureaucracy,

Metochites would have been a good judge of the technical details of the census. The seated officer, perhaps intended for "Quirinius, Governor of Syria", wears a curved official cap with the Metochite skiadion inscription on p. 85. José, with the children from a previous marriage, who play an important role in this cycle, seems to encourage María to carry the weight of the encounter. "Maria, what is your action?" The paintings and mosaics are executed by the artists with unparalleled brilliance and shaped by the client with unparalleled humanity and drama. Metochites himself appears in one of the images, prostrate at the feet of God, with his face half raised, ashamed and awed. But he wasn't modest enough to appear hatless at present. He wears his skiadion, or clerical headdress, an exotic white garment that makes him look like a Turk to innocent eyes. Despite the vast cultural gulf that separated the Byzantines from the Ottomans - the Christian consciousness of Islamic identity, the imperial experience of the nomadic tradition, the cult of women from the values ​​of masculinity - these hostile neighbors became increasingly more similar to the late Middle Ages. . . He trades influences like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza or like the Chinese and the Khitans. Even as they besieged the empire's dwindling territory, the Turks refrained from destroying it completely. It flattered Ottoman vanity to have emperors with universal claims as clients at their mercy. John V, imprisoned for debt in Venice in 1379 as he was returning home after a temporary conversion to the Roman faith, had to rely on Turkish help to reclaim the throne from him. The cabin of the Orthodoxy 85 Metochites offers the Chora Church on the Throne of Christ. In this mosaic, facing the west door of the church, the building is shown without the donor-added outer narthex: compare photo above, page 82. In 1403, a visiting Castilian ambassador took a guided tour of Constantinople at his own request, "through the city to visit and inspect churches and relics." The first impression of him was one of wealth, evoked by the marble and jasper columns and wall coverings, the silk tapestries, the richly worked mosaics, the jeweled relics, and the grand size of the Hagia Sophia. so that "although the visitor had to return day after day and see all he could, there would always be new places to see the next day." The next impression of him was the defensive fortress of the place, enclosed "within a strong and high wall, defended by many strong towers." As the tour progressed, however, he discovered signs of decay: the depopulated neighborhoods abandoned to cornfields and orchards, the many monumental buildings, in fact most of them, now destroyed. "Yet it is clear," he concluded, "that in earlier times, when in its primitive state, Constantinople was one of the noblest capitals in the world." The ambassador was destined for the court of the distinguished Tatar chief Timur.

the pressure of the Turkish threat on Byzantium by defeating the Ottomans and imprisoning the sultan. The relief was temporary, and the Turk's shadow still seemed to hang over the city. The Ambassador particularly admired the enormous bronze Justinian, four times life size, which stood on a high pedestal in front of the cathedral. The emperor, they told him, received a splendid commemoration because "in his time he accomplished many deeds in the fight against the Turks." In fact, the campaigns of his government were against the Persians, the Vandals, and the Ostrogoths, and no people the Greeks called Turks appeared two hundred years after his time. When the Turks finally lost patience with Constantinople, the blow came quickly and inevitably. Mehmed II's accession to the throne in 1451 at the age of 19 marked the end of all precautions. He resented foreign control of a fortress overlooking a strait vital to his empire's communications. He considered himself a Roman emperor. The fall of the city was prepared with all the means of the siege engineer trade. Huge forts, known as the Castles of Europe and Asia, were built on both banks to control access to the Bosphorus. The heaviest artillery ever established was used to tear down the walls. The ships were transported overland in kit form to overcome the defense boom. In the end, it was the sheer volume that made the difference. The attackers climbed through the gaps over the bodies of dead comrades. The body of the last Constantine was identified only by the eagle symbols on its platform. THE RISE OF THE THIRD ROME There is a paradox here: Byzantium's period of decline or eclipse in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was also a period of unprecedented expansion for Eastern Christianity. To our galactic museum keepers of the far future, the fall of Constantinople, if noticed, will appear as a minor local hardship for one of the fastest growing civilizations of the late Middle Ages. The shrinking and demise of the Byzantine Empire was more than offset by the phenomenon of Moscow, which was building a Russian Empire more dynamic and, in its way, more enduring than any Western European empire, which from today's perspective seems to have dominated Europe, second half of our millennium. In the hundred years since 1362, Muscovy evolved from a poor, despised, small and prosperous principality under the tutelage of Tatar lords to a great state encompassing an expanse of land from Solvychegodsk on the Northern Dvina to Tula near the source of Don Dvina. , which dominates the upper and middle reaches of the Volga. In 1478, the conquest of Novgorod, a northern polis with a tradition of independence and a Venetian-style land empire, secured the borders of Pechora and Lake Ladoga. In 1480, Tatar suzerainty was renounced and Moscow was declared the “Third Rome”, thus regaining the booth of orthodoxy.

to the appearance of Moscow. Perhaps the first bearer of the Renaissance was the Romanesque-educated Empress Zoë Paleologus, who arrived in 1472. When Fioravanti, who had previously worked for Matthais Corvinus (see p. 173), arrived from Bologna in 1475, he immediately embarked on a provincial trip trip to get acquainted with Russian architectural traditions. His greatest work in the Kremlin - the Assumption Cathedral, where Ivan the Terrible "saw heaven", is remarkably faithful to the vernacular vernacular; and the outlines of the towers that crown the red brick walls are reminiscent of wooden river fortresses. Fragments of the old white walls appear in some places. But details like the dormer windows and references to the Western Romanesque reveal the origins of the designer. the staff and perhaps the scepter fell from the dead hands of Byzantium. In the 1490s, architects in Italy decorated the Kremlin in classical motifs, fragments of which can still be seen today. Moscow's Roman self-awareness stemmed from a relationship with Byzantium that began before the millennium, well before the founding of Moscow, during the early history of the pre-Muscovite Russian or proto-Russian states. A letter from Novgorod reached a Viking prince in 862. “Our country,” he said, “is great and rich. But there is no order for it. Come and rule us. In response, he founded the first of the states that eventually became Russia. The story may have been oversimplified on record, but it shows how the territorial state was exported beyond the borders of the old Roman Empire to relatively young political worlds in northern and eastern Europe. It took a part of the cultural heritage of the Romans. Its main vectors were Christian missionaries. Tribal hegemonies could only be transformed into territorial states through communication and administration. As the church monopolized literacy or, in the case of the Cyrillic alphabet, even invented it, the reach of the state expanded with Christianity. By legitimizing a strong government or sanctifying a weak authority, the church could also make enormous contributions to political stability. A prodigious generation of evangelists around the turn of the millennium endowed various emerging states on the eastern and northern borders of Europe with these resources. From the point of view of the future of Eastern Christianity, the most important royal convert was Volodomir, ruler of Kyiv. The blood of this prince, like the culture of his country, was a mixture of Vikings and Slavs, pagans on both sides. In 1988, to commemorate 1,000 years of Russian Christianity, statues and plaques in honor of Volodomir, erected through subscriptions from Orthodox communities, appeared throughout the Western world, confirming the image of the man of honor as a Christian and his sainthood. . But, like many great saints, he sinned wholeheartedly in his lifetime, supposedly maintaining a seraglio of eight hundred maidens, coining proverbs in praise of drunkenness, and leaving a reputation in German annals as "fornicator immensus et Crudalis." His conversion was, in fact, the bride price of the Byzantine princess whose marriage hand he tore from Constantinople by threats of violence. The faith he opportunistically defended

followed consistently. Its reception was oiled by the use of native Slavic liturgy created by the missions of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Moravia, a remote frontier from which Byzantine influence gradually spread, and spread by numerous native Slavic clerics. His wife was a unique prize: a princess "born in purple," as Byzantine law and custom forbade barbarian suitors. A short time before, the Emperor Constantine had banished Porphyrogenitus from "outrageous demands" for a marriage alliance with "scheming and disgraceful northern tribes". . . he should not marry or cohabit with people of a different race and language, but of the same tribe and language. The marriage proposals presented by Otto I's court were rejected "as scandalous". For Volodomir, therefore, elevation by affinity to the imperial house was a price worth sacrificing to his pagan gods. When his reluctant bride arrived, lured by bloody threats, she solemnly dethroned the inhabitants of her sacred idol grove. The thunder god Perun, with his golden head and silver mustache, was tied to a horse's tail and beaten with sticks on his ordeal to a grave in the riverbed. It was a measure of the importance of the new connection to Byzantium that justified this affront to a supposedly powerful divine protector. The Cabin of Orthodoxy 89 The connection stopped. A strong sense of belonging to an Eastern Christian community with its head and heart in Constantinople remained in Russia for most of the Middle Ages and, despite territorial losses in the peripheries - the Latin Church in central Europe and Islam -strong in Asia- spread as Russia expanded and new territories fell victim to Russian weapons or Orthodox missions. Whereas a common sense of identity was slowly, awkwardly, and sometimes painfully forming in Western Christianity, that of the Orthodox community was fully armed. Relations, as in any family, were sometimes turbulent, but always characterized by a sense of camaraderie. Then Russian armies attacked Constantinople in 1043, but twenty-five years later, when Prince Izyaslav marched into Kyiv with a part-pagan, part-Catholic Polish army, the citizens threatened to burn their city and “flee to the land of the dead.” Greeks”. Even at the last breath of Byzantium, in 1452, when the Russian Church reluctantly transgressed its tradition of deference to the See of Constantinople, opposing the Latin community's Byzantine approach to electing a patriarch of its own, the tsar felt compelled to apologize. to the Emperor: "We ask Your Majesty not to reproach us for not having previously written to Her Majesty; we did so out of urgent need, not out of pride or arrogance." In the 13th century, for the tradition of Eastern Christianity to be successfully transmitted from Constantinople to Moscow and for civilization to survive, a deep chasm had to be bridged that threatened to engulf the political structure of the Orthodox community. It was a double crisis. While Constantinople was in the hands of the Latin conquerors - like much of the rest of the empire from 1204 to

1261: The northern lands of the Orthodox Commonwealth were cut off and nearly wiped out by one of the most terrifying and transformative invasions Europe has ever suffered from Asia: that of the Tatars. For eight centuries, the wide corridor of the Eurasian steppe allowed hordes of nomadic warriors to enter Europe. Between the 5th and 10th centuries, the Huns, Avars, Magyars, and Bulgars advanced west to varying depths, but all were defeated and colonized or destroyed. More recently, and with greater persistence, the Pechenegs, the Cumans, and the Turks had battered and eroded Byzantium's defenses. Despite this long experience, when the Tartars descended, their victims did not know what to make of them. The first Latins to hear of them (crusaders in their camp in Damietia in 1221) assumed for their attacks Muslims who must be Christians, perhaps even the long-awaited legendary people of Prester John. Information from people with direct experience may have proved them wrong, but the warnings of Queen Russudan of Armenia, whom she called "evil people" who "cause many disasters," languished unheeded in the papal archives. Guiragos, an Armenian monk who had just come of age at the time of the Tatars' first appearance, had little time for Russudan, whom he condemned as "an affectionate and shameful woman like Semiramis". Her recognized agents of a vengeful providence in "Forerunners of Antichrist...loathsome in appearance and merciless in their bowels...jubilantly rushing to kill like a wedding feast or an orgy." When the Tatars invaded Russia two years later, the blow was completely unexpected; no one knew where they came from or where they were going. They were treated by analysts almost as if they were a natural phenomenon, like a storm, a flood, or a momentary and destructive plague. Some Russian rulers even gloated over the further destruction inflicted on their hated Cuman neighbors. But the first Tatar invasion of Russia turned out to be a mere reconnaissance. When the nomads returned in earnest in 1237, their campaign lasted three years. They devastated and depopulated much of the land in the south and north-east of Russia and captured or plundered cities. Refugees spread horror stories across Europe, picked up by an incredulous chronicler in Cologne. "It is no small fear," he wrote, "that this barbarian race has invaded even very distant lands, not only France, but also Burgundy and Spain, where before the name of the Tartars was unknown; of said barbarous race we have heard many things , which are unbelievable, and which we refrain from writing here because we are not entirely sure of them until the plain truth comes out to us.However, when the Westerners came face to face with the Tatars, they shared the astonishment of the Russians. The missionary Wilhelm von Rubruck found them in 1253, and "as soon as we got under them," he reported, "it immediately seemed to me that we had entered some kind of other world."

The lasting effects of their raids do not appear to have outweighed the effects of the Roman occupation of Constantinople. As the tide of invasion receded in both countries, orthodox civilization was unaffected by the experience of temporary immersion. According to one chronicler, the Tatars spared the peasants in order to maintain production. Ryazany (a principality on the Volga, southeast of Moscow) appears to have borne the brunt of the invasion and suffered the least discriminatory looting; but there, if the local chronicle is to be believed, “the pious Grand Duke Ingvary Ingvarevich sat on the throne of his father and renewed the land and built churches and monasteries and comforted the newcomers and rallied the people. And there was joy among the Christians, whom God saved from the wicked and wicked Khan." Many cities escaped lightly, soon surrendered, and Novgorod, which could have been a coveted prize, was completely ignored. Rumors, Western travelers, such as that of Pope John, envoy of Piano Carpini, who heard it said that in kyiv there were only two hundred houses left standing and that the fields were "dotted with innumerable heads and fewer bones" - seems to have been exaggerated by sensationalism, like many war reports hegemony could be used to the advantage of Russian princes By acknowledging Tatar supremacy, Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, was able to establish an immortal legend as a Russian national hero: submission to the Tatars enabled him to repel German and Swedish invasions. he benefited from Tatar protection at the expense of the rulers of other Christian states. His son Daniel was the effective founder of Muscovy and proclaimed or the independence of Moscow from the centers that previously governed it. His grandson became known as Ivan the Moneybag, due to the wealth he amassed as a Tatar tax collector. From his time (reigned 1329-53), Moscow was able to compete for imperial supremacy over other Christian states with the title of Grand Duke and possession of the metropolitan see. Despite an early challenge to Tatar supremacy in 1378-82, Moscow's privileged relationship with the overlords remained more or less intact until 1480, when Ivan the Great, having invaded most of the other surviving Christian principalities of Russia, "was the sun of the land of Suzdaly". " I would like. A Slavic Identity Hero Painted by Another: Alexander Nevsky (r. 1252-63) by Semen Ushakov, 1666. Alexander cannot be said to have earned his reputation as a defender of Russian nationality: his policy was to appease The Tatars, forced them to collect taxes from their people and suppress the resistance of princes and cities to this.Their victories on the Western Front against the Swedes, Lithuanians and Germans distracted the attackers rather than

would-be conqueror However, the saintliness represented by this iconic version of him is easy to understand: his policies helped protect the church from Tatar taxes and, at the time of the painting, Swedish irredentism (see pp. 224-56) reinforced Alexander's memory. 92 THE SPR I N G S OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​T I VE was ready to refuse. He married a Byzantine princess, inserted a double-headed eagle into his arms, forged a genealogy that traced the house of Alexander Nevsky back to the Roman Caesars, and scornfully rejected the Habsburg emperor's offer to install him king. “We have been sovereign in our land from our earliest ancestors,” he replied, “and we have our sovereignty from God.” There were, or could have been, other contenders for the role of the Third Rome. In the mid-14th century, Serbian monarch Stephen Dusan dreamed of defeating the Turks to conquer Constantinople and proudly, if somewhat exaggeratedly, proclaimed himself "lord of almost the entire Roman Empire." His younger contemporary, the Bulgarian Tsar John Alexander, claimed dominance over "all Bulgars and Greeks" and painted himself in scarlet boots with a gold halo. Where a Byzantine chronicler hailed Constantinople as the new Rome, a translator at John Alexander's court substituted the name of the Bulgarian capital for Trnovo, calling it "the new Constantinople." But these offers were premature: the proto-empires of the Serbs and the Bulgars were themselves -f * £ f U) ^Afi kXA VA hé» IÍAA ' HriOkoilíííti'ílMHIHA.» iÛiJA h ta fJU^ftMUHlA H m KO MA ^ KoAfilAA^'Aflfl h-h\ASA%t)tnhmi HIvflKCO Byzantine weakness in the fourteenth century aroused imperial ambitions among its neighbors. The Russians, Serbs and Turks strove in different ways to strip Byzantium of its empire status, as did the Bulgarian Tsar John Alexander shown here, chosen by the hand of God and combining imperial attire and native hairstyle. The image is a sheet from the Gospels by him, translated into Slavonic. Your Legacy also uses an Imperial

Crown and boots and the same sash and cuff as his father. The booth of Orthodoxy 93 will be swallowed up by the same Turkish expansion that destroyed Byzantium. MAD PLANET The geography of Eastern Europe is hostile to political continuity. Carved and traversed by encroaching corridors, its flat, open expanses and sparse, well-connected population create an environment in which states can form with ease, survive with struggle, and prosper with oddity. It favors vast and fragile empires, vulnerable to external attacks and internal rebellions. In our millennium, they came and went with incredible rapidity: Around the first generation of this period, Wielkopolska briefly had borders with the North Sea and the Danube, the Pripet Marshes, and the Bohemian Forest. Similar volatile hegemonies were established by the Mongols in the 13th century, by Poland-Lithuania in the 14th century, and on both sides of the Dnieper by Poland and Moscow in the 15th century. After a period of relative stability during most of modern times, when territory was disputed between the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires, the region has returned to its former forms in the present century with the sudden rise and fall of the Third World. Reich and the Union. .Soviet. Empire. Future galactic museum owners are expected to compare the cockpit of Eastern Europe to a run amok planet rocked by wild climate change, cosmic storms, and earthquakes. This history of empires made and not made, on the contrary, makes the cultural continuities of the region clearer. Slavic identity and communist ideology have been common influences in much of the region of late, but no shared cultural characteristic has achieved the reach or permanence of the Orthodox Church. In much of Europe ruled by Constantinople or Moscow in the Middle Ages, Orthodoxy has survived and continues to contribute significantly to its adherents' sense of identity. The fellowship of Eastern Christianity in the first half of the millennium may seem loosely connected in comparison to China, Islam, or even Western Christianity; but it possessed in the Orthodox faith and in the Orthodox Church a cultural and ideological resource of extraordinary power - power and beauty, just as it seduced the emissaries of Saint Volodomir in their probably apocryphal quest for the perfect religion: the Bulgarians bow and sit and they look back and forth like demoniacs; but there is no joy between them, only sadness and a terrible stench. Your religion is not good. Then we went to the Germans and saw them perform many services in their churches, but we did not see any beauty there. So we went to the Greeks, and they took us to the place where they worship their god; and we did not know if we were in heaven or on earth, because there is no such spectacle or beauty on earth, and we do not know how to describe it. All we know is that God dwells there.

among men The strength of Orthodoxy's appeal can be felt at remote shrines like St. Sava's in Mileseva, where King Vladislav, after burying the saint in the tomb intended for the monarch, -as an eyewitness recounted- "in what high, in front of the sanctuary of the saint, he jumped out, like the prophet David, to dance and have fun". Sava was a saint that Christianity could not understand; After the Turkish conquest, Muslims who came to kiss his hand gave the monastery more alms than Christians, until the Turks burned his relics in 1595 in a vain attempt to eradicate his cult. In the southeast, in the Serbian royal pantheon of Sopocani, the purest classical murals of the Middle Ages remained intact until the Turkish devastation of 1689. The painter achieved an impressive mystical-inspired luminescence, a light, according to Father Domentian, that he saw. in the mid-13th century, "which can only be seen with the help of angels". Contrary to modern appearances and reputation, Eastern Christianity was by any measure a more powerful civilization than the Western. Moscow's rate of expansion in the 15th century not only surpassed that of any Western state: during Europe's "great age of expansion" in the early modern period, when Westerners established their conspicuous, remote, and doomed naval empires across the globe. In the world, the Russians created, as we shall see (Chapter 7), in Siberia one of the largest and incomparably longest-lived non-European empires. The story of how this was possible in a landscape of scattered resources will have to wait until we see how the rest of the world fared in the first half of our millennium. The Cabin of Orthodoxy 95 "Mother, there is your son." Saint John and the Virgin consoling themselves at the foot of the cross in the Sopocani frescoes, commissioned by King Stefan Uros I in the late 1250s from an anonymous painter who was one of the greatest masters of the neoclassical humane style, favored by Serbian cut them. Its characteristics are fidelity to the Scriptures, dramatic postures, genuine but contained emotions, variety of expressions and gestures, and an emphasis on human relationships: the exchange of anxious glances of the Marías, the decent intimacy of the close-up embrace. Chapter 3 THE TOWER OF DARKNESS: ISLAM IN THE FIRST HALF OF OUR MILLENNIUM The Stones of Konium - The Serpent in the Garden - The Zengid Empire - The Khan's Fingers - The Auspicious Amir - The Limits of Islam - The Vision of Mimbar THE STONES OF ICONIUM An Oghuz Turk in need of a scratch casually revealed her shame to Ibn Fadlan, the caliph's ambassador, during her journey to the court of the Volga Bulgars in 921. Ashamed, the messengers "hid our sight and begged for forgiveness." of God. The woman's husband explained with a laugh:

however, that ad was made up to teach them a lesson. 'Tell them,' he said to the interpreter, 'that we will uncover this part in your presence so that you may see and be ashamed; but remains inaccessible. This is better than covering it up and making it available like you do.” Although he felt duly censured, Ibn Fadlan continued to display the traditional antipathy for the nomadic way of life, neither after urinating nor bathing after ejaculating. Even his boss wore a shirt that was fraying with dirt like rotten silk under Prince Yakimov's armpits. The ambassador's attitude was characteristic of the ambivalence with which the cultivators of the soil in the garden of Islam viewed the world beyond their fence. The Turks had their place in the divine order: they were examples of virtue to admonish the vices of the Muslims. They were more than a rebuke, they were also a punishment: "The army of God I raised up in the east" (according to an apocryphal saying of the Prophet) unleashed to punish transgressors. The applied Scourge can damage and heal. In addition to respect, the Turks also inspired fear and disgust. In the first half of our millennium, Islam faced a similar range of threats with equally divided sentiments: from internal heretics, the Crusaders, the Mongols, and the Black Death. All were outclassed, with limited damage to varying degrees. Islam, dangerously susceptible to a rat-borne bacillus, as we shall see, proved particularly resistant to human enemies. In the 10th and 11th centuries, successive waves of Turkish invaders might have shaken Islam, just as Sasanian Iran was destroyed by Arabs or Rome by Western barbarians. Rather, assimilated, tamed, they became the great force and shield of Islam. Having tamed the Turks in their territories and on their borders, the imams of the Muslim path would repeat the trick with other barbarian peoples further afield. As receivers of the Qur'an and transmitters of jihad, Asian and North African nomads made Islam the most dynamic world civilization of the late Middle Ages. The essential difference in their appeal to these peoples can be appreciated by comparing the fate of Islam with that of other victims of the same invaders. Byzantium, which had absorbed or distracted so many barbarians, was annihilated by the Turks. China managed to seduce its Mongol conquerors in the Chinese way, but was unable or unwilling to regain the momentum of expansion. In India and Europe, the borders of the dominant cultures (Hindu and Christian, respectively) were pushed back as the invading Turks invaded new elites. Islam's attraction to the Turks is easier to express than to explain. The memories they retained of their pagan days emphasized their indomitable values ​​and strong-willed ways. The children were not named until they had "cut off heads in battle". A hero was judged by the number of times he could braid his mustache behind his head. Even women were trained for warfare and "made the enemy spit blood." The conversion effect

about the traditions of the Turks becomes tangible, for example, in the ruins and remains of the mosques and palaces of the Seljuk capital Konya, the ancient Iconium. At the end of the 12th century it was a beautiful and splendid city "the size of Cologne", according to Western visitors. Arranged in the shape of a rectangle with rounded corners, it was surrounded by 108 large stone towers. Evidence of growth and activity can still be read in the surviving foundation documents: a new market with shops of all kinds. The pentagonal citadel was built around the hill where the Alaeddin Mosque still stands. Inside, the bones of eight sultans pay homage to an austere room built in the second half of the 12th century, when the simplicity of the Seljuk taste was not spoiled by lightness. The main ornament of Seljuk art Konya developed, in the second half of the 13th century, a "baroque" phase characterized by exuberant external ornaments. The most popular architect of this period was Keluk bin Abdulla and his most acclaimed work, the 'Ince Minare Medresè', shown here before the minaret was restored to the height and elegance that gave it its name. The dome, originally covered in tiles, collapsed in a lightning strike, but the stout lantern that opened up inside is typical of Ottoman adaptations. The large flowery portico is characteristic of the Keluk era. The Tower of Darkness 99 The work of this period was the conquered beauty of cannibalized pillars of ancient monuments. The outbuildings added in the 13th century were more glamorous. A palace kiosk, now represented only by fragments in the museum, competed with the glass-enclosed interior of the Capella Palatina in Palermo; the interior of the mid-13th century decorated dome of the Büyük Karatay Medresè still glows in blue and gold on triangular pendants. In addition to court life, worship, death and burial, this was a city built for trade and where Greek and Armenian carpet merchants continued to congregate for centuries after their greatness had passed. The caravanserais, built like basilicas,

it had vaulted passages to accommodate camels. The Mint did not shy away from impressive depictions of rulers on horseback, with scimitars on display and stars and halos around their heads. The vast market gardens that extended below the walls to the Anatolian plains were developed to house a large transient population. While each slender minaret proclaimed an aggressively Muslim identity, the conical mausoleums in which warriors were buried and which still dot the city show that the culture, even at its most urban, kept in touch with its nomadic past. The tombs are designed to resemble tents. THE SNAKE IN THE GARDEN The soil of Islam, absorbing the torrential rains of the Oghuz and Seljuk Turks, was turned upside down by worms. Heretics dug and bred under the foundations of Islamic unity. Doctrinal and political differences fed off each other, so Islam could easily have permanently split into rival blocs like Christianity. The differences that gradually separated defined Islamic orthodoxy from the main alternative tradition of Shi'ism were, in some respects, more obvious and fundamental than those that separated the Eastern and Western families of Christianity. Like Christian heresies, Shiism tends to create political divisions and spawn increasingly radical sects. Hate and violence followed and, as with Christianity, some of the division and much of the hatred has survived to this day. On one level, the issue between Shi'ism and Sunni orthodoxy, as well as between Catholics and Orientals, was a matter of authority. In Christianity, the problem can be formulated like this: "Who, if anyone, is the special Vicar of Christ?" In Islam, the corresponding question was: "On whom does the mantle of the prophet as commander of the believers descend?" for the Shias, it passes by inheritance to the generation of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima, and her husband, Muhammad's cousin, Ali. Furthermore, just as between Protestants and Catholics, Sunnis and Shiites differ in the nature of man's relationship with God. In Sunni, as in Protestantism, a written revelation, a book, is a sufficient channel of communication. In Shiah, as in Catholicism, a human actor intervenes: the Imam, "specially chosen by Allah as the bearer of a part of the divine being." But whereas in Christendom the book-worshippers fragmented uncontrollably into myriad sects while the priest-worshippers remained united, in Islam the Sunnis remained disciplined and homogeneous. "Nowhere have I seen such prosperity" (see p. 103). . A rock crystal jug carved with motifs suggestive of refreshments recalls the luxury of courtly life in Fatimid Cairo. Vine tendrils twine around the bowl. A gazelle or water buffalo rests at a watering hole. A duck chases a fleeing fish. The delicacy of the object and the fragility of the skeletal handle make it seem more like an ornament than a utility, but the thumb guard is obviously intended to make it easier to spill. The faith of the tower of darkness while the Shias was divisive, torn apart by charismatic and messianic aspirants.

Subversive movements and secession. The basic unity of Islam over the past thousand years has been preserved largely because Shia political experiments outside of Iran tend to be small or short-lived. Yet by the turn of the millennium, the largest and most threatening Shi'ite state ever established had grown to cover almost half of the Islamic world. The Fatimid Caliphate, which arose in what is now Tunisia in the early 10th century, had its capital in Cairo, while its western edge was on the Atlantic. According to the orthodox geographer al-Muquaddasi, Cairo has supplanted orthodox Baghdad as the largest Islamic city. The threat of Fatimid territorial expansion at the expense of the Sunnis was compounded by the political envy, economic rivalry, and theological hatred with which each community regarded the other. The ever-changing threat of Fatimid power was embodied in the ruler, Caliph al-Hakim, whose reputation for madness was fueled by the capricious and arbitrary turns of his policies. He assumed the role of him at eleven years old; In adolescence, therefore, his appetites were unruly, his humor unbridled, and his self-esteem inflated by being subjected to uniform and pathetic deference. The whims of tyranny, to which he began to indulge at the expense of his ministers, soon spread to victims of all classes. Bloody taboos forbade sharing food and drink, night trading, canal traffic, dogs, churches, and women's shoes. Blackmail alternated with gestures of generosity. With surprising unpredictability, he issued fines and mortgage bonds and handed out gifts with a generous hand. Perhaps, already approaching messianic self-understanding, in fulfillment of a later written apocryphal prophecy of Muhammad that "in the last days there will be a caliph who will scatter money without counting it." Though he loved pageantry in his youth, he later embraced austerity with the peculiar enthusiasm of a man who is well prepared to appear plainly dressed and forbid extravagant forms of address. There were elements of permanence: the regulation of luxury, the moral rearmament and the persecution of the infidels were infallible features of his government. But he was justly known for his contradictions: now he commands, now he forbids nocturnal audiences; sometimes abolition, sometimes reintroduction of certain taxes; sometimes cutting off the hands of a qadi, sometimes covering it with gold coins and clothing. Nowhere was he more indecisive than in his attitude toward his Sunni neighbors. As the Nile rose and fell and the granaries filled and emptied, he changed course, as if to appease God or manipulate nature. At various times, the traditional Shia curses against the early caliphs were imposed or just as severely prohibited. Orthodox ritual practices, such as observing Ramadan fasts, were alternately tolerated or persecuted. One winter morning in 1021, as a last act of anticipation, he went up to the observatory, where 102 THE DATA OF THE INITIATIVE Part of the legacy of Caliph al-Hakim is the political recalcitrance of the Lebanese Druze, which continues -almost- a thousand years later. of his mysterious disappearance - until

Worship him in the Chouf Mountains, southeast of Beirut, while challenging all attackers. In the photo, a sheikh briefs members of Kemal Jumblatt's Druze militia in Moukhtara. Ally withdrew in private to the astrological calculations he was performing with the help of his huge copper astrolabe and disappeared forever. Today, the Druze of Lebanon, who are taking the Shiite tradition to its wildest extremes, worship him as the incarnation of God. To his contemporaries, his virtues and vices were typically human. He was remembered as "generous but bloodshed", whose "actions were without reason and whose dreams had no interpretation". Although the state he bequeathed continued to suffer from the strange behavior of the young caliphs, he was sure of his wealth. Food supplies remained at the mercy of the delicate ecological balance of the Nile. The prosperity of al-Hakim's time failed to alleviate the famine of 1008 and the famine of 1012. The richest of all the Fatimid caliphs was al-Mustansir (1035 -1094), who rode on a golden staff under a jeweled sun, but in 1070 had to send his wives to Baghdad to avoid famine. The problems were one of supply: wealth was plentiful but poorly organized for times of need. The development of the Red Sea trade routes in the late 10th and 11th centuries made Egypt rich at the expense of the Levantine coasts, and a Persian envoy in the late 1040s was dazzled by Cairo: "He could see no limits to his wealth. And I had nowhere seen such prosperity as I saw there." Although Muslims were tempted to violence by the presence of the heretical serpent in the Garden of Islam, the conflict between the rival caliphs of Cairo and Baghdad was limited by three influences: First, there was an enduring sense of a common identity - the garden arch of Islam, so to speak, protecting believers of both traditions-from the hostile Christian and pagan worlds.Second, the Fatimid state, though prone to occasional conquest attempts in Asia, had It had reached the practical limits of its viability by the end of the 10th century and was experiencing marginal erosion in the second half of the 11th century After all, the main problem facing Eastern Islam in the 11th century was the absorption of the Turks. Although it brought an increase in strength, the process was traumatic. It caused political fragmentation and internal conflicts, leading to a brief and nominal Fatimid suzerainty over Ba itself. gdad. After the Restoration, the orthodox caliph was "a parrot in a cage" under Seljuk control. The mutual balance and simultaneous immobilization of both Islamic traditions at the end of the 11th century introduced a new enemy into the garden. In Syria in the 1090s, Fatimid invaders by sea met Seljuk attackers by land. In 1098, Jerusalem changed hands for the second time in a generation. By this time, the First Crusade had begun, and when Jerusalem fell again in 1099, the conquerors were there.

Christians. THE ZENGID EMPIRE The guardians of the galactic museum are unlikely to care about the Crusades. A movement that called its participants to heroic endeavor and inspired its heirs with romantic tales, remains remarkable even at the end of our millennium. For historians looking to the past for evidence of the vitality of medieval Christianity, the Crusades seem to offer a clue to the mystery of Europe's eventual supremacy. However, from a sufficiently distant point in time, the founding of states in the Latin Levant will seem like a flea bite in the skin of Islam. Most of the Crusaders quickly disappeared; most of its territory was soon recaptured. Other than the ruins of their castles, few of their possessions have long survived. But in one respect they were really and profoundly important: by provoking a form of irredentism deeply rooted in religious self-consciousness, the Crusades did their part, less as a threat to Islam than as a stimulus to its revival and survival. The great instrument of this Sunni revenge was the short-lived empire founded by a Turkish chief named Zengi. Its climax was the rule of the self-proclaimed heir to the Zengids, who remains to this day the most famous figure of medieval Islam in the world: the Kurdish strongman Yusuf ibn Ayyub, traditionally known as Saladin, who during his lifetime achieved a unique status. as a leading figure of universal respect for Islam. Muslims saw him as a model of piety, Christians as the epitome of chivalry. The invincible warrior was equally at home in "an assembly of scholars discussing various sciences" or among workers digging trenches at the siege of Jerusalem, where he "carried stones on his own shoulders to set a good example." shame the scribes into helping with the work. His achievement and that of the Zengids is all the more remarkable against the background of the unfavorable climate for the construction of the state in which he achieved himself. Hostile circumstances are evident in countless scenes of conflict and domination in the 12th century Middle East, and none are more vivid than Saladin's deathbed. As Saladin lay dying in February 1193, his son and successor, al-Malik al-Afdal, gathered the emirs of Syria at his bedside and asked them for their oath of allegiance. Most of them did not feel close enough to al-Afdal's traditional loyalties to refrain from asking for his patronage. Some -according to Saladin's secretary- conditioned his loyalty to confirmation in his jurisdictions or offices, others to obtaining additional satisfactory concessions. Still others stipulated that they would heed the sultan's call to arms only in cases where they supported or defended their own rights and possessions, a condition that circumvented the oath, which was essentially a promise of military service. Others omitted parts of the oath on a whim. This scene evokes a pattern familiar to students of European history: a monarchy bound by lordship and clientele, dependent on crumbling loyalties, threatened at a time when the sovereignty of subordinate lords is weak. Twelfth-century Syria displayed these characteristics with equal certainty

like late Carolingian France or Ethelred Unraed's England. Recently, in a region traditionally unstable and politically difficult to organize, revolts by leaders, political assassinations, and dynastic insecurity have become features of the public scene. Heretics and infidels multiplied and grew bolder, despite leaders who combined religious uniformity with political unity. The Assassin cult, a divinely inspired leader with a drug-obsessed following, achieved territorial independence in an enclave in Syria, as well as in their traditional hilltop strongholds in Persia: they practiced political assassination as a duty. ritual and aggravated the instability of the region as they spoke. . many modern languages ​​added a hashish-derived term that bolstered their nerves or dulled their decency. Trade, which in the distant past had balanced the region's centripetal tendencies by creating widespread interest in long-distance communications, was disrupted or diverted to new routes to the north and west. Trade was still adjusting to the rise of the Crusader states along the Mediterranean coast. Under similar conditions, three heroes, Zengi, Nur ad-Din and Saladin, against all odds, established states of great size, unity and cohesion. Saladin's own career is a good case study in how this was done. Following the death of his own master, Nur ad-Din, Saladin rose from captain of the personal guard to governor of Egypt, conquered by the Zengids in 11–9. The conditions for saving or rebuilding the monarchy seemed, in any case, even less favorable conditions than those that Saladin bequeathed on his part. No heir-to-be had time or opportunity to reignite the fires of the Empire before the coals slipped from the grate or were torn from the coals by the usurpers' tongs. In fact, from one point of view, Saladin was only the most successful usurper of all; He used his military prowess, loyal professional guards, and his power base in Egypt to rob and destroy Nur ad-Din's natural heirs and all other surviving descendants of Zengi. These goals required a massive program: the conquest of the Zengid Empire's sub-capitals in Mosul, Aleppo, and, most important of all, Damascus, where Nur ad-Din held his court. At the same time, Saladin had to overcome the legitimacy of Zengi's blood servants to claim Nur ad-Din's moral legacy. Perhaps the marriage to the widow of the great Atabeg helped; but it was only by continuing and transcending Nur ad-Din's policy of ruthlessly persecuting Shiism and resolutely opposing Christianity that Saladin was able to boast of his moral authority. Therefore, he was committed to war on three fronts, or against three enemies. His own starting position was not secure either. His turbulent relationship with his master exposed the fragility of his control over his own province of Egypt when Nur ad-Din threatened to replace him. His Black Guards revolted in 1169, and in the same year as Nur ad-Din's death, Saladin was threatened by a palace conspiracy, while the temporary capture of Alexandria by a crusading force served as a reminder of the impending threat.

Saladin lacked allies among his future subjects east of Suez. The large merchant class in a place like Damascus viewed the war with disgust and would happily have enjoyed a fruitful coexistence with their Christian neighbors. An enthusiastic traveler to the Maghreb in Saladin's time noted how "the Muslims lived comfortably with the Franks." The educated emirs residing in the urban areas of Syria would generally have been happy to support Nur ad-Din's sons when they gave up on the plans. The Turks, used to a lord of their own race, were probably reluctant to submit to a despised Kurd. It took Saladin twelve years to reunite the Zengi government through conquest. He sought the support of any lord he could buy, mobilized Egypt's resources, and pledged land to investors in the wake of his conquests. His great rival, Imad ad-Din, was unable to simultaneously maintain control of Mosul and Aleppo because the existing powers in those cities lobbied for patronage. Saladin could control both. Of all the virtues attributed to Saladin by his own propaganda, generosity was the most profitable. According to his secretary, he emptied his treasury out of generosity. He prepared campaigns distributing "benefits and blessings." And occasionally, he used the other side of generosity: periodic revocation of favors, humiliating a great lord, and instilling fear in others. Out of sincere preference and calculated self-interest, Saladin also employed spiritual weapons. He began his campaign to rebuild the Zengi empire on what appeared to be a cynically false foundation, pretending to serve the interests of the heirs of Nur ad-Din, whose youth had insulated him "from concerns of sovereignty and the task of ruling the world." country". "enemies of God grown out of the earth." From the mid-1170s, he increasingly based his own claims to legitimacy on the approval of the caliph, who generously delegated authority that he personally could not exercise. Saladin assumed the title of king, although his chancery adhered to the old style of the sultan, and gained the backing of the caliph Used convincingly he made it difficult for orthodox Muslims to oppose his actions, he could justify his attacks on Gla to present his compatriots as preemptive strikes to save his country from infidels or heretics, he was able to exploit the goodwill of the clergy and caliph and, like Nur ad-Din, rely on the courts for orders from Sufis and jurists who traditionally served as administrators and propagandists for secular rulers The declaration of holy war was not universally popular, it was an inconvenience to merchants and a threat to religious minorities yes; and once proclaimed, it had to be resisted. But its advantages, especially for a leader like Saladin who had Nur ad-Din in mind, far outweighed those disadvantages. The depth of his devotion to jihad, his sense of sacredness, can never be gauged; in comparison, let's say,

With a cross-adherence to pilgrimage principles that conferred a similar legitimacy and sanctity on his own violence, he appears to have been a staunch adherent. He tried to practice the Holy War with an uncompromising purity, extremely demanding when he was forced to associate with heretics or infidels. The most eloquent proof of his sincerity is found in the praise of his secretary, who attributed credit to politics. Originally employed by Saladin's enemies, the secretary, feeling "moved in his heart by God" to switch allegiances, presented his would-be new master with his own treatise on jihad, "which the sultan had made for his frequent study." ". Saladin's "zeal in holy war" became proverbial. The jihad worked. Only ad-Din controlled the Crusaders. Saladin reversed his progress. When he overthrew the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187, the Third Crusade was contained and Latin America, though it lasted another century, was limited to acres and conquests at Byzantine expense. But this was not Saladin's greatest achievement. Above all, he wanted to be remembered as "the restorer of the kingdom of the Commander of the Believers", the restorer of Islamic unity, the torch of Islamic orthodoxy in the Zengid tradition. One eulogy declared, with a forgivable exaggeration, that "no Muslim prince was not subject to him." European imperialism did not return to the Middle East until the 19th century, but the destruction of the Fatimid Caliphate was, in a sense, a more important and lasting triumph. While Islamic uniformity remained tinged with heresy, Islamic solidarity, the unity of compassion, must never again be challenged by such a large or threatening Shiite empire outside the Shiite heartland of Iran. The other legacy of the Saladin and Zengid eras was the militancy of Islamic legitimacy: jihad remained a way of confirming the credentials of emerging dynasties and emerging regimes. Saladin foresaw the collapse of his empire after his death, and indeed the turbulent history of his work made the long-term political fragmentation of Islam seem irreversible. The areas that he ruled were not permanently reunited until the 16th century. But he made a lasting difference because his example lived on and because the threats he faced were buried. THE KHAN'S FINGERS In a famous incident in 1254, the Supreme Khan of the Mongols, Mongka, grandson of Genghis Khan, summoned the Franciscan missionary Wilhelm von Rubruck, who had ridden to Karakorum, further into Mongol territory than recorded explorers, hoping make converts. William was such a keen observer and such a meticulous reporter that the scene can be imagined with some precision. The friar approached the long, barnlike audience chamber, past the elaborate fountain cast by the Khan's Parisian goldsmith: a trumpeting angel enthroned in a silver tree entwined with a golden serpent and guarded by silver lions; Mare's milk gushed from his throat, while the various liquors—rice, milk, or honey—served at the khan spilled from his branches.

drunkenness. At one end of the palace boat sat the drunken Mongka, small, snub-nosed and dressed in "a spotted coat, bright as a seal." Even sober, Mongka was the kind of interviewee that journalists fear: determined to always be right and ready to exploit his pretense of deference or abuse his interlocutor's courtesy to win any argument. Whatever William said in explanation or defense of Christianity, the Khan rephrased to suit his own ends; what he could not adjust, he discarded before employing a formula of his choosing. "Do you think in your scriptures that one man should correct another?" Mongka asked. "No, my lord," William replied. "I don't want to argue with anyone." A few generations after Wilhelm von Rubruck met Mongka Khan, this Mongolian painting showed a ruler drinking from his throne, with bottles of wine in the foreground. The crouching position and clothing of the Persian court are in stark contrast to William's description, although paintings of previous rulers collected in the same album show the "bright, dappled hair like a seal" and informal demeanor noted by the monk. The goblet was evidently part of a royal ritual captured with ballet precision in this painting, and William's disdain for Mongka's "drunkenness" may have something to do with the cultural distance that separated them. The Tower of Darkness 109 "I'm not talking about you," was the reply. "In the same way, do you not find in your scriptures that a man can do evil for money?" "No, my lord, and I certainly did not come to this country to get money." "I'm not talking about that. So God gave you the scriptures and you don't follow them. He gave us fortune tellers, and we, in turn, do what we're told and live in peace." And despite William's insistence that he was just a humble missionary, Mongka refused to accept this self-description, denying him ambassadorial status to the King of France and demanding performance from him. Despite his frustration, the monk frankly recorded the khan's sophisticated religious philosophy, expressed with the kind of simile that seems to have been Mongka's characteristic rhetorical device. The khan compared the extent of his influence to the rays of the sun and the relationship of religions to the fingers of his hand. "We Mongols believe," he said. , "what's up

one God, in whom we live and in whom we die, and have a sincere heart toward him.” He held out his hand and added: “But just as God gave the palm different fingers, he also gave people different fingers. Given religions". The story captures the atmosphere of competition, in which missionaries of rival religions preached at Tatar courts and fields. William was committed to the Khan's edification, or, more convincingly, the Khan's entertainment, with Buddhists and Nestorian Christians to debate who, in the remote enclaves of their sect, clung to the ancient heresy that Christ had two persons and two natures.Toying with these traditions was not seen in Karakorum as incompatible with the high-level theism that Mongka defended – alluding to – the bowing of Tengri, usually translated as "heaven", also did not supplant traditional shamanism, which considered the earth and populated the atmosphere with gods and demons, and conjured up the spirits of the ancestors - represented by small figures suspended in felt bags made from the skins of nomad tents, in the ritual trances of an indelible priestly elite Beyond the established position of shamans, who were never so completely marginal Used as the folk healers and wise women of Europe, the tenacity of this folk religion resembled the tenacity of pre-Christian folk magic and rituals in pre-industrial Christianity. Like its European counterpart, it was a religion of survival in this world, not salvation in the next. His goal was the reconciliation of a densely populated natural universe by an invisible gathering of hostile demons. An "ancient text from ancient times" compiled in oral interpretation by an 18th-century Lamaist missionary may bring us closer to the everyday religion of most Mongols in their imperial days: we worship deities and dragons, our protectors and guardian spirits. when we pray and make offerings. 110 THE SPRINGS OF THE I N I T I A ​​​​T I VE By the force of this our subjection, this worship and this praise, we constantly ask you to be our companions and friends, you sacrificers and those for whom sacrifices are made, at home or in the Steppe or wherever we are. It alleviates diseases and obstacles from the demons of heaven and the demons of the dead. . . . Expels all tormenting enemy demons of a different race. Banish plagues and epidemics and evils of the day, month and year. Avoid evils like wolves attacking herds, thieves and raiders, riots in the open, hail, drought, or rinderpest. The malleability of this Mongolian religion made it attractive and resilient to missionaries of potentially universal beliefs. The Christian mission was launched with particular zeal when Christianity's first references to the Tatars in the 1220s raised hopes that they might already be Christians, or at least pagan allies against Islam who could attack the Crusaders' enemies for the rear. It was not a totally unreasonable hope. Wang Khan, chief of a Mongol village and sometimes Genghis Khan's teacher, was somewhat of a Nestorian, or at least under strong Nestorian influence. For most of the 13th century, the Mongol hordes lashed parts of the Muslim world as effectively as any other scourge from God. mongka khan

He is said to have advocated Nestorianism, but the Buddhists at his court also thought he supported them. His favor was as resilient as his understanding of his faith, as long as he didn't cost her anything. Wilhelm von Rubruck was convinced that he could have been converted if he had found a good interpreter or, which would have been easier, the grace to work miracles, like Moses. The Mongol conquest brought a brief Christian revival to Persia in the 1230s, and Khan Chormagan, before being inexplicably rendered speechless in 1241, is said to have contemplated the conversion. Hulägu, conqueror of Baghdad, was under the influence of Christian women and was hailed as the "new Constantine" by an Armenian monk. In 1287 Arghun Khan sent a Nestorian ambassador to Rome and Paris, ostensibly to negotiate an anti-Muslim alliance. Even in the 15th century, Westerners hoped that the Mongol rulers would revive their supposed ancient interest in Christianity, and Columbus sailed west in the avowed belief that he would find heirs to the khans, still eagerly waiting to hear the gospel. In reality, however, there never seems to have been much prospect of widespread Christianity among the Tatars. The familiarity of Nestorianism bred contempt; the heart of Catholic Christendom was far away; and it was the religions of powerful neighbors that proved most attractive in the long run. In China, for example, while Kublai Khan allowed shamans to reside in his court, the Mongol conquerors assimilated the religious milieu of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Chinese writers attributed the fall of the Mongol dynasty in 1368 to the pernicious influence of tantric, or gies, enjoyed in excess by members of an elite who only imperfectly understood the spiritual importance of association with lamaist deities. In the last Mongol homeland, missionaries from Tibet made Buddhism the national religion in the 16th and 17th centuries, without eradicating shamanism (see Chapter 9). However, in the late Middle Ages, when the Mongols were still a dynamic force capable of shaping and reshaping the world through warfare, Islam was incomparably more successful than competing religions in winning their allegiance and using their power. Islam's first experience with the Mongols was their terrible destructive power. In 1256, the Assassins were exterminated. In 1258 Baghdad was sacked and the last caliph was trampled to death. According to Rashid ad-Din, who was a boy at the time, "Unarmed villagers came in groups to confront the Mongols, who killed them on the spot." Mongka Khan's death in 1259 and a reaction from Egypt the following year ended Hulägu's siege of Baghdad and is widely portrayed as a catastrophe, a "defining moment" in world history that destroyed the last symbol of unity. of Islam. Contemporary moralists didn't always see it that way: the illustrator whose work is shown here - done in Persia under the patronage of the Mongols - was interested in the technical details of close-up siege operations and Hulägu's dramatic encounter with the caliph. , which is unlikely to be shown on horseback in the background. But he shows still lifes in the city, birds singing on the battlements and palace officials and women walking.

about your business. See page 110. 112 THE DICTATIONS OF THE I N I T I A ​​​​V of Destruction. Mongka's legacy to the west split into three vast states, ineffectively exploited by a still partly nomadic elite: the Khanate of the Golden Horde, which held the Black Sea steppes to roughly the Yenisei; the Il Khanate in Persia; and the Jagatai Khanate, stretching from Amu Darya to the Altai Mountains, named for Genghis Khan's second son, who had been his father's regent in the region and established his own character. In all three, the progress of Islam towards final triumph was irregular or gradual. Like that of the Turks, the culture of the Mongols was obviously not adapted to the reception of a literal clergy, rigid monotheism, or Koranic disciplines, particularly regarding diet, drink, and sex. The faith gained adherents when former nomadic chiefs "went indigenous", intermarried with indigenous populations and adopted customs and practices of their new surroundings, or when the khans fell under the control of administrators whom they trusted to convert the nomadic rulers. in sedentary empires. In the case of the Golden Horde, the call to jihad may have had a special appeal, since this Khanate had a long border with part of Christendom and extensive Christian vassal states. Beginning in the 1260s, rulers turned to Islamic madrasahs, or universities, to support their bureaucracies. Pagan Knights The rarities of Mongol Islam, probably illustrated by Ahmad Musa, 'the master who lifts the veil of painting', in the early 14th century Saray album. In the lower right corner, the Prophet is shown openly and without the usual Muslim inhibitions. The white rooster, which he admires and which the angels applaud, seems to be in a mimbar, and perhaps for this reason it represents the call to prayer. Still, the image has a suspiciously idolatrous air about it, especially since the Jagatai khans ruled lands where Zoroastrians practiced a sunrise cult. The Tower of Darkness 113 is said to have attempted to thwart the succession to the throne of an annoying Muslim propagandist in 1312, exclaiming, "Why should we abandon the laws of Genghis Khan in favor of the religion of the Arabs?" But that of the suitor

The triumph and massacre of its enemies decisively changed the orientation of the state towards an increasingly fanatical Islamic self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the Jagatai and Persian khanates teetered unsteadily in the same direction. In the Jagatai state, rebellion and pagan reaction continued until 1338, although a few years later a Franciscan mission massacre appears to have been inspired by militant Islamic revenge. The Mongol rulers of Persia vacillated between Buddhism, Islam and Christianity - sometimes even showing an interest in Shiism and Zoroastrianism - until 1295, when the pretender Ghazan won decisive Sunni support in his fight for the throne through a timely conversion. He burned the temples of other religions and, in excessive disgust at idolatry, erased the portrait of his father from the palace walls. The Islam practiced among the Mongols was idiosyncratic. Its distinctive features include a collection of religious paintings preserved in Istanbul in a 14th-century album, where they are attributed to Ahmad Musa, "the master who lifted the veil of painting in Persia during the turbulent reign of the boy Khan Abu Sa." raised'.'id, between 1317 and 1335. The novelty of the style for which this master was praised came in part from its realism, particularly in the depiction of emotion and the capture of natural postures in figure drawing. Such as the Most attributed "revolutions" in art, was not the work of a single genius, but the gradual effect of a long process of cross-fertilization that transformed the depiction of sacred subjects through the importation of Christian, Zoroastrian, and perhaps Mongolian conventions into Islamic tradition Taboos figurative representations were broken, Muhammad appeared transported over the mountains on the back of an angel, or ascended to heaven on the back of an anthropomorphic horse, or conversed with giant angels, in the strangest of images, while the angels hailed a huge rooster, perched on a minbar or pulpit, resplendent against a background of dark silver, the prophet watches dispassionately, hands folded s on his chest. Presumably the rooster is a zoomorph of the muezzin. which sings the hour of prayer, but inevitably suggests the Zoroastrian cult of the dawn. In other surviving paintings from the Mongolian period, between scenes of steppe life, the demonic dances and shamanic trances of traditional nomadic religion return in the Islamic period. The desert described by Marco Polo comes to life where "even during the day one hears the cackling of devils and... drums more often." Practitioners of horse sacrifice spin the bloody limbs of dismembered steeds in wild ecstasy, while demons steal live mounts or appropriate the bones of sacrificial victims as weapons. At best, the Jagatai khans were seen by rival co-religionists as imperfectly Islamized and fit victims of the jihad declared in 1386 by the last would-be world conqueror in the Mongol tradition. THE HAPPY AMIR In Elizabethan England, Christopher Marlowe envisioned the hero he called Tamerlane the Great as an inspired shepherd who drew his followers.

Standard both for the compelling beauty of his poetic expressions and for his invincible prowess in war. Romanticization has always supplanted the image of the historical Timur. Western writers saw him as the embodiment of an idyllic pastoral ideal, a testament to the higher virtue arising from a bucolic setting. His court historian proclaimed him "the closest being to perfection" and the successful self-portrait of him as a devout practitioner of the Holy War - despite the fact that most of the victims of his conquests were Muslims - won enthusiastic acclaim. press of other believers. . In reality, he was a highborn citizen. The true models of him were the pagans Alexander and Genghis Khan. Despite his self-appointment as "Auspicious Emir", in most cases his victories were devastating or short-lived. And although he claimed descent from Genghis Khan and married into his dynasty, all of his true ancestors appear to have been Turks. Travelers on the silk roads around the Taklamakan desert often complained of the agony of the demonic dancing musicians depicted in Saray's album. The Mongols recommended smearing blood on the horse's neck to scare them away. Wilhelm von Rubruck sang the creed for the same purpose. Mongolian horse sacrifice rites and shamanic dances were meant to soothe and, judging by the album's treatment of all these themes, mimic demonic behavior. The Tower of Darkness 115 Born in 1336 as a cadet in the line of the Lords of Kesh in Transoxania. His service in the Jagatai Khanate earned him promotion above the heads of the most qualified blood relatives to control the family domains; He then turned against his masters in a collaborative movement for independence from the region's Turkish nobility. Cleverly eliminating his allies as his victories piled up, Timur remained Transoxania's sole ruler into 1370. He donned a royal diadem and "put on the imperial belt," but his legitimacy was always in doubt, even at the pinnacle. of his achievements. . On the one hand, he appealed to Mongolian tradition, invoked the name and upheld the laws of Genghis Khan; on the other hand, he exploited his Islamic credentials, quoting the Koran - particularly on the issue of holy war - and denouncing his enemies as outspoken pagans or indifferent Muslims. His empire was an adventure and his strategy was opportunism. The state he created by conquest was a personal monarchy that could not survive him; Even during his lifetime, he was held together solely by the dynamics of expansion, constantly renewing the fish with which warrior-followers could be rewarded. By the time he died at the age of seventy-four, he had conquered Iran, destroyed the Khanate of the Golden Horde, reduced the Jagataite state to a rump, halted the growth of the Ottoman Empire and imprisoned its sultan, invaded Syria and India, and designed the conquest of China. The hallmarks of his passage where he passed were the devastated lands of lords and peasants slow to submit, and the piled skulls of commoners reckless enough to try to resist his sieges. The success of him was by no means

uniform, but so impressive in its general effect that it seemed "ordained by God" or "by the hand of fate." His warnings to potential victims reflected the arrogance of traditional Mongolian rhetoric: "Almighty God has brought the world under our rule, and the will of the Creator has entrusted the lands of the earth to our power." his legatees pitted against each other over shared inheritance, their ambitions seemed empty and their achievements ephemeral. For Islam, Timur's impact is seen primarily as something absolutely negative. Had it not been for him, it is said, the force of Islam might have been directed against external enemies; his success against the Ottomans gave Byzantium a truce; humiliating the Golden Horde, he encouraged the Christians of Russia; By devastating the Delhi Sultanate, he freed millions of Hindus from the threat of Muslim rule. This critique, however, ignores what could be called Timur's psychological legacy as a defender of Islamic orthodoxy and as an example of the power of holy war. Turk by birth, Mongol by adoption, he was the last great conqueror of the nomadic tradition and represented, powerful and terrible, the completion of the process by which nomads turned from the scourge of Islam to the spearhead of jihad. The ruins of Timur's mausoleum in Samarkand on a site formerly shared with a defunct madrasa and a Sufi hospice, donated by Timur's grandson and heir Muhammad Sultan. Timur erected the Pantheon when his grandson died in 1403 at age 29 and joined him in the main chamber under the lofty dome in 1405 in the tradition of the great nomadic conquerors, "converted from the scourge of Islam to the spearhead of the jihad". In 1260, an ambassador from the Mamluks, slave warriors who had recently conquered Egypt in a rebellion, taunted the Mongols at Hulagu's camp that they had "kings like donkeys." Because "the kings of the Muslims, when they drank wine, asked for pistachios, citrus juice, lemon slices in porcelain cups, pots of rosewater, basil, violets, myrtle, cloves, daffodils, and other such good things. Mongols, they drink their wine with hot coals, cotton seeds, dried grapes, wood shavings, and similar ugly objects.” The contrast suggested was not only between Muslims and pagans, but also between civilization and savagery, between the sedentary and urban world in the garden of Islam and the nomadic barbarism of his disenfranchised neighbors.When Ibn Khaldun sat in a village in Oran in 1377 "with ideas running through my head like cream in a churn" to write the most admired work of history and political philosophy of the Middle Ages The Tower of Darkness 117 Throughout the Late Middle Ages, survival and success of Islam depended on the ability of civilization to combat the extraterrestrial forces that challenged it from the deserts and steppes.

With the exception of the Magyars and (to a small extent) the Bulgars, no fully nomadic people had been successfully absorbed into Christendom; India fell prey to the invading Turks, whom it never managed to convert; China assimilated the Mongol conquerors, but emasculated them in the process, rather than channeling their energies into the service of the host civilization, as Islam did. Islam's unique achievement in this regard was one of the great formative influences on the late medieval world. The transformation of the Turks and the Mongols ensured that Central Asia remained Muslim, while helping to ensure that the Indian Ocean connected primarily Muslim shores, that the ancient trade routes that traversed both spaces were controlled by Muslims, and that the hand of work of Islam will be renewed. with battlefield fodder for an expanding frontier. THE LIMITS OF ISLAM It was only at its northwestern edge that the limits of Islam diminished in the late Middle Ages. Traditional historiography presents the expulsion of Islam from the Iberian Peninsula as a continuous process that began almost at the time of the Berber invasion of 711 and continued, of course with controls and interruptions, but without any significant change of spirit, until the fall of Grenade. in 1492. Indeed, the Christian reconquest was the work of widespread outbreaks of frenzy in the tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, and fifteenth centuries. The 13th century losses to Islam were decisive, extensive, and never reversed. At that time, Muslim Spain formed a coherent political world with the Maghreb. In the history of Islam's wealthy Mediterranean outposts, the Sahara played a role similar to that of the Near and Middle Eastern steppes. A formidable but short-lived entity was imposed on the region in the 11th and 12th centuries by two movements of frenzied desert ascetics, each known as the Almoravids (al-Murabitun, garrison people, meaning ascetic retreat and warfare). holy) . ). and Almohads (al-Muwahhidun, adherents to the Unity of God). But ancient movements are dying, charismatic leaders are dying, and desert warriors are being corrupted by the quiet life of the civilizations they are conquering. Historically, all political authority in Western Islam has tended to be overthrown by one of three means: conquest from without, usurpation for extreme ends, and coup from within. After nearly a century of rule, the Almohad state succumbed to a combination of all three. In Spain, Christian opportunists, the kings of Portugal, Castile and Aragon, encouraged by a minaret in the Hassan Mosque in Rabat, began celebrating their victory over a coalition of Spanish Christian kingdoms at Alarco in 1195.

Earlier generations, whose good and evil the Almohads despised, borrowed motifs from Almohad architecture, particularly the arches so prominent here, and fused them into a new and terrifying beauty. The look of rigor and strength is close to his ideology of selflessness and devotion to jihad. a mixture of crusading zeal and a worldly, chivalrous love of "shares" - he parceled out Majorca and most of the Islamic mainland to aristocratic patrons of colonization and exploration. In the eastern Maghreb, the Hafsids, the family of the local governor, seized power; in the middle by the Banu 'Abd al-Wad, a tribe established by the Almohads to maintain control; to the west by a predatory tribe from the south, the Banu Marin. In the 1330s and 1340s, Ibn Khaldun served as a high official in the courts of these three Maghrebi states in Tunis, Fez, and Tlemcen. His theory of his history as the interplay of tension between sedentary civilization and the savagery behind it reflected his actual life experience. Marinid Morocco, for example, was founded in an act of nomadic aggression, but by the time they eradicated the last Almohad strongholds in 1269, the Banu Marin had already begun to adopt the culture of their reluctant hosts. Sultan Abu Yusuf built a pleasure palace on the outskirts of Fez to commemorate his victory and dabbled in learning and bibliophile. The Tower of Darkness 119 But before the sandstorm of Berber militancy lost its fury, it spilled over and nearly buried a major state at the far end of the Sahara, where the Almoravids coveted the gold of the black African empire of Ghana. This pagan kingdom has been admired or coveted by Muslim writers since the eighth century, and is credited with a much older history that began with the arrival of a white culture hero from the north. In fact, there is no reason to believe that there was more than purely indigenous development among the Soninke of the upper Niger, who were able to exploit their dominant position on the gold routes leading north to the Maghreb markets. The desert formed a vast frontier, almost impenetrable to invaders; On the other hand, they defied the Almoravid armies with some success, until in 1076 their capital Kumbi, with its stone palace, fell, presumably after a defiant siege, if the tradition of massacring commoners persists.

It is true. Norse political influence did not last, but Islam was firmly entrenched. By the middle of the next century, Ghana was considered a model of Islamic property, with its king worshiping the true caliph and administering justice with exemplary accessibility. His palace well built; its artwork and stained glass windows; the enormous natural gold that was the symbol of his authority; the gold ring with which he tied his horse; his silk clothing; their elephants and giraffes: all projected to the rest of the Islamic world an image of strange magnificence, along with Muslim sympathies. It didn't last. After a long period of stagnation or decline, the Soninke state was overrun by pagan invaders and Kumbi was eventually destroyed. but Islam was already widespread enough among Sahelian warriors and traders to maintain a foothold south of the Sahara for the rest of the Middle Ages. On Islam's eastern frontier, the advance achieved in the West across the Sahara barrier roughly a century later was accompanied by the establishment of a permanent Muslim state, or at least one with a ruling Muslim elite, within the Indian subcontinent. India was the Cinderella civilization of our millennium: beautiful, talented, destined for greatness, but relegated to the back ladder of Islam and Christianity by these domineering sisters. A history of the first millennium AD would have to give India enormous weight: the subcontinent was home to a single civilization characterized by elements of a common culture that coincided with its geographical boundaries; his achievements in art, science, literature, and philosophy were formatively exported to China and Islam; and it was a rising civilization that created its own colonial New World in Southeast Asia. With incredible speed, inspiration seemed to dry up around the turn of the millennium, vision turned inward, and the connection dissolved. While previous generations of Muslim scholars regarded India with great reverence, al-Biruni, who turned in the 1020s to seek more knowledge from the same source, was disappointed with what the monsoons had done to turn the Arabian Sea in Muslim. The Indian pilgrim ship depicted in this 1238 Iraqi manuscript of al-Hariri's Maqamaat is fitted with square sails to better take advantage of the tailwind in both directions. The deck shed was a feature of South Asian ships; see page 138. Note the hold below and the ingenious mechanism of the stern rudder which evidently astonished the artist. The small pillar in front of the captain at the helm could be a binnacle. The Tower of Darkness 121 what he saw. Indian science, he discovered, "is based on the ignorance of the people." Political dissolution went hand in hand with cultural decline. The great states that had occupied most of the subcontinent in a shaky balance since the early ninth century collapsed under the strain of mutual competition and the influence of invaders and insurgents. The wealthy temples of North India fell victim to opportunistic invaders from Afghanistan. At first, Muslim adventurism was of the smash-and-grab type; systematic The last written records are said to have been thrown into the sea for protection

German colonial authorities in 1886, but Kilwa's ravaged splendor is evoked by the remains of the mosque, probably one of many monuments originally erected in the late 12th century. Convenient for the gold, ivory, and salt trade from the East African hinterland (see p. 122), Kilwa was a major Indian Ocean trading center with a well-established Muslim community at the turn of the millennium. In the late Middle Ages, the dome of his mosque was lined with blue and white porcelain bowls from China. The decline that left it in ruins began with Portuguese competition and became irreversible after the Zimba invaders massacred the remaining citizens in 1587. Conquest was not attempted until the late 12th century. The first permanent Muslim state, the Sultanate of Delhi, was not founded until 1206, in the traditional tradition of a Turkish general disowning his mistress to make her conquests a state of his own. In the 13th century, the sultanate was limited to the Punjab and the Ganges valley. Even when Alauddin Khalji (r. 1296-1316) conquered Malwa and briefly threatened to impose his rule or hegemony over the entire subcontinent, he outnumbered many Hindu states. His turbulent life was a metaphor for the changing fortunes of the state he ruled. He was a usurper who wiped out the surviving members of the founding dynasty, called himself "the new Alexander", imitated the prophet of Islam and invented a new religion. When his dreams crumbled and his achievements were lost, he "bite his meat in anger." Muhammad Ibn Tughluq made a similar but more disciplined attempt to unify India from Delhi in the 1330s, but his success was short-lived. The next attempt, at the beginning of the 16th century, had to be launched over the mountains, starting practically from scratch (see chapter 7). The Islamization of conquered populations was also a slow affair, often stalled by rulers anxious to delay the transformation of tax-paying infidels into immunized Muslims. Conversions were few in India, although there were interesting attempts to merge Hindu and Muslim teachings from time to time in the 15th and 16th centuries. But without the drive of conquest, Islam seemed almost unable to expand for most of the first half of the millennium. By a curious symmetry, the sandy shores of the Sahara were mirrored by the shores of the Indian Ocean, which bordered the lands of Islam to the east. Both were empty regions traversed by ancient trade routes along which Muslims had smuggled and immigrated for centuries without expanding Islam's frontiers. At the turn of the millennium, there were mosques in Dayub and Canton, Kumbi and Kilwa, but they were for visiting merchants and crews, or immigrant craftsmen and professionals, rather than local converts. The fact that Islam did not make much headway in Southeast Asia before the fourteenth century, for example, is astonishing when compared with the progress of the region's Hindu and Buddhist communities. This lack of evangelical mission calls and experience was one of only two visible deficiencies in the Islam team to maintain a world-shaping momentum ahead of competing civilizations in the first half of the millennium. The other mistake was a negative demographic trend compared to Christianity.

(Video) What Humans Will Look Like In 1,000 Years

THE VIEW OF MIMBAR Of all the enemies that Islam has absorbed or contained, only the plague has been invincible. Like the Mongols, it was an invader of the steppes, where "a permanent reservoir of infection" still exists among wild rodents. His transmission was dirty, his effect relentless, his treatment unknown. The fleas either spit the bacillus ingested from the rat's blood into the bloodstream of human victims or transmitted the infection by defecating over their bites. In septicemic plague, one of the first symptoms is usually death. If not, it can be delayed by the appearance of unsightly, small, bulbous bumps like Brazil nuts, or large, warts like grapefruits, on the neck and groin or behind the ears. Tremors, retching, dizziness, and pain, often accompanied by photophobia, can occur before fainting and exhaustion. When the Black Death broke out in Cairo in 1347, the bumps were smeared with Armenian clay. In Andalusia, Ibn Khatib advised against corn, cheese, mushrooms and garlic. Decoctions of barley water and basil syrup were widely prescribed. The Turks cut off the heads of the boils and removed the green glands. Just as devastating as the physical suffering was the psychological ruin caused by a mysterious, rationally inexplicable visit that shattered morale. It seemed to an Egyptian observer that "everything was dead, even the year itself." Ibn Khaldun's description is famous, but bears repeating: Civilization has shrunk with the decline of humanity. Cities and buildings were left bare, roads and landmarks abandoned, villas and palaces deserted; Tribes and dynasties were wiped out. It was as if the voice of existence had called the world to oblivion and the world had answered the call. In most of Western Christianity the plague was probably no less virulent than in Islam. In both civilizations, recurrences became common throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages and until the late 17th century. In Islam, however, it appears that the effects were more long-lasting, permanent, and in most cases fatal. Europe recovered faster and held up better in the long term. The slow shift in the balance of the world's resources and means in favor of Christianity may have begun with the Black Death. Yet from the perspective of future galactic museum owners, our millennium seems to be the millennium of Islam rather than the millennium of the West. The change of initiative, though in some respects it may have begun in the late Middle Ages, was long-lasting. Islam remained the fastest growing civilization in the world until the second half of the era; The entire so-called early modern period, from the 16th to the 18th century, was actually a period of transition. If the current Islamic revival (see Chapter 19) continues into the next millennium, the intervening centuries of unchallenged Western supremacy will fade or dwindle to the dimensions of a strange but insignificant speck. 124 THE DOCKS OF I N I T I A ​​​​T I V

The world as seen by al-Istakhri of Persia in the mid-10th century. Despite its schematic form, this map was the work of a geographer who believed in supplementing theoretical knowledge with travel. He was a key figure in the transmission of the tradition of the Balkh School of Geography in Persia. The notes he provided to Ibn Hawkal formed the basis of the most influential Arabic geographical compendium of the first part of the present millennium. Europe is the little triangle in the lower right corner. In the first half of our millennium, the supremacy of Islam was partly a matter of perspective. Their core areas were at the center of the island-land, the landmass of the "known world", from where traders could travel, conquerors could reach out and grab, or scholars could survey all of Oikoumene. AlIshtaqri's 10th-century world map is an important document for understanding millennium history because it shows the breadth of vision of a Fars or Balkh worldview over the limited perspective available to civilizations like China and Latin Christianity, which had their centers turned towards the force of gravity near the edges of the sea. Islam was well informed on both sides of the accessible world. Latinos and Chinese were just getting to know each other. In the second half of the millennium, Islam lost this privilege of seeing, as new ocean vistas opened up and the visible range from vantage points along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts expanded. From the crow's nest, the watcher could see more of the world than the muezzin in the Tower of Darkness. Chapter 4 THE WORLD BEHIND THE WIND: CHINA AND ITS NEIGHBORS from her, FROM Sung TO MING. The final farewell was not given until dawn on July 4, 1170, at the foot of a new pontoon bridge a few miles northwest of Shanyin. Lu Yu was on his way to take over a prefecture in Szechuan in the entire Chinese Empire. It was an honorable and lucrative position, but a long and challenging journey, and the elected mayor's health was poor. His siblings and friends accompanied him on the first leg of his overland route to the Ch'ien Tang River for a carefree farewell ceremony. He left behind a journal of what was effectively a transshipment of the Empire, towed by barge almost a thousand miles down the Yangtze River like a tiny particle pumped along China's main artery. His impressions of his country are full of satisfaction: by the novelty of this first wharf, by the prosperous trade, by the ships crowded together "like the teeth of a comb." He was amazed at the war-readiness of seven hundred great river galleons, which with their "speed of flight would break huge waves."

The rumble of battle drums and the display of brightly colored pennants. He celebrated the many signs of increasing prosperity, such as the East Park in I-cheng, "formerly vast and magnificent, then thorny and desolate", now "rebuilt like a garden after only about forty years" by the diligence of citizens. She traveled between respectful stops at hospitable monasteries, walks through parks and pauses to contemplate hundred-year-old cypresses. At each stop, she accepted invitations "to dine and drink" among plates decorated with pyramids of alum, in freezing rooms with mounds of ice. His hosts were educated provincial officials like his distant relative Lu Chung-Kao, who had been banished from the capital in an episode of factional fighting but whose initial bitterness had dissipated with the recognition. With the indifference of a scholar, Lu Yu does not reveal the menu. The exoticism of Hangchow restaurants – ash-cooked pork, fragrant seafood, lotus seed soup – would be out of place, though the ideal Confucian diet of rice with fresh or pickled vegetables would be complemented by fish and meat to show respect for the Guest range. Throughout the book, Lu Yu recorded the beauty of nature, the blessings of peace, and the evidence of the longevity of Chinese civilization. He looked back with a sense of satisfaction and a sense of history as he surveyed over a thousand years of the past through the monuments he visited. The Southern Dynasty tombs evoked the tears of a penitent rebel from the fifth century. The stone on which a coup was planned in the third century drew sighs from travelers but laughter from local attendants. As he traveled east, to newer lands with a less respected and less accessible past, his admiration turned more and more to the mountains and Lu Yu's earnest, decent entertainment with provincial officials: the elaborately decorated tables and decorations. arranged, the ritual toasts, the literary conversation... it reflected scenes of court social life painted by Ku Hung-chung in the 10th century. With crockery on lacquered tables and the shameless luxury of a musician. 128 THE DOCKS OF THE INITIATIVE Caves. As he approached Tzu-kuei, he was impressed by the proverbial and immutable Yellow Ox Mountain with its population of wild monkeys, and marveled at the Jade Void Grotto, whose glittering interior was transformed by nature into "a thousand immortals, dragons, tigers." , birds." and wild beasts." However, nature was meant to be enjoyed from a greater distance. Civilization has always seemed to outsmart the environment: open cave rapids, for example, with patterned rocks "as if written in a wizard's spell", could be circumnavigated in a palanquin. Even in the wildest and poorest areas of the country, Lu Yu's sense of belonging to the people around him was never compromised. A China that he recognized was always around him. The modesty of the outpost he frequented in Pa-tung was compensated for by a subprefecture

Residence of incomparable beauty, where an ambitious official, willing to carry out the literary cult of rural happiness, "could sleep and eat in the pavilion and his pleasure would have no limits." One exchange rate that Lu Yu noticed affected the country's economic productivity. In Kweichou province, for example, an entire province of wheat, millet, and non-glutinous rice could only assess the value of a single family's production in prosperous Kiangsu. The province to which he was assigned, despite its remoteness, possessed an enviable wealth of salt, forest products, tea, and cereals. Together, Szechuan's Ch'eng tu-Fu and Tzu-Chou prefectures had 22 population centers that produced annual tax revenues of between ten and fifty thousand strings of money, more than any other prefecture in the Sung Empire outside of the lower Yangtze. The border described in the first chapter was drawn towards the interior of the empire, both culturally and economically. Throughout the Chinese cultural sphere, particularly in the north, but probably also in the Sung Empire, population growth appears to have plateaued and begun to decline from a peak recorded in the census of 1124, when twenty million households were claimed. However, the authorities were still not alarmed, and the Empire remained the incomparably strongest state in the world in terms of income and manpower. But Lu Yu's complacency did not diminish. The Jürchen wars, which devastated his beloved Ostpark, dismembered the former territory of the Reich. The northern plain and most of the Yellow River Basin were in Jurchen hands, while the Mandate of Heaven was again divided between the Sung and Chin, as it had been between the Sung and Liao. China had survived many of these divisions in the past; Since 361, when the northerners became desperate to create a river fleet capable of conquering the south, the twin kingdoms have acquired the habit of mutual passivity and shared values ​​of richissez-vous. Paradoxically, however, a greater threat would emerge in the next century from a power that, at terrible cost to Lu Yu's world, would restore a level of political unity not seen in China since the Tang dynasty. Around the time of Lu Yu's journey across the Yangtze, on the banks of the Onon, in the barren and wild land of present-day Outer Mongolia, the Fant Temujin, the future Genghis Khan, was inaugurated. in a program of war exercises that would equip him for one of the most ambitious plans of conquest ever conceived. The Jack Tail Carriers Sung China was so crisscrossed by rivers, so choked with rice paddies, so dotted with cities, and so poorly supplied with grazing land that it was almost untouchable by purely nomadic armies. In contrast, the Jurchen Empire of the Chin Dynasty, which encompassed the Great Wall to the north, was open to invaders. The ancient ossified and sinicized barbarians fell prey to Genghis Khan, just as the Khitans, in turn, fell to the Jurchen. China began to work its charms on these new recruits as soon as they arrived in the 1120s. The founder of the Chin Empire, Wu-ch'i-mai, bathed in the river with his

Warlike tribe like any nomadic chief, but favored Chinese administrators and admired Chinese art. Jurchen father and statesman, Hsi-yin, was a former shaman who amassed a collection of classical Chinese literature when his people conquered the city that would later become Beijing. From the seventh to the ninth decade of the century, ancient nomadic virtues of simplicity and austerity battled against a rear guard led by an emperor steeped in Confucian tradition and whose admiration for an ideal barbarian lifestyle - a pure model of pastoral virtue - - it was itself a testament to his personal immersion in a Chinese mindset. In 1191, the repeal of an old and never applied law against intermarriage marked a decisive return of Jürchen policy in favor of Chinese customs. The nomadic values ​​abandoned by the Jurchen were personified by Genghis Khan. The fascination he held for admirers of untouched barbarism is well illustrated by the story of Ch'ang Chun, a Taoist sage, who was summoned to him in 1219 - "Long years in the caves of the rocks" the sage had a reputation unsurpassed for bringing holiness; however, at age 71, "at the first call of the Dragon's Judgment", he agreed to embark on an arduous three-year journey to meet the Khan at Perwali, at the foot of the Hindu Kush. There were some principled sacrifices that he did not want to make even for the sake of Genghis Khan: for example, he refused to travel accompanied by recruits for the khan's harem, and in Samarkand he refused to go further "to any country, where the vegetables were not available." But with twenty Mongolian guards and nineteen students, he traveled through some of the most difficult countries in the world: through the Gobi desert, through "mountains of great cold" and into Dzungaria, where the company brought the heads of their horses with their blood. tainted downed demonic attackers The Taoist man of peace may have felt uncomfortable in the presence of a barbarian chieftain whose greatest delight was "to shed the blood of my enemies and wring tears from their wives." the trip was very friendly, judging by the language of a stele written by one of the sage's disciples in honor of the khan: “Heaven tired of China's excessive luxury. I stay in the northern desert. I return to simplicity and seek again moderation. As for the clothes I wear and the food I eat, I have the same rags and food as the cowboys and grooms, and I treat the soldiers like my brothers." As a propaganda image, it was successful; as a formula, it was invincible. in military victory Genghis Khan spent most of his time on other fronts, and though the Jurchens resisted with a bravery he admired, ceding territory bit by bit for a total of 23 years, the Chin Empire was no more capable than anyone else. of his other victims, to reverse his fate or convincingly challenge his claim to have been chosen by God as the universal conqueror.

impressive huge permanent powers; mobilization of complex logistical support; organization of siege convoys; and to exploit the fiscal potential of the countries conquered for the war. The conquest of China made the Mongols masters of positional warfare. In the early 14th century, the world history illustrators of Rashid al-Din were evidently impressed by the technical prowess of Mongol forces in conducting sieges. Praised by Marco Polo, the new generation of ballistae capable of throwing a 300-kilogram stone was widely illustrated, here accompanied by an Arab engineer. The Mongols were adept at harnessing foreign know-how: in 1253, a thousand Chinese engineers accompanied Hulagu's western campaign. 110. The Downwind World 131. The Mongol conquest of Sung China, which was repeatedly delayed and interrupted, took some forty years to complete: it was not until 1276 that the Mongol general Bayan was able to announce that the south and north had "become a family." The experience has transformed male and female conquerors. For the Mongols, the century that began under the brave Genghis Khan was coming to an end under the gouty Kublai. Genghis Khan fought under the shadow of a yak-tailed banner and Kublai grew fat under the shade of an umbrella. While the founder of the dynasty traveled on horseback, his grandson needed four elephants to carry him, and while a simple tent was good enough to house his ancestors, Kublai Khan had an imposing pleasure dome built at Shan-tung. with golden sticks Here, too, there was ample evidence of the Khan's enduring Mongol tastes: in the white mares that grazed the grounds, whose milk was reserved for his exclusive use; in Kumiss's libations, with which he honored his ancestral gods; in the constant diet of meat served at his banquets; in the freedom with which he selected senior officials from outside the traditional Confucian elite, indeed outside of China; and in the religious eclecticism of his court, which led him to repeat to Marco Polo, in a leafy version, views on the equivalence of different religions very similar to those of his predecessor, the ostensibly tolerant Mongka Khan (see the chapter Seen from the Air in 1938 Beijing still conveys the character of an armed camp given to it by Kublai Khan when he established his court there, but Kublai was emphatically a Chinese emperor as well, performing the appropriate rites, dressing in Chinese, learning the language, promoting the arts, that it protected the traditions and promoted the interests of its Chinese subjects. The traces of its passage through Chinese history are perhaps most pronounced today in Beijing. and difficult to provide The city that has remained the capital ever since, with interruptions. No no buildings of the Kublai survive, but the rectangular shape of the old city was designed by its Muslim immigrant architect.

East. The layout of the streets in geometric regularity, with avenues wide enough for nine horsemen galloping in parallel, reflects his choice. The rammed-earth wall is gone, but the surrounding underground continues its course, marked for all by the ring of apartment blocks fifteen stories above. The old imperial palace still stands where Kublai erected it, though the buildings he built are long gone and the park is empty of the tents with which he filled it with nostalgia for the nomadic past of the Mongols. Kublai's rule also drew Chinese attention to previously unknown horizons. By Chinese standards, the Sung were a cosmopolitan dynasty that established a coastal capital and promoted trade as a better means of generating income, as one emperor put it in 1145, "than taxing the people." However, the Mongol tradition of world conquest was far more dynamic than the Chinese Mandate of Heaven concept, which equated China with the world and despised the barbarian fringe as unworthy and ungrateful of the Chinese conquest effort. Genghis Khan's legacy demanded that his heirs rule the world with a firm hand. Not all Confucian traditionalists in southern China were ready to collaborate with the Kublai regime, but those who were had to change their minds. For example, for Chou Ta-kuan, who attended a Chinese embassy in Cambodia in 1296, Heaven's mandate included the obligation to "scatter over the four seas." Kublai's conquest of Burma and his campaigns against Vietnam, Java, and Japan helped expand the Chinese worldview, fostering the accumulation of geographic and ethnographic data from afar, and ushering in an era that lasted until the fifteenth century: values expansionists were well balanced with traditional Chinese isolationism. THE LANDS OF MANY UMBRELLAS Chou Ta-kuan's account of Cambodia opens a direct window from China into the jealous world of rival cultures and states that competed with each other in medieval Southeast Asia. This was a world with many highly civilized communities, but without a dominant state or unifying culture or shared sense of identity. From the 13th to the 16th century, the region was transformed by the collapse of a Sanskrit culture inherited from the "Indianization" era of the previous millennium; through the cultural achievements of Sinhalese Buddhism; by the incursions of Islam; by the collapse of the old empires; and the rise of new states founded by peoples with different identities, Burmese and Thai. Chou captured the look of Cambodia in a still-bright era, when King Srindravarman's "one white umbrella" swept across a country where many umbrellas of competing claimants snapped open and closed at a time of disputed succession. Chou noted that "although this is a land of barbarians, they know how to treat a king." Srindravarman rode in a golden litter behind curtains that the girls parted with the sound of conch shells to reveal the king on his lion-skin throne. That

everyone banged their heads against the ground until the projectiles stopped and the drama ended. Chou's disgust was aroused by some barbaric habits. He lamented the open display of his preferences for homosexuals, who, curiously, seemed to have been particularly insistent on recruiting Chinese. He condemned the fickleness of Khmer women, whose fidelity could not survive a two-week separation. He was fascinated by accounts of the ritual deflowering of virgins by the intrusive fingers of specially hired monks, although monastic jokes were a topos of Confucian literature and Chou's information may not have been true. His appreciation of everything was marred by the unbearable heat, which he claimed encouraged excessive bathing, leading to an increase in illness. The savage tribes of the forests and mountains, killing each other with bows, spears, and poisons, filled him with terror. On the other hand, his admiration for essential Khmer urbanity shines through in his account of a city easily identifiable as Angkor. "We believe that it was these monuments that from the very beginning inspired Chinese merchants to extol Cambodia as a rich and noble country," he wrote, describing the Seven Mile Wall and the Five Gates. On the east side, golden lions flank a golden bridge supported by huge pillars topped with Buddhas. A golden tower in the center of the city was surmounted by a copper one. In the royal palace, the bedroom was at the top of a third tower, also made of gold, where political stability was said to be ensured by the king's nocturnal copulation with a nine-headed serpent. All the gold attested to the value of Cambodia's exports, as none was produced locally. Much of Cambodia's recent history can be read in Chou's remarks. Most of the monuments he admired dated from the reign of the great king Jayavarman VII, who died some three-quarters of a century ago. The Bayon at Angkor Thom was built by Jayavarman VII to house a Buddha in the late 12th or early 13th century, when the Hindu character of the court tradition was being eroded by Buddhist influence. The intricately carved hill-shaped chambers surrounded the "Golden Tower" that so impressed Chou Tai-kuan. In front. Angkor Thom's walls, moat, south gate and towers were just the centerpiece of a massive construction campaign that surrounded the capital with shrines and palaces, way stations and, it was said, more than a hundred hospitals adorned with faces. giant humans. No other people on Earth, except perhaps the Maya of Mesoamerica, had ever built on such a scale, with such limited technology, and in such a humid environment. The bayon - chou "golden tower" - had a solid central mass, reflecting the central hills of the ancient capitals; however, its inner chamber did not contain the Hindu Devaraja image of earlier reigns, but rather a Buddha intended to symbolize the apotheosis of the founding king, whose images, although Indian "cultural colonization" in Southeast Asia waned after the turn of the millennium,

Sanskrit inscriptions were still being made: this example from Angkor, with its praise of Jayavarman's bravery, knowledge, skill and other virtues, dates from the 12th century, when Cambodia was still "full of experts in the Veda". Others survive to the 1330s. "Looked in every direction" from the exterior friezes. The transition to a predominantly Buddhist court culture initiated by Jayavarman was still ongoing, although Hindu roots ran deep. Under Jayavarman's reign, a Brahmin scholar from Burma could still travel to Cambodia because he was full of "eminent experts in the Veda". Sanskrit inscriptions, which disappeared from the neighboring kingdom of Champa in 1253, continued to be made in Cambodia until the 1330s. At terrible cost, Kublai Khan recorded only fleeting successes in Southeast Asia: in Java, a native prince was persuaded to replace another, with no lasting gains for the Chinese. In Champa and Vietnam, the tribute was levied at a rate insufficient to reimburse the cost of the campaigns. On all of these targets, the Chinese experience was similar: initial military success was thwarted by the inability to maintain remote control of enemy populations. Java, which, had it been more accessible, might have become the first colony of the world's first long-distance maritime empire, was protected from the monsoons. On China's other major coast, in the northeast, expansion has been hampered by more severe and less predictable weather and maritime obstacles. Japan, which Kublai worked hard to conquer, creating and rebuilding an invasion fleet and wiping out the doomed Korean and Jurchen tributary armies, proved invincible, not because of Japanese resistance, weakened by lack of practice against the invaders, but because of due to the treacherous and capricious weather of the sea that had to be crossed. Kublai's two invading forces were scattered or trapped by typhoons, the kamikaze "divine winds" that make the leeward shores a death trap in summer. In two respects, however, the ambitious reach of Kublai's imperialism had a lasting impact. First, he confirmed how things were already going in some neighboring states: a fierce nationalism based on distancing from a supposed Chinese enemy in Korea and Vietnam; isolationism and shyness in Japan; Cultural change and political dissolution in Southeast Asia. In Sarawak, for example, where the great island empire of Srivijaya or San fo-Chi had previously ruled, Marco Polo's return reported only a group of misclassified chiefs: one of the cannibals, one of the tailed men, one of the was devoured by the "law of wild beasts", both Kublai's invasions of Japan were thwarted: the first repelled and the second destroyed by "divine winds". Encounters with the Japanese were brief and they fought mainly with arrows: in the skirmish fought by the first task force, the Chinese had already run out of arrows by the time the wind changed. In the Japanese memorial scroll, much emphasis is placed on the attacks of the heroic archer Takezaki, who is in charge here.

a boarding party on a war junk. The world downwind 137 with an economy based on camphor, and one - the only one he knew firsthand - where Muslim influence had settled on the coast, while the interior was left to the "beastly tribes of the mountains." mountains". The Japanese complacently rejected the Chinese worldview. When the next Chinese dynasty tried to restore traditional relations with Japan, demands for tribute were met with conviction and threats of invasion with scorn. Instead, the Japanese offered a vision of a politically pluralistic cosmos and a concept of territorial sovereignty: “Heaven and earth are vast; they are not monopolized by a ruler. The universe is great and vast, and the various countries were created to participate in its domain. Second, Kublai's campaigns in China itself stimulated scientific curiosity and commercial greed. The Java Expedition brought back a map of the island, perhaps one of the first examples of what was to become a great school of cartography, the entire production of which was lost: in the mid-14th century, the Javanese king Hayan Wuruk commissioned a cartographical investigation exhaustive. I N I T I A ​​​​T I VE from your island; When the Portuguese arrived in the early 16th century, their explorations of the East Indies apparently depended on Javanese maps. China's native cartography was stimulated to new conquests, gathering information about the vast world from the reports of sailors. Chu Ssu-Pen's (1273-1337) world map includes most of the islands of the Indian Ocean and an incredibly realistic depiction of Africa with its South, South Cape and inland lakes. The invasion of Java, which demonstrated Chinese naval and military power in the China Sea, must have helped Chinese merchants operating in distant waters. Where conquests failed, diplomatic missions strove to promote trade. Chou ta-Kuan, for example, has compiled lists of Chinese products that are in demand in Cambodia and Cambodian products that can be sold in China. Judging from the surviving temple reliefs, Hayan Wuruk's Java, one of the Bayon reliefs, captured the maritime backdrop of Southeast Asian civilization in the late Middle Ages. Javanese boats—although they appear on few temple reliefs and none from the Hayan Wuruk period—certainly belonged to the tradition of this 13th-century Cambodian scene, which should be compared with the Indian boat of the same period, p. 120. Note here on the large merchant ship the square sails, the protruding stern -also a feature of Chinese junks-, the shed on deck, and the hoisting mechanism on the bow. The sea is teeming with fish and fishing boats, and a pleasure boat is also provided. World Downwind 139 does not seem like much of a maritime power to its inhabitants. The scenes represented show organized villages of wooden houses supported on pillars on stone terraces. Farmers plow flooded rice fields or provoke water buffalo over them to break up and fertilize the soil. The women harvest and cook the rice.

Orchestras play gongs with sticks to inspire masked dancers. These details form a portrait of an agrarian society and a self-sufficient economy anchored in traditional rhythms and rituals. The island's flourishing trade must have served the needs of an elite tempted by foreign luxury rather than the chances of a commercial revolution. When the revolution took place at the end of the 14th century AD. C., Java should have been well placed to benefit. The island's northern ports probably already had shipyards dominating Indonesian waters when the first European invaders arrived. Even in Latin Christianity, the island was reputed to be the point of origin or transshipment for all spices from the East. To a cosmic observer, it might seem like Java's time: Far more than the remote, backward, and dwindling states of Western Europe, the island looked like a potential launching pad for an empire of long-distance trade and conquest. Hayan Wuruk himself appears to have had dazzling imperial ambitions. His thoughts are captured in a poem written by his childhood companion, Winada-Prapañca, a Buddhist scholar in the royal chancery. The Nagara Kertagama of 1365 is a eulogy of the ruler, an exercise in intimidation of the locals, and a manifesto of dynamic and aggressive politics. He lovingly describes the wonders of the royal Majapahit compound with its iron gates and "diamond-encrusted" watchtower. While Majapahit is said to be like the moon and the sun, the rest of the kingdom's cities "in great numbers" have "the appearance of stars". Hayan Wuruk, in his royal advances, travels across the land in countless wagons, or is carried through the capital in his lion-throned palanquin, to the sound of kettledrums and battle drums, conch shells, trumpets and singers, to receive homage in Sanskrit verses. of foreign courts. He is both "Buddha in body" and "Shiwa incarnate". Indeed, his empire, which according to the poet is incomparably famous throughout the world except India, occupied little more than half of the island of Java. But Hayan Wuruk wanted to make it bigger. The poet's list of tributaries stretches across Sumatra, Borneo, southern Malaysia, Celebes, and the eastern islands of Timur and Sumba and as far north as the Talaud Islands. Protectorates are claimed in northern Malaya, Siam, Cambodia, and Annam; the poet even submits China and India to his master. "The other continents," he boasts, "are already preparing to obey the august prince." Rival trading empires on Sumatra appear to have been crushed by the Majapahit. Trade is generally good for peace; but the sudden expansion of trade whets the territorial appetite. The late medieval boom in Southeast Asia forced the Indian states to hold on and attracted Chinese conquerors and settlers. THE MING MENAGERIE On a summer day in 1415, the Emperor of China, accompanied by a vast retinue of courtiers, hastened as swiftly as the dignity of the occasion suited to the Feng-tien Gate of Peking to receive an award.

foreign arrival brought by a Chinese fleet from Malindi, across the Indian Ocean. The court met with suppressed curiosity, as only one such visitor had been received, and at that time, the previous year, no proper ceremony had been arranged. If the reception had been for a purely human guest, the occasion would not have been so auspicious, but this time the newcomer was a creature supposedly of divine origin. According to an eyewitness, he had “the body of a deer and the tail of an ox, and a fleshy drawing of Shen Tu's ch'i-lin, or unicorn, of Bengal was copied by Ch'en T'ingpi, among others. , and the other exotic creatures in the imperial collection have generally become favorites of artists. beyond the wind 141 Boned horn, with luminous spots like a red or purple mist. He walks imposingly, observing a rhythm in each of his movements. Led by the confusion with the mythical ch'i-lin, or unicorn, the same observer explained: "His harmonious voice sounds like a bell or a musical flute." But even this flight of fancy couldn't hide the true identity of what was actually a giraffe. The giraffe carried an assurance of divine benevolence, which was evident, for example, in the lines addressed to the emperor by the artist Shen Tu, who had made a life drawing of the first giraffe to appear at the Ming court: The ministers and all the people gathered to marvel at it, and there is no end to their joy. I, his servant, have heard that when a sage possesses the virtue of supreme benevolence, so that he illuminates the darkest places, then a Ch'i-Lin appears. This shows that the virtue of his Majesty is equal to that of Heaven. His merciful blessings have spread so widely that their harmonious vapors have been emitting chi-lin as endless blessings to the state for countless, countless years. Despite this, the emperor was reluctant to show excessive zeal. When

When the first giraffe arrived, he declined congratulations from his ministers, stating that "even without a giraffe, nothing stands in the way of good governance." When the second came, he said that he would rather have a copy of the Classic Five. However, he prepared himself to face it. Giraffes were just two of many strange new creatures to join the imperial collection in the early 15th century. The animals were kept in a part of the Imperial Park where, despite the intimidating name "Forbidden Forest", admirers were invited to marvel as in a modern zoo. In 1419, a fleet returning from Hormuz brought "strange birds". An inscription reported: "They all craned their necks and gleefully looked and kicked, they were terrified and terrified," and those were the courtiers, not the birds. The zoo acquired lions, leopards, ostriches, dromedaries, zebras, rhinos and antelopes, as well as giraffes and the incredible realization of a mythical animal, the Touou-yii. Drawings made the latter creature resemble a white tiger with black spots, while written descriptions portrayed "a beautiful animal" that did not tread grass, was strictly vegetarian, and appeared "only under a prince of perfect benevolence and sincerity." ". . Truly, he seemed to Shen Tu, "all creatures of good fortune come." The zoo's inhabitants and their countries of origin - Bengal, Arabia, East Africa - have demonstrated the survival of Chinese interest on the world stage since Kublai Khan. Chinese trade traversed the Indian Ocean for centuries: it lined the interior of the dome of the Kilwa Mosque with porcelain; The "buried history of Tanganyika" was unearthed in thousands of bluish-white and jade-green shards in the first half of the millennium. Shortly before the Mongol invasions, a high-ranking official published the Chu Fan Chih, a detailed description of the South China Sea and the countries of Southeast Asia and India, as a practical guide for commercial travelers. But even by these standards, the politics of the early fifteenth century represented a new departure: it was a time of unprecedented official naval expeditions to the most remote regions of the world known to Chinese geography. The need for the imperial government to become interested in ocean exploration and perhaps ocean expansion was extraordinarily acute. Timur's Central Asian empire revived the threat of conquest from that direction. Just as European explorers were looking for allies behind Islam, the Chinese needed to gather information and identify potential resources in the areas to the south and west of the Timurids. The Indian Ocean, which a hundred years later would be easy prey for Portuguese imperialism, was already highly vulnerable to a predator willing to use force to support commercial initiatives. Businesses in the region were highly lucrative and included spices, aromatic woods, valuable medicines, and exotic animal products; The ships of the Chinese naval expeditions were called treasure ships. In addition, the years of the most intense long-range naval activity since

1402 to 1424 coincided with the reign of one of the most expansive, aggressive, and maritime emperors in Chinese history. Emperor Yung-lo revived much of the clay and some of the designs from Kublai Khan's time. He restored the capital Beijing, invaded Vietnam, and seemed to have conquered it for a while, and interfered in politics in the Malacca region and beyond. For a time, even Japan emerged from isolation by the commercial opportunities eagerly offered to it. Hoards of Chinese coins from medieval Japan, accumulations of trade, and piracy point to the importance of relations with China to the islands' economy; but official trade was sanctioned only for brief periods, punctuated by periods of defiant autarky on the part of Japan. The instrument chosen for his naval ambitions was a Muslim eunuch of Mongolian descent known as Cheng Ho. Every element in the prosopographical description of this admiral marked him as an outsider to the Confucian academic elite that vied for power with the court eunuch establishment. His appointment to head an oceanic task force in 1403 was a triumph for related pressure groups whose interests violated Confucian values: the commercial pressure group, which sought to mobilize naval support for Chinese merchants in the Indian Ocean; the imperialist lobby that wanted to renew Mongol visions of conquest; religious lobbies who wanted to keep state funds out of skeptical or anticlerical Confucian hands by diverting them to other businesses. Cheng Ho led seven expeditions from 1405 to 1433, six of them under Yung-lo's auspices. Its scale and scope were enormous. The first will include 62 junks of the largest ships ever built, 225 support ships and 27,870 men. The ships, judging by a recently discovered rudder post, vindicated the reverent terms of contemporary estimates, displacing perhaps 3,100 tons. By the best available estimate, the seventh voyage, probably the most penetrating, sailed 12,618 miles. The trips lasted an average of two years. In all, they visited at least thirty countries on the ocean's edge, as far south as Zanzibar, as far north as Hormuz, and as far west as Jiddah. Mutual amazement was the fruit of contacts in a previously unique place. Although the official records of Cheng Ho's voyages were destroyed by anti-imperial court lobbying, maps illustrating his general survey of ocean coastlines reappeared in a printed work on the war in 1621. Like the old western portolans, these are diagrams of sailing directions rather than

large scale maps. In the section shown here, the compass routes connecting the ports on both sides of the Arabian Sea are shown: Cheng Ho's surviving navigation instructions are all of the form: "Follow such and such a course for such and such." watch series". The port is marked with its latitude corresponding to the height of Pole Star above the horizon, which Cheng Ho verified using "starboard main": ebony strips of different widths held at a fixed distance from the observer's face to accurately fill the space between the star and the 144 THE SOURCES OF THE INITIATIVE on a large scale with peoples whose previous exchanges with the Chinese had been limited or mediated through young intermediaries, observing the seasons, the weather, the landscapes, and the peoples of the distant L Ander, very surprised, "How can there be such differences in the world? His own travels with Admiral Eunuch convinced him that the reality was even stranger. The arrival of Chinese junks at Middle Eastern ports with cargoes of prized exotic goods caused a stir. Ibn Tighri Birdi described the excitement at the Egyptian court when news arrived that the junks had anchored in Aden and that the The ship's captains had asked the Mamluk sultan for permission to enter the nearest port of Mecca. Despite his impressive strength, Cheng Ho's voyages were designed to display the flag and not permanently hoist it, as was done on European scouting voyages, as a sign of compromised sovereignty. They distributed fabulous gifts to foreign potentates and shrines, and in return collected tributes intended to increase the emperor's standing at home. These exchanges were themselves a form of trade, probably designed to encourage trade of a more conventional nature. However, they demonstrated China's potential as a launching pad for a maritime empire: the capacity and productivity of its shipyards; his ability to organize expeditions of daunting proportions and send them over long distances. Cheng Ho's meetings with the opposition

unequivocally emphasized Chinese superiority. On the first expedition, he was attacked by a Chinese pirate chief who had established his own bandit state in the ancient capital of Srivijaya on Sumatra; The pirates were massacred and their leader sent to China to be executed. On the third voyage, the Sinhalese king of Ceylon tried to arrest Cheng Ho and capture the fleet; The Chinese disbanded his forces, captured his capital, deported him to China, and installed a pretender in his place. On the fourth expedition, a Sumatran chieftain who refused to cooperate in the exchange of tribute was overpowered, kidnapped, and eventually executed. Cheng Ho's own perception of his role seems to have combined an imperialistic impulse with the peaceful inspiration of commerce and science. A stela he erected in 1432 began chauvinistically: "At the junction of seas and continents, the Ming dynasty transcends even Han and Tang... The lands beyond the horizon and the ends of the earth have become subjects. But he added , in deference to merchants and geographers: "However far away they are, their distances and routes can be calculated."The journey Cheng Ho was making when the stele was erected would be his last, and China's last.A Promising Imperial Effort it was abruptly abandoned and never again.China's apparent destiny never materialized, and the world dominance that for a time seemed its own was left to other Western competitors.It only stirs on an empty stomach, as revolts cause Pompeian-born women of prosperity tend to set generically conservative goals.In the mid-14th century, swarms of conscripted peasant laborers flocked to repair the Grand Canal that carried to the necessities of life in Peking were rocked by discontent and classic peasant expectations. They fell victim to grueling patterns of economic misery that, by some estimates, reduced China's population to half its peak; They were survivors of catastrophes: the flooding of the Yellow River in 1344, the prolonged droughts of the following years, the local famine exacerbated by the deterioration of communications. The rhythms of rural life are so slow and unchanging that hopes are often postponed and promises of improvements tend to be rejected. The usual response is to wait and pray for the millennium, occasionally trying to make it happen. The most explosive popular movement among the canal workers of the 1350s had begun nearly nine hundred years ago as the Quietisi sect of Buddhism, patiently awaiting the long-awaited reincarnation of Lord Maitreya. Now, the belief in imminent consummation was refined with a political veneer: the reincarnated Lord would give his followers power over his oppressors. This was a close parallel to contemporary millenarianism.

the Fraticelli in the Christian West, who expected a cosmic hero to snatch new treasures from the depths of the earth, enrich the poor, topple the mighty from their seats, and exalt the lowly and meek. But the cult of the White Lotus became more than just a popular religious movement; it was now a subversive secret society with a mass membership comparable to political Freemasonry in parts of Europe in the 18th century, or the Italian Carbonari or the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Two similar movements coincided and partly combined with it. A dualistic tradition identified Lord Maitreya as Ming Wang, the Prince of Light, whose promised coming would bring to a triumphant end the cosmic struggle of good against evil. At the same time, a popular memory longed for the Sung dynasty, which had been dispersed by the Mongols almost a hundred years ago. This is also characteristic of peasant uprisings throughout the world. Often they are revolutionaries in the true sense of the word, trying to bring the world back to an imagined or barely remembered golden age. A conspiracy created and exploited in 146 by Han Shan-t'ung, the Apologist of the White Lotus, which influenced politics and art. This 1396 gilt bronze Buddha is of Chinese manufacture, but is largely based on an Indian model. But despite the enormous contribution that Buddhist ideology made to the rise of the Ming, mobilizing support and even providing the chosen name for the dynasty, the conservative Confucianism of the academic class reasserted itself once the new dynasty was safely enthroned. See page 148. The combination of the three common myths among peasants: messianic,

Millennial and Wake Up. He declared himself the rightful heir of the Sung, his blood brother Liu Fu-t'ung, "by sacrificing a white horse and a black ox and swearing to heaven and earth and planning to raise armies with a red turban as a sign." ." Han's execution in 1351 sparked a rebellion among the red turban-wearers who were suddenly able to muster tens of thousands into field armies. These peasants were singled out as war fodder for their circumstances: driven from their homes by natural disasters and forced labor projects They rallied to a surprising degree with the citizens of the city Civic patricians generally felt neglected or undermined by the Kublai Khan dynasty, which had an atavistic attraction to cattle ranching and a predilection for advisers However, in the chaos of social upheaval, the lords of misrule arise.The Chinese equivalent of Jack Straw or Huey Long was Kuo Tzu Hsing, son of a fortune teller and butcher's apprentice, who drank heavily with his ragged bodyguards. to the charismatic upstarts who seize power in riots through speech and toughness and rule cities through violence of the mobs. In 1352 he took over the city of Haochou in the north-central province of Anhwei. The most restless city-states falter or disappear; this should become an empire. The founder of the Ming Dynasty was a bodyguard and also a Kuos drinker named Chu Yüan-chang. He was one of the peasant emperors who occasionally pass through Chinese history, of whom Mao Tse-tung was, so to speak, the last. Engaged to a Buddhist monastery as a child, he led the despicable life of a wandering monk, a typical figure of great villainy in Chinese literature. This was a fitting setting for a member of Kuo's entourage. His master took a liking to him and gave him his adoptive daughter in marriage. Fascinatingly tall and ugly, intimidatingly bold and strong, Chu was able to develop a personal following thanks in part to his responsibility for recruiting Kuo's gang. No one could prevent him from usurping the authority Kuo left behind when he died. Haochou was just one of a series of bandit states that flourished in central China in the 1350s and 1360s, protected by the Red Turban Rebellion in the north. Twice the rebels were saved from annihilation by the ambitious policies of the imperial court, where the strongmen who could have ensured victory were disgraced, assassinated, or both. Kublai Khan's dynasty was returned to the heart of Mongolia. Meanwhile, the states built by Chu and his fledglings grew, merged, and became stronger. In 1360, royal power was contested between the three most powerful warlords in the Yangtze region. The Chu forces were numerically the weakest of the three; he was poorly supplied with ships that could be decisive in river warfare; and the centrality of his empire exposed him to attack on two fronts, but perhaps he offered a compensating advantage conferred by internal lines of supply and communication. Coming from behind, he had less to lose than his enemies in campaigns of almost reckless daring. Against all odds, taking initiatives and following a toujours strategy

de l'audace achieved a series of brilliant successes: in 1360 he defeated the neighboring warlord at Nanjing and captured more than a hundred ships sunk in the mud. He was able to lead his own counter-campaign upriver in 1361-1362, and the following year gained an insurmountable advantage over his rivals in an ongoing skirmish at P'oyang that lasted nearly four weeks. He was still careful to present himself only as a servant of the Red Turban Empire; but the untimely death of the imperial figurehead in 1366 created a vacuum that Chu could not help but fill. In 1368, he heralded the inauguration of a new dynasty and the era of his own rule under the imperial name of Hung Wu, or Rich Victory. Like all the best Parvenu dictators, he was an astute administrator of the coalition that brought him to power. One thinks of Napoleon juggling monarchists and Jacobins, or Franco playing with fascists and traditionalists. Chu respected all the ideologies wrapped in the red turban. He compared himself to the founder of China; he restored Tang-era court ceremonial; he maintained the military command structure of the previous dynasty and even influenced some clothing habits of the Mongols; He balanced these characteristics of his style with concessions to the Confucians and restored the civil service examinations. Maitreya's cult was explicitly denied, but only after Chu made it clear that he had lived up to his expectations. By adopting the Ming name for his dynasty, he usurped the "brilliant" attribute of the reincarnated Buddha. Hesitantly and slowly, the era of Emperor Hung Wu ushered in China's return to the Confucian values ​​that would govern the empire's modern history. As a farmer and a former Buddhist monk, Chu can hardly be expected to embrace his Confucian heritage with unreserved enthusiasm. He had typical self-taught disdain for the academic establishment. His forceful accusations of the uselessness of "cultured gentry" would have sounded plausible on the lips of Newt Gingrich (ironically, a former history professor). "Chewing sentences and biting words" were of no use, he asserted, not even to his own students. “All they can do is write on a piece of paper. They never had any hands-on business experience… If you look at what they do, it's nothing.” In practice, Chu, like Mr. Gingrich, recognized that academics had some exploitable forms of knowledge and that a vast educated empire was a bureaucracy disciplined by a traditional code of ethics. But he balanced the various centers of power around his court: the Confucian republicans, the military high command, the eunuchs, the foreign advisers, the Buddhist and Taoist clerics, the business lobby. The successor to it was a Confucian tool; one is tempted to say "enthusiastic," but enthusiasm would be a non-Confucian emotion. His reign was brief, however, and the outdoors was an era of naval display, flourishing trade, and extensive exploration in the early fifteenth century.

Equioise bequeathed by Chu Yuan-chang. It couldn't last. In the 1420s and 1430s, the balance of power shifted. When the Hung-hsi Emperor ascended the throne on 9 September 1424, one of his first acts was to cancel arrangements for Cheng Ho's next scheduled trip. In one year on the throne, he restored the Confucian officials removed by his predecessor and reduced the power of other factions. In the reign that followed, the military establishment lost face with defeat in Vietnam: Montgomery's martial law - "Never invade Russia" - would be expanded to reflect the experience shared by the Chinese with their French and American successors (see Chapter 21). . . By 1429, the shipbuilding budget had been reduced almost to a standstill. A dislike for Buddhism and Taoism, except as a hodgepodge for the masses, increasingly characterized the dynasty's emperors. By the mid-1430s, the Confucians had not finally won the factional struggles, but their values ​​were on the way to almost exclusive triumph. The abolition of overseas expansion, the degradation of trade values, and the abandonment of shipbuilding became such important identity traits for the academic elite that bureaucrats destroyed all Cheng Ho's records to erase the memory of him. . The examination system and the gradual weakening of other forms of civil service recruitment meant that China was increasingly governed by a code of scholars with their contempt for barbarism and gentlemen with their disregard for commerce. In the distant future, galactic historians may see China's maritime self-containment as a smart long-term strategy. While other powerful states of the so-called modern era focused on creating distant empires that were briefly profitable but impossible to sustain, China has returned to its traditional arena, expanding at the margins, sinifying minorities, and creating much more recently. Empires controlled by time, first at the expense of neighboring Muslim communities and then in Tibet. The effects arguably included a more defensible homeland, a more unified heart, a more enduring culture, and more concentrated power than their Western Christian rivals, whose dominance for a time seemed spectacular. To be sure, China was remarkably spared from the imperial shocks of the late 20th century and, at the time of writing, seems immune to the fragmentation processes that afflict many other modern superstates. After the events of the early 15th century, China could have conquered a sea-based empire on the world east of the Bay of Bengal, the "downwind world" as it was called by Arab navigators; Then it could have established a formidable lead in the modern space race for a global role. Their tolerance remains one of the most remarkable examples in the history of collective moderation. Chapter 5 A LITTLE ASIAN PREEDGE:

Latin Christianity in the Late Middle Ages The Stranger in the Jug - The Expanded Horizons - The Enemies of the Promise - The Divisions of Latin Christianity - The Fool's Gold Age - The Wandering Spirit THE STRANGER IN THE CUP A mule was as good as a woman to the perverse intentions of the Basques and -according to the same 12th century pilgrim guide- the Navarrese poisoned their rivers to increase the sale of their wines. These notes from an ancient ethnographer's notebook may sound conventional or eccentric: excerpts from a tradition in which national characteristics were minced into gnomic stereotypes to reinforce the viewer's sense of superiority. Taken in context, however, they typify the era of self-discovery in Latin Christianity in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, when writers, spurred on by the process of identity formation described in Chapter One, turned inward to find and describe to the internal barbarians. of Europe: the remote peoples of forests, swamps, and mountains, the imperfectly assimilated marsh-dwellers whose evangelization was sketchy at best, and whose habitats were often blank spaces on the map. This exploration of the interior and the threshold, of the secret niches, of the seldom frequented margins of Christianity preceded and in a way initiated the expansion of Europe in the late Middle Ages and early Modern Ages. In the 12th century, the riparians of Latin Christianity conquered the wild jungle. In 1122, Abbot Suger's search of the forests for trees large enough to frame the roof of Saint Denis symbolized a vast project to tame underexplored and underused environments. Gothic architecture, built with wood-saving means, was a style adapted to the dwindling forests. The growth of the Cistercians, the most dynamic religious order of the century, abandoned inhospitable places and drove herds and teams of oxen into the desert, where now the vast abbeys, in turn, often lie in ruins. The towns brought to the light of science by this process had a variety of uses for the writers who considered them. Adam, Bishop of Bremen, used his image of the Prussian pagans as a weapon to rebuke the moral shortcomings of his fellow Christians; Without the benefit of access to the gospel, they shared their possessions and despised gold and silver "as rubbish." For the Barbarossa enthusiast, the poet Günther de Pairis in Alsace, the Poles were the opposite; Wilde despite his Christianity, with his wolfish voices and disheveled hairdos. Perhaps the Polish elite, who, despite their immaculate Slavic credentials, cherished the myth of their descent from nomadic "Sarmatian" warriors, changed these misperceptions. For the author of the pilgrimage guide Aiméry Picaud, the mountains and forests that Compostela pilgrims had to cross were the home of lost exotics whose unnatural desires –

Sodomy and bestiality - licensed pornography. Despite the distractions from these partial purposes, however, medieval ethnography was able to provide some genuine field studies and construct some realistic pictures of marginalized peoples and their societies. Before looking out of the windows opened by colonial and commercial expansion in Asia and Africa, scholars came to behold strange faces in a mirror of their own, among residents on the frontiers and strongholds of their own world. Perhaps the most representative of the researchers was Gerald of Wales, whose travels through Wales and Ireland were true projects of encounter with himself, since this normalized and Anglicized scholar explored his Celtic roots. From his career in the royal administrative professions, in which he specialized, he frequently returned to his home country for espionage or diplomatic missions. When he finally returned as canon of St David's in 1199, he was subject to political smears, being denounced by his enemies "as French to the Welsh and to the French as Welsh". His preferred habitat was comfortable, academic, and urban. His conceited account of his receiving a lecture he gave to the Oxford masters and doctors in 1184 is one of the earliest evidences of the university's existence. His account of a barnacle goose meal that he shared on a fast day in Canterbury with cathedral clergymen who were convinced they were eating some kind of fish is a masterpiece of satirical irony. A small promontory of Asia 153 Pushed from the meat pots to the border, Gerald viewed the desert of his birth with the nostalgia of a newcomer and the trepidation of a stranger. Gerald inherited a dilemma from the classical tradition. He never got rid of the belief that a sedentary lifestyle is courtesy and transhumance is savagery. But he was also receptive to the myth of Arcadia and tended to see his fellow Celts reveling in a bucolic idyll. Therefore, he suppressed or ignored the essential agricultural and sedentary sectors of the Welsh economy and portrayed the whole country as pastoralists, with occupations in pickpockets and pickpockets. He condemned the Welsh as incestuous and promiscuous, the Irish - suitable for his would-be conquerors in England - as unfaithful savages. Typical of Irish barbarism were two hairy, naked savages, who fished in the barge of an English ship off the Connaught coast and marveled at the sight of bread. On the other hand, the Welsh had the conventional virtues of a pastoral race, among which “no one is a beggar, because everyone's house is common to all. Generosity, especially generosity, is valued above all virtues. Here the courtesy of Welsh Hospitality is appreciated by all, so much so that it need not be offered or demanded of travelers." Truly torn between conflicting perceptions of his subject, Gerald developed a highly sophisticated model of social development. "The Irish", he wrote, they are a wild people of the forest... they derive their sustenance from animals only and live like animals; a people who did not abandon the first way of life - the pastoral life - for according to the order of humanity they passed from the forest to the field , and from the countryside to the cities and assemblies

Citizens, these people disdained the work of agriculture. They viewed the city's treasures without ambition and rejected the rights and duties of civic life. Therefore, they did not abandon the life of forest and grass that they had led until then. The Irish were particularly recalcitrant, but in general the landlocked and frontier barbarians of Latin Christendom were assimilated by their neighbors during the first half of the millennium. Hungary, considered too good for Hungarians by Otto von Freising in the mid-12th century, became the cradle of the Renaissance in the 15th century. The Basque lines, so despised by Aimery Picaud, brought a new aristocracy to the rest of Spain in the 14th century. Residents of remote or inhospitable regions never escaped the scorn of city dwellers and seldom matched the teaching standards of zealous evangelists, but the barbarian's quest shifted increasingly outward, to the world beyond. the confines of the Latin West. During the twelfth century, two movements also broadened the intellectual horizon of Christianity. The Crusades made Westerners aware of the vastness of the world and the smallness of the corner in which they live. The Architect of the Universe uses divisors to check the accuracy of your proportions. The sun, moon, and stars have just taken their places, and an earth "without form and void" has been solidified. The illuminated caption above explains that the sky and the elements are also made. In the pre-Copernican universe it is often said that man exaggerated its importance, but this illumination of a 13th-century French Bible shows how insignificant creation seemed in God's hands. A Little Headland of Asia occupies 155 in his "Little Headland of Asia." The advance of academic humanism in the recovery of classical learning revived the science of geography and extracted some details from the expanding worldview. THE EXPANDED HORIZON The end product was the wonderfully comprehensive schemes of knowledge and belief produced by the thirteenth-century Parisian encyclopedists. The results can be seen today in the decorative scheme of the Spanish Chapel of the Dominican Church in Florence, where the contents of the Spirit of Thomas Aquinas are painted on the walls - a panoptic view, in precise categories, ranging from experience or the known report. On a smaller scale, Hereford Mappamundi describes the growth of the type of spirit that created it, probably the spirit of a Lincolnshire lay priest. Like its predecessors in the Christian world map tradition, the Hereford specimen presents the devout observer with an ordered world in an image intended for altarpiece decoration. However, liberties are taken from the traditional scheme to reflect true knowledge, with Jerusalem slightly shifted from the necessary central position for purely devotional purposes, and the explored world surrounded by speculative lands and beings, sometimes fantastic, but always documented.

On the frontiers of Christendom, a 13th-century astral gazer might have been forgiven for assuming that this world was about to expand even further. The population of Western Europe may have doubled between the early 11th century and the mid-13th century. Restrictive hereditary customs released or expelled excluded sons from their inherited lands within the limits of conquest and settlement. Beyond the expanding frontier, modest technological revolutions boosted productivity: great curved-bladed plows dug deeper into the earth; More efficient mills, more precise metallurgy, and new products, mainly weapons and glassware, expanded the range of business and the flow of wealth. The momentum of the Crusades was halted and reversed in the eastern Mediterranean, but at the other end of that sea spectacular conquests were made at the expense of the Muslims in the Balearic Islands and the Iberian Peninsula. On the northern frontier, planned towns like Elbing in Prussia and Neubrandenburg were designed for scale and populated with wagons carrying debris from recruiting drives in the Rhineland and northern France. They bear the imprint of the grid plan of the colonial city throughout history: the same rectilinear image is engraved on the face of Melbourne or Lima. Beyond these pickets of a new political order, the merchants deployed their most adventurous colonies. Those of Genoa had the most impressive reach: they served Mongol khans on the northern Black Sea coast or Moorish sultans in Seville and Malaga, without sacrificing Genoese identity; in fact, in Kaffa the streets are named after their houses. They sold – in exchange for oriental spices, forest products from the Danube or African gold – the result of the first European industrial revolution: fine cloth, produced through scientific breeding and stuffing, through long-distance trade and specialisation. In the 13th century, the long-separated economies of Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe were brought together as ships from the Mediterranean traversed the Strait of Gibraltar and prevailed against the raging current. English wool could now be transferred to sophisticated production centers in northern Italy; Phocaea dyes could be taken to cloth manufacturers in Flanders. This proto-capitalism, in turn, inspired proto-imperialism as merchant families sent cadets to establish new markets on the fringes of Christendom and beyond. The way of life in a Genoese colony at that time, beyond the borders of Christianity, is recorded, for example, in a valuable series of Tunisian notarial records, covering about the first six months of 1289. The value of the 133 Surviving notarial documents Pietro Batifoglio narrates in his daily and hourly chronicle a few days of the life of the community of Genoese merchants in one of the most important Muslim ports in the West. They are a reminder of the enormous scale of the Genoese operation in Tunisia. The number of notaries mentioned implies a colony of several hundred people. It was not only a large church, but also sedentary. The children of local parents or former locals used to do business there. some merchants

they had established families with their own wives. Waldo di Budi was tentative: the form of his marriage to a former slave was annulled due to his previous marriage in his homeland. Others were more permanent: a Genoese resident of the Marseillais district - presumably by marriage - requested burial in the Genoese cemetery; Jacobina de Savignano stayed after the death of her husband and remarried. It was a society with established rituals and a clearly defined elite. Most of the business was carried on in the "old storehouse of the Genoese", where the first mercantile district had been founded in the 12th century and had since been outgrown. But there could also be particularly solemn acts in the Genoese church or larger disputes with local authorities in the emir's palace. Occasionally, an urgent matter related to the arrival or departure of a ship can be handled in the open at the dock. A more popular venue was the wine camp, the natural gathering place for Latin American expats in a Muslim state. Anything worth reporting, be it purchase on credit, recognition or payment of a debt, incorporation of a company, registration of a navigation contract, acquisition or a small cape in Asia 157 “It will go to foreign peoples. He will taste good and evil in all things." In the only surviving miniature illustrating his story, Brother Wilhelm von Rubruck appears alarmed by King Ludwig's instructions for a mission to the Mongols, but leaves with sufficient determination. His voyage of 1253-55 took him to Karakorum and produced an account full of vivid and faithful detail. No text better illustrates the broadening of the horizons and the widening of the eyes of the people in the Latin Christianity of his time. See pgs. 158-59. the sale of a house, the drawing up of a will, a divorce or paternity acknowledgment, a dispute or claim to the Muslim authorities, the granting of a power of attorney, the obtaining of the majority - all this was registered before a notary and witnessed with disconnected formulas. The triad of dignitaries (the consul, the priest, and the chief merchant) often sat next to the notary. Tealdo, the priest, was a universal helper, witness, or representative in nearly 20 percent of recorded transactions, more often the recipient of powers or commissions than an agent in specific matters. Only one family, that of Cibo da Cibo, was Batifoglio's most important client, but the recognized head of the community was the consul Balianno Embronio. The fact that he is even more sought after as a witness than the priest reflects his role as godfather to him. The practical importance of him lies in his duty to represent the common interests of the community before the Emir. This was not an easy task. In the brief period covered by these records, Embronius had twice complained of violations of the Genoese treaties with Tunis. He resisted attempts to interfere with established procedures for buying and selling wine by increasing the tax or rent on the warehouse;

He locked up the place and gave the key to Tealdo until the status quo was restored. He rebuked customs officials for exceeding their powers and had to denounce the emir's refusal to grant him an audience twice a month, in accordance with agreed practice. The tense relations ended in violence on May 3, 1289. Two days earlier, the consul had gone to the emir's palace to demand the income owed to Genoa from the sale of olive oil by some Genoese merchants. part of the tax was to be paid to the Genoese state, and it appears that the merchants in question retained it for this purpose. Refusing to cede the right to the sum in question, except to the Genoese leader himself, the Tunisian authorities sent a force armed with stones and sticks to seize the oil in exchange for full payment of the tax. According to the notary, the Tunisians threatened to act "with violence and even against the law"; he probably put those words in their mouths, but the tone of surprise is quite real. On the eve, the siege ended. The prudent consul capitulated, and the merchants agreed to pay most of the bill, remitting the consul "to the Tunisian court or to the oil buyers" to claim the disputed part of the tax. Such a life—dangerous, arduous, comradely—was lived by merchants even further afield, along the "safe road by day and night" that led to Peking, according to a 14th-century merchant's manual. This was the path that led Marco Polo to Kublai Khan's court, where he apparently served as a sort of male Scheherazade, collecting amusing stories to the Khan's delight as he traveled the empire on official business. He was a banal observer, but a charming storyteller. He offered practiced charms of embracing prostitutes in Hangchow or Tibetan sexual entertainment; He sincerely assured that there are islands with tailed males or Amazons, which only allowed males to reproduce. Such sensational excerpts vindicated the reputation he had earned at home as a mere itinerant fable-peddler. While in the Orient, a fleet of galleys sailed from Genoa to the same sea destination: "across the ocean to the regions of India," anticipating Columbus's similar adventure by little more than two centuries. His success may have heralded the great age of maritime exploration in Europe, but he was never heard from again. However, land communications with China remained active. Ambrogio Lorenzetti could present the massacre of some of the first Franciscan missionaries in Ceuta as an event of universal significance. A whole human gallery dominates the scene, including blacks, Jews, a helmeted Mongol, a Turk, a Chinese, and what is probably intended for a Persian. This represents not only the wide range of Franciscan evangelical ambitions, but also the artist's diversity of interests and insight into the landscape of humanity. For more than a hundred years and well into the fourteenth century, the dynamism of Latin Christianity in general seemed unstoppable. When Ambrogio Lorenzetti decorated a church in Siena in the 1320s with a grand vision of the martyrdom of the Franciscans in Ceuta, he could allude to a

a vast and familiar panorama of humanity, with a Chinese observer alongside other races viewing the scene as if it were a gallery within the painting. ENEMIES OF THE PROMISE The best of all surviving medieval maps, the Catalan Atlas, produced in Majorca in the late 1370s or early 1380s, is as rich and intricate as a buried map. Plausible crests attributed to Abraham of Majorca, dating from the late 1370s or early 1380s, is one of the pinnacles of medieval cartography, as complicated as a buried jewel box. The depiction of a caravan on its way to Cathay, with gregarious merchants following laden camels, reflects the confidence in long-distance trade expressed by Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a servant to the House of Bardi in Florence, in his Manual for Merchants Around from 1340. On the Silk Road, "safe day and night," he advised, "you must let your beard grow" and take with you: a woman "if the merchant wills," a dragoman, and two servants with flour and salt fish. You will find other things in abundance, and especially meat. Resplendent jewel chest with images of exotic creatures and untold riches. Representing the Atlantic Ocean, next to the bulge of Africa, is a well-equipped galley, emblazoned with the legend of the disappearance of Jaume Ferrer, a Mallorcan explorer, who perished on this coast in 1342. His voyage is no stranger to any other source. , but places it in a context that makes it credible, a sudden and rapid Majorcan gold rush in the mid-14th century, when navigation licenses for exploratory voyages in the African Atlantic abounded. It was a propitious moment in the medieval economic boom. Of all the Catalan chroniclers, Ramon Muntaner was the most indiscriminate in his praise and the most willing to use superlatives. But the breathless eulogy he wrote in Majorca around 1325 rings true. It was "a beautiful and honorable island." The king had “granted all his men great favors and great favours. And he populated said city and island with more exceptions and privileges than any other city in the world; For this reason it became one of the good cities in the world, nobler and richer than all the others, and all populated by Catalans, all of noble birth and good courage, from whom descended heirs, many of whom became. The city of Mallorca, now called Palma, looks like a feudal fairyland, dominated by the imposing Almudaina Palace, the martial walls and the oratory in the middle distance. The countryside seems more for pleasure than profit, and on land only the windmill is a clue. Mediterranean world: vast A class of small independent shipowners had much initiative but lacked the collective strength of, say, the Venetian patriciate. seed.

Abulafia, A Mediterranean Emporium (1994), pp. 127-28, 168. enterprising and brilliant people from any city in the world.” The focus on the city of Mallorca, despite the rest of the island, is revealing. When outsiders thought of Mallorca, they thought only of its headquarters, since now they only think of the tourist complex, on the same coast, with the same city as center attract settlers to the island Parish records from 1349 reflect the epicene contentment of the peninsular rulers of the city of Barcelona who replaced the natives At least seventy-six artisans and decorators - some Moors, some Greeks, some especially slaves - were hired to decorate the city's apartments for banquets.162 THE SPRING OF IN I T I A ​​T I V decorated tapestries to celebrate the funeral of the Queen of the Continent. And the large sums spent defending against the claims of the defunct island dynasty included the payment of eleven surgeons and barbers to serve the fleet. A society so abundantly supplied with charlatans and artisans must have wallowed in excess wealth. Such complacency must have been the enemy of Majorca's long-term promise. But a faster, deadlier foe was already on the prowl. In the same year as these boastful reports, Majorca had just emerged from the clutches of the Black Death, a plague of unprecedented severity in the past but one that would recur many times in the future. The plague spread throughout western Christendom and the Middle East, but Majorca, which lost perhaps a third of its population, was hit particularly hard. Scouting voyage records are disappearing from the archives. In the second half of the 14th century, almost the only Majorcan sailors in the African Atlantic were missionaries with their message of hope in the afterlife, rather than the traders and prospectors whose optimism in the early 1340s had been closer and centered. The fall of the Black Death was only the most impressive in a series of setbacks that discouraged European initiative in the fourteenth century. In 1303, a pope's health was shattered by the fatal blow from disrespectful French knights who invaded his chamber. The unity of Latin Christianity never again looked so impressive as the Western churches became increasingly "national" in character and personnel. Between 1304 and 1307, in an alpine valley, an enraged Franciscan with the unlikely name of Fra Dolcino proclaimed an ancient republic to the enemies of the Antichrist; it was part of a spasmodic series of social upheavals and radical religious upheavals. In 1315-17, from the Elbe to the Loire, the dead were mourned for an exceptionally deadly succession of winters of famine and flood. It was a centerpiece of a climate change now known as the "Little Ice Age" that marginalized some areas.

of settlements and other empties; The frontiers of Christianity gradually receded from its outposts in Greenland and the Baltic in the 15th century, while in the central areas mountain farms became untenable. The Icelandic annals record the last advance of the islanders towards Markland in 1347. Impersonal enemies (plague, famine and cold) were supplemented by human enemies. In 1354, a violent earthquake destroyed the walls of Gallipolli. The Turks waited to take the ruins, beginning a history of European concern with the defense of the eastern border of the Mediterranean that would last, with fluctuations, for more than two hundred years. Meanwhile, in the northeast, pagan Lithuanians undermined the Teutonic Order's conquests along the Baltic Sea. When the Greenland colony was finally wiped out in the 15th century, it was at the hands of mysterious, ferociously savage marauders known as the Skraelingar. Against this general defense, the damage suffered by Latin Christendom in the Holy Land in the twelfth century was minimal. Indeed, like so many other imperial checks - for Rome in the late Punic War, for the Ottomans at Timur, for Britain in the American Revolution - it seems, in retrospect, to be more of a relief than an impediment, a stepping stone to added greatness, a Pause to rewind feathers. The experience of the fourteenth century—in which the spread of Latin Christianity was delayed and rejected—had no such redeeming characteristics. Its crippling legacy made 15th-century Western Europe the least promising civilization in the world and, viewed objectively, one of the least prepared to benefit from the world's "age of expansion" that began with initiatives designed in favor of China and the Islam, as we will see in the next chapter - with more dynamic states in Africa and the Americas than any visible in the Latin West. THE DIVISIONS OF LATIN CHRISTIANITY In June 1417, a powerless papal envoy sought refuge in Castel Sant'Angelo, the fortified Roman mausoleum that was the constant refuge of the popes in times of danger. Outside its walls, in the camp of an ambitious mercenary captain named Braccio da Montone, he was showered with excrement by siege catapults. Braccio, whose war career had begun when he was an impoverished exile from Perugia, carved out a fief for himself in Umbria amid the distractions and opportunities of war between powerful rivals. He seemed ready to usurp the traditional secular power of the papacy and turn the ancient legacy of Saint Peter into a principality of his own. The fact that a despicable adversary could pose such a threat, and hurl such an insult from his siege engines, showed just how nearly broken the papacy has been on the wheel of fortune since 1378, when a schismatic election divided and undermined the loyalty of the Curia and Christianity to the Pope. prestige. . Since 1409 there have been three popes at the same time, all with credible claims and sizeable followings. In the summer of 1417 it seemed that unless the dispute was soon resolved there would be little more to say. In November of the same year, when the rivals were deposed or considered abdicated,

An ecumenical council meeting in Constanta to reform church governance allowed cardinals to elect Martin V, an unspiritual bureaucrat from one of central Italy's oldest noble dynasties. First, Martin had to endure the barracks of Florence's street urchins, with their chanted taunts that "he wasn't worth a dime...our friend Braccio takes it all." Braccio could not be defeated; however, he reconciled with bribes. By focusing on management, Martin has rebuilt the legacy and, to a large extent, the power of the position he held with surprising speed and integrity. But while resolving one schism, the same council opened another, condemning the teachings of the reluctant Czech heretic Jan Hus. As the founder of English Lollardie, by whom he was heavily influenced, Hus was a Done character with a flair for vulgarization; He began by challenging academic orthodoxies and ended by subverting the dogmas of the Church. Early fifteenth-century Prague had a lively venue for popular preaching in the Bethlehem Chapel, where Hus was one of several famous preachers whose appeal can be compared to today's television evangelists. Devotion to the vernacular was in great demand among an urban class of immature sophistication—artisans, humble merchants, women—who could read their own language and nothing else. In that atmosphere, and even beyond that constituency, Hus's teachings provoked a fiery response. Some of his teachings—in favor of the use of the chalice by the laity at Communion and of the Czech language in the Church—struck more disciplinary than doctrinal nerves. However, he continued to question the nature of the church as traditionally understood, seeing it as the community of the unknown and predestined few who had little need for its traditional institutions and wealth. In a further development of his ideas, he threatened the very basis of social and political organization by challenging, though less offensively than his accusers claimed, the right of sinners to property and power. Hus was lured to Constance by a safe conduct and lured by lodging with a friendly widow; but he was cremated under a fool's hat, and his ashes were scattered in the Rhine to deny the relics to his followers. In Bohemia, his attractiveness did not fade so easily. The nobility advocated the secularization of church property. The intelligentsia preferred access to the chalice. The urban rich wanted to pray in their own language; and radical heretics and rebellious peasants could exploit Hus's message for their own ends. Although divided within itself and exposed to the crusades of its neighbors, Bohemia became the first state within Latin Christianity to break away from the Roman community: Bogomil Bulgaria was barely under Roman allegiance in the 9th century; Neither Provence nor Cathar Aragon had declared themselves independent of the Holy See. The 14th century Bosnian autocephalous church was probably not heretical and perhaps not intentionally schismatic. Until the Reformation, about a century later, no other state

would follow the example of Bohemia. However, it would be a mistake to see Hussiteism as an isolated phenomenon that did not affect the unity of Western Christianity. The Lollards, whose teachings coincided with Hussiteism, nearly conquered the English state in the early 15th century. Lollard knights were numerous on the lesser promontory of Asia. Reynard the Fox Celebrating Mass is a commonplace of late medieval anticlerical art. The fact that, like scenes of sexual indecency involving priests and nuns, it could appear in church - in stained glass, or in this case on a mercy seat in Worcester Cathedral - shows that it was some kind of humor in which his own victims might enjoy. . It illustrates a fairly common Reynard story in which he, caught stealing, disguises himself as a priest in order to fool the parishioners and take the loot. This image is not only an expression of greed and clerical cunning, but also of blasphemy: the sheep's head that Reynard consecrates is, without a doubt, a crude allusion to the figure of the Lamb of God. royal retinue. Henry IV himself wrote a testament imbued with his characteristic language of self-deprecating piety. In 1409, the crown was saved from a Lollard coup attempt. A Lollard joke, a fox celebrating mass, even found its way into the carving of a wretched bead in Worcester Cathedral: the fox was a hoax image in folk art and sermons of the day. While heresy has failed to achieve political advances, it has wrinkled the face of Christianity. It spread to all social and educational levels, particularly in urban settings, and was detectable wherever authorities wanted to track it. Where he could not contain himself, he was embraced by the resilience of the church establishment, which could tame dangerous movements, giving them status and overloading them with jobs. In the 13th century, the potentially revolutionary Franciscan movement was absorbed and became a powerful instrument of Orthodox evangelization. In the fifteenth century, the New Devotion, which anticipated much of the tone and tenets of Protestantism, electrified personal piety through spiritual prayer, and opened direct channels of communication between the believer and God, organized itself as an arm of the division between the East and and the western countries of Latin Christianity. The line between the Elbe and the Upper Danube has become a cultural error. In the west, the effects of population decline were to diversify tenure, freeing up farmers, and converting arable land to pasture. In the east, which gradually replaced the Mediterranean as the great breadbasket of Europe, serfdom took hold and spread, although in parts of the central Brandenburg March depopulation was so severe that landed nobles resorted to the plow themselves. Even the free cities of present-day Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary lost their sovereign rights en masse to aristocratic or princely litigants and usurpers. For example, Duke Kasimr of Pomerania encountered "savagery like the Hussites" when he tried to impose the Stettin tax in 1428:

The bones of the leaders were crushed and a castle was built overlooking the city. When the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg came to power in 1440, he refused to take the traditional vows to the saints to confirm Berlin's privileges. In the years that followed, he showed up armed at the gates, confiscated the keys, confiscated the town hall, and began to build a formidable, formidable castle. The citizens responded by undermining the foundations, breaking down the doors and burning the archives. The threat of arms was enough to subdue them: Frederick placed the city under complete control, appointed its councillors, collected their revenue, and disposed of each citizen's property as he saw fit. The economic and social divergence between East and West may have been accompanied by a divergence of ethos. Hard times in the late medieval West were times of economic opportunity for those with the skill or fortune to take advantage of it. The high mortality created gaps in the elites. The government was revolutionized in the fourteenth century with the use of paper, which transported the orders of the princes to the confines of each state cheaply and quickly. The resulting bureaucratization added another avenue of social advancement to the traditional avenues of church, war, and commerce. The ranks of magnates in most Western countries were almost entirely replaced by new men throughout the 14th and 15th centuries. Consistent with their self-perception, Western moralists have begun to redefine nobility. "Only virtue is true nobility," proclaimed the coat of arms of a Venetian patrician. A Parisian scholar declared in 1306 that "intellectual power" best equipped a man to have power over others. A few years later, a German mystic rejected carnal nobility among the qualifications for office as inferior to "soul nobility." According to a fifteenth-century Spanish humanist, "letters" ennoble a person more than "weapons." Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the strongman who conquered Milan in 1395, might be flattered by an inappropriate comparison to the model self-taught humanist hero, Cicero. Antonio de Ferrariis (1444-1517), a humanist from Otranto who defended the authenticity of the Constantine donation and whose obscurity is a guarantee that it was typical, claimed that neither the wealth of Croesus nor the age of Priam 'a small promontory of Asia 167 SOLA .£5T t f ï *^ »aa 'Virtue alone is true nobility': the Venetian family motto distills the meritocratic ethos developed by Western moralists in the late Middle Ages, overthrowing the Aristotelian definition of nobility as ' ancient wealth' and age-old heresies that have made it unattainable except by bravery or blood. Latin Christianity never had an "open elite," but there were more avenues of access to its higher echelons - through the church, warfare, law, financial management, trade, exploration, and even, at the end of the period, art- than there were. they were in most other cultures. 168 THE SOURCES OF I N I T I A ​​​​T I V

Blood could replace reason as the main ingredient of nobility. In Eastern Europe, these revaluations were barely heard. For Ctibor of Cimburk, nobility was conferred by God and denoted only by blood right. This was what his audience wanted to hear in Bohemia, where the traditional aristocracy had subjugated the throne, looted the church, overburdened the peasants, and emasculated the cities. East of the Bohemian Forest, the nobility was old blood, and that was all. Torn by heresies, torn by economic divisions, torn by conflicting social values, nothing threatened the unity of Latin Christianity—in comparison with some other great civilizations—so much as the strength of its constituent states. I do not mean strength in relation to their own subjects, since pre-industrial states around the world were, in practice, weak in this regard, but in relation to each other and to the institutions that claimed the most loyalty. With the exception of Southeast Asia, no other part of the world in the late Middle Ages had as diverse a state system as Western Europe. The old unity of Islam had crumbled by the turn of the millennium, but the Ottoman Turks were in the process of restoring much of it. Through all its divisions, China seemed, as by some mysterious natural process, to fight for a unity that the Ming restored. Eastern Christianity could never be reunited after the demise of the Byzantine Commonwealth, but the Moscow Empire grew to control most of what was left in Ottoman hands and dominate much of the rest. Even the ever-changing Indian subcontinent encompassed one dominant state, the Delhi Sultanate. Mesoamerica in the 15th century was intimidated by Aztec hegemony, and the Andean cultural area was unified almost simultaneously by the rapid rise of the Inca Empire. In contrast to these imperial worlds, Western Europe was an exceptional arena for distinct territorial states. This must be a surprise. All who reflected and wrote their views at that time remembered with admiration the unity imposed by Rome and were reluctant to set aside the claim that the Roman Empire still existed. In a sense, it still existed. The styles "King of the Romans" and "Holy Roman Emperor" belonged to the electoral chief of the loosely affiliated states of Germany and some neighboring areas. Provided the holder of such titles had enough influence of his own—enough inherited domestic power along with his particular dynastic territories—optimists would emerge to welcome the possible restoration of the empire by Augustus or Constantine, or at least Charlemagne. For example, when the Emperor Henry of Luxembourg briefly entered Italy in the early fourteenth century, Dante envisioned an era of universal peace, justice, and happiness under imperial rule. In the early 16th century, when Emperor Charles V combined in his person more dynastic and selective power than any of his predecessors since Charles V. The apocalypse was eagerly awaited in late-medieval Latin Christendom, but it never came.

perhaps conceived with as frenetic vigor as Dürer in the series of overwhelmingly virtuosic woodcuts with which he illustrated the Apocalypse in the 1490s. In this scene the sixth trumpet sounds and the angels of the Euphrates go to work to kill a third of humanity. Dürer contains much conventional moralizing: the victims include a pope, a bishop, a knight, a merchant, and Jews. To the left, an angel points to a fly, an unconscious victim displays busty cleavage, and an anal appears to be shaving a maiden's hair. Magne, a conquistador from Extremadura, an Italian cardinal, and Spanish and Belgian courtiers shamelessly repeated this kind of language. Meanwhile, Imperial resources could hardly justify such claims. The bombast was not scratched with a shot. However, the territorial lords were wary of the imperial potential. When the Emperor Sigismund V was visiting Henry V of England, his ship was struck by a knight riding with the tide to demand his prior relinquishment of all superior rights to the kingdom. A long tradition of eschatological prophecy fueled hopes of the reunification of Christianity by a last world emperor whose cosmic struggle with the Antichrist would usher in the millennium. Holy Roman Emperors, even weaker ones, tended to elicit at least the expression of such expectations, but they were often elicited in the retinue of French and Aragonese kings as well. Under the mysterious shadow of Rome and the distant pull of the Apocalypse, Western leaders minded their own business, concentrating sovereign power within their borders. Castilian kings in the 14th century and an English king in the 16th century called their kingdoms "empires". Born in the 14th century, applied in the 15th century, the doctrine that the kings of France were emperors in their own realms spread and reinforced the self-image of most Western monarchs. Ideological strategies devised by propagandists to enhance the image of kings included the notion that the office of King of France was a miracle, endowed by God with "such virtue and power that you will perform miracles in your lifetime." , and the formula used in the century in which the authority of the King of Castile was "sovereign and absolute". Territorial sovereignty was solidified as the functions of the state changed. Traditionally, the business of government was the jurisdiction, and the law was a legacy of the past, not an area of ​​ongoing innovation. As the estates grew in size and complexity and their technical resources increased, the scope of their administration expanded, beyond the vast vistas of common life and the common good displayed on the walls of the Signoria di Siena in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Panorama of Good Government. The husband of the republic in all its aspects became the goal of the kings, who had in mind the example of Saint Louis de Joinville; His life was the last mirror of princes, more influential in late medieval European government than any explicit political theory. Along with, and perhaps in part as a result of, the expanded reach of the state, laws and regulations have multiplied.

In the fourteenth century, I believe, statute making began to supplant jurisdiction as the primary function—indeed, a defining characteristic—of sovereign authority. Legislative bodies (kings and representative assemblies) gradually monopolized previously shared sovereignty: with rival jurisdictions within the empire, with feudal lords outside whose jurisdiction overlapped, and, most important, with popes exercising a supranational role as court of last resort. appeal in cases that fell within his sphere of influence. In 1476, the Spanish monarchs began to use the printing press to circulate their vast legislative and administrative output. At the height of legislative activity in Henry VIII's England, eight sessions of Parliament in eight years produced an unprecedented total of 333 new statutes. Was the state system of Latin Christianity a source of weakness or strength? Researchers of the European miracle, the process by which Western European civilization in modern times surpassed more promising rivals for world domination, often emphasized the benefits of competition between rival states for control of the world's resources and the establishment of global empires. But the disadvantages—shared command, limited resources, wasted effort and manpower in extermination wars, vulnerability to outside predators—seem to outweigh the other side of the scale. Certainly the expansion of parts of the Latin world, when it resumed on a large scale in the sixteenth century, was the work of individual states, not the kind of collective enterprise that the Crusades had been. The empires he built were the Spanish and Portuguese, followed in the next century by the Dutch, English and French, each jealously guarded against their European and sometimes bloodthirsty rivals. In this sense there was no European expansion, as we could speak of an expansion of Islam or of China. There was only the imperialism of individual peoples. However, there are almost no connections to the state system. All European overseas empires would be built through almost unsupported initiatives by private companies with little or no government sponsorship. No royal jewels were promised to Columbus; the Portuguese crown spent more money banqueting for royal festivities than Africa, India, and Brazil combined in the 16th century; The most successful of the early English émigrés were refugees, not agents of the local government. The poverty and remoteness of the states from which the first imperial initiatives came are the best indications of their nature. Portugal and Castilla were small countries, sparsely populated and not endowed with sources of natural wealth. His early interest in long-distance imperialism was like the desperate drug-seeking of today's emerging nations, drilling for offshore resources with foreign capital and foreign know-how. Much of the investment and manpower launching the two empires came from the traditional medieval centers of capitalism and entrepreneurship in northern Italy and southern Holland, the birthplaces of Columbus.

and Ferdinand van Olmen, trying to anticipate the voyage of Columbus in the service of the Portuguese. The Iberian "cradle of empire" was in relation to the rest of Christendom in the same way that the Latin West was in relation to the rest of the civilized world: an inauspicious edge occupied by poor marginal communities, coming from behind. The heyday of European expansion was not an outpouring of pent-up momentum. He was thrown from the uncertain edges of a restrictive civilization. It was a slow and sometimes painful recovery from the crisis of the late Middle Ages. Fifteenth-century Europe, still a place of perspective and promise to our eyes, will seem stagnant and introverted to future galactic museum keepers, if they notice. The population has barely recovered from pre-Black Death levels. New mineral resources were exploited in Central Europe, new lands were plowed up in the Atlantic and the East; but the economy as a whole still suffered from a persistently negative trade balance with Islam and was unable to feed the population. None of the states that civilization was divided into felt really robust. Of the three great medieval trading empires in the Mediterranean, the Catalan was on the verge of collapse, weakened by its colonial "cancer" in Sardinia; the Genoese were withdrawing from the eastern Mediterranean; and the Venetians turned inward with a touch of il faut cultivaver notre jardin. The great land empires of the last century—the English in France, the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic—collapsed or failed in the first half of the century. None of the Iberian Peninsula states continued their previous history of growth and all were torn by civil wars. The union of Poland and Hungary, which had previously seemed terrible, fell apart. France made spectacular advances, but it was not until the end of the century that they began to transcend the borders of the high medieval kingdom; Nor should they be sustained or projected abroad into the next century. The outlook would be almost entirely bleak, except possibly for the phenomenon we now call the Renaissance. THE KARENGOLD AGE Only a few elegant remains can be seen above ground on the site of the former palace of the Hungarian kings in Visegrád. In the courtyard, however, a very young Hercules wrestled with the hydra in a version of one of the works that once adorned the great bronze doors. A mortal whose virtue elevated him to the level of the gods, a warrior whose valor was invincible, a worker who resisted the temptations of pleasure with the steadfastness of an honorary Stoic or perhaps even a foreshadowed Christian, Hercules was a favorite hero of the Europeans. , the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He was expressly the model recommended by the court humanist Bonfini to King Matías Corvino of Hungary. Whether Visegrád Palace really lived up to the description recorded in A Small Promontory of Asia 173 will never be known. The ruins of Matthias Corvinus's palace at Visegrád require a bit of imagination.

to get an idea of ​​what this center of Renaissance patronage was like in its heyday, when the Hungarian king, reigning in a state of dynamic - if ephemeral - vitality, recreated Pliny's country villa for his pleasure. In the foreground is the podium of the Hercules Fountain described in the text. Bonfini. At least in its conception - or rather, in the perception of humanists - it was based on a typical-ideal prototype of a Renaissance prince's estate: the most famous private house of antiquity, Pliny's Laurentian villa. Room by room, Bonfini takes us through the retreat of Matthias Corvinus: vaulted rooms, partly reserved for summer or winter use, the bathroom equipped with a hypocaust, the loggias and a library full of Greek and Latin books in which "the heaven should be visa." , judiciously painted on the ceiling rather than exposed to a risky skylight. It is said that the rooms were golden rooms, with silver beds and chairs. The murmur of the sea was not heard, nor that roar of the storms, nor the lightning strikes", the sleepers in the morning "only saw the sun through the open windows". By patronizing architecture like this, the king he achieved fame as enduring as that of the Romans. As Bonfini repeated his aspirations: "If you read that the Ro174 THE SPRINGS OF I N I T I A ​​T I V people created gigantic works that proved their magnificence Sen, not fear, oh invincible prince, that their buildings surpass yours in majesty, but revive in the architecture of the ancients." Matthias Corvinus invoked all the resources of the Renaissance to project and perpetuate his own image. "Your triumphs over the enemy will not perish promoted in most of Western Europe as part of the theater of despotic deployment, was also in some places the product of civic pride and investment private. The towers of the small town of San Gimignano, near Florence - fifteen of the seventy-two remain - are a reminder of the world she gave birth to: jealous, crowded, dangerous, where rivals lived under the eyes of others and your enemies through their eyes. squares and squares crossed streets. In Florence, the Medici, Rucellai, Albizzi, and Pazzi complemented their sometimes violent political rivalries by vying for the foundation of ostensible religious endowments. Similar rivalries were fought at the bourgeois level: the tower of the II Mangia in Siena was intended to eclipse that of the Signorie in Florence; Florence commissioned Brunelleschi to give the cathedral a dome more impressive than that of Siena. The art sustained by these traditional medieval rivalries was distinctive. The skyline of San Gimignano, with its fiery spiers, became a symbol of the exhilarating rivalry of the aristocracies of the Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, many of whom still rage at these relics of mutual defiance. Civil rivalries of a similar nature saw ever taller towers and domes spring up across Europe, at least where the wealth of local communities allowed them to play this costly game, and helped build them.

increase the rate of funding for art. A small promontory of Asia 175 largely shaped by traditional medieval tastes. While the Medici Palace presented visitors with a surprisingly classical atrium filled with Roman trinkets and lined with looted inscriptions, the family's private room, the little oratory, was decorated by a conservative painter in the style and colors of a rich tapestry of the Gothic period with portraits of the Medici. in the form of the three kings. Like good businessmen, the Medici wanted value for money. And the money was best suggested by the expensive use of gold and lapis lazuli. They spent more on jewelry than on the contemporary art of their day, and the family's interest in antiquity appears to have stemmed, at least in part, from the value of investing in antique gemstones. The style of realist painting we call the Renaissance likely developed under the patronage of mendicant monks to serve the impoverished urban communities for which the Medici orders are reputed patrons of the Renaissance style. In fact, they spent more on jewelry than painting, and if there was any taste in the Medici family in the late 15th century, they tended to favor old-fashioned painters whose style sparkled with the jewelry details of tradition. of Gothic illumination, like Pinturicchio, Baldovinetti or, like here, Gozzoli. In this detail of the decoration of the small private chapel of the Medici Palace, where the self-image of the family is revealed with particular intimacy, the portrait of Lourenço the Magnificent, in the form of one of the three Magi, reflects the admiration of the portrait for antiquity: the Horse is inspired by a classic example: that of Marco Aurelio in the Capitol or the horses of San Marco in Venice (see p. 76). 176 THE SPRINGS OF THE I N I T I A ​​​​T I VE served with vividly comprehensible pictures of Christian history. That Renaissance art was in some sense secular is a myth fueled by a minority taste for investigated eroticism and pagan symbolism, such as that provided by Botticelli in the Medici country house. Even Botticelli turned away from these themes in the 1490s, when Florence was ruled by a dictatorship of the pious; This was not a rebirth, but a time of rebirth. Recovering the knowledge, values ​​and tastes of classical antiquity was a very long process. The fifteenth century may mark an acceleration of pace, but not a new beginning or change of direction. Around 1200, an English visitor to Rome called Spinarius "that ridiculous Priapus looking at his large genitalia." Propelled "by some magic or something", he went three times to Venus naked on the Quirinal, like a hiker in modern Copenhagen who is drawn to a peep show. His account of his visit was entitled "An Account of the Wonders of the City of Rome: Produced by Magical Art or Human Craft." Few educated pilgrims would have been so naive in the 16th century, but the awe and excitement of "Master Gregory" was only possible because of the continuing history of reverence for antiquity, which inspired popes to collect ancient art and successively revive it in Rome to honor her. imitate Throughout the Middle Ages, Western Christian artists copied Roman models whenever they could.

put your hands on them. A lost Laocoon inspired an 11th-century capital at Frómista in northeastern Spain, nearly five hundred years before the same subject matter became a favorite source for Renaissance artists. A Roman aqueduct hinted at the arcades of the Autun Cathedral and a classical sarcophagus in the Saint Gilles frieze. Brunelleschi mistook the approximately 400-year-old church of San Miniato in Florence for a neoclassical building. The influence of the Renaissance has been exaggerated both in intellectual history and in the fine arts. Humanists reformed the curriculum, at least within the limited range of the institutions they influenced, but, like modern curriculum reformers, they had little impact on standards or values. Some orthodoxies about the meaning of the Renaissance are true. The range of classical and patristic texts available to scholars increased enormously in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks to the proliferation of scholars in insufficiently exhausted libraries. The language skills necessary to read them carefully and interpret them sensitively have been improved. At the turn of the century, the printing press supported science by providing standard texts. Yet almost all of the ancient authors and most of the specific works that shaped modern intellectual traditions were never lost or found long before the onset of the Renaissance. Aristotle, for example, surpasses all other classical writers in his impact on us. When W.H.K. Guthrie was a student, he was fascinated by the extraordinary way in which Aristotle seemed to anticipate modern thought; A small Asian promontory 177 The resurrection of the dead, performed c. 1320, on the facade of the Cathedral of Orvieto, by Giovanni Pisano who, with his father's Nicola, founded one of the most decidedly neoclassical schools of medieval sculpture. The bodies are modeled with a realism and fluidity that demonstrate the sculptor's familiarity with classical type, and the sarcophagi appear to have been copied directly from genuine relics of pagan antiquity. Although other fashions came and went, medieval sculpture never lost touch with the inspiration of the classics. it was only as he matured that he realized that this was because so much of modern thought came from Aristotle. But most of Aristotle's texts were already known in the 12th century and were fully integrated into the Western tradition by the end of the 13th century. Politics informed the political thought of Thomas Aquinas. Ethical and scientific works gave Albertus Magnus his rank. Logic was the reason for the popularity of Abelard's lectures in Paris before 1121. In fact, the reception of the essential techniques of Aristotelian logic has been assured since the turn of the millennium, when Gerbert von Aurillac taught an influential generation of students from synopsis. Aristotle and Plato collected them in Rome five hundred years before. In the mid-13th century, Richard of Furnival, chancellor of Amiens Cathedral, had at his disposal a magnificent library of Roman literature, containing his catalog of three hundred books in the form of

Garden, plot by plot. Renaissance scholars thought they were doing something new; but scholars always think so, and each generation likes to pit its own modernity against the darkness of the past. We must not be fooled by the self-perception of the original men of the Renaissance. The enthusiasm with which Western European writers around 1500 awaited the dawn of a new golden age intoxicates today's reader, who searches the past for signs of Europe's awakening to a destiny of world domination. But gold was fool's gold. At the end of the 16th century, the fashion pendulum swung again. Disillusioned artists adored melancholy, and writers shook off the shackles of their "Iron Age." The Wandering Spirit If there was a special spirit in Latin Christianity of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that helped to smooth over the divisions and weaknesses of civilization, it was not to be sought in the world of scholars and artists, who had little to do with it. with contributing to the hard work of starting the European expansion, but in the mentality of navigators, explorers and settlers. These were the humble heroes who conquered the only new frontier added to this otherwise inactive or declining cultural area during this period: a zone of navigation and new exploration in previously unknown waters, bounded by the Azores to the north, the Islas Canaries to the south to the south and the Iberian and African coasts to the east. Most were unknown pilots. Many of those known by name are recorded only or mostly on maps. The only monument on a Mallorcan map was accidentally tattooed by a clumsy gesture by George Sand during one of his winters in Mallorca, by the Portuguese Diogo Silves, who may have discovered the true lie of the Azores in 1427. Chopin. But just as his efforts can be reconstructed from maps, his profiles can be built from some surviving documents. At first they came mostly from Mallorca and Genoa, cradles of the art of “sea raiders”, later and increasingly also from Portugal and Andalusia. They often had crossover experiences, like the adventurer Poitevin Gadifer de la Salle, who set out in 1402 to conquer a kingdom in the Canary Islands, or Joan de la Mora, who was captain of the King of Aragon in the waters of Canaria in 1366. rivers". of gold", such as La Salle, or sources of slaves, such as the Peraza family of Seville, which promoted a series of attacks and conquests beginning in 1393. by Gabriel Vallseca in Mallorca in 1439, the treatment of the Azores seems be based directly on the description of the hitherto unknown navigator mentioned in the cartographer's note: Diogo Silves, Piloto do Rei de Portugal The islands had been charted before, but always with a disconcerting inaccuracy: here they appear, lined up in groups from southeast to northwest, exactly as they would be seen by a conscientious explorer who lacks the means of determining their position in the open sea to verify, but is determined to determine bearings that would help locate them again on the islands, Flores and Corvo, went unnoticed until the 1450s. .

King of the Canary Islands in the streets of Seville, or the "knights and squires" of the Infante D. Henrique de Portugal (1394-1460), who felt called to great deeds by his horoscope. Or they were missionaries, like the Franciscans of the Canary Islands diocese of Telde, who sailed to and from remote and wild islands for almost forty years, until they were massacred in 1393. They came from a world steeped in the idealization of adventure: the wars The dirty fights of the Peraza against the aborigines of the Stone Age on the island of La Gomera were celebrated in chivalrous verses; The Bethencourt family coat of arms was carried with Wodehouses in honor of Jean's fierce adversary. They had fairy tale names like Gadifer and Lancelot or, in the case of one wretched bandit who served Henry, Tristram of the Isle. They fought for glory, and most were forgotten. They shared and aspired to embody the great unifying aristocratic ethos of the Western late Middle Ages: the "code" of chivalry. His models were loose princes who, in popular chivalrous novels, fought for kingdoms through daring exploits at sea; Figures like the savage or the Wodehouse were par excellence the adversary of the knight who, with passion and ferocity, defied his civilized restraint and fought for the possession of lands and ladies in hundreds of surviving works of art. On the frontiers of Christendom, their imaginary involvement in turf wars could turn dirty adventures into chivalrous escapades. Equipped with a club and a shield, this specimen is topped by a silver-gilt jug, probably commissioned in 1500 by the Master of the Teutonic Order, the order responsible for the frontier against the "barbarism" of Lithuanian pagans. The appearance of the wild man in this context has the same implications as the coat of arms of Jean de Béthencourt mentioned in the text. A small promontory in Asia 181 Dieval Brutus, who founded a kingdom in Albion when Troy was lost, or Prince Amadis of Gaul, who fought against giants and conquered an enchanted island. His spokesperson was the Castilian knight Count Pero Niño, whose chronicle, written by his standard-bearer in the second quarter of the fifteenth century, mixed history, romance, and chivalrous discourse. The Vitorial celebrates a gentleman who was never defeated in tournaments, wars or love affairs, whose greatest battles he fought at sea, and "winning a battle is the greatest good and glory of life". When the author talks about the variability of life, fortune and the wind are his interlocutors, whose “mother” is the sea “and in it is my thirst”. Columbus, whose biography was strikingly similar to the plot of a chivalric maritime romance, probably had similar models in mind. He usurped the prize for sighting land in his first Atlantic. Far from keeping Parvenus in his place, chivalry has encouraged and endowed enterprising men who have risen in Western society for centuries. Columbus in a 16th century everyday print and Cornelius Vanderbilt in a Tiffany window

in the most socially respected church in Newport, Rhode Island, both appear with helmets and weapons and accompanied by Christian symbols. It would be appropriate enough for Vanderbilt to emulate the other American hero; In truth, however, both images are independently inspired by the chivalrous ideal: the New England nouveau riche and the visionary weaver boy appropriate the outer shell of chivalry. Columbus called himself the "Captain of Knights and Conquests." Vanderbilt puts on "the whole armor of God." Perhaps less out of sheer greed and more because his trip, while unprecedented, had some precedent in literature. In a Spanish version of the medieval Alexander romance, Alexander makes his own discovery of Asia by sea and, as the poet points out, he was the first to see it before any of his sailors. Chivalry was a powerful and enduring incentive in the West. In the 19th century, you could still rustle Victorian knights in their replica armor. In the 20th century, he could still make up for the "Knights of the Air" of the Battle of Britain for his modest social background. In a stained-glass window in one of America's most socially acceptable churches, he wears the image of Cornelius Vanderbilt with unconscious self-mockery. In the late Middle Ages, it was still strong enough to inspire the vanguard of European expansion abroad, when characters seeking resolution to their own romance reached opposite shores of its "little promontory of Asia." ". SECOND PART MUELLES RELAX Nequiquam Deus abscidit Prudens Oceano dissociabili Terras, si tarnen impiae non tangenda rates transiliunt vada. HORATIO, ODES, I, 3 In vain God in his wisdom has planned to separate the ocean from the earth, when ships, despite his intention, pass through the forbidden element. Translation by JAMES MICHIE When the waters saw you, they trembled with fear. PSALM 77 CHAPTER 6 SHY AND DECLINE EMPIRE. EXPANDING STATES IN LATE AFRICA AND MEDIEVAL AMERICA The Mayan Renaissance - The Retrospective Screen - The Black Empires - An Empire Built on Sand - The Aztec Memory - The Frustrated Empires THE MAYAN RENAISSANCE

Near the northeast corner of Quintana Róo, where the Gulf of Mexico meets the Caribbean, not far from the well-preserved resort land of Cancún, the ruined Mayan city of Tulum juts out into the sea from a high promontory. The sister city of Edzná, on the opposite side of the peninsula, so impressed Spanish explorers in 1517 that they called it "Greater Cairo," a name synonymous with awe-inspiring opulence. At first glance to Christian visitors, these cities would have achieved that rich, exotic, and menacing hue. Lushly painted, decorated in traditional Mayan aesthetics, which to Western eyes tend to appear more gruesome than beautiful, towering above the sea, walled and seemingly fortified, Tulum was the most impressive human feat European invaders had ever seen in the The new World. Now their fixed eyes are blind and black sockets in the fallen and weather-beaten facades; and the bright colors faded in the most protected spots of the cast. Those who see Tulum in its dilapidated state today may well be at the end of a tour of Maya sites that began inland between the trade, past the reefs to the foreground beach, where the trade of the Bahía de Honduras is located. with that of the Gulf of Mexico. much larger and richly restored monuments from earlier times see this as evidence of the fall of the Maya. But to those who saw the cities through the eyes of 1517, they were promising, civilized, and feared emblems. In its time, Tulum was a symbol to its residents of what could have been a conscious resurgence, based on memories of a great past and hope for a great future. It was already carrying out a modest colonial expansion of its own, reoccupying the interior town of Cobá and rededicating its ruins to the cults and icons of Tulum. Through the low, dark gates of Tulum, we can zoom in on some little-known but vivid examples of state-building and, in some cases, empire-building in the niches of Africa and the Americas of the late Middle Ages. The people of Tulum were different from the Maya of earlier times in size: smaller and worse fed, judging by their remains. They inhabited different rooms (lower buildings and ceilings) and ascended shorter steps stacked to more modest heights. They occupied a very different type of city from the ceremonial centers of earlier phases of Maya history. Tulum had streets like the cities of many cultures, instead of plazas and groups connected by procession paths and causeways. The excavation site was surrounded by a wall of immense thickness, but apparently modest in height, pierced by five narrow gates. This may have been for defense, or perhaps to distinguish a sacred or socially elevated center from profane suburbs. A particularly exclusive neighborhood right in the center consisted of two large, richly decorated palaces, a temple, and a small but dignified house built on top of a rich tomb. From an imposing position near the

At the edge of the cliff, another, more important temple dominated the city. All the interiors were modest and dimly lit: Tulum's elite did not enjoy the luxurious life of the seventh-century rulers of Palenque, with its salons and baths; but it was part of the Mayan tradition to combine sober, functional and austere interiors with sumptuous exteriors where life was lived in public. For example, although Tulum doesn't have any of the huge plazas of ancient Tikal or Quiriguá, the best of the palaces is set back from the street behind a colonnaded arch, and the smallest palace has a small grove of columns to one side. . A wide avenue connects the residential center to the clifftop temple, but Tulum was not primarily designed for ritual. Whereas in the older Mayan cities, comfort and practicality were subservient to the demands of spectacle, mass sacrifice, or perhaps, in some cases, geomancy, Tulum is geared toward commerce and security. Access to the open sea is protected by deadly reefs. Access to the cabotage in canoes that held the wealth of the city is easily controlled. The beach and bay immediately below the town were as good for trade as they are now for digging and digging, and the thick walls surrounding the center of town would help protect dumped goods from land attack. Tulum was well positioned in the 15th century to be a transshipment point along the trade route that linked the Gulf of Honduras with Xicalango and the Aztec world via Cozumel around the Yucatan peninsula. Although they lived differently from their ancestors, the Tulum Maya were not impervious to the past. They kept a stele from AD 564. c. in its central temple; they respected the old buildings of Cobá; and both as a sign of their own identity and as a memory of the past, they adopted the figure known to archaeologists as the diving god. Embedded and carved in stucco above some of Tulum's most prominent doorways, he descends, wild-eyed and arms crossed, legs tucked in and folded like wings. He runs instead of swimming; His bee wings, protruding from under his arms, make his movement unmistakably a flight movement. The image of "plunging" fits Tulum's position on the cliff, but to followers of him it could easily mean a shooting star or a descending lawyer. His cult was not exclusive to Tulum; other similar cults can be found in other parts of Mesoamerica. In the court of the Tajín in Vera Cruz, a place before 600 AD, a creature like the diver descends from Tulum to devour victims. The last occurrence of a comparable cult, before its reappearance at Tulum, was no later than the twelfth century at Sayil, the red-earth town in the arid Puuc limestone hills of Yucatán, where, without its wings, it graces the façade. of the largest building. . It was characteristic of Maya history that political revolutions and cultural revivals were accompanied by changes in the celestial images promoted by him as his tutelary deity and as a symbol of a

strong civic identity. Her cult was apparently revived here after centuries of obscurity: despite the discontinuities of Maya history, long memories are characteristic of Maya culture, in which time is counted in eons, astronomical records and predictions span hundreds of years. thousands of years old, and are historical and prophetic. the events merge into a characteristic literary genre - the books of Cbilam Balam - which has a long tradition. Through the state. During the High Middle Ages, which we refer to as the High Middle Ages, the rise of the great cities of Yucatán was marked by the progressive rise of the cult of Kukulcán, the feathered serpent god of central Mexico, who aligned himself with the natives. gods of ancient antiquity. Timid and retreating empires 189 Kukulcán is in Tulum, but only in a humble role. Chaac, the square-eyed deity with a long, curved proboscis whose masks concealed the most intricate Maya facades of Kabáh in the 11th century and who had once been dominant and ever-present in traditional programs of Maya iconography, has disappeared from Tulum. The diver who plunged other gods into oblivion was a powerful symbol of identity for his followers; yet, after a pause of three or four centuries, it was revived, not invented, as a link between the burly merchants of Tulum and their heroic predecessors in the great Puuc period. The Maya are best known to us as the creators of a classic period of monumental architecture and high art between the 3rd and 10th centuries AD, when their resplendent cities rose above the tropical jungles of the Usumacinta and Motagua valleys and in the Petén, or as the builders of "post-classical" centers, braving the arid climate and dense jungle of Yucatán. Nothing created by the descendants of the Maya after the 13th century equaled or even came close to the triumphs of human will over hostile environments represented by the size and majesty of these early groups of cities. However, the type of renaissance achieved in Yucatán in the High Middle Ages could have been repeated later in a new location. The ruins of Tulum suggest that a true Mayan renaissance was underway, which for unknown reasons was interrupted around the arrival of the Spanish invaders in Mexico. The fate of this Maya renaissance was typical of the African and American experience: vigorous and promising initiatives in state-building or cultural achievements in the late medieval period were frustrated or crushed. Some of them, however, produced expansion cultures as impressive and dynamic as those produced in the Old World of Europe or Asia at the time. In easily quantifiable terms, such as military reach and effectiveness, some African and American empires surpassed anything Western Christendom has achieved. A series of aggressive states arose suddenly and spread rapidly in the 14th and 15th centuries. Viewed correctly, their stories should change our conventional image of an "expansion era" fought by old forces, with inevitable casualties, rather than active combatants on the new worlds.

developed by the explorers of the Old World. THE DISPLAY OF RESPECT An astral observer privileged to see the world of the fifteenth century with a cosmic view from a towering height may have first noticed the rapid, dramatic and far-reaching expansion of the Ottoman and Muscovite states. The following most striking examples would have drawn his attention to Mesoamerica, where the Aztec world expanded from the Valley of Mexico to fill the land between the oceans; to Peru, where the Inca Empire stretched across thirty degrees of latitude and included almost all the sedentary peoples of the Andean valleys south of present-day Colombia; to West Africa, where Songhai rose from a subject state of the notorious Mali Empire to its rival and potential successor; to Ethiopia, which invaded its traditional highland strongholds to rule from the Red Sea to the depths of the Rift Valley; and Mwene Mutapa, a new Zimbabwean highland empire that established control from the Zambezi to Limpopo. By comparison, no Western European effort would have seemed very remarkable. Latin expansion was reversed in the Levant and checked in the Baltic. The Mediterranean empires of Genoa and Barcelona stagnated or declined, Venice's turned inland to grow. English rule over France was laboriously built and very short-lived. The Portuguese penetration into the Atlantic—although our farsighted cosmic observer would have recognized it—was still weak, superficial, and slow, and its main colonies had established themselves on previously uninhabited islands where no one could oppose them. The future Spanish Empire was little predicted until the last years of the century, except in the Canary Islands, where the Stone Age occupants were remarkably successful in resisting Spanish arms, from the founding of the first permanent European settlement in 1402 until the subjugation of the last conquest. from the island of Tenerife in 1496. Along with the then notable, but now forgotten, Third World empires of the 15th century, there were notable promising examples in parts of Africa and the Americas where, if anything, no great empire emerged. In the region of southern Niger and the lower Congo, states developed that, under different circumstances, could have played an important role in their regions and beyond. In its little world of city-states, Benin could have become the Genoa of West Africa; or, in a region of fiercely contested territory, the Congo, another Mwene Mutapa. In Mesoamerica, the Mayan Renaissance stalled. On the fringes of the central Amazon, the first Spanish visitors observed a remarkable settled rainforest culture in 1542, populous and militarily strong, but fading a generation later, perhaps wiped out by European diseases. In North Africa, Mamluk Egypt held promise but declined an imperial destiny until overtaken by Ottoman expansion. The era of the expansion of Morocco was postponed until the end of the 16th century.

century and with limited success. None of these cases, neither bright nor promising, ever received much attention from world history writers. With the exception of the Incas and Aztecs and, at an earlier period, the Maya, they are generally unknown or unsolicited. The history that we experience or that we make sense of is projected through a retrospective film that filters stories of unexplored potential. Given the long-term success of European imperial initiatives, we examine the origins of European expansion, excluding parallel phenomena in other societies. A significant part of the reality of the past leaves our image. If we look at some of the timid and reclusive empires, which generally left their place, we can better see the late Middle Ages and early Modern Ages for what they really were: eras in which various sprawling civilizations in parts of the world came into conflict when their dynamic caused them to collide. The traditional image of a largely passive non-European world, receding or declining, stagnant or stagnant in its development, awaiting the imprint of a single European life force, must be discarded in favor of a more fluid image of the past. THE BLACK EMPIRES The king best known for his wealth, according to a Mallorcan cartographer from the end of the 14th century, was neither in Europe nor in Asia. None of the ancient civilizations that dominated the first third of the millennium could compete for supposed wealth with the newly emerged empire of Mali, where deep in Africa, above the splendor of the Sahara and against the darkness of the jungle, in the middle of the prairies From the savannah and bushland of the Sahel, the golden glow began to attract the admiration and desire of the Mediterranean world in the 1320s. In 1352, the most traveled person in the Muslim world set out from Tangier on his last great journey across the Sahara. to see this empire with your own eyes. Although reputed to have only "a modest involvement in the sciences", Ibn Battutah was a conventionally well-educated scion of the Maghrebian service aristocracy who, on a pilgrimage to Mecca, developed a passion for "land travel". The accounts of him, received with astonishment at the court of his patron at Fez, were embellished with repetitions. However, the surviving account from his own hand is almost entirely convincing. When he crossed the Sahara, he had already passed through East Africa, India, Arabia, Persia, the lands of the Golden Horde and supposedly China, and his powers of observation were at their peak. His route south was through Sijilmassa to Taghaza, "an unattractive little town with the curious feature that its houses and mosques are built of salt blocks." From here he planned to travel to southern Mali with the gold caravans, which were said to be so rich in gold that the value of the salt tripled or quadrupled.

when crossing its territory. Ibn Battutah still had an arduous journey ahead of him. The desert had to be traversed in ten-night marches, a stretch without water, eating "desert truffles full of lice" in a land "tormented by demons... Here you can't see a road or trail, nothing." windblown sand." The heart of Mali lay in a landlocked but river-bound kingdom between the Niger and Upper Senegal, roughly at the southwestern tip of what is now the state of the same name. savannah and an empire that covered the Sahel, stretching from north to desert and south to rainforest Through the land of Mali, gold found its way north by cunning monopolists to the merchants of the Sahara, their caravans they were taken to Mediterranean ports Their location was a closely guarded secret Acquired - by all accounts perhaps closer to Ko's inventions being written out of conviction - through "stupid" trade, in which they were exchanged goods leaving them open for collection, gold gave rise to strange theories about its origin: it grew like carrots, it was created by ants in the form of nuggets, it was extracted by naked men who live in holes, its proof ble royal origin was mainly in the Bure Region, around the headwaters of the Niger and the headwaters of the Gambia and Senegal rivers. Some may also have come from the Volta Valley. Mali's middlemen were never able to control gold production; Whenever their rulers attempted to exercise direct political authority in mining areas, the residents would engage in some form of passive resistance or industrial action, and mining operations would cease. But Mali controlled southern access to the commercial centers of Walata and Timbuktu on the edge of the Sahara. Marketing was therefore in the hands of the rulers, who received the nuggets as tribute and left the gold dust to the merchants. As the most remote place on the Gold Route to which gold can be reliably traced, Mali became famous in the Mediterranean world in the 14th century. Its ruler, known as Mansa, reached legendary proportions as a result of spreading the knowledge of Mansa Musa, who reigned from 1312 to 1337 and made a spectacular pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 that spread his fame far and wide. He was one of the three mansas who performed the Hajj. This alone shows the substance and stability of the Mali state, as the pilgrimage lasted for over a year. Musa's journey was carried out in particularly lavish style and to impressive effect. For centuries he was remembered in Egypt where the Mansa stayed for three months and doled out gold with such a generous hand that it caused inflation: according to various accounts, the value of gold in Egypt fell between 10 and 25 percent. He gave fifty thousand dinars to the sultan and thousands of raw gold bars to the shrines that received it and the officials who received it. Although he traveled with eighty or one hundred camels, each loaded with three hundred pounds of gold, he was forced to bolster his finances by borrowing on the journey home. That's what he said when he came back.

for Mali he repaid his loans of 700 dinars for every 300 dinars he borrowed. Ibn Battutah founded Mali's first civil service post in Walata. "At the time," he lamented, "I regretted coming to your country because of your lack of education and contempt for white men." Culture shock hit quickly. The visitor was disgusted by the food, not knowing at what price the precious millet was brought from afar. Outraged by a passerby while he was doing his job in Niger, he later discovered that the man was on duty to protect him from a crocodile. Fiery women and sexual freedom alarmed him, but he was shocked to find children chained until they learned the Koran, and he praised blacks' "aversion to injustice." When he arrived at Mansa's court, he was enraged by the contrast between the ruler's personal pettiness and luxurious gold. A golden bird climbed on the umbrella of the mansa; his skullcap, quiver, and scabbards were of gold; but the Mansa had to be ashamed in generosity: "What shall I say about you in front of other rulers?" Some of the opulent rituals seemed silly, particularly the antics of the choked-feathered poets "with wooden heads and red beaks". Emissaries of the cannibals, to whom the Mansa presented a slave, appeared at court to thank him, stained with the blood of the gift they had just consumed. Fortunately, "they say that white is indigestible because it is immature." But, against his will, Ibn Battutah could not help but be impressed by the ceremonial splendor of the Mali court. He discovered that Mansa demanded more devotion from his subjects than any other prince in the world. Black states generally did not command the respect of Arab writers; this makes the wide-eyed admiration of Ibn Battutah, or fellow observant Ibn-amir Hajib, for that matter, all the more impressive. Everything in Mansa exuded majesty: the majestic gait of him; the hundreds of his servants carrying golden staffs; the indirect approach of him through an intermediary; the humiliations -prostration and cleansing of the head- to which his interlocutors were subjected; the resounding hum of bowstrings and the murmur of assent with which his words were received in the audience; the capricious taboos that imposed death on anyone who walked in his sandals in his presence or sneezed into his ears. This exotic theater of power had suitably dignified scenery. La Mansa's courtroom was a vaulted pavilion where an Andalusian poet sang. His capital in the bush country had a brick mosque. The Empire reached this peak of power and opulence in less than a century and a half of its existence. Its founder in the early 13th century was traditionally known as Sundiata, a cultural heroine of the ideal type, a crippled boy whose mother was insulted by the king's other wives and who brought a terracotta knight from a tomb in the Dienen/Mopti area. between the Bani of the Niger and Niger rivers,

probably late 13th or early 14th century. The aristocratic cavalry was the effective arm of Mali's military expansion into the Sahel. Ibn Khaldun attributed the era of conquest to the rule of Mansa Uli, who made a pilgrimage to Mecca "during the reign of Baybar in Egypt", that is, 1260-77. "During his mighty reign, his domains expanded and dominated the neighboring peoples... and all the nations of the dark lands admired them." power and wealth united. he returned from exile in Ghana to reclaim his homeland and overthrow his oppressors. The strength of his army and his successors was cavalry. Images of mounted Malian soldiers survive in terracotta. Aristocrats with thick eyelids, pursed lips, and proudly held heads surmounted by crested helmets, ride stiffly on horses with elaborate bridles. Some have breastplates or shields on their backs, or strips of leather armor that they wear as aprons. Their mounts wear garlanded halters and carved flank decorations. The riders lead them with short reins and arms outstretched. By the mid-14th century, the power of these warriors had established dominance over Mansas of the Gambia and from lower Senegal in the west to the Niger valley below Gao in the east and from upper Niger in the south to the Sahara in the North. The trade followed and exceeded their standards. Mali was not only a war empire, but also a commercial empire. The merchant caste, called the Wangara or Dyula, pushed the colonies beyond the reach of the ruler's direct authority and established, for example, a settlement at Begho, on the northwest frontier of Akan country, where they bought gold from the chiefs of forest regions. When the Portuguese established a gold trading factory at Elmina, a hundred kilometers west of the mouth of the Volta, in 1482, the Portuguese found themselves doing business with a ruler named Karamansa, whose title reflected the greatness of Mali's former rulers. That

The 14th-century Mandés, like their closest contemporary European counterparts, the Catalans, were an equal mercantile and imperial people, strong in warfare and goods. Like many up-and-coming empires in remote worlds in the late Middle Ages, Mali fell victim to its own relative isolation. Mansa Musa recognized this weakness of his empire, whose inhabitants "were a great multitude...However, when you compare it with the black populations that surround it and extend to the south, it is like a small white spot on a black cow." . by rebellion and invasion of her shores, she was weakened by the rivalries in her heart. Around 1360, a power struggle ensued between the descendants of Mansa Musa and those of his brother Mansa Sulayman. Around the end of the Songhay century, the People at the foot of the Niger, off the island, and Gao were lost to Mali. This was a serious blow, since Gao was one of the great trading posts between the forest and the desert, and now it was possible to overcome the monopoly of Mali 1430 years ago. The desert Tuaregs conquered Walata and Timbuktu. Two decades later, when Portuguese expeditions advancing up the Gambia River established the first recorded direct contacts between Mali outposts and European explorers, power in the Mansa was virtually in the hands of the former Mande-restricted Heartland. stroke of luck that deprived the European invaders of the opportunity to build a great Black Empire in India. Seeing the height of his fame seems, in retrospect, one of the most tragic. ironies of history Although known only through reports, Mali had projected a great image. On Majorcan maps of the 1320s, and more lavishly on the Catalan Atlas of around 1375-85, the ruler of Mali was portrayed as a Latin monarch, except for his blackface. Bearded, crowned and enthroned, with an abundance of orb and sceptre, he was perceived and portrayed as a wise man, not a savage: a sovereign equal in esteem to any Christian prince. Given this scenario of expectations, the discovery of Mali in decline caused bitter disappointment. Familiarity breeds contempt, and Mansa's heirs were considered stage black: crass racial stereotypes, dangling ape sexual organs. Mali survived until the late 16th century, narrowly surviving mutual reconciliation. “This Black Lord is called Massa Melly”, says the legend that accompanies the portrait of Mansa Musa in the Catalan Atlas (see page 160), “Lord of the Blacks of Guinea. This gentleman is the richest and most noble lord in this entire region thanks to the abundance of gold collected in his lands. His reputation increased his wealth to exceed that of all other kings. The European-style insignia and lush beard are high praise for an artist who hadn't yet learned to despise black royalty. Cresque's depiction of the Sahara is dominated by a cameleer in a litham, the veil-like harness that was the privilege of the elite and gave it an almost divine character. The figure depicted here, also wielding a knotted whip, a mythical magical weapon "like cattle tails", is probably intended for the great hero Sanhaja Abu Bakr bin DUmar al-Lamtuni, who founded Marrakesh in 1070 and fought jihad in all the fronts and is said to have been killed by a poisoned arrow in the "Golden Mountains" near the source of the Nile in 1087.

exhausting conflicts with Songhay, but he never regained his former power or prestige. In disappointing or declining black political worlds, European visitors decided that blacks inherently lacked political capacity. The Portuguese Crown went to great lengths in the late 15th and early 16th centuries to impose on their European compatriots a keen appreciation of the level of civilization of the black cultures with which it was introducing them. For example, in an extraordinary political pantomime in 1488, King João II welcomed an exiled Wolof potentate to a full royal reception, for which the black guest dressed in specially borrowed European clothing and cutlery. The kings of Portugal long adhered to the convention of treating the Congo as a "cousin," building it a Lisbon-inspired palace, sending their heirs to Portugal for education, and censuring the Portuguese there for their contempt for blacks. . None of these devices worked. With the exception of a few missionaries, all the Portuguese who went to the Congo to serve or trade had a pejorative image of their hosts and spread it back home. The expectations shattered by the first encounters with black societies could never be restored. If the first encounter with a significant black community had taken place a century earlier, when Mali's greatness was at its height, the entire subsequent history of black-white relations might have been different. Perhaps the African state best equipped to impress Europe with an image of black dignity in the late Middle Ages was Ethiopia. “Although the Nubians are black”, says an Aragonese geographical compilation from the end of the 14th century, “they are endowed like us with the faculty of reason”. widespread psychophysiology in late medieval Europe, associated with animal characteristics of sensuality, lust, indiscipline, and stupidity; fortunately, Ethiopians were rarely among them. Furthermore, they were zealous guardians of an ancient Christian tradition that entitled them to the brotherly sensibilities of the Latin West, rather than simply making them members of that vague legal category that allowed for so many pernicious distinctions known as communitas mortalium, or communion of humanity. , but also of the Communitas Fidelium, or community of believers, whose rights were well defined. Thanks to sporadic diplomatic contacts since the Council of Florence in 1439 and frequent study tours and pilgrimages to the Ethiopian religious community founded by Pope Sixtus V in the church of San Stefano dei Mori in Rome, scholarly and enterprising examples have become known. of Ethiopian church art. in the West at the end of the 15th century. The image that Europe took away from Ethiopia was like that expressed in an Ethiopian miniature in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, in which the patron, splendidly attired, prostrates himself before the benediction of Christ, bearded and paternal, in the form of a diamond, next to to the symbols of the evangelists. while a little black acolyte, stripped to the waist

she gets up, puts on a long linen stole. Despite the doctrinal heterodoxies known to characterize a Monophysite church for centuries and which received its patriarchs from Alexandria, Ethiopia appeared as a country rich in strong devotion and liturgical decorum. The information was supplemented by Christian traders who were sporadically willing to brave the dangers of traveling through Muslim territory along the Nile, caravanning across the country to the Red Sea to embark at Massawah, and then through the perilous pass into the lands. tall. Kingdom. Early 16th century Coptic psalter of the Ethiopian priest Nicholas performing a proskynesis, perhaps to commemorate his ordination, as an acolyte waits to dress him in his stole. promising. The Negus - Negushta Nagast, or King of Kings - is believed to be identified with the legendary Prester John of the Indies, whose aid in the worldwide conflict against Islam was often expected and sometimes sought since the mid-12th century. . During most of the Late Middle Ages, the rapid and relentless rise of Ethiopia seemed to justify the expectation that the Negus would prove a powerful ally. Since Solomida's accession to the throne in 1270, the empire had organized for war, its court an army and its capital a camp. The monasteries of Debra Hayq and Debra Libanos, the small world of religious communities on the islands of Lake Tana, became schools for missionaries charged with consolidating Ethiopian power in the conquered pagan lands of the Shoah and Gojam. Under the Negus Amda Siyon in the 1320s and 1330s, the border was extended to the south and east. A new route to the sea through Zeila to supplement the long drive north to Massawah became a major goal of Ethiopian politics. Access, initially forced by raids, was secured by conquest under the Negus Davit in 1403. At this time, Ethiopian rule extended as far as the Rift Valley south of the Upper Awash. The trade in slaves, ivory, gold, and civet north of the valley was largely in the hands of the Ethiopians, who financed the empire's defenses and fueled its expansionist ambitions. The same sources of wealth adorned the court with exotic splendor. Perhaps with a calculated exaggeration, the Portuguese embassy of 1520 reported the "innumerable tents" carried by fifty thousand mules, the crowd of two thousand in audience, the feathered horses trimmed with fine brocade. The letters sent by the Negus to Portugal, which treated their addressee with great condescension, shamelessly played on the legend of Prester John and boasted of "men and gold and provisions like the sand in the sea and the stars in the sky". However, defense became increasingly difficult as the borders expanded. The reason for the Ethiopian appeals to Portugal was to get help with the task. The expansion was difficult to sustain with a jealous elite, a quarrelsome clergy, and a divided imperial family. Ethiopia was cursed with a system of dynastic instability, tempered by the dispossession of royal children. successor

Conflicts plagued him. The vanquished pagans were easily assimilated through conversion and colonization when mass enslavement and deportation of the existing population proved insufficient; The Muslims, however, were more stubborn, and the failure of the overworked Ethiopian Evangelists in the early fifteenth century, when given the chance not to impress the entrenched Islam of the nobility, proved almost fatal in the long run. . In the early 16th century, as Ethiopian energies were waning and the initiative was shifting to the pagan and Muslim tribes on the southern and eastern borders, a strong, cunning and charismatic leader emerged among the nobility, bent on revenge. Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim, known as Gragna (often referred to as "Grange"), Zeila's left-handed imam, secured Turkish money and weapons for his campaigns and coordinated his attacks with Ethiopia's other regional opponents. By the 1520s, the empire's defenses were crumbling with terrifying rapidity, and attacks by Imam Ahmad struck the northern monasteries. An Arab chronicler who claimed to have accompanied the expedition vividly recorded the moment the Lalibela monastery complex sank on April 9, 1533: It was raining. The imam marched all night, hastening his pace. The extreme cold killed many men. They arrived at the church. The assembled monks were determined to die for this place. The Imam saw a church like he had never seen before. It was carved into the mountain. Although Great Zimbabwe is the most impressive of the region's stone-built sites, it is generally typical of medieval construction techniques south of the Zambezi, before the political center of Mwene Mutapa was supplanted by northward expansion in the 19th century. XV. This funnel-shaped tower dominates the walls of a large oval enclosure that sits below a 350-foot-high granite hill, housing an impressive citadel. Shy and reserved Rich 201 tainside; its pillars were carved into the rock. Nothing was made of wood except their images and relics. It was usually the custom of the imam to light the churches with torches, and the monks "threw themselves into the flames like moths into a lamp". Nothing could burn here. After an exchange of attempted fire attacks between Christians and Muslims, Ahmad "put his relics on the sword and smashed the stone idols and took whatever he found of gold vessels and silk." During the next ten years of fighting, the Empire was saved from its own embers thanks to the energy of the Negus Claudius and the intervention of a force of Portuguese volunteers. but it never regained its former glory, and its decentralized system of government, often compared to feudalism by Western historians, kept its elite divided and its power weakened. The examples of Mali and Ethiopia seemed to convey a general rule about the instability of black empires and the unsustainability of African conquests. The mid-16th century Portuguese historian João de Barros recounted with admiration that the ruins in Zimbabwe were “wonderful”.

Sublimity, without mortar or tar in the joints", incomparable to the modest effort of the Portuguese themselves to build a castle in Sofala, and "perfect, both in the symmetry of the walls and in the size of the stones and in the dimensions of the colonnades. However, he dismissed the suggestion that they might have been of native construction: to say now how and by whom these buildings could have been built is impossible, as the people of this country have no tradition of such things and no knowledge. of letters: that is why they consider it the work of the devil, because when they compare it with other buildings they cannot believe that man made it political events administrative centers south of the Zambezi between the 12th and 16th centuries An impressive site was unearthed and the relics others are scattered throughout the country. The shift of the center of power from the northern Zimbabwean plateau to an area with less durable building materials in the mid-15th century was caused not by a decline in state power or the level of material civilization, but by Mwene's military expansion. Mutapa. in new and highly attractive areas. Settlers from the north were drawn in, not driven out, although a decline in the navigability of the Sava River may have helped spur the change. Indeed, the great era of Great Zimbabwe and Mankweni was in the 15th century, when hewn stone buildings were erected in a regular course and the meat-fed elite were buried with gifts of gold, as Mwene Mutapa's Empire appeared in André Thevets in 1575 Cosmographie universale, the year in which the Portuguese conquest attempt was repelled. Thevet's text is incoherent and barely coherent, but the engraver had a clear, if imprecise, perception of the state and its ruler. The elephant and palm trees are exotic conventions. The thatched huts are realistic enough, but Monomotapa advances against them like a foreign conqueror, bringing a higher level of civilization with him. Mistaking him for a Muslim, the engraver gives him and his men an oriental look and weapons. The pack of dogs that accompanies him is a sign of nobility that any European would recognize. The supplicant subjects suggest the role of the ruler as a court official. The naked savages fighting in the background give the impression that the Monomotapa is strengthening as a peacemaker and conqueror. Undoubtedly, wineries, jewelry, large copper ingots and Chinese porcelain made their way across the Indian Ocean via Kilwa and Sofala. The abandonment of the sites, lamented by Barros and later European commentators, did not mark Mwene Mutapa's extinction or eclipse, but rather a shift in his center of gravity. The change is traditionally associated with the campaigns of the rozwi chief Nyatsimka Mutota in the second quarter of the 15th century, who conquered the middle Zambezi valley, a frontier country at the northern end of the Shy and Withdrawn Empires.

Amazons have always been popular with illustrators. Columbus had reported Amazonas in the Caribbean and in 1542 Francisco de Orellana had picked up rumors about his rich and powerful empire in the valley of the river that bears his name. Monomotapa probably had a female bodyguard. The "Amazons" of the court Kabakas of Buganda exerted a similar fascination in the 19th century. The representations of all these subjects were mixed and confused with the Amazons of the classical myth. Despite the exotic setting depicted in this 1707 Dutch engraving, the artist is primarily interested in the torsos of the Amazons, who remove their right breasts to facilitate archery. The operation takes place on the left and its effects are modeled on the deliberately classical pose of the warrior doll in the foreground on the right. from the Zimbabwean plateau, rich in textiles, salt and elephants. The ruler acquired the title of Mwene Mutapa, or "Lord of the Spoiled Peoples", which was extended to the state. From the mid-15th century, the pattern of trade routes changed as conquests spread eastward towards the coast along the Pungwe and Sava rivers. Travelers to Mwene Mutapa in the 16th century typically traveled up the Zambezi to the confluence with the Mazoe, from where it was a five-day walk through the Mazoe Valley to the fairs where Mwene Mutapa's gold could be purchased. At the time, the Empire occupied any territory its rulers desired. Its northern and southern borders were protected by tsetse fly-infested rivers. The Kalahari Desert lay to the west, and to the east they had the natural defenses of the Inyanga Mountains, well beyond the limits of their advance. A direct outlet to the sea was probably not in the interest of a native trading community that was very good at dealing with coastal middlemen and inexperienced in maritime trade. There were striking structural similarities between Mwene Mutapa at the end of the fifteenth century and Mali a hundred years earlier. Both were products of a sudden and rapid expansion. Both were landlocked empires whose economies depended on control of the gold and salt routes. Both were large enough to be vulnerable to secession and internal coups. Both were surrounded by greedy enemies. Both were isolated and difficult to access. It may have been Mwene Mutapa's formidable natural defenses that saved him from the fate of Mali. The most determined attack by the Portuguese from 1571 to 1575 was repelled and ended in a commercial haven. The admiration that Portuguese writers retained from other black states was selectively bestowed on Mwene Mutapa, identified with the kingdom of Sheba as well as with Ofir, and suggested as the true prototype of the kingdom of Préster even after John's near-collapse of Ethiopia. The one hundred bodyguards of the Monomotapa - supposedly converted to Christianity by a Jesuit in 1560 - aroused the curiosity of humanists interested in etiologizing the Amazonian myth. The empire never fully succumbed, but it disappeared as its sub-communities became more assertive and increasingly victimized in the 17th century.

Century for "men who want to be kings": desperate Portuguese who "go native" and win fiefdoms in the native jungle. However, its precarious existence continued until the 1830s, when it was inundated by the flood north of Natal Ngoni (see Chapter 14). AN EMPIRE BUILT ON SAND The vitality of some sub-Saharan states at the end of the Middle Ages makes the stillness of North Africa surprising at the same time. Egypt and Morocco, at least, were poised for a greatness that was never realized. Between the repulsion of the Mongols in 1260 and their submission to the Turks in 1517, the Mamluk rulers of Egypt enjoyed a secure, wealthy, and populous state; Its imperial potential was sensed by its founder, Baybars the Great, who boasted that he could play polo in Cairo and Damascus in the same week. While Cairo's skyline is dominated by the ancient splendor of the pyramids and the modern pretensions of Mehmet Ali's Acropolis, its best buildings, after the Ibn Tulun Mosque, are the late medieval splendor of Mamluk mosques and madrasahs. The most lavish spending, and thus perhaps the wealthiest era, was the reign of the Qa3it Shy and Retiring Empires. 205 The mausoleum of the Mamluk sultan QaDit Bey, the incredible master builder of which seventeen buildings remain today in Cairo. Typical are the elegance of the minaret and dome, the luxury of the striped masonry and the filigree ceiling of the burial chamber. This is the most beautiful of the twenty tomb complexes of the Mamluk rulers that make up the "City of the Dead." They were also built to house the living, with apartments to receive family members who came to pray, and often had a pious endowment such as a school, a collegiate mosque, a public fountain and rest-place, or a congregation. sufi. Qa3it Bey has all these dependencies. Bey, which ended in 1496, less than a generation before the collapse of the state. Egypt's inability to turn this wealth into power may be due in part to a structural failure in the state that also affected Morocco. Both states were dominated by armies of different social compositions: Morocco was ruled by tribal vanguards, Egypt by a military caste; both provided excellent light cavalry, but relied on weak recruits, unreliable Christian renegades, and treacherous Turkish mercenaries for infantry and artillery. The consequences can be fatal. In 1557, one of Morocco's most successful sultans was assassinated by his Turkish artillerymen, who sent his pickled head to Istanbul. The history of Morocco in the 16th century can be characterized as a search for ways to adapt to the new war technologies that Spain, Portugal and the Ottoman Empire used to threaten the Maghreb. Despite its enviable position on the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts which, like France and Spain, gave it an unusual advantage in the late medieval and early modern struggle for ocean resources, Morocco was also characterized due to a lack of tradition and a disdain for the sea, which led Moroccans to dismiss the Ottoman Empire as a fishing enterprise.

Still, to the south, Morocco had a sea of ​​sand with a welcoming coastline. Like the Atlantic of Spain, the Sahara of Morocco was an obstacle course crossed only with risk, work and expense towards a land of gold. In the late Middle Ages, Morocco's chances of founding a trans-Saharan empire were slim. The path to the gold was protected by the great power of Mali. The imperial ambitions of the Merinid dynasty, which ruled from 1269 to 1465, were mired in dreams of rebuilding a North African and Andalusian state as the first conquerors of the desert; but they were weakened by sedentarism, and by the fourteenth century, owing to solitary customs and royal minorities, they tended more and more to withdraw into palace and seraglio life, leaving the government to their hereditary viziers, the Banu Watta. The palace rule of the prefects almost always ends in a coup. When the Wattasids gained sovereignty, they had to fight to assert their legitimacy against claimants from the desert sects and supposedly from the tribe of the Prophet of Islam. These religious movements were dangerous when they divided and untouchable when they merged. In the early years of Wattasid's rule, followers of a murdered charismatic Sufi named al-Jazuli fanned a rebellion by marching across the empire with his embalmed corpse. They were narrowly defeated, but they demonstrated how the reputation of a holy man can spur a political movement. In the second decade of the 16th century, the al-Jazuli mantle passed to a Tidsi family who claimed the Prophet as their ancestor and organized a tribal confederation for a rival Wattasid state. They gained support by declaring holy war against Christian opponents, but their real enemies were the ruling dynasty of Morocco. Spain and Portugal, their nominal enemies, actually supplied them with firearms. In 1541 they turned these weapons against the Portuguese garrison in Agadir. Enriched by plunder and ransom, and strengthened in prestige by a victory over the infidels, they conquered the Wattasid rear in Morocco in 1549 and unified the country under their rule, following the precedent of the earlier Maghrebi conquerors of the coast, succumbing to the Temptation of the Mediterranean. civilization and taking classes Behavior of the servants of the deposed sultan of Fes. Once the war with the Wattasids was over and the combined power of Morocco was available for a new venture, Muhammad al-Shaikh beShy and the Retreating Empires 207 began planning the conquest of the Sahara. In 1557, a Moroccan expeditionary force briefly conquered Taghaza, the salt-mining town in the middle of the desert. Logistical problems from the desert campaigns and distractions on other fronts delayed further advances until the 1580s, when the vision of an empire of gold captured the imagination of Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur. He called for a campaign in the South against the doubts of his followers and the advice of his advisers. He took the need for enlargement for granted. The way north was blocked by the Habsburgs; the east was guarded by the might of the Ottoman Empire. The black country was richer than

that of the Maghreb; their conquest would bring a profit that more accessible countries could never offer. The desert was not impassable. What merchant caravans could do, a well-organized army could do. Ahmad al-Mansur agonized at the prospect of the destruction his army would wreak on the blacks, for his firepower was now at full strength, with 2,500 renegade Christian or Moorish riflemen under the command of a Spanish captain and a platoon of camel mounted artillery. . . In 1588 he demanded a new exorbitant Songhay gold price for shipments of salt from the Sahara. It was a deliberate provocation. Songhay's defiant response was a gift of darts and a sword. Nine thousand camels accompanied the Moroccan task force on a 135-day, 1,500-mile journey, mostly through the desert. Half the force is believed to have died en route, but the survivors dispersed the Songhai hosts as efficiently as earlier conquering vanguards had crushed the Aztecs and Incas. The parallels with the Spanish experience continued. Over the next twenty years, Morocco transformed the Sahel into a colony of twenty thousand people. After al-Mansur's death, settler communities, often intermarrying locally, created their own Creole and mestizo states, which gradually slipped out of Moroccan control. The gold that passed through his hands flowed to other destinations. The largest shipment back to Morocco arrived in 1599 on thirty camels and was valued at £604,800 by an English merchant in Marrakech; but this magnitude of return was never repeated, and by the late 1630s Morocco's gold reserves were running low. Around the same time, the Spanish Empire experienced a similar crisis, as levels of gold shipments from the Americas plummeted to an all-time low and the "criollo patriots" of the Americas, particularly in Mexico and Peru, developed anticipated identities and myths, if not immediately accelerated, political separation from Spain (see Chapter 11). Still, Spain's empire proved more resilient than Morocco's, despite serious relative weaknesses in its structure and origins. The distances covered by their communications were much greater; it had been built with relatively fewer, more sparsely distributed workers; and he faced native adversaries of immense power and unbridled aggression, to whom we must now return. Why didn't Cortés in Mexico or Pizarro in Peru suffer the fate of Magellan, who, overestimating his abilities, died at the hands of local warriors in Cebu? Or Captain Cook being beaten up on a Hawaiian beach? Or Cristovão da Gama's Portuguese in Ethiopia in 1542, where three hundred men out of four hundred were massacred by tribal nobility? Or, to give some examples where the technical differences between the competitors were even greater, why were they not destroyed like Chelmsford's men at Isandhlwana, or Gordon's at Khartoum, or Custer's at Little Bighorn, or one of the many "thousand formations"? pounds". " made by them "a jezail of ten rupees" was dropped?

But given the experience of the Spanish in the New World and some similar examples, our sense of the ease with which expanding modern European societies asserted their supremacy over technically inferior indigenous civilizations is much less clear. Numerical weight or wild engagement often outweighed the generally modest technical advantage that pre-Christian armies powered by steam engines, machine guns, and Gatlings could wield. European successes in the third quarter of our millennium, "Western" world domination in the last, no longer seem to be the natural thing for which they were taken for granted. But the true story of the founding of the Spanish Empire in America does not support the conclusions that are usually drawn from it. With the exception of Mexico and Peru, notable for the glitter of gold and the dramatic possibilities of the stories, the conquest was generally painful and slow. The Yucatán Maya defeated repeated Spanish incursions and, after conquering most of their lands, maintained a remnant state of their own deep in the Petén until the 1690s, when a Spanish monk convinced them that submission would be in accordance with his own oracle. . The Florida Seminoles continued to fight until the Spanish Empire collapsed. The Araucanians of Chile maintained their resistance throughout the history of the Spanish monarchy and then, with characteristic perversity, continued in the name of that monarchy against the successor republic. Many jungle tribes in Central South America could only be reduced by the peaceful methods of missionaries. On the northern frontier of New Spain, Indians who had never responded to Spanish gun power were only persuaded to follow Spanish policy through laborious negotiations on equal terms, called parlamentos, in the 18th century. The ultimate triumph of this collaborative approach was spectacular. His discoveries are exemplified in the 1754 plan to decorate the settlement of San Juan Bautista, Texas, in the Simancas Archives, where the Spanish monarchy ultimately built native communities that could not be forcibly reduced. Through a "pull" policy, Native Americans were drawn into rationally planned settlements. The drawing was made for official record, but it obviously seems idealized. It shows the consecration of the main square through the erection of crosses in its corners. Above is the mission with its garden and its magnificent church, to the right of which is the town hall. A community of nuns comes out of the mission buildings with their schoolchildren to witness the ceremony. Groups of Indians arrive at each of the main entrances to the plaza while Spanish troops and local auxiliaries parade and fire salutes of cannon. 210 D E S P R I N G S U N B O I LED José Gabriel Condorcanki, “Túpac Amaru II”, self-proclaimed restorer of the Inca Empire, wealthy landowner from the Cuzco region who mobilized a “general rebellion”.

Peru in 1780, evoking memories of the resistance against the conquistadors in the 16th century. Although this Jesuit-trained revolutionary wore European garb, Inca garb was the style of choice for portraits of the descendants of the native elite in 18th-century Cuzo. José Gabriel went through the lengthy process of claiming descent from himself from the last Inca ruler and was inspired by reading the utopian accounts of Inca history popular with criollo readers. The goatskin painting was painted more than a generation after its brutal execution - by mutilated dismemberment - in 1781. See page 222. Timid and Retreating Empires 211 Strolling through the orderly lines of colonnaded streets, processions of Indians and Spaniards, with their weapons and traditional costumes and their music, to meet the missionary people in the main square and in each of them festive crosses to erect songs. But the process was neither quick nor easy, nor was it motivated by any Spanish superiority, technical or moral. Furthermore, the achievements of the great indigenous civilizations of Mexico and Peru were generally not adequately represented. Peru was not fast and Mexico was not easy. An Inca state existed in the forests of Vilcabamba until 1572. Like the Roman Empire in the Middle Ages, the Inca Empire continued a kind of ghostly existence until 1780, when José Gabriel Condorcanki rebelled against Tupac Amaru who, combined with the appearance of a Spanish knight with the blood of an Inca emperor, he proclaimed himself as "José I, by the Grace of God, Inca King of Peru." In one of Hergé's Tintin stories, the hero discovers an active Inca court deep in the South American jungle; the imagination has enough plausibility to make it powerful. The Aztec empire was more quickly overthrown and more completely destroyed; but, as we shall see, it was a no less formidable foe and, in its own way, an equally tenacious conquest. "In war," said Napoleon, "material morality is ten to one." The conquerors of Mexico had no advantage. The events of the conquest unfolded rapidly, but they were just as arduous and terrifying for the Spanish as they were for their opponents. Cortés landed in Veracruz in August 1519 with a supposed reconnaissance force. He renounced the authority of his superiors in Cuba, founded his men as a civic community and was elected mayor: it was a reflex act. When the Spanish found themselves on a wild frontier, they founded a city, just as the English would found a club in similar circumstances. He beached his ships and went on "without fear that the people left in the city would betray me as soon as I turned my back on them." Rumors of Aztec wealth strengthened a resolve that literally meant conquer or die when the ships ran aground. "Trusting in the greatness of God and in the power of the royal name of his Highnesses," 315 Spaniards set out inland in search of Moctezuma "wherever he is." The route was deliberately chosen to penetrate the most inaccessible corners of the Aztec world, where the most reluctant tributaries and defiant enemies of the Aztecs were to be found. They climbed from Jalapa by "a pass so rough and steep that there is nothing so difficult in Spain" and set out convinced that they were now in the Aztec Empire.

"God knows," Cortés wrote, "how my people suffered from hunger and thirst and... hail and storms." They fought their way through the land of Tlaxcala, where their bravery was rewarded by the alliance of the fiercest source of resistance against the Aztecs between Mexico and the coast. The thread on which his morale hung was rapidly unraveling. They were farther from home than any man had ever traveled west. They lost hope of help and knew that a force would follow them out of Cuba to punish, not help. They were surrounded by a hostile and imposing nature and hundreds of thousands of menacing "savages" that they could not understand. They had to breathe a rarefied and unknown atmosphere; withstand extreme heat and cold; a debilitating diet without red meat or wine, which the Spanish considered essential for good health and high status. They were at the mercy of local guides and interpreters who could betray them at any time. In Cholula, where the feathered serpent god had his most important sanctuary, Cortés resorted to methods of terror. To prevent an indigenous conspiracy, he said, but more convincingly, to ease Spanish stress, he says he massacred more than 3,000 citizens. Even when they reached the maritime fortress of Tenochtitlán, where they were solemnly received and comfortably housed, the conquistadors remained nervous and psychologically unstable. It is important to remember that prior to the conquest of Mexico and Peru, the Spanish had not fully articulated the divine self-awareness that came so easily after victory. Stories of superhuman abilities had not yet been transmitted, such as that of Hernán Sánchez de Badajoz at the Siege of Cuzco in 1536, when he climbed a ladder and used his shield to fend off a rain of stones to get into a tower on the other side. from a window, behind which, after defeating the Indian defenders on this level, he grabbed a dangling rope and pulled himself up, braving more rocks along the way to encourage his companions to follow. Stories like these, reminiscent of modern comic book heroes with "special powers", true or false, can only be told in an atmosphere of heightened self-awareness. The conquistadors of Mexico dug the foundations of the myth of Spanish invincibility and found no solace in it. It is true that they spoke a language in which the word "arrogance" denotes a virtue. They came from a people accustomed to self-assertion, whose leading historian of the day claimed that the Spanish were superior to the Italians because the Goths had defeated the Romans, and whose representatives at the Council of Basel settled a priority dispute with the Spanish. and the English delegation overturned the bench on which their rivals sat. Furthermore, in the half century that preceded the conquest of Mexico, Spanish arms had a formidable record. His prizes were the western Canary Islands (1476-78), the Kingdom of Granada (1482-92), Naples (1497-1503), Melilla (1497), Oran (1509), Algiers and Bejaia (1510), the south of Navarra (1511-14) and in the New World, Hispaniola (1495-96),

Puerto Rico (1508), Jamaica (1509), Cuba (1511) and Castilla del Oro (1512-17). However, none of this set a precedent for the situation in which Cortés and his men found themselves. The Old World conquests were accomplished with relatively short lines of communication and relatively concentrated and well-equipped forces. Those who were in the New World so far faced relatively weak enemies and at least received help in logistical support. Cortés not only had to defeat a populous and powerful enemy without such advantages; He also had to defeat his own potential allies before they joined him, and defeat the forces sent after him from Cuba before he could enlist his help. The conquistadors of Tenochtitlán developed some strange psychological strategies to deal with their isolation and exposure. Bernal Díaz del Castillo, who left incredibly vivid memories as an old soldier, took refuge in a chivalric fantasy. His first vision of Tenochtitlán was like a glimpse of an enchanted city; In his eyes, Montezuma was an exotic prince whose prize he valued as proof of his own nobility. Pedro de Alvarado, whose long career in the New World would earn him one of its fiercest reputations, attempted to replicate Cholula's terror tactics and provoked a bloody Aztec response by massacring a group of Tenochtitlán nobles. Part of his strength resorted to the consolation of religion: the appearance of Santiago at his side in battle gave his battle the scent of a crusade; Cortés himself became increasingly religious as the conquest progressed, ending with a vision of the future of Mexico as home to a new "apostolic" church. Some idolized their leader and sang campfire songs about his bravery in his presence. Fear was behind all of his reactions: fear that could be read between the lines in Bernal Díaz's dry-throated stories about the agony of witnessing human sacrifices, or the beautiful balance of battles from which all Spaniards were wounded. Even in practice, the Spanish were not invincible. Their first major encounter with the hostile Aztecs resulted in bitter defeat on June 30, 1520, on the Noche Triste, or "dark night," when, driven from Tenochtitlán with heavy casualties, they fought their way under intense pressure. fire along the lake. roads. . . "Only God," said Cortés, "knew how difficult and dangerous he was." Even when Cortés raised the empire's tributary subjects and returned with thousands of native allies to avenge him, the Aztec capital could not be subdued by force. The technical advantages generally attributed to the Spanish were worth little: the horses were not suitable for street fights in the middle of a lake; Superior to the enemy's obsidian-studded maces, steel blades were held in too few hands to be of much use, as were crossbows and rifles, which relied on a limited supply of ammunition. Even the nine sailing brigs built by Cortés to patrol the lake were not decisive. Rather than be outmatched by superior morality or superior technology, Tenochtitlán starved to death and surrendered. An empire fueled by tribute can

it will not survive the power outage. A densely populated community crammed onto a small island could not survive without the vast food supplies provided by the Empire. The Aztec state's power to collect tribute was both a source of its weakness and a daunting measure of its strength. Only the degree of consumption among the hegemonic communities in and around Lake Texcoco can reveal the degree of their dependence on inland resources. According to surviving tribute lists, which may not be complete, Tenochtitlán received annually, in units of probably about a bushel and a half, 140,000 maize, 105,000 beans, 105,000 sage, 90,000 purslane, 4,000 breads of salt, 980 shipments of cocoa and 320 baskets of cornmeal and other powdered foods. Bernal Díaz witnessed 1,000 daily meals served to Moctezuma's entourage and 300 dishes for the ruler at each meal. These included chicken stew, turkey stew ("double chin," Bernal said), pheasants, "wild partridges," peccaries, quail, wild and domestic ducks, venison, roasted songbirds, doves, what appeared to be hares, and rabbits. , "and more." types of poultry and other things that occur in this country... I heard that young boys cooked for it, and how it had so many different types of stews and other things that we couldn't see, whether it was human meat or something else." When the cacique finished, his family received "boats of sparkling chocolate, more than 2,000, with an infinity of fruits. In the mid-15th century they received up to 1,200 per day. cocoa beans, 100 turkeys, 20 breads of salt, 40 baskets of peppers, 10 baskets of tomatoes and 10 pumpkins with supposedly 400,000 tortillas When this kingdom of greed closed its tentacles forced to retreat when it could no longer get beyond the Valley of Mexico for the tribute with which if it feasted, it was doomed, Cortés did not need to kill him; by creating its subjects and tributary towns, it cut off its sources of life. What its Indian allies could not, the invisible allies finished off: disease must have left the city weakened and malnourished before it finally surrendered. The colonial ity of early Mexico disagreed on how to explain the conquest. For the conquistadores, embittered by the lack of rewards, it was the sum of their individual acts of bravery in the petitions they wrote to the Spanish courts in pursuit of their claims to the crown. Well, missionary monks, like the feared Toribio de Benavente -who in Nahuatl adopted the last name Motolinia, or "poor thing"-, was ordained by God for the conversion of the Indians. For the Tlaxcala Indians, who provided the vital native tributes that allowed Cortés to dominate other potential allies, it was a Tlaxcalan victory over Tenochtitlán with few others, including the Spanish, playing a minor role. In a legal document prepared to claim the tax-exempt reward, they showed photos of their bosses negotiating with Cortés over his Indian interpreter lover, Shy and Retiring Empires 215

^OSTW«/ •ríkí^i^eh^aa.'hf fft ' ^ s 5 5 S 5 a , T / J f \h«mf fiJ-r^ -tape>4S> jwtv The tribute section of the Mendoza Codex conveys an idea of ​​the vast scope of Aztec power and the complexity of the network of tributaries that held hegemony together. The glyphs in the upper and left margin show the names of remote places that owed tribute to Tenochtitlán. For example, the prickly pear glyph in the upper left corner represents the Xonconochco, the southernmost tributary of the Aztecs on the Pacific coast. The annual tribute due is vividly displayed, with the amounts indicated (each flag-shaped symbol represents twenty units): jade beads, magnificent feather caps, exotic bird skins, amber jars and pieces, jaguar skins, baskets of cocoa beans and chocolate drinking containers. . 216 THE SPR I N G S UN C O I L ED, which was always at the center of the composition; They showed scenes of the triumph of their warriors, with Spanish knights like the Duke of Plaza Toro bringing up the rear. Most explanations, however, have divided the blame between the innate virtues of the Spaniards and the supposed moral crisis that would have rocked Aztec society in its last years of self-government. The image of Aztec decision makers paralyzed by a sense of impending doom and of an Aztec world reconciled to its own failure comes from two partial sources: Cortés's own accounts and early colonial myth. Cortés, in his account of their first meeting, first put into Moctezuma's lips the admission that power was to be handed over to strangers from the sea, representatives of a late culture hero from the distant past, "and after the things the captain said about the lord and king, who sent him here, and judging from the direction he came from, I'm sure… this is the same gentleman we've been waiting for.” This appears to be no more than a device used by Cortés on behalf of the King of Spain to justify his naked usurpation of the apparently legitimate Aztec sovereignty over his own country.The largest of these compilations, The General History of Things in New Spain, by Franciscan missionary Bernardino de Sahagún. In this tradition, the Aztecs are portrayed as a sinister people, some millennial feat always seemed to be just around the corner, and their resistance to the conquistadors was undermined not only by the history of a return to god with which Cortés was confused, but also by a series of omens and forebodings that convinced her -in sandwich plate language- that the end was near. Sahagún's prestige as an ethnographer gave credence to these revelations. However, from a lesser source, it is hard to believe that they had much persuasion. The myth of a "sea god" is found throughout the world, but in other cases only among and the coastal towns. wise men registered by Sahagún as heralds of the conquest seem more like a confusion

of classical and ancient prophecies about the fall of Rome and Jerusalem as a true Aztec tradition. These include strange lights and fires in the sky, spontaneous combustion, stray lightning, comets, earthquakes, eerie howls, and monstrous warps. To identify the tradition to which these utensils really belong, it is enough to go to Shakespeare's fulius Caesar, where the child prodigies feared by Casca and Calpurnia correspond exactly to each of the characters recorded by Sahagún. The friar's informants and interpreters were his students at the Colegio de Santa Cruz in Tlatelolco - the lakeside community on the border with Tenochtitlán: high school students, so to speak, educated, like the Stratford actor, in "little Latin", but with A strong reverence for the classic El Lienzo de lìaxcala - the main source of the Tlaxcalan vision of the conquest of Mexico - was destroyed, but a copy survives in which Tlaxcalan warriors dominate most of the battle scenes, while the Spanish teach otherwise. The pictorial history was created to be presented to the Spanish courts as part of the Tlaxcalan case for exemption from tribute in recognition of their important role as allies of the Spanish. Even in negotiation scenes such as this one, in which there are no tlaxcaicos, Cortés (on the right, with a romantically helmeted Spanish knight behind him) plays a subservient role to his mistress and interpreter, Doña Marina, a Nahua princess who learned Chontal Maya as a prisoner. in Tabasco. Here he negotiates the alliance of the Otomi community of Atluçian. There is no evidence that she spoke Otomi, but Nahatl was a lingua franca in the area. models At the same time, they were young noblemen, aware of their Aztec lineage and eager to defend Aztec civilization along the lines of Renaissance humanism. For them, Tenochtitlán was both the Rome and the Jerusalem of their ancestors. The tails of these comets must be generous. 218 THE SUN OF SPRING K O I L ED The mythical base of Tenochtitlán - the opening page of the Mendoza Codex. The year marks representing the count from AD 1325 to 1376 form the boundary. Above is the signature of André Thevet (see p. 219), marking his ownership of the manuscript after French pirates captured it en route from Mexico to Spain. The central scene - in which the native artist was influenced by European heraldic conventions - depicts the eagle nesting on an island fig

Lake Texcoco, at the confluence of two streams: this was the omen that led the culture hero Tenuch (recognizable by the sacred darkening of his face) to the indicated place. The skull to the right of the eagle represents both the burial shed of the eagle's nest and its continuation by the Aztecs, who built mounds of skulls from sacrificial captives. sprinkled with grains of salt. Our image of corroded Aztec morality at the time of the Conquest derives from the struggles of confused children in colonial New Spain to understand the Conquest as a foreign heritage. However, there is one source to which we can turn for an uncorrupted Aztec memory of the last years before the conquest. Sometime in the early 1540s, he could not remember the exact date, a Spanish settler in Mexico, Gerónimo López, walked into the studio of an Aztec "master painter" named Francisco Gualpuyogualcal. Apparently, he was intimate with the artist and apparently had a habit of conversing. The painter confided that he was engaged in a secret mission of the viceroy himself, in which, according to López, in the form of an illustrated story, like a comic strip, he wrote "the entire country... and all the gentlemen he made until the arrival of the Spaniards had governed... and the division of these towns and provinces by Moctezuma among the caciques of that city of Mexico. The purpose of the exercise was to show that the system of exploitation of land and people by timid and withdrawn empires 219 was not a Spanish artifice illegally invented by the conquistadors, but a tradition inherited from the Aztec past. Instead of this pretended colonial propaganda work, Gualpuyogualcal produced a triumphant vindication of his own people in paintings executed strictly in an indigenous style and uncorrupted by the Renaissance aesthetics introduced to native painters by the Spanish. His work displayed the glory and hinted at the legitimacy of the Aztec state. The first decorated sheet of the surviving version summarizes the character of the Aztec painting that the artist wanted to transmit to posterity. It shows the founding of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán. In the center, the glyph that gives the city its name in the proto-Aztec writing system -a prickly pear growing on a rock- is surmounted by an enormous eagle, whose animated realism with outstretched wings, open beak, head poised to attacking and the claws being widely extended in a way that might betray heraldic influence, is the only echo of European leaf-painting conventions. The image alludes to the founding myth of the city, in which the Mexican cultural hero Tenuch was led to the place chosen by the gods. He is jealously guarded by symbols of war: a shield adorned with plumes of eagle feathers and plenty of spikes.

and feathered darts; a skull stand to display the heads of slaughtered prisoners. The surrounding lake and canals intersecting the city are shown schematically, and Tenuch and his nine companions perch on status-giving reed mats, looking down in the central founding scene. Next begins the Aztecs' race of conquest, which is the subject of the next twenty sheets, as giant Mexican warriors, upright and wielding obsidian blades, defeat weak foes who are hunched over in humiliation, almost fetal with fear. The surviving manuscript—which, if not a secret commission from Gualpuyogualcal, is something of the kind—passed into the hands of French pirates, who looted it at sea, to André Thevet, the French royal-cosmographer, to whom it was sold. to Richard Häkluyt. . The publisher no doubt hoped that it would provide useful information for England in the war against Spain, while John Seiden, whose collection brought it to its present location in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, examined it in the course of his comparative study of writing. systems For this reason, all its owners, starting with the client who commissioned it, had their own expectations about it; and he defied all and served the purpose of his author and the cause of his people. It is an ideal resource for studying the Aztec past from the perspective of an educated Aztec of the early colonial period. Few individual texts have the power to undermine our traditional image of world history in the sixteenth century. The Aztecs portrayed in the Gualpuyogualcal studio were not intimidated by the oracles and resignedly awaited their fate. The reality of his attitude was the complete opposite of what had previously been assumed. The main lesson the play teaches about the Spanish experience in Mexico is that the conquistadores were not being dragged into the void as if by some hideous nature, but were encountering a competing culture that was also expanding rapidly and aggressively. Throughout the codex the triumphant tone of the first page is maintained. Although there are occasional Aztec defeats, history is steeped in the "code of honor," the ethic of victory that drove the Aztec elite. Page after page of images of burning and destroyed enemy temples tells of the unstoppable rise of the Aztecs. Ultimately unsurpassed, his warriors parade in lush war feathers or tower over timid, sometimes satirically depicted opponents. A rebellious cacique from Tlatelolco, ashamed and defeated, threw himself down the stairs of the temple foaming at the mouth with the pulque glyph, a sign of drunkenness. The reigns of Aztec chiefs are numbered in only two ways: by years of reign and by cities conquered. In general, the number of achievements increases from one rule to another. And the last reign - that of the supposedly reconciled leader Moctezuma, whose reign was overshadowed by omens of doom - appears as the most dynamic, the most aggressive, the most triumphant of all. The total number of his conquests - forty-four cities - was slightly less than that of his predecessor, Ahuitotzin; two previous rulers were slightly ahead in terms of the average number of achievements per year. the relative

The effectiveness of such operations can be judged by the fact that, throughout their reigns, Moctezuma and Ahuitotzin only had to return four times to re-impose their authority over already conquered communities. However, where Moctezuma incomparably surpassed all his rivals was in the context of his campaigns, which took him with astonishing rapidity from the Pánuco River, on the northern Atlantic coast, where skilled Huastec artisans lived, to Xoconusco, in the south. Peaceful. — back and forth across borders covering more than 200,000 square kilometers of territory. It can be argued that the very speed and magnitude of this expansion must have overwhelmed and weakened Aztec power. However, this evidence cannot be reconciled with the view that the Aztecs were morally weakened or that their dynamic and dominant drive had been exhausted. The contemporary Spanish commentator who annotated the manuscript well summed up the magnitude of Moctezuma's reputation among the surviving Aztecs of his day: "Compared with his predecessors, there were none who reached a quarter of his great possessions and majesty." For the fatalistic Aztecs familiar to most accounts of the conquest, the thriving and vital Aztec world depicted in the pages of the Mendoza Codex was perceived at least as vividly, and perhaps more accurately remembered. The ultimate irony of the conquest of Mexico is that when the Spanish replaced the Aztecs as the imperial ruling class of the timid and retreating empires, Codex Mendoza 221 candidly depicts Aztec self-perception. Heroic warrior-priests, heavily armed and disguised as gods, tower over the insignificant enemies they sacrifice. One of the priests carries a shield adorned with the eagle plumes of Huitzilopochtli, the deity particularly identified with Tenochtitlán. His colleague in the lower right corner wears a jaguar outfit and carries the ornamental solar shield of Tonatiuh, a god identified with the sun. He notes the feathered banners and clubs tipped with black obsidian blades. The suicide of Micuihuixtl, cacique of Tlatelolco, a neighboring municipality of Tenochtitlán. The mound is the place name glyph: the distinctive twin temples for which Tlatelolco was famous are shown ablaze as a sign of the conquest of Tenochtitlán. From the Parchments of the Conquest section of the Mendoza Codex, in which Aztec history is presented as an almost non-stop triumphant parade. 222 PRIMAVERA SOL SOL ROLLED Nahua, the dynamism and expansion have not stopped. in a way the

The last Aztec conquests were those initiated under Spanish rule by predominantly Nahuatl-speaking armies from the Valley of Mexico to conquer Guatemala and Honduras in the 1520s and Yucatán in the 1540s. The last formally constituted Aztec emperor, Cuauhtémoc, was assassinated by Cortés on their march to Honduras as comrades in arms. WEAK EMPIRE The Aztecs ruled only one of several rapidly expanding civilizations in Africa and the Americas of the late Middle Ages. The closest parallel is with the Incas of Peru, whose status and society were very diverse, and whose eclipse by the nascent Spanish Empire was not so sudden or total, but whose imperial epochs were of similar duration, and their growth, according to one's standards. of other contemporary empires besides Spain were equally spectacular. The expansion of Aztec power in central Mexico is traditionally traced to the subjugation of the neighboring former hegemonic city of Azcapotzalco in 1428; The rise of the Incas is controversial. The typical eighteenth-century portrait of Tupac Yupanqui's father, the Inca Pachacuti, wears the elegant garb worn by the mestizo elite for special occasions, his reputation as a conquistador hinted unconvincingly in the diminutive ax and shield. Timid and retreating empires 223 Rafts of Peruvian Indians, such as these recorded for Girolamo Benzoni's polemic against Spanish imperialism in the mid-16th century, encouraged Thor Heyerdahl to believe that the stories recorded in the early colonial period were narrated fact-finding missions by Inca Yupanqui, a Tupac sailor. may be true It was not the first: at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, Spanish expeditions crossed the Pacific Ocean in search of the "Golden Islands" of the Incas. See pages 262 and 66l. conventionally dated to 1438, when the Inca Pachacuti is said to have conquered Chava and began to extend Inca rule beyond the Cuzco valley. The rapidity of growth of the Aztec empire is reflected in the case of the Incas in the period of the conquests of Pachacuti and his heir Túpac Inca Yupanqui, who in a meteoric race through the last third of Chile15 supposedly reached the Biobío River and found themselves It is said that he discovered rich islands in the Pacific. Although the Incas were torn apart by civil war at the time of Pizarro's invasion and no longer held the Aztec advance until their collapse, their military prowess did not diminish. A few years before the arrival of the Spanish, the Inca Huayna Capac massacred and dumped the bodies of 20,000 Caranqui Indians in what was probably the bloodiest encounter in pre-Hispanic New World history.

Lake Yahuar-Cocha. This destructive force was matched by appalling administrative efficiency. The Incas maintained a road network of more than 30,000 kilometers, with teams of runners capable of traveling 240 kilometers a day on preferential routes. They organized trade across the climatic levels and the various environmental zones that made up their long empire. They were able to uproot and reallocate labor on a large scale. In the first quarter of the 16th century, Huayna Cápac colonized the Cochabamba valley for the production of corn with fourteen thousand colonists from all over the empire. When Pizarro proclaimed in El Moho: "The time of the Incas has ended", almost the entire population got up, collected their belongings and left for the distant houses where they had been resettled. Of course, no empire could be so large and diverse without serious structural problems and internal tensions; But the conquistadores were lucky, both in Peru and Mexico, to be the beneficiaries—almost bystanders—of an indigenous civil war that allowed them to seize control like hot coals. None of the failed empires in Africa and the Americas of the late Middle Ages seem to have accomplished much. Some, like Mali or the Mayans, faltered or faltered before taking blows from their rivals in Europe. Others were eliminated or defeated by European imperialism. Unusually, Ethiopia was rescued from impending trouble with European help, but it never recovered. Morocco and Mwene Mutapa survived European expansion (indeed, both repulsed Portuguese conquest attempts in the 1570s), but could do little to compete with it. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the dynamism of these societies in their time or the implications for the later character of world history. Morocco's belated and less-than-glorious empire in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, was part of a larger and more influential phenomenon: the meteoric spread of late medieval and early modern Islam (see Chapter 9), which also shaped the modern world. as the contemporary and parallel movement of Christianity. Though their revival faltered, memories of a great past among the Maya endured through centuries of their survival as a people with a strong identity in the Hispanic world and helped inspire a long line of political movements: rebellions against Spain in the 17th and 18th centuries. .; the "caste war" against the State of Mexico in 1847; the Cruzob movement, which created an independent state that survived in the jungles of Quintana Roo until 1905, under leaders inspired by a 'talking cross'. Aztec myths and images were appropriated in the fabrication of a Mexican national identity (see Chapter 11), and the ghostly Inca empire, which reemerged in the 1780s, remained an influential idea, despite its mixed appeal in Peru. . A recent major Peruvian textbook conceptualizes the entire colonial period of the country's history as an era of reconquest by a foreign enemy. After a long period of sacrifice in academic study and popular memory, some of the

It was recalled that the great black states of medieval Africa gave names of varying degrees of adequacy to their modern successors. While Mwene Mutapa's name has not been revived, Zimbabwe's has just the right archaic flavor. Songhay is still missing, but Mali, Ghana, and Benin are all on the modern map, slightly displaced from their original locations (see Chapter 18). Ironically, the name Congo, which acquired an unacceptable resonance to African nationalists by remaining under colonial rule, was dropped by the state that now occupies its former territory. Faint as these echoes of past greatness may seem, the faraway kingdoms of the late Middle Ages were easily absorbed or replaced by those of the sixteenth century, and judging by how flawed they were through isolation, overexpansion, divisions internal and external threats. Important to the imperial careers of these African and American states is their place in the generally accepted record of the past. Without examples of the rapidity of its growth or the reality of its promise, one can hardly appreciate the relatively static nature of fifteenth-century Latin Christianity and much of Asia; Without a comprehensive view of the expansion and convergence movements that took place in the 'Era of Expansion', the nature of the world shaped by European initiatives in the second half of our millennium cannot be fully understood, nor the magnitude of the achievements. can be realistic. foretold. Chapter 7 THE EXTENT OF CONQUEST: EARLY MODERN IMPERIALISM The Army Turtle - The Corners of the Carpet - The Color of the Bear - The Impossible Realms - The Highway of the World THE ARMED TURTLE “The deepest caves in the mountains and the reach of Oars in the Lake" represented the ambitious limits of a study of Japan proposed by the military dictator Hideyoshi in the 1580s. It was to include the size and quality of the soil of each rice field and the location of each irrigation canal. would be crucified Uncooperative landlords would be punished with the sword Started in 1583, fueled by demonic energy and accelerated by relentless power, the job was completed in 1598. The very idea of ​​a comprehensive investigation of the empire would have been hard to imagine the previous generation when Japan was among dozens of others hostilely divided by the Warlords, whose defiant independence in small territories was the result two hundred years of civil war. Japan had been torn apart into smaller and smaller pieces. The two-century trend has been reversed for twenty years since 1560, to the point where Hideyoshi was able to survey the land and plot world conquest. This concerted effort was remarkably the work of one man: Oda Nobunaga, a warlord in whose service he served.

226 The Scope of Conquest 227 Shinsen Dainihon Zukan (Revised Map of Japan) of 1687. The maps produced by Hideyoshi's research do not survive, but this is a series derived from them. Each province is marked with the name of its daimyo and the level of his salary. Above right, the cartographer clearly has some doubts about the nature of the Oshima Peninsula and its relationship to the rest of Hokkaido. The above plate lists topographic information, including place names, temples, and shrines, by province. The country in white on the left called Chosenkoku is Korea. Hideyoshi transcended his humble beginnings and learned the military trade from him. Warlords often dreamed of restoring imperial unity for their own benefit, just as some Renaissance princes dreamed of unifying Italy. Nobunaga partially achieved his dream by exploiting the overconfidence of his competitors, starting from a small and awkward power base in Owari, halfway up the Pacific coast of Honshu. His battle tactics were characterized by irrepressible nerves: in his first great battle, he is said to have defeated an army with more than eight times his own strength before they had time to prepare their weapons. His political strategy combined ruthless methods and unrestrained objectives: his campaign in Echizen clogged the streets with corpses, and fugitives were pursued "hill by hill, valley by valley." His seal bore the inscription "Rule the kingdom by force." An inventive streak, a technical talent gave him an advantage over rival warriors: he helped revolutionize Japanese warfare by organizing the manufacture of firearms copied from Portuguese prototypes. In 1568, he conquered the sacred but reserved personality of the emperor, allowing him to legitimize his wishes and ostracize his enemies. By the time of his death in 1582, he had taken control of approximately half of Japan's provinces. Secured the uneasy approval of Tokugawa Ieyasu, Nobunaga's other top lieutenant, Hideyoshi was able to quickly halt the decline that began immediately and rebuild and expand his master's legacy relatively quickly. Hideyoshi's letters to women—to his wife, to his mother, to his future concubine of thirteen years—reflect the calculations of a mind oscillating between amoral pragmatism and visionary madness. He avoided the formalities that made most of the Japanese correspondence of the time unfathomable, explaining politics and the passions in plain language with alarming indiscretion. The burning of hostages and the self-destruction of a rival were described with open glee. Discomfort at the appearance of gray hair and fear of his wife's displeasure were admitted with equal frankness. In a letter of 1583 he declared his ambition to rule Japan. Writing to his wife in 1587, he had the same ambition to conquer Korea and China. His drive for success must have made it all possible. His passion for conquest became an obsession reminiscent of the global vocation of a 13th-century Mongol khan. Hideyoshi sent requests for submission to the kings of Indochina and the Spanish governor

From philippines. He declared himself chosen by the gods to rule the world. In a way, the foreign venture was a sensible policy under the circumstances. Long civil wars militarized Japanese society; Professional warriors needed jobs; the arms industry needed a market; The energies of the warlords had to be diverted. Unlike China, which could meet its own needs, Japan was dependent on trade; War was a way to secure supplies. Piracy, which had increasingly drained excess wealth from China and Southeast Asia in the 15th and 16th centuries, could have become a prelude to empire, as did so much piracy around the world: that of the Vikings and the Genoese in the early days. the Middle Ages, for example. Example, or the Portuguese in the fifteenth century and the English and Dutch in the sixteenth century. Korea produced surplus cereals. Chinese cities, sometimes inland, can be blackmailed. China was invaded almost every year from 1545 to 1563. On one occasion, the attackers captured Nanjing. However, Hideyoshi's ambitions seem to have transcended rational limits and turned into a form of raging madness. He vividly imagined the future of his possible conquests. They would form not just a personal trophy, but a thoroughbred empire. Koreans and Chinese would be "taught about Japanese customs." In fact, in the early, successful stages of the invasion of Korea, a policy of indoctrination was instituted and local children were selected to learn Japanese. The land of China would be divided among the notables of Japan and the Japanese Emperor would receive the Mandate of Heaven. While Japan was hardened by long civil wars, Korea enjoyed two centuries of unprecedented peace. The rulers dismissed Hideyoshi's threats as unbelievable; the generals submitted to them as irresistible. Compared to the Japanese task force, which numbered 300,000 men and was equipped with firearms, the Korean forces were weak and outdated. The invaders reached Seoul in twenty days. Within eight weeks, the Korean court was forced to take refuge in a refuge on the banks of the Yalu River, barely clinging to the kingdom. The only serious ground opposition came from bandits temporarily turned guerrillas. At sea, however, Korea was better prepared. Its navy had a strong history of fighting pirates and a vibrant tradition of technical innovation. The idea that the purpose of a sea battle was to sink enemy ships was still in its infancy in the Western world, but was fully understood in Korea. The use of heavy weapons as ship-killing weapons developed, as well as smaller firearms as man-killing weapons; Ships specially converted to carry weapons, the so-called turtle ships, were under construction at the time of the Japanese invasion. The turtles had reinforced hulls, scorpionfish-shaped prows to conceal cannons, and decks covered with iron spikes to deter invaders. Six guns were placed on each side, protected by a turtle-shaped upper deck and aimed by portholes. The overall dimensions were small in comparison

by European standards, very small compared to those of Chinese warships. But a would-be ship-killer would do well to fire his cannons close to the enemy's waterline. A Korean witness to the war recalled how the turtles "could enter the enemy at will and be easy prey for all of them." In reality, there may have been too few of them in service to significantly affect the outcome, but they are representative of the Korean Navy style. The success of the Korean navy, however, seems to depend on the personal genius of its commander, Yi Sun-shin, who left behind wartime memories of Attic upheaval who rarely deigns to indulge in self-aggrandizement. When jealousy of his victories forced him to retire to write poetry in Chokye's ranks, fate was reversed and the navy dwindled to twelve of more than two hundred ships. King Sonjo wrote to him: "It was because of my lack of wisdom that I replaced you... I have no words to regret my mistake with you... I ask you again to save the country. After Yi's rehabilitation, an atmosphere of misery, intensified fatalism pervades the newspapers, yet he remained a man of action. Dependence on a beloved mother who died at a critical moment in the war left him uninhibited. He was realistic enough to realize that Korea, with a depleted fleet and too much territory in enemy hands, could only survive with Chinese intervention Cooperation between Yi and Japan made Japanese communications untenable for his Chinese counterpart Chen Lin the politician, Philip II of Spain, died a week later on the same date, enveloped in the stench of his own decaying body and the disenchantment of aborted conquests prospects of conquering China earlier in the decade, and a group of asp Instead of conquerors, he explored Cambodia and produced the first known account of Angkor to Europeans. but, like Hideyoshi's, Spanish invasions closer to home, in the Netherlands, France, and the English Channel, were thwarted. Like Japan, Spain would enter the new century with goals adjusted to more modest objectives. World imperialism has gone out of fashion. However, this does not mean that the era of global imperial expansion is over. In the context of Japanese history, Hideyoshi's failed imperialism can be seen as an unusual contraction. For three hundred years, no Japanese conquest program reappeared outside the home islands, and meanwhile the Japanese directed the energies previously expended fighting each other primarily toward enrichment and pleasure. The military caste rusted and sold its assets. Impoverished samurai were ridiculed in literature, as were poor nobles, who were devastated by the "decline of the

Spain" on the other side of the world today. Less fairly, Chinese imperialism is often said to have been paralyzed by isolationism and inertia at the same time. Although the Chinese sincerely congratulate themselves on repelling their enemies in Korea, they are supposedly weakened, and ultimately discouraged by the cost of warfare, even when a new dynasty seized power in 1644 - the Manchu dynasty of invaders from the northern steppe, heirs, one might assume, to the limitless imperial ambitions of nomadic conquerors. earlier-no change ensued, and the "timelessness" of China set the rhythms of prosody favored by mandarin scholars.Indeed, China's frontiers continued to expand quietly and at times throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. .. The Romans in particular established their borders across the Danube, and France in modern times sought natural borders along mountain ranges and river courses. It is in Mexico, Spain reached the northern end of Nutka Sound in the 18th century. In the name of security, the Turks reluctantly took control of Hungary in the 16th century. The conquests were justified on security grounds, from the ancient Egyptian submission of Syria and Palestine to the New Kingdom to the establishment of the small besieged Zionist empire in the same region today. Within a generation of their conquests of remote or rebellious parts of traditional China, the Manchus overtook or pursued Russian rivals into new territories in the north. At the end of the 17th century, the road leading to the war zone against Russia on the Amur border was kept smoother - according to Ferdinand Verbiest, who walked it with imperial hunting parties - "as our Catholics in Europe keep the road on which the sacrament is distributed". be administered." The Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 formalized Chinese claims to vast unexplored lands of dubious extent in Northeast Asia, where some cartographers envisioned a giant log pointing to or even connecting to America. By the end of the century, Outer Mongolia had become In the southeast, where the Manchus found it difficult to maintain their authority during the uprisings of the 1670s and 1680s, circumstances dictated consolidation rather than expansion, but China faced fears of a Tibetan revival by conquer Tsinghai in the 1720s. China's most complacent era was also one of its most aggressive.Perhaps the best-known episode of eighteenth-century Chinese history in the West was Emperor Ch'ien Lung's famous rejection of the Lord Macartney's trade mission in 1793 on the grounds that China already had everything it wanted.The remark came at the end of a period of dynamic expansion that, since mid-century, has extended Chinese rule or protectorates to the Tien Shan and the Himalayas and launched invasions of Nepal, Burma, and Vietnam. That

Conquest habits were as ingrained in early modern China as in any other part of the West. In fact, no potential imperial power anywhere in the world was left untouched. Of all the influences—including colonization, evangelization, and trade, which are the themes of the next three chapters—that brought the world's great civilizations into contact between the 16th and 18th centuries AD, none was more dynamic than the impetus for the Conquest, nothing more ubiquitous than war. THE CORNERS OF THE CARPET Its central square was seven times bigger than the Plaza de San Marcos. The goals installed there for polo matches were made of marble. At one end, the great mosque, the Masjid-i Shah, has been angled to give a good view of the dome and minarets, which are displayed behind a 27-metre-high gate. The builder who ordered its construction did not have time to look around. 232 SPRING SUN K O I LED Archery backdrop set up at the polo field in the main square of Isfahan, engraving from the 1680s, illustrating the travels of Jean de Thévenot in Persia. The Masjid-i Shah is the building at the end of the square. its architect's warnings about the dangers of shipwreck; To save time, substance was sacrificed for surface splendor, and painted polychrome tiles replaced mosaics. In the entire city, according to a mostly sober European visitor, there were 273 public baths and 1,802 caravanserais. The Isfahan of Shah Abbas (1588-1629) was an unequivocal demonstration of the power, wealth, confidence and dynamism of Safavid Persia. Like so many Islamic dynasties, like Islam itself, the house of the Safavids was founded by warrior holy men who raised members of poorly evangelized desert or mountain tribes into mighty armies. The first Shah was a precocious visionary who was crowned in 1501 at the age of fourteen, had private conversations with an apparition of Ali and, according to his powerful and self-centered poetry, saw himself as an incarnation of God. . It seemed to a Venetian traveler that "the name of God is forgotten throughout Persia and only Ismail's is remembered." He initiated the policy that distinguished the dynasty from him and gave Iran its distinctiveness among Islamic countries, to impose Shiism by force. When he was swayed by moderation, he threatened to kill the entire population unless they shared his beliefs. Of course, he considered himself invincible, and it is true that the armies of the Safavids under his rule and those of his successors showed remarkable versatility well into the seventeenth century. Baghdad was twice conquered, but never held. Tens of thousands of Georgian, Armenian, and Circassian prisoners were inducted into the shahs' elite slave families. But Iran's potential has always been limited by its position, squeezed between two imperial giants of the Islamic world: the Ottoman Empire to the west and Mughal India to the east, unfurling like giant prayer rugs from its center to the corners of the Islamic world. . delivered islamic world. When Ismail's wild horsemen were stopped by the Ottoman guns at Chaldiran

In 1514 he put on mourning and raised black sashes inscribed "Vengeance". Although Shah Abbas made gains on the Ottoman front, Ismail's planned retaliation was never easy or lasting. Early in the formation of the Mughal Empire, Persia welcomed an exiled emperor but, partly due to scruples about religious purity, was unable to capitalize on the potential advantage. The shahs were forced to test all the neighbors; with less concern we should do the same. Mughal India is best evoked through two ruins in contrasting settings. The shattered fragments of the city of Vijayanagar lie scattered across an almost deserted landscape of humped hills on the banks of the Tungabhadra; The remains of Shahjahanabad are piled up among the busy streets of Delhi. Vijayanagar is a defunct seat of Hindu power in a part of the country where avoiding a vegetarian meal is nearly impossible. Shahjahanabad was a Muslim capital that now smells like meat from Kumar's Grill. When Shahjahanabad was built in the 1640s, Vijayanagar had been devastated, emptied and devastated by Muslim raiders from the north for nearly two generations. Today, wild sugarcane grows between the elaborate temples. Now Shahjahanabad's central avenue, Chandni Chowk, is jammed with cars and bicycles. After the fall of Vijayanagar, no Hindu state with imperial potential arose until the 20th century. The Mughal unification of the peninsula took place from north to south, with the successor Mughal states, the British Raj and independent India, ruling from the same place in the north. However, for some time in the 15th century, Vijayanagar seemed to demonstrate the vitality of both the south and the center. His aggressive spirit was proclaimed in his name, which means City of Victories. Its defensive capabilities were explained by its seven-fold wall, sixty miles long. It struck a Muslim visitor in 1443 as more beautiful than Herat, indeed, "so that the eye has seen nothing like it". When power finally shifted north, Shahjahanabad won even more praise. It was "an inhabited Eden", the "foundation of the eighth heaven", the "center of the earth", or - as a Hindu commemorating the inauguration of the desolate environment, contrasted with the continuation of life in the Chandni Chowk: formerly the central avenue of Imperial Shahjahanabad dominated by the domes, minarets and walls of the Jumma Mosque. W Palácio da Conquista 235 in 1649 - "the house of the sun, so full of pleasures that its avenues are like paradise". Relying on the compelling memories of its founder, this empire, which eventually achieved such splendid solidity, was founded in an atmosphere of distraction. Babur (1483-1530) was a Central Asian adventurer, in the form of his ancestor Timur. In the changing world west of the Hindu Kush, he raised warbands and changed rapidly changing kingdoms.

unreachable elsewhere. However, he constantly dreamed of rebuilding a Timurid empire based in Samarkand. He claimed that it was only after winning and losing Samarkand for the second time that he heard about India from a 111-year-old woman in Dekhar. She told him stories of relatives who had followed Timur's Indian campaign in 1398. The seeds planted in her mind became a will to conquer, which she doggedly pursued from 1519 on. Once in India, like so many modern visitors, he was seduced by the country. He was about to be poisoned due to his fondness for Indian dishes. He chided Afghan supporters who favored Kabul, where it was "the sport of extreme poverty." He never left India after 1526, although he could never banish "the taste of melons and grapes" from his memory. Although he conquered more parts of India than any other man has ruled in over a hundred years, his empire initially seemed typically fragile and probably short-lived. A story told of the birth of él Akbar's grandson in exile illustrates fragility and heralds recovery. Driven to poverty in Persia, Babur's heir distributed a capsule of crushed musk to his few remaining followers, saying: "This is all I can give you as a gift for the birth of my son, whose glory I hope you will be." . day that spread throughout the world, while the fragrance of musk now fills this abode." The prophecy was duly fulfilled. Akbar's father met the death of an established emperor when, six months after the recapture of Delhi, he fell of the library steps. He had climbed to watch the rise of Venus fall. Akbar himself was too busy fighting to acquire the literary talents of his father and grandfather. A monarch, he thought, "must always be bent on conquest" to handle the books himself, like Charlemagne, he read them while he ate, and cursed leadership, he established his dynasty so securely that it lasted three hundred years and ruled India for two hundred years.It has always been an imperfect form of domination, exercised from the beginning. sea ​​as possible, with a countryman's perspective.The Mughals never ruled the coasts, leaving the margins of their world to tributaries with proper maritime tendencies. wads. adas. Consequently, just as Iran was held back by political restrictions, the Mughal Empire remained within its natural borders: the geographical barriers that define India, mountains to the north, desert to the northwest, jungle to the northeast, 236 THE REFRIGERANT OF LA SUN SPRING A commentary on Kutchi's chart showing sailing courses from Socotra to ports around the Arabian Sea. Star orientations, latitudes, and surface distances are provided. Indian sailors did not produce nautical charts before the introduction of European influence, although maps were common in East Asia and Indian methods of navigation lacked sophistication: charts such as this may have made conventional charts obsolete. and around the rest the surrounding ocean. Some beautiful nautical charts were made on the shores of the Mughal world. A 1664 Gujarati map, annotated in Kutchi, shows the southern cone of India, with Ceylon strangely displaced; The sailing courses were recorded schematically

Form with a lot of practical information: stellar trajectories, latitudes and surface distances. But the Mughals did not have access to a realistic picture of the world. A brass 'Globe' in the Oxford Museum of the History of Science, made in 1571, with Indian place names inscribed in Sanskrit, shows the frontiers of timeless Indian cosmography: it represents the traditional Buddhist world of four island continents from a radiant mountainous core. Being a world conqueror, as the Ottoman sultans aspired, does not necessarily require being up to date on world mapping. But it helps From Constantinople, a city founded as universal capital, it was easier to reach a luxurious perspective. The interest of the Ottoman court in supervising the discoveries of the world is evident in the walls of the Topkapi Saray, in the greatest cartographic treasure of the sultan's palace: the western part -all that remains- of the world map made by Piri Re'is in Istanbul in 1513. The map shows the influence of the captured Spanish maps on which it was based. Contains a detailed account of Colum's discoveries. The Scope of Conquest 237 An Indian bughola or globe of 1571, engraved with Indian Sanskrit place names but reflecting a conventional worldview: the post-Vedic "Four Continents" perhaps reflecting a schematic version of a world centered on the Himalayas. A mountainous core is surrounded by concentric rock circles from which the four zones extend. Bus and delimits that of Vespucci. If his purpose was related to Turkish fears that Christian sailors would divert the spice trade from Ottoman territories, the sultans need not have worried. World demand for spices was driven by supply in the 16th and 17th centuries, with the total volume of trade increasing so much that traditional caravan routes expanded their capacity despite competition from new ocean highways. However, if the map was created out of general concern about the long range of the infidels from their bases on the Atlantic coast, it shows a remarkable degree of foresight in Istanbul. By all accounts, the Ottoman Empire remained very dynamic until the 17th century. In terms of territory added to the influence of their rulers, the conquests of Columbus and Cortés were dwarfed by their Turkish contemporaries. Turning from contemplation of the Piri Re'is map to a tour of the palace that contains it, one can evoke a vivid impression of the political nature of the Ottoman Empire. The throne room is a pavilion, and many dwellings are huts scattered across the land like the tents of a nomad camp. The Imperial Stool is roomy enough for the most morbidly bulky Sultan. Because this was an empire that preserved the memories of its nomadic origins through long centuries of sedentary solidity. In the maze of the harem, with its sumptuous alleys and mysterious dead ends, the air 238 THE SPRING SUN K O I L ED Despite their territorial traditions, the Ottoman Turks quickly and skillfully adapted to the demands of naval warfare as they conquered the Mediterranean. . If they could never make up for their limited access to the world's oceans and their backwardness

Beginning with the exploration of the oceans, interest was not lacking, as evidenced by the global reach of Piri Reis's geographical works from the early 16th century. The surviving part of his 1513 world map records Columbus's discoveries with the help of Spanish documents captured at sea and translations of the printed versions of Columbus's and probably Vespucci's reports. One can feel the scope of the methods of conquest by which the empire was regulated: politics was discussed here, and women and eunuchs conspired to secure the succession of a potential patron from among the sultan's descendants. In the gilded "cages" in which little princelings were imprisoned when parricide was out of fashion, a knock at the door might have been a call to the throne, or the executioner's knock: Ibrahim I heard both and mistook them for the other. . Access to a sultan's favorite wives was a way of exerting political influence, although more often this meant his mother than his wife or his concubines. For much of the 17th century, the effective heads of state were queen mothers who knew nothing of the world beyond the walls of the harem firsthand. The harem had space for two thousand women and the stables for four thousand horses. The scale of everything at Topkapi Saray is a testament to the size of the empire and the effectiveness of Ottoman rule. The 700,000 square meter site included ten mosques, fourteen baths, and two hospitals. The kitchens were equipped to serve 5,000 diners a day and 10,000 diners on holidays; the head chef had fifty assistant cooks, the head pastry chef thirty assistants, and the head taster one hundred subordinates. The wood for the kitchen fire was carried by a hundred wagons. Dates, plums and prunes were shipped daily from Egypt, honey from Romania or, to the sultan's table, from Candia, oil from Coron and Medon and butter from the Black Sea, wrapped in oxhide. At the beginning of the 17th century, the daily intake of meat included 200 pieces of lamb and 100 pieces of lamb or kid at the time, 330 pieces of poultry and 4 calves for the eunuchs' anemic calf. Like the products for the kitchens, the palace staff came from all over the empire. The harem was an ethnic melting pot, and the janissaries came from infidel minorities, mainly in European domains, for re-education in arms. The Topkapi Saray was not only a fortress-palace, but also a shrine and sanctuary. The bustle of the halls, where the noise of the kitchens competed with the noise of the janissaries, contrasted with the inner stillness of the sacred chambers where the Sultan wrapped himself in his incredible collection of relics of the Prophet. Here, according to the traveler Tournefort in 1700, "even the horses seem to know where they are". Although all Western visitors were intoxicated by the exotic aromas of palace life, from the 15th to the 17th centuries the Ottoman state was able to outdo its Western competitors, with whom it shared many traditions, in efficiency and adaptability. When Mehmet II conquered

Byzantium and Constantinople occupied, he saw his empire on one level as a continuation of the Roman empire; In his Bellini portrait, he profiles a Renaissance prince who employed Italian humanists at his court. Other empires of nomadic origin failed due to the need to adapt to new military and naval technologies, while the Ottomans became a naval power upon reaching the Mediterranean coast. "Horses," they might have said, "are my job, but the sea is my hobby." They could smash the walls of Byzantium or blow up Safa-Vid's cavalry, thanks in no small part to the quick mastery of their engineers' artillery. The direction and balance of their conquests, which in the fifteenth century leaned heavily towards the heart of Europe, gave them access to large numbers of Christian subjects raised in distant successor states of Rome. In the 16th century, Turkish political thought kept pace with the evolution of Western Christianity. The jurist Ebu us-Sud provided a justification for absolutism that revealed a complete mastery of Roman law. Even allowing for the inevitable inefficiencies that arise when pre-industrial technologies transmit commands over long distances, since Murad IV's domain was conceived as a whole, it was more centralized than that of his Habsburg counterpart Philip IV, who ruled several kingdoms with the help of a modern bureaucracy, but without a higher authority. And unlike Christian rulers, who struggled to extend their patronage, sultans did not need reform; Although they had to be careful about the moral surveillance of their clerical establishment, they themselves controlled its power structure. Although the Ottomans were surrounded by enemies on all sides, only a state of extraordinary resistance could survive, only a state of extraordinary efficiency could prosper. The armies of Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566) had to come and go across the empire in successive seasons to intimidate the Habsburgs and keep the Safavids at bay. In 1529, Suleiman was called to the Eastern Front for the siege of Vienna, while a Turkish flotilla invaded Valencia. In 1538, in a single season, Ottoman forces conquered Moldavia, laid siege to Diu, and destroyed a Christian fleet in the Ionian Sea. Until Suleiman's death, the pace of conquest was prodigious: from Egypt, conquered in 1517 and cunningly exploited for huge annual fiscal surpluses sustaining campaigns elsewhere, he extended his protectorate, and in a sense his authority, over as many of people. from the southern Mediterranean coast of Egypt, where the Barbarossa brothers, corsairs from Turkish Rumelia, organized a naval empire of war galleys and pirate ports. He conquered Iraq and most of the Red Sea coast while exercising more informal rule over much of the rest of Arabia. What began as a punitive expedition against Hungary ended in conquest. The degree of imperial authority could hardly be uniform on the periphery of so vast an empire, but it was felt everywhere. The younger Barbarossa, known as Khair el-Din, who ruled the most remote outposts of the Maghreb coast, was casually referred to as "King" even in Turkish annals; he recruited

Ships and men at his own expense, he won his own victories and sold Christian captives "for an onion a head". He was more a collaborator than a client of the sultan. In the Maghreb, legitimacy was demonstrated with the sword. But when Suleiman called him to Istanbul, he did not hesitate to obey. If the rate of expansion slowed in later reigns, it was due to diminishing returns from more distant conquests. But each generation brought with it a net gain of territory until the last years of the seventeenth century, and only the treacherous cunning of hindsight led historians to anticipate "decline." When Austrian diplomats sacked the "sick man of Europe" in 1721, the patient defied slave surgeons for another two hundred years. Meanwhile, only expendable limbs were amputated. What is remarkable about the Ottoman phenomenon is not the long illness but the long survival, not the illness that consumes it but its robust resistance in a permanent framework. THE COLOR OF THE BEAR In a popular English joke, an idiot looking for the best route to a passing motorist's destination replies, "I don't know exactly, but if I were you I wouldn't start from here." For all the success of the Turks in the lands and seas within their reach to build a world empire, Ottoman Turkey was the wrong place to start. Enemies controlled access to the world's seas through easily defendable straits. Piri Re'is could map the world from Istanbul, obviously lamenting the rich and easy booty available to the more fortunate states. The world's fastest growing land empire at the time was beset by similar constraints. When Sigmund von Herberstein visited the Moscow court as imperial ambassador in 1517, Russia was already a conspicuous giant of an empire that had dwarfed all other states in the world in the previous century. When Herberstein tried to measure its true extent, its margins on Fabel seemed to disappear; He questioned the reliability of his Russian itinerary, with its exotic description of the features of the Ob River: "how dumb men die and rise again, the golden old woman, men of monstrous stature, and fish with the appearance of Men." . "However, this icy version of Eldorado was well beyond the limits of Russian royal control, and an extremely fat Tatar, insulted by his Russian captors, could still make a case for assuming they didn't have enough land to feed them. When Herberstein returned In 1526 as an envoy of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, the Russians launched a series of campaigns that brought the territory of the most formidable Tatar state, the Khanate of Kazan, under their rule, and farcical terms in the second half of the century, the The Volga had become a Russian river, and the entire route of products from the north to the Caspian Sea was under a single political authority, so it was a remarkable coincidence that 1553 began at the other end of the great Russian river system.

On the shores of the White Sea, at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, the merchants should have made a "discovery of the Moskovy Kingdom" capable of bringing the Volga Valley into direct contact with their own native kingdom of England. Richard Chancellor was the navigator assigned to undertake an expedition from London to Cathay around northern Russia on a supposed route. His escort ships were lost in a storm, but by his own admission, "Meisterkanzler kept his course to that unknown part of the world and sailed so far that he finally came to the place where he found no night, but a calm sea." of the sun shining clear on the vast and mighty sea. At last he pleased God to lead them to a certain great bay which they entered." The inhabitants received him as the natives of the Bahamas treated Columbus, caught between admiration and fear, prostrating themselves and kissing his feet. It was a discovery as new as Columbus's, for it was a hitherto unknown exploitable path between mutually beneficial economies. . The growth of the Muscovite state gradually increased its importance and increased the scope of English trade, which was now beginning to move closer to Russia and Asia across the White Sea. The tsars offered English merchants personal embraces and dinners on gold plates, having opened up the only access to the world's seas that Russia would have until the 18th century. Mor. The futile arctic navigation project drew attention to Siberia. An empire that spanned the land from the White Sea to the Caspian Sea had every reason to expand and extend its control. ole north and east. In 1555, Ivan IV began to call himself Lord of Siberia. From the early 1570s he encouraged settlers beyond the Urals. The first campaign of conquest was launched in 1580 or 1581, like so many of the great naval conquests by the Western Christian imperial powers of the time, as a private initiative. It was financed and equipped by fur and salt traders and managed by Cossacks. The drawings, made more than a hundred years later and illustrating one of the chronicles of the conquest, show how it was done: by barge and with firearms, while the conquerors in the water exchanged bullets for archery with the natives on the shore. bank. . The defenders with their turnip-shaped helmets hint at the nature of the enemy. The first goal of the conquest was not to defeat the primitive Ostiaks and Samoyeds who roamed the tundra, but to eliminate the only state that could compete with Russia in the region, the Tatar Khanate of Sibir, which dominated the eastern tributaries of the Irtysh. Thus, the conquest was sold as a crusade. On the front page of the Chronicle, evangelical texts are scattered about the Siberian settlements flatteringly exaggerated by the rays of the eye of The Scope of Conquest 243 UlHI)«M>ll. ,\-HI,> "'.' .'srr'i—-^sgsssoegfes, •;1..íÍÍÍ!th Ityúrtfl

*****»£•*• 1 , . vr. t «•• t '.*' *P" ,*• • ••—•• - ' • • • » • « - • • " - - - . ^-! , • * • », '»4—¿a*». In the Remezov Chronicle of 1700, the conquest of Siberia is seen as an evangelizing and civilizing mission. The words on the first page read: "From the beginning of time, the All-Seer... decreed that the gospel should be preached in all Siberia, to the ends of the universe and to the limits of the mountains, to the famous city of Tobolsk ", flatteringly shown below, as the rays of the gospel spread to twenty-one other cities. Among the legends engraved around the eye of God is: "He will dwell in righteousness, and cities will rise for the Lord." The hen is an evangelizing mole, "she Gathers the chicks under your wing." Christ. Tatar resistance soon dropped to the level of guerrilla activity, but it was not finally crushed until 1598. Even so, the sheer hostility of the surrounding area hampered the Russian advance. The Pacific was not reached until Okhotsk in 1639, Cape Dezhnev, the tip of Siberia, by sea in 1648. The image of Siberia as a rich and strange new world was spread by scientific expeditions and commercial enterprises. Peter the Great donated a pair of Siberian brown bears to the Dutch head of state's zoo. The talented marine painter Sieuwart van der Meulen mixed them up in his search for models and dropped a polar bear of the wrong color onto one of his Arctic whaling scenes. The Bering expedition in 1733 had a scientific department that provided the world with more or less definitive images, in maps and sketches, engraved and printed. Russia's reward for this long and arduous undertaking was the only enduring empire of the early modern period. Russian Siberia remained Russian and outlived all the maritime empires of the Western powers and the land empires of the Ottomans and the Ching. survived the breakup

Tsarism and the Soviet system. Its full potential has not yet been realized and, in all likelihood, the extent of its hidden wealth has yet to be revealed. However, Sieuwart van der Meulen, Dutch Arctic whaling scene, 1699, with Siberian brown bear drawn by Peter the Great's proposed pair and mistaken for a polar bear by the artist. The brown bears currently on display at the Amsterdam Zoo are descended from gifts from the tsar. the conquest did not then mark the culmination of Russian expansion; it was just a springboard for 18th century imperialism in Alaska and on the Pacific coast of North America. On the Empire's western frontier, Russia achieved something in the 18th century that seemed more important at the time, allowing access to the Baltic Sea at the expense of Sweden at the turn of the century and to the Black Sea at the expense of the Ottomans at the end. At the same time, the Russian border crossed the Pripet swamps as Poland was divided between its powerful neighbors. When Russian expansion finally came to a halt in the early 19th century, it took the joint diplomacy of all the other great powers to keep them out of the Mediterranean. One measure of the breadth of Russian imperialism in the early modern period is the number of other sprawling empires that touched its borders in the 18th century. It reached Chinas in Central Asia and the Amur. In the 1680s, the Albazin fortress was destroyed and rebuilt almost every year as Russians and Chinese followed one another along a faltering border. However, west of Tola, according to a Scottish traveler of the turn of the new century, "neither party thought a few hundred miles of property worth fighting over". The expansion of Russia found Turkey in Bessarabia and the Black Sea, Persia along the Caspian Sea, Sweden in the Baltic Sea, Prússia in Poland, the Netherlands in the northern Balearic Islands, Spain and Great Britain in South America north. Ironically, in 1812, when the Grande Armée was starving in Russia, the Spanish mercifully fed the starving Russian garrison at their furthest imperial outpost, a hundred kilometers north of San Francisco. With Great Britain, Russia disputed influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan (where her sphere also approached that of the Mongols) and, ultimately, rights in the Ionian Islands. Late in the period, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which brought French troops to Moscow and Russian troops to Paris, even brought Russian expansion against French imperialism. The only great empire at that time whose ends were far from the Russian outposts was Portugal. THE IMPOSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE In 1594, the commander of a small Portuguese fortress on the Persian mainland wrote an ominous report to the king about him. He began to complain that his fort was made of mud and had to be rebuilt every year after the rains. He also explained that his garrison was made up of seven Portuguese mercenaries and twenty-five natives and that with these he was to not only defend his position, but also escort caravans to Hormuz, punishing and punishing robbers and bandits.

intimidate the local satrap. Furthermore, he was plagued by a lack of ammunition, not problems with the supply of gunpowder and ammunition, for he hardly aspired to such a luxury, but an irregular supply of arrows for his men's bows. The list of problems ends with the worst: he couldn't guarantee his men's supply of opium. A compelling picture emerges of life on the furthest frontier of an impossible empire, where the reality of the defenders' situation was too desperate to face and where the morale of the doomed heroes could only be sustained by canisters of drugs. A crucial irony makes the document tragic: the report never made it home. A victim of the fragile communications that held the Portuguese Empire together, he was captured at sea by English invaders and ended up in a London archive along with other enemy intelligence. No document expresses so clearly the fragility of the Portuguese global company. For most of its history, it was an empire of outposts, of borders without an interior. Their monuments are the ruins or reconstructions of forts and trading posts that clung to the ends of the wind and sea routes, or the points where these met the continental trade routes controlled by other hands. Where the Atlantic meets the Sahara, Arguim was the first to open in 1448 in hopes of drawing some of the Saharan gold trade west of the Wadan. Elmina, the next great commercial center, opened in 1482 at the base of the West African bulge, was "a sort of Camelot with negroes" for its fortress of São Jorge da Mina, later called Elmina, founded in 1482 and nineteen Magnificently represented later on a map acquired in Lisbon by the agent of the Duke of Ferrara, Alberto Cantino. Time and Place is an impressive subject, erected by a hundred workmen and represented by the early cartographers as a kind of Camelot with blacks; However, the current building is mainly Dutch in design, such as Bertie Wooster's cow's milk jug. It bears scars from the 18th and 19th century wars between the Dutch, English and Ashanti, in which the Portuguese extruders did not participate. Across the continent, the battlements of Mombasa or, further east in the Empire, the bare façade of the São Paulo Church in Macau show how, in the 16th century, the Portuguese system of naval and coastal imperialism came close to the breaking point. of break. Coastal debris is full of debris in the sea. The darkest point of the Carreira da Índia, the round-trip route linking Lisbon to the Indian Ocean, was the deadly leeward coast of the Transkei, where the frequency of shipwrecks inspired a new genre of Portuguese maritime-tragic literature in the 16th century and short stories 17th century warnings or inspiration from sinking ships with their pepper-clogged pumps and survivors' walks helped fuel Dutch expansion abroad. The engravings illustrating the published versions were based on drawings which, according to him,

(Video) What Will Happen in the Next 1000 Years?

they made a living. Despite the obvious idealizations, the depiction of street life in Goa at the end of the 16th century is compelling in detail. Note the transactions being recorded at the notary public's desk and the merchants gathered around him, the failed peddler in European dress, the woman selling a concubine to the left, and that characteristic institution of Portuguese colonial life, the asylum. To the right. overland to await rescue at Delagoa Bay. Reflected in hopeful eyes at home, this tattered empire was perfectly perfect: on a globe illuminating the frontispiece of a chronicle to a royal patron, flanked by armillary spheres and angelic musicians, the empire covers part of North America and the West Indies as well. . like Brazil and covers the Atlantic covering Africa and Asia adorned with royal arms. The linchpin of the empire was Goa, seat of the viceregal court of the Estado da Índia de Portugal. When São Francisco Xavier docked in his port on May 6, 1542, it had been a Portuguese city for just over thirty years and it was still dressed in Western fashion. In the foreground of the approach were delightfully exotic landscapes—native thatched huts, paddy fields, mango trees, and coconut palms—but, turning onto the road west, evidence emerged of a scene distorted for Portuguese purposes: the armory and the workshops that The shipyards on the red sand beach, the longbow docks, the productive sailing where ships are pushed with dhows. Then the city walls came into view, low enough to reveal the whitewashed houses and unplanned streets beyond, showing that this was an old settlement undergoing renovation rather than a reconstructed colonial base. with a rational plan. At the other end of the port was a fortified wharf and the customs house. The churches dominated everything and outlined the horizon: the chapel of Nossa Senhora da Piedade, announcing the city from afar; the towerless, white sanctuaries of Nossa Senhora do Rosário and Nossa Senhora do Monte on two hills framing the city; The towers of the Franciscan church and most of the cathedral rise above the streets of the center. This was essentially the view that João de Castro sketched in 1539, although some new construction has since been completed as well. Engravings illustrating Jan van Linschoten's account of his service to the city offer a close-up of the bustling street life two generations later, where tall stone houses serve as backdrops for ornate stalls frequented by patrons. armed from the tropics, with parasols and palanquins. . Goa remained Portuguese until the 1960s; The colonies that eventually sprang up around the outposts in Angola and Mozambique persisted into the 1970s, adorning imperial banners at provincial subsidiary post offices proclaiming that Portugal "is not a small country". As of this writing, Macao has yet to return to China. These striking examples of longevity or slow development make Carreira's Portuguese empire seem deceptively strong and stable. However, the fragile reality was revealed in the 17th century,

when much of their trade and most of their forts fell to the first determined and continued attack by Dutch raiders and predators. Meanwhile, it was amplified and sustained by the tolerance of host communities within the Portuguese outposts and by the verve and nervousness of a succession of visionary viceroys, impractical men unfettered by common sense, who with conviction and ruthlessness They made up for everything. they lacked resources. Afonso de Albuquerque, who connected the ends of the Estado da Índia network in campaigns to both ends of the Indian Ocean between 1510 and 1515 and captured enough trade to make it profitable, inherited Columbus's dream of conquering Jerusalem from the East. Antonio Galvão began the evangelization of the Pacific at a time when there was only a vague idea of ​​the limits of the ocean. It is often assumed that the Portuguese succeeded in terrifying their hosts and crushing their opponents. It is true that the calculated show of force was often a useful move to initiate trade or seize a base, and that the Portuguese, at least in the Indian Ocean, repeatedly demonstrated a reassuring naval advantage over regional adversaries. What was certain, however, was that the Portuguese were too thin and too exposed to counter-attacks to win by force; the self-romanticizing of daring writers and the condemnations of moralists have given us an exaggerated impression of the role of violence in an essentially peaceful enterprise. The Portuguese conformed to existing trade patterns or increased the native societies' prospects for enrichment by creating new trade routes (see Chapter 10). For most of their hosts, this allows them to keep their coastal conquests profitable most of the time. Like many early modern empires, the Portuguese got a second wind after the turmoil of the 17th century. The coastal empire of the Indians The scope of the conquest 249 The austere Temple of Mamón and the splendid Church of the Apostle of Poverty: the simple exterior of Bolsa do Porto contrasted with the luxurious gold decoration of the Church of São Francisco around the corner from the corner. 4i ti*, /' JM li-' HM Ri Èk.*' SS apl'aHtVMK • SP ** i r

> * i 4 '-SÄ F -i,: ii |. , if 4to! Ï• '.. ^ Bn 'ui IfliS* ^=¿£ . . . . . _*«»;». ^J, /# ​​tul I j.jLM : W-;~ •--••'"' ¿fef^,. Ç •-' J " y ,'N j 1 .« *< The most admired work in Minas Gerais is at Nossa Senhora do Carmo, at Ouro Preto, his bitter and distorted style is most extreme in his last sculptures, a series of twelve prophets on the terrace of the church of Nosso Senhor do Bom Jesus of Matosinho in Congonnas of the Countryside. The animation, emotion and decorative details on display in this representation of Ezekiel, for example, would have been impossible.

not for the crippled hands of the sculptor, but for soapstone from Minas Gerais, which is soft fresh from the quarry and hardens in the air. The ocean was devastated, but over the next century Portugal developed a vast and rich territory within its previously neglected outpost of Brazil. As early as 1500 a claim was made over Brazil, when a fleet bound for India made landfall on a westerly wind in a wide arc in the South Atlantic. Faltering exploitation, first of carelessly harvested logs and then, beginning in the 1580s, of carefully planted sugar, created a coastal colony hardly larger than that of the Indian Ocean. The interior was left largely in the hands of slave traders and looters of Spain's precious metals routes until Mato Grosso's gold and diamonds brought its untapped wealth to the attention of the metropolis' elite. The effects are measured by the depth of the gilding, that the mantles count for less than the walls of the Portuguese baroque churches. With a seductive irony, Porto shows the full range of reactions of the metropolis. In the gloomy and cavernous interior of the Igreja de São Francisco, the layers of dust are penetrated, the dark layers are removed by the radiance of an almost completely golden interior, as if Midas had become a caveman and had become your home. The sparsely decorated Bourse around the corner was built by John Carr of York with all the austerity of northern classicism, under the auspices of a merchant class conscious of its imperial responsibilities. Thus, the Temple of Mammon shows Roman austerity, while the Church of the Apostles of poverty suffocates in the accumulation of wealth. The most striking counterpart to these monuments in Brazil is the vibrant rococo originality of the crippled mulatto Aleijadinho, who carved his masterpieces in front of the Nossa Senhora do Carmo church at the turn of the century, chiseling his paralyzed middle fingers. . One could almost say that in the eighteenth century it became fashionable to found land empires far from home. The British did it in India; the French and the Dutch tried it in North America and Java, respectively, with disastrous results. Until then, it was a trick that only Castilla had successfully pulled off. If Portugal was an empire of the impossible -so extensive, with such a small and uninhabited base-, Castile seems to be an empire of the inexplicable: unprecedented in its time and strictly without precedent, since it was the only world empire of land and sea. , created with pre-industrial resources. The great French and British empires of the 19th century, for example, which surpassed it, were equipped with the magic of modern technology: meters, antiscurvy, malaria suppressants, breechloaders, Gatlings, steam power, electric telegraphs, and the like. equipment that used to be sold to newly minted members of an imperial master class in the army and navy

shops or Walters of Oxford. When the first of these resources became available, the Spanish Empire had already developed to its full extent. In the 1770s it stretched without interruption from Manila to Naples and from upper Missouri to Tierra del Fuego, except where the sea divided the Spanish territories. Today's visitor, unaware of its glorious past, would never imagine that the Madrid Botanical Garden was once the nursery for this unique empire, literally. It's more like an organized urban playground, the haven for flirty couples, rowdy kids, and friendly neighborhood cats. The flower stalls are clean and plentiful, but unremarkable. In the half century after it was founded in 1756 and in the generation after it was built on its current location in 1781, it was one of the great adornments of the European Enlightenment. At the end of the century, it constituted the last link in a chain of acclimatization gardens in Manila, Lima, Mexico and La Orotava in the Canary Islands, which, at least in theory, made it possible to sample the flora of each one. climate occupied by the monarchy and centralize them in a single research site. The Spanish crown was prompted to start the project by criticism from Linnaeus, who in his great botanical compendium of 1736 had lamented the lack of scientific publications on Florilegia in Spain. The monarchy hired one of his students, Pehr Loefling, to ensure that the collection was organized according to Linnaean principles. He was sent to Venezuela to continue the work that Spanish scholars had begun to catalog and publicize the plants of the Empire. Loefling died on the job, but specimens of him reached Spain and formed the nucleus of the American Botanical Garden. After that, the official commitment to the project was unwavering. In an 1811 work, the great naturalist Alexander von Humboldt praised Spain for spending more on botanical science than any other government in the world. From the dialogue with their spirits and from the inspection of their specimens in the remains of their gardens, one can obtain an idea of ​​the scope and fruits of the work of successive expeditions, of increasing cost and scope. But the publications documenting his work, together with the great piles of detailed drawings that remain in manuscript form and were collected in the Botanical Garden archives, offer a more illuminating guide. For example, 1,000 color drawings and 1,500 written descriptions of plants arrived from Peru in 1783. The collection (another 1,100 plates) of an expedition leader, who also helped establish the Botanical Gardens of Mexico, was nearly lost when he fled with her to Switzerland during the Napoleonic War; When the Spanish government demanded its return in 1817, 120 Geneva ladies made copies of the lot for the local botanical society to preserve. Perhaps the most important collections are those of Hipólito Pavón, whose expedition to Chile and Peru in 1777-88 gave him the opportunity to follow his personal passion, the study of the therapeutic properties of plants, and attempted the most comprehensive study of quinine. till the date. . . . maybe the most beautiful

It was about von Humboldt's important botanical collaborator, José Celestino Mutis, who from 1760 until his death in 1808 presided over scientific life in one of the outposts of the civilized world in Bogotá. This could mean the best of imperialism in the modern world: being able to pluck the flowers of empire from an incredible variety of fields and make them bloom together in scientific proximity. Subject races were less receptive than plants to the processes of centralization, transplantation, classification, and experimentation practiced on them by overly ambitious imperial governments. By the end of the 18th and 19th century, all the great empires that arose in the early modern period would either be destroyed or reformed. They were followed by new forms of imperialism, executable through industrial technology. The near disappearance of the Spanish Empire in a series of convulsions that paralyzed the country is a nod to the ambitions and limitations of colonial mentalities determined to imitate Europe in a hostile environment. In 1526, the Santo Domingo historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo described it as "far in advance of any city he has ever seen". As early as 1554, Cervantes de Sálazar had extolled life in the imperial and loyal city of Mexico in a dialogue in Latin through its cobbled streets, grand doorways, unitary houses, classical proportions, and the "artfully worked architraves" of the viceroy's palace. and the excellence of a university, supposedly equal to all in the empire of Charles V. The growth of the Dutch Empire eliminated the Mongols, crushed those of France and Great Britain in America, destroyed the Ottomans, Russia and Portugal, and destroyed the expansion of China. When Columbus launched the Spanish adventure overseas, he called his conquest "the conquest of the seemingly impossible." While it existed, the Empire seemed to be just that, of monumental cities that defied hostile environments. At 7,350 feet, Mexico City reproduced all the comforts, all the urbanities of an old world metropolis. It had a university, printing press and cathedral long before Madrid. It was complemented by the snobbish elegance of their social rituals, painstakingly painted, for example, by Cristóbal de Villalpando in 1695. The still-inhabited ruins of Antigua, Guatemala, bear witness to the impressive confidence of a society willing to build and rebuild under the volcano. , with reckless spending in bold colonnades. There, in the eighteenth century, the nuns of Las Capuchinas could meditate with equal serenity in their earthquake-proof cloisters or in their cells equipped with bathrooms. THE WAY OF THE WORLD The spread of the Imperial plague has left its traces in some strange places. I am not referring to the effects of smallpox -they belong in the next chapter- but, for example, to the unfilled cracks in the walls of Vijayanagar, to the emptied treasures of the Temple of the Sun in Cuzco, to the permanently depopulated villages of Khorchin, and the gaps in the photo galleries of

Munich and Prague came out of the way of the Swedish troops in the Thirty Years' War. Sweden seems an unlikely place to be the metropolis of an empire. The Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch examples show that a small, poor, peripheral and unpopulated home base is not a necessary disqualification, but to a 20th century reader it is probably the Swedish 'image' that is not convincing. Today, the nation's federations have an impeccable reputation for benevolent neutrality, painless social democracy, and complacent sociologists. It missed its moment of imperial opportunity, however, in the 17th century, when three rulers—Gustavus Adolphus, Queen Christina, and Charles XII—descended from their even more distant legendary ancestors, the Geats. Looking at the world from their northern vantage point, they could now glimpse its oyster potential. Sweden's imperial feat was all the more remarkable because it took place during another century of the "Little Ice Age," which sent icy lands through northern European mountain valleys, suffocated some fertile land, encircled seaports behind mounds of ice and even occasionally provided Ice Passages for Swedish troops through the Danish Baelts. Like other imperial peoples of the early modern period, the Swedes had some medieval colonial experiences behind them. His foray into Finland, perhaps beginning in the 12th century, was heralded as a crusade. He subdued the Suomi agrarians and plowed up the Tavastian hunting lands, reached Karelia and disputed a border on the Neva with the Russians before losing strength. That tradition, such as it was, helped set the direction of Swedish ambitions. When Imperial expansion resumed under Gustavus Adolphus, it was aided by firearms technology and efficient battlefield organization to maximize its impact. The king's technical talents helped give the Swedes an advantage that their limited manpower could not grant. Showing the range of provenances of their artistic loot accumulated in the Thirty Years' War, in 1650 Queen Christina's coronation procession approached the Royal Palace in Stockholm under a trompe l'oeil arch made of wood and rubber and resin canvas. , uploaded by a Parisian referee. Elegantiae were designed based on the Arch of Constantine. It was surmounted by twenty-four wooden statues painted to resemble stone and representing virtues. Like Constantine, Cristina would make the trip to the north of Rome and be seduced by the Mediterranean culture and religion. of Russia and Lithuania, Franconia and Alsace- suggests that her expanding power could have been pursued in all directions. The glorious art collections of the Bavarian Elector and Imperial Emperor disappeared on barges sailing north to enrich a palace that once contained just a single painting. With their share of the loot, the Swedish nobility moved from their rustic, one-story, thatched-roof huts to baroque palaces, where they competed to learn French dances and dances.

Cultivate an adequate artistic taste. For her coronation in 1650, Christina entered her palace through a wood-and-glue replica of the Arch of Constantine, fit for a 20th-century film production. In practice, however, Swedish soldiers, while they could go anywhere as allies or mercenaries for others, were mainly used to build a Baltic empire. Charles XII wasted his labor in an endless war against Russia. It was the wrong direction to go. Had Sweden led her armies west to conquer the Atlantic coast of Scandinavia, she might have better invested her energies in participating in the naval imperialism of Europe's coastal powers. Its traders reached Guinea and North America and traded in South Africa and Canton in the 17th and 18th centuries; the Swedish West India Company even acquired its own sugar island at Saint Barthelemy in the 1780s; but Denmark stayed behind to rake in the crops left behind by others in Greenland, St. Thomas, the Faroe Islands, and Norway. Sweden's brief imperial spasm is often cited, along with the colonial and mercantile precocity of the French, English and Dutch, as evidence that the widely perceived shift in initiative in favor of Western Europe to the detriment of other world civilizations within Europe was accompanied by a shift from the former powers of the southern Mediterranean to the north. It is even used as proof that Protestantism was superior to Catholicism as an imperialist faith, and as proof that Protestants inherited the aptitude for capitalism that was particularly attributed to Jews in the Middle Ages. Every part of this thesis seems wrong to me. If Europe's center of gravity has shifted, it has not been from south to north, but from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The English, French, Dutch and Danish shared the benefits, but to a lesser extent and to a lesser extent than the Castilians and Portuguese. The southern Atlantean empires started earlier, went further, lasted longer, and outperformed those in the north. The dominance of the Northern powers in the world struggles of the 19th century did not begin, nor does it show signs, as early as is generally believed. It is a common failure of historians to ignore the speed with which change occurs and to trace "origins" through meaningless eons. By the way, neither was northern capitalism, judging by the religion of the leading northern capitalists. Below the portrait bust of Wilhelm III. you can see the emblem of the company: a sun rising from the sea, an emblem of the western empire that was never conquered. The scope of the conquest 257

The times, generally ecumenical, latitudinal, moderate and insensitive to predetinism, have a lot to do with a certain Christian tradition, certainly not radical. Being Catholic was not an obstacle to conquest in the early modern period, nor was being Muslim, Russian Orthodox, or Chinese. The geographical location of potentially imperial societies was decisive. What all the sea kingdoms had in common was their starting point on the shores of the Atlantic. For the Atlantic, in the age of sailing, it was a highway that led not only to America's vast, underexploited, and defenseless resources, but also to the wind systems that connected the rest of the world. The monsoonal regions of the Indian Ocean are cut by a belt of storms in the south; Exploring these latitudes was worthwhile for those approaching the Cape of Good Hope, while local navigators who traded on the monsoons had no need or incentive to explore them. Regularly crossing the vast and unprofitable expanses of the Pacific from China or Japan is not worth it. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the world became accessible to researchers who cracked the codes of the wind system. Discovered in the late 15th century, the westerlies of the South Atlantic led to the Indian Ocean via a route blazed by the Portuguese and the Roaring Forties by the Dutch. The central Atlantic trade wind route discovered by Columbus took the Spanish to Mexico, from where the shortest trans-Pacific routes could be operated in both directions, indeed, for a long time, the only viable one under sail. Even Scotland, the smallest and poorest of the European Atlantean kingdoms at the time, tried to take advantage of these opportunities. In 1695, William Paterson, inventor of the Bank of England, proposed a Scottish corporation that would establish a colony in Central America to trade with the East Indies. Unable to share the load with hostile English investors, Scotland subscribed half of its available capital into the venture. It was a ridiculously optimistic plan. There were some prospects of trade with Africa, which provided the only profits for the venture and produced the funds for the last gold coins struck by the Scottish Mint in 1701. But the Darien location for the "emporium and staple of both Indies" planned. it was unhealthy and subject to Spanish attack. Nearly all of the 3,800 colonists died of injury, disease, or shipwreck on the flight home. The company was bought and killed by an embarrassed British government. Only the moat around the ill-fated fort that is still used by the indigenous canoes and the name of Puerto Escocés on the map remain of the company. Chapter 8 THE EMPIRE'S BREATH: COLONIZATION ON THE MODERN FRONTIERS ANCIENT WONDERLANDS – The Pioneering Spirit – The Involuntary Settlers – The Indigenous Victims – Points of Contact at the Empire's Edge SUCH WONDERLANDS There is a saying that in Xinjiang even a beggar should ride a donkey

"Otherwise," a trucker explained in one story, "having eaten your fill in one town, you will starve in the next... Unless you go west to Xinjiang, you will never realize the size of your country." The driver had started his own life on the border in 1960 as an undocumented migrant. "Sinkiang came to life in my imagination through a song we sang at school: 'Sinkiang, O Land So Wonderful.' So I decided to go to Xinjiang. ". The labor pains were so brief that recruiters ignored the lack of documentation "as long as you have all limbs intact." process of colonial expansion in the Gobi desert that began in the 17th century and began when the conquest of the area was completed in 1759. The beginning of Xinjiang's transformation fell into an era of global, or at least global, colonization that populated the shadows of the burgeoning empires of the early modern period and aligned political borders with colonists whose growth he followed in the previous chapter Carefully sourced and sparsely distributed, the colonists had only just begun to expand the boundaries of the inhabited world; in some quarters they were a destructive presence whose creation Time and disease certainly eroded the borders, but on the fringes of empires they were part of, where they touched the outposts of other countries. By expanding the eggs, they helped connect the world. When the scholar Ji Yun embarked on his exile journey to Xinjiang in 1769, he felt the awe of entering "another world" that the Chinese often felt beyond the Jiayuguan Pass. From afar, at first glance, he mistook the Turkestan Uyghur traders for women because of their long dark green and pink sheepskin coats. But he soon established himself on a frontier that was becoming civilized with remarkable rapidity. When he arrived, the capital, Urumchi, the provincial capital, had housed bookstores selling classical texts for two years. He arranged to send his wife seeds from the huge mums and marigolds he grew in his own garden. Peaches planted by a deputy mayor and peonies by a fellow exile gave Urumchi aromas and images of home, though some of its flavors were indescribable, mainly because pork - the meat of the Chinese festival - was offensive to the locals. local Muslims. Da Nang's colorful cupcakes have become a common local flavor. Meanwhile, in Hi, as far west as the empire reached, poppies were famous for their size, and in the same city, an emancipated convict could make a fortune opening a shop selling Kiangsu-style delicacies in 1788. At least 200,000 Chinese immigrants were lured to Xinjiang through a combination of selective deportation and incentives for voluntary settlers. Many criminals and political undesirables were forcibly sent there, but for the merchants the opportunities were so lucrative that they were punished for their mistakes by being sent home. Okay

The FIDE immigrants were facilitated by a government that reimbursed travel expenses and offered credit for seeds, livestock and housing, granting four and a half acres of land per family and a temporary exemption from taxes. In some respects, the economy was a continuation of the old southern frontier of Kweichow: a get-rich-quick economy based on the logs that flowed in the rivers and the products of the mines: lead, copper, iron, silver, mercury, and gold. . But in Xinjiang, settlement was concentrated on farmland north of the Tien Shan, where trading cities grew rapidly. The Urumchi iron and lead mines, unlike those of Kweichow, produced nothing for export; all materials were absorbed by the frontier boom itself. The convicts worked the minerals to obtain base metals, but the laborers extracted the veins of copper and gold. Production depended on colonization. The natives, unable to "smell" the copper, left the exploration to the Chinese. The growing population of the Empire, which more than doubled during the year 260. THE SPRING SUN HAS COOLED The Tien Shan, the "Celestial Mountains" that protect the Takla Makan desert to the north, is one of the most formidable mountain barriers in the world . , encircling Xinjiang to the north and west: 1,800 miles long and up to 300 miles wide, they occupy nearly a quarter of the province. The highest peak is over 24,000 feet. The extraordinary environment that the mountains contain is made even stranger by the deep depressions that the mountains cut through: Turfan drops to more than 500 feet below sea level. in the eighteenth century it helped maintain similar colonial pressures on all fronts. The Manchu conquest of Szechuan was extraordinarily savage, reportedly wiping out three-quarters of the population and undoing the arduous medieval colonization described in Chapter One. But between 1667 and 1707, more than 1.5 million settlers were attracted by promises of tax immunity. Here and on the southeastern border, intense resettlement pressures unleashed a cycle of conflict and resolution ominously familiar to students of New World colonialism: rebellious aboriginal tribesmen were driven onto reservations. Militarized agricultural colonies grew wheat, barley, peas, and corn while the natives were subjugated. Schools were established to bring the Chinese language and values ​​to the tribes. At the southern fringes of the empire, the only exception to this pattern was Taiwan, where the Manchu government initially used local hunters to suppress the supposed immigrant population in an overseas province whose resistance to Manchu conquest had been strong. However, by the mid-18th century, deer populations were declining and Chinese farmers were allowed to move in as tenants of the natives. In the traditional north of China, in the border regions of Mongolia and Manchuria, colonization was carried out in a different way. The Manchus came to power in China believing that their very heart had to be preserved as a reservoir of Manchu identity where warriors, unsullied by Chi-Nesen, incorruptible by Chinese contacts, could continue to breed.

Dynasty Service. In the only Manchurian schools in the 18th century, the curriculum was limited to horsemanship, archery, and the Manchu language. Chinese immigration has been actively discouraged or banned altogether on several occasions. But despite imperial policies, the Manchus were sinicized and the frontier tamed. The rich, dark soils of a country quite close to the competitive and densely populated world of North China held an irresistible allure. From the point of view of local authorities, illegal immigrants were welcomed for their exploitability. Early settlements inevitably had the flavor of present-day Canada or faraway Siberia: a quality of life in the camp of roaming communities of ginseng graves and coureurs des bois. However, the peasant pioneers were not far behind. Under the Ming dynasty, the Manchurian Pale stockade, the outline around the Liao Valley, was designed to keep the Manchus out; Under the Ch'ing, their goal was to keep the Chinese. The unmistakable character of unofficial colonial society was evident in the scruffy appearance of the border town of Ninguta (north-east of Kirin on the Hurka River) compared to the neat hairstyle of Urumchi. In the generation after its founding in 1660, only four hundred families lived within the collapsed mud wall of Ninguta. There was no "leisure person" and the wives of the exiles, "descendants of China's rich and honorable families," slid barefoot down the icy slope, weighed down by water from the only well. Yet even in this environment, some metropolitan values ​​have triumphed, while others have been toppled or blown away by the winds of change. Anyone with scientific credentials, not to mention accomplishments, was valued in Ninguta. A visitor from an exile in 1690 was impressed by the deference the natives had for the Chinese, and the wealth the colonists amassed compared to Manchu officials. The older merchants "even greeted the military governor as a younger brother." In other words, the hierarchies of the homeland persisted alongside the new hierarchies developed by the emerging frontier society. From the point of view of the ruling dynasty, the colonization of the frontier was too important to be left to the Chinese. In a reorganization of tribal peoples reminiscent of the border defense strategies of the late Roman Empire, the Ch'ing moved Mongol bands like knights on a chessboard, displacing some among weak points along the borders and bringing to others from abroad for the empire. . In a moving ceremony in Beijing in 1771, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor welcomed the Tatar Torghut Khan Upasha, who had renounced Russian sovereignty over the Volga Valley to return to Dzungaria, the homeland they more than abandoned, again. in the imperial bosom than a century before. They were attracted by a long courtship begun in 1712 by a diplomatic mission that felt homesick for Torghut. Meanwhile, the remaining native Dzungarians were nearly wiped out after the Chinese conquest, and the imperial government attempted to repopulate the country from all parts of the empire.

from the pastures of other nomads to Manchuria itself, as well as ethnic Chinese convicts, exiles, and migrant peasants. The arable steppe could accommodate large numbers when it converted from nomadic to sedentary use, especially with the new efficient crops that were introduced. Corn, potatoes, and peanuts were made available through the transoceanic ecological exchange network that was a byproduct of early modern imperialism. THE SPIRIT OF THE PIONEER In 1595, in Callao, Peru, Don Álvaro de Mendaña and his formidable wife recruited in the streets while their ships were being prepared in the harbor. They planned to colonize the Solomon Islands, which had been discovered twenty-seven years ago and had not been visited since, ninety days' sailing across the Pacific Ocean. Peru, as far as its inhabitants knew, was already at the edge of their world; its settlers were mostly first-generation pioneers; its own interior was underdeveloped and cozy; and yet the Mendañas managed to gather 300 followers willing to venture across another ocean, to a land so far away that even the proponents of the adventure had only a vague idea of ​​how they might find it. For the tragedy of their journey was that their fate eluded the victor, and most of them perished in pursuit. This incredible wanderlust was the essential ingredient of the first modern settler societies. Each new frontier was colonized by the remnants of the previous one. Many of the Spanish settlers in the Caribbean came from Extremadura and Andalusia, the last frontiers of Spain's own medieval history of "gigantic and uninterrupted" colonization; The colonial societies of Mexico and Central America were founded in the Caribbean. From these first continental colonies came the vanguard of the conquerors of the Inca world, who in turn founded colonial companies in Chile and Tucumán. Ferdinand Verbiest was appalled by the Chinese policy of destroying villages in Manchuria so that people exported to the nearest border along the Amur could not return home. The first group of Russian conquerors in Siberia consisted of Cossack frontiersmen with recruits from an armed company of fur trappers, including "men from Lithuania, foreigners, Tatars, and Russians." When John Winthrop's settlers arrived in Boston in 1630, they found the site already occupied by a pioneer who sold and moved. At the turn of the century, English North America was strengthened by the arrival of emigrants from the West Indies. Deserters and runaways from Portugal's fortresses and factories left the African hinterland to "go native", where some of them ruled chieftains in and around the former lands of Mwene Mutapa's weakened empire in the 17th century. Or, in Asia, they commanded a "hidden empire" of merchants who operated beyond political borders and the scope of official contracts. Neither economic determinism nor dialectical materialism can explain the scope or nature of early modern colonialism, because much of it was generated by the unpredictable impulses of the mind. a little more than

quantifiable imperatives or rational calculations must have propelled or lured participants into endeavors, sometimes rewarding but more often leading to disappointment or death during this period. The importance of individual psychological quirks in groups of colonists that shape the world, but are rarely numerous, makes generalization dangerous; however, tireless ruthlessness seems to have been an integral part of the pioneering profile. Ultimately the only answer to Horace's question. . . quid terra alio calentis sole mutamus? – which could be paraphrased, “Why do some of us care about foreign lands?” – is: “Because some of us are like that”. Much, in the New World, by far the greatest part of early modern colonization was under the sanctions of imposed slavery; much more was state sponsored. But everything depended on the availability of pioneer workers in the societies of origin, not always overcrowded or inhospitable. Moving to the frontier was, as one English advocate of American colonization put it in the 1640s, "the determination of free spirits." Still, it is useful to place the aspirations of the pioneers in the context of their parent societies. Those emanating from the Iberian Peninsula often seem animated by a form of madness of grandeur, inherited from the traditions of urban, aristocratic, chivalric and crusader values. In 1606, when Pedro Fernandes de Queiros, the self-proclaimed new Columbus, believed he had discovered the great and unknown southern continent, which had eluded previous explorers for the simple reason that he was not there, his first act was to found a city. , who called it the New Jerusalem, and ride every member of his crew, even his black cooks. In 1499, the captain of the small island of São Tomé in the Gulf of Guinea, at a time when its population numbered fifty criminal exiles, announced his intention to build a city "which, when completed, will be one of the greatest works that could be found" with a church larger than that of San Pedro. Spanish archives are full of petitions from disappointed conquistadors of named lineage who petitioned the Crown for the right to have coats of arms over their gates or to wear a coat of arms. Returnees ensured that Trujillo would benefit for generations, and the Inca conquest was the greatest blessing to a town whose local countryside was poor. the street. This was an empire of Sancho Panza and Don Quixote. An aging sojourn in America was a standard means of escape or attempted enrichment for the humble heroes of Spanish picaresque fiction. Sancho's requests to the Don to make him "governor of an island" or "a little piece of heaven" were realistic enough to be funny. Trujillo in Extremadura is slightly larger today than it was in the 16th century

Century in which Peru supplied many of its conquerors and colonizers. Here, in the mirror of a repatriated society, the hopes of the settlers are reflected. The irregular square is presided over by the statue of Pizarro, who made the fortune of the entire city by conquering the Inca Empire. The palaces of the returnees are scattered: that of the Pizarros, with servile Incas on the corner pillars. Tucked modestly behind an archway that leads below the Town Hall is a magnificent Renaissance palace, perhaps the finest of all, built by a conquistador who returned with his loot from Atahualpa's ransom and gained meaningless dominance over an acquired desert town. Of the 1,021 immigrants who arrived in Peru in the 16th century, only 62 returned permanently, but they took over the city, bought titles and offices, founded churches and a hospital, and dumped rich dowries on the hungry marriage market. Those who remained in Peru exerted influence from afar, shipping their relatives or invoking the riches of the New World to correct the balance of the ancient ones. In 1574, Inés de Cabanas de Lima sent for her brother "because it hurts me to know that you must be at someone's service." In some settings, French and English colonists may be influenced by the same type of self-perception. Eighteenth-century Canada had its burgher gentilshommes, and James I felt that colonization could be stimulated by the granting of titles such as Baronetcy of Nova Scotia. When the hapless Thomas Wentworth came to rule Ireland in 1633, he was disgusted by the presumptions of the New England colonists, who had gladly become penniless adventurers buying titles and the affections of ad power. . It was thought to be a good destination for "lesser brothers who were accustomed to being placed in abbeys" and indeed the English upper classes of the late 16th and early 17th centuries appear to have been extraordinarily philanthropic. In Ireland, honors were cheap and positions were plentiful. The wife of one of the beneficiaries of the sponsorship of James F. did not remember the names of the three dioceses of her husband, "they are so strange except one, which is Deny: I pray God to make us happy." Whether they were settlers, economically motivated and nothing else, Ulster was close enough and lucrative enough to monopolize immigrants from Britain. The more distant English colonial aspirations needed the impetus of a larger cause, and it was fortunate for England that the era of her enterprise coincided with the era of the religious wars in Europe. English America was populated with the debris of sectarian strife. This did not necessarily mean that everyone was religiously motivated. The 130 Englishmen massacred by the Indians in an arm of the Amazon in 1618 were the dissolved garrisons of the Dutch hostage towns. Many of the Germans, Dutch, and Scandinavians who fed the sparse populations of the Dutch and English colonies were prisoners or displaced refugees during the Thirty Years' War. Although the English Catholic nobility founded Maryland as a refuge for their persecuted fellow believers, they were forced to do so.

recruit mainly Protestant laborers to serve them. However, there were many colonies that drew all their energy from faith. In the Virginia Company's original charter, the investors' business objectives were not tainted by reference to religion, but its workforce was recruited exclusively by preachers who presented Virginia as Canaan and the company's mission as similar to that of Joshua. in the land of the Perizzites. . . Winthrop's founders in Boston arrived there, they believed, "under the eyes of God." Increaser Mather's surprisingly satisfied account of the extermination of the Algonquin Indians is held up as evidence of divine favor to "English Israel." In numerous engravings of his treaty with the Indians, William Penn is shown wearing a hat, not out of disrespect to his contractors, but as a symbol of Quaker identity. Sir Connor O'Brien ceded the independent Irish colony in the Amazon to Portugal in 1629, despite English demands, to prevent the Indians from becoming heretics. Evidently many pioneers practiced evasive maneuvers; some avoided work, since, as the Dutch in North America conceded in 1628, "they might as well have stayed at home." Others avoided wives or complicated marital affairs, since bigamy was one of the most common crimes in colonial times. Others shunned the burdens of lords or masters at home, though many, especially in the English colonies, were willing to buy their freedom for long indentured stays on the plantations. However, even these needed a source of commitment to emigration as a preferred escape route. A sense of mission and a high self-image were, on the one hand, rational strategies for coping with the demands of a hostile and barbaric environment. Winthrop's colony, for example, though in one of the healthiest places, was devastated during its first winter by dysentery, scurvy, bad weather, gales, forest fires, and the ravenous wolves; In the end, only about six hundred of the original thousand settlers remained. But Winthrop felt that he "never did better in my life". Similar steadfastness was shown by the Austrian Lutheran settlers at Ebenezer, Georgia, in 1737, who "carried home what little grain the worms had left them" and declared "their contentment and satisfaction with what God had given them." The profane equivalent of these impressive consolations is found in a corner of what is now the Republic of Mexico. When the Montejo family completed their arduous and costly conquest of the Yucatán in the 1540s, they knew they were followers in Mexico's race for wealth, relegated to a peripheral province with no mineral resources and no cities sitting on arid limestone and vernal plateaus. artesian. But they were able to console themselves with the construction of a palace in Mérida, which still proclaims the success of their search for self-improvement through great feats. Along a Renaissance belted façade, helmeted and armored conquerors tower over vanquished savages, while the inscription, without deliberate irony, proclaims the conquering power of love.

Clearly, to be a colonial pioneer in the early modern world required not only good health and a robust physique, but also a keen imagination; a fantasy like that of Alonso de Lugo, who designed the main square of La Laguna, but made it roughly carved, with one side planted with vines; a fantasy like that of Columbus, who expected to see his colony openly with the oriental merchants with their Aladdin hats, seen in the engravings that illustrate his first story; an imagination like that of Jan Coen, who in the 1620s, with his monsoon-soaked and muddy garrison in Indonesia, dreamed of conquering all of China's trade by force; a fantasy The touch of empire 267 A bank now occupies the Palacio Montejo in Mérida, built by the family of the founding conquistadores and outfitted with this luxurious, self-admiring Mannerist façade. It was a typically grim, harsh, and destructive conquest, claiming perhaps 60,000 lives in warfare, displacement, and imported disease before populations began to recover; but the legend on the door of the palace says: "Love conquers all". Note how the depiction of conquerors and their victims continues to be influenced by medieval iconography of knights and wild men: see page 180. such as that of Bryan Edwards, who in the 1790s believed that breadfruit turned Jamaica into a hive of industry. to transform. One of the most useful refuges of the colonizing imagination was the ability to visualize an uncomfortable, unfavorable or demanding environment. At the mouth of the Orinoco, Columbus thought he was near the Garden of Eden, and Thomas More's Utopia was inspired by Vespucci's description of an adjacent coastline. "Acadie" was adopted as the misnomer for a frozen French colony outside of Canada in 1610 as an apparent misspelling. Religious and Secular Utopianism Combined in Direct Exploration "The City of Melilot in the Remarin Province of the Kingdom of Appalachia," Charles Rochefort's 1681 fantasy capital, designed to bolster his campaign for a Huguenot settlement in present-day Georgia . The primitive settlement can be seen in the valley, marked

C, founded by refugees in friendship with the natives, whose ominous fortified temple towers over the mountain and looks suspiciously like a medieval European city. The clothed and clothed figures in the foreground examine a plant with wonderful prophylactic properties. This scene must be compared with later instances of utopianism in America, p. Or it could make Mexico the imaginary setting for a new era of the apostolic church. Disappointed with the experience, the colonial planners pushed their longed-for utopias beyond the next horizon. 16th century explorers searched for the Fountain of Youth in Florida, the kingdom of the "White King" in the Chaco, the legendary city of Los Césares in Patagonia, the Seven Cities of Cibola in the Arizona desert, and the kingdom of El Dorado. in the jungles of Guyana. Charles Rochefort, a late 17th-century advocate of Huguenot colonization, even described and illustrated the city of Melilot, the capital of the imaginary kingdom of Appalachia. In a fantastic landscape worthy of a primitive Flemish, leafy with miraculously therapeutic plants, Huguenot pioneers fraternizing with natives, crowned with oriental hats and cloaks of the court of Louis XIV, under a citadel flanked by a temple dominated by the sun. The supposed location of this paradise was what is now the state of Georgia. In 1747, the enlightened French naturalist Georges-Louis Buffon lost patience with the utopian tradition of depicting the New World, which, of course, owed much to the promotional purposes of the imperialist patrons of such literature. He sketched an alternate America, a dystopia of harsh climates, dwarf beasts, stunted plants, and degenerate humans. The successors masterminded the attack, and the most vicious of them, Corneille De Pauw, who believed that the Western Hemisphere was irrevocably brutalizing anyone foolish enough to venture there, wrote the article on America in the Bible supplement of the Illustration, Encyclopedia. These views appealed to students, generated controversy, and sparked scholarly research into the concept of noble savagery, to which we will return instead (see Chapter 15). But he left the pioneering spirit undaunted. Among those who responded to Buffon was Thomas Jefferson. At a dinner in Paris, he pointed out that all the Americans present were larger than their French hosts and compiled lists of American species to show that they were at least as large as European ones. Could the current European stereotype of American taste -distorted by quantitative values- have its roots in this philosophical dinner? THE INVOLUNTARY SETTLERS The first man who planted wheat in Mexico was Juan Garrido. This fellow conquistador of Cortés saw Tenochtitlán subdue, made an expedition to California, and was administrator for his fellow citizens of the Chapultepec aqueduct that supplied water to Mexico City. He was also black. He wasn't the only one of his color when it came to taking a stand.

responsibility in colonial society in Spanish America; however, she was exceptional, to say the least, in living his life there on his behalf. As strong as the pioneering spirit was in the metropolises of the early modern empires, the homelands—with the possible exception of China—were not densely populated to meet the labor needs of their own colonies. In some areas due to the emptying of colonial lands; in others, by the intense labor demands of successful cults; in others, the demographic catastrophe of the 16th and 17th centuries made slaves essential to sustaining colonial enterprises. The only source that could supply them in sufficient quantity was Africa. As a result, black slave labor remained important in parts of India and in some European and Chinese contexts, while Dalzel's 1793 History of Dahomey was a slave trader's apology and the engravings reflect the prejudices of the Author. The Dahomey royal court is portrayed as a contemptible mixture of despotism, stupidity, and debauchery. In contrast, the King of Dahomey, who graces Duclos's 1780 Histoire du Costume, is a dignified figure, a "society hunter", with a mixture of European and Turkish clothing on legs exposed by royal taboo. Dutch spice farming companies created a major new market in the East Indies in the 17th century: the largest population shift in early modern colonization was from Africa to the Americas. Slaves arrived, at different times and to different degrees, from Atlantic Africa, particularly from most of West Africa, the Congo, and Angola. They were largely acquired from their black vendors through warfare and raids reaching many hundreds of miles inland. Despite the vastness of the catchment area, it is hard to believe that the export of labor to the extent necessary has not severely affected the victim societies. Most slave communities in the United States did not reproduce naturally for reasons that are not yet well understood. Therefore, constant new imports were only necessary to maintain labor levels. Important inputs were needed to increase economic activity. More than 1.5 million black slaves arrived in the New World in the late 17th century, and nearly 6 million more in the 18th century. The numbers shipped from Africa were slightly higher, as crossing the Atlantic was deadly for many. According to the best available figures, about 400,000 of the people exported from Africa in the 18th century never made it to the Americas. The demographic and economic effects are difficult to estimate. For some time, the Angola region seems to have developed a significant surplus of women to men; Apart from black slave trading societies, some areas may have been depopulated.

However, the political effects are sometimes staggering and can be traced, for example, in the origin story of the Kingdom of Dahomey. Two images of Dahomey were projected onto 18th century Europe. In an engraving illustrating a contemporary story, King Agaja (r. 1708-40) influenced the society's pose of a hunter's portrait by leaning on one of the long muskets that formed the basis of Dahomey's military power. He wears a white double-peaked hat, a richly embroidered Turkish silk shirt, and a long tunic with ruffled sleeves like a Western university medical doctor's lab coat. With his thin nose, butterfly lips, and Mediterranean complexion, he's about as far from a white-on-black stereotype as can be; The naked savage peeks out of the clothing just below the knee, where the bare legs slip into the sandals that were the privilege of kings. This is the Agaja, who a French visitor said he looked like Molière and asked the European merchant to bring him armor. In a competing version of The King of Dahomey's Levée, published by a slave trader in 1793, a Stepin Fetchit in a plumed straw hat lounges drunkenly between his silly, bare-breasted wives, sucking on a long pipe while receiving comic greetings from his subjects. crawling For white visitors, this empire combined the extremes of civility and ferocity in an extraordinary way. The guests ate with silver-handled forks the dishes of their homeland, prepared by chefs "trained in Europe, or at least in the different fortresses", but they had to approach the King's Chamber through a path of skulls and they found themselves forced to testify. to human presence. sacrifices that Dahomeyans used to celebrate royal funerals and annual commemorations of ancient kings. Dahomey thrived on war, and all other values ​​were subservient to a cruel warrior cult: "the insatiable thirst for blood, the barbaric vanity of being considered the scourge of humanity, the savage pomp of living in a house adorned with skulls and stains". with human blood." The kingdom arose in the early 17th century within what is now Benin, traditionally founded by exiles from the dynastic conflicts of the wealthy city-state of Aliada. By the 1640s, Allada was already a magnet for European slave traders. its port with its nearby rivals at Whydah gave the area the name of the Slave Coast Around mid-century, Dahomey began collecting European muskets for slaves raided further north The eighteen subsidiary parishes controlled by King Wegbeja (c. 1650-80) had grown to 209 by Agaja's time, and its greatest treasure was the coast d between the Ouémé and Mono rivers, which, he told European traders, was conquered to give him access to markets. With a productive homeland in an area with a long tradition of middle-class commerce, Dahomey cannot be said to have been dependent on slavery, which accounted for perhaps no more than a fortieth of the economy. Slavery frequently noted that Dahomey's aggression was inspired by a less discriminatory desire for conquest, and that POWs were valued more as potential victims than slaves. It was

he claimed that slave traders were performing a work of mercy by rescuing their victims from certain death. But the facts are clear: Dahomey rose and fell with the slave trade, and the cult of savagery coincided with the POW trade. The commercial economy forced its suppliers to be warriors or bandits. The prices paid by the Europeans made it worth looting but not raising slaves. They were a form of animal husbandry that was only profitable when it whispered. Since Agaja's time, Dahomey has been eclipsed by an even larger captor kingdom, Oyo State, which had its heart around the upper reaches of Ogun, south of the now-dry Moshi River. Just as Dahomey relied on the slave trade for its supply of muskets, Oyo indirectly sold slaves to finance its own horse-based warfare technology. The Europeans brought some horses as gifts, but the Oyo cavalry set out on purchases of the savannah lands further north, paid for with the proceeds of slavery. So extensive was their trade, especially after they conquered Porto Novo, some 100 kilometers west of Lagos and opened a direct route to the sea, that they not only raided them, but also imported slaves from Hausa lands. When Oyo attacked Dahomey to secure their own access to European outposts, the mounted lancers demonstrated their superiority over the Dahomeyan musketeers. This seems a curious reversal of the trend in other parts of the world, but is probably due to the Dahomeyans' lack of bayonets - they preferred to close with an ax or knife - and their inexperience in shooting to kill. After all, the purpose of their war was to take captives for slaves or sacrifices. They were never able to handle horses: on ceremonial occasions their king had to be held in the saddle by flank attendants on foot. Further west, Ashanti history shows that state-building on an even larger scale was possible with resources other than slaves. Gold was the basis for Ashanti's spectacular rise from the 1680s to the dimensions of a great kingdom in the mid-18th century, occupying 10,000 square miles of present-day Ghana and ruling a population of 750,000. The royal chest is said to have contained 400,000 ounces of gold. The throne was a golden chair that was said to have been called from heaven. The backyard was shaded by umbrellas the size of trees. For the annual yam ceremony, the capital Kumasi welcomed 100,000 people as the king's tributaries gathered their entourage. More adaptable than Dahomey, Ashanti was able to defeat the mounted armies of the savannah with firepower while facing a variety of environments and fronts. Part of the success of the armies was due to superior intelligence and logistics, with fast runners operating on unobstructed roads. However, even Ashanti became increasingly dependent on slavery to supplement their tributary wealth in gold. East of the Gold Coast, Akwamu was another sizable slave-robbing state of a peculiar character: its ruler enslaved large numbers of his subjects by arranging trumped-up charges of adultery, an offense punishable by serfdom in many African states, and when mobilizing gangs. of "smart boys". ". " to do

kidnappings Our traditional images of the horrors of Paso Medio and the degradation of life in slave communities are derived from slave memoirs and abolitionist treaties. Skeptics wonder if the porters might have been so careless with their cargo that they tolerated, and even invited, great loss of life along the way; Evidence such as the oft-reproduced 1783 deck plan of the slave ship Brookes, where slaves were "stacked like books on a shelf," or the treacherous 1781 case of the Captain of Liverpool, in which 130 slaves were thrown by overboard, to which El Seguro confirms the horror stories of the surviving slaves. Some carriers have had more rational policies to protect their investments, but the level of inhumanity and inefficiency in the trade is enough to shock moralists and pragmatists alike. In their destinations, slaves generally made up the vast majority of the colonial population: 45,000 to 8,000, for example, in Jamaica in 1700. In 1553, when blacks did little more than domestic chores in Mexico, the viceroy feared that the settlers went to the whites. flooded Blacks outnumbered indigenous peoples in much of the hemisphere. Don Francisco Arove and his sons, leaders of the Cimarrón de Esmeraldas community in present-day Ecuador, who submitted to the Spanish Crown by treaty in 1599 commissioned by a government official and judge in Quito, Juan del Barrio de Sepúlveda, to deliver to Philip the Third The mixed culture of the runaway slave republic they led is reflected in their exotic appearance: the black faces, the rich clothing of Spanish nobles, the precious ear and nose jewelry borrowed from Native American tradition. tion also: in North America, from Virginia southward, in most of the West Indies, in some coastal areas of Central America and Venezuela, where plantation economies gradually developed, and in the sugar-growing countries of Guyana and Brazil. These differences gave blacks potential power that was rarely realized; Coming from many places and nations, they have rarely been able to show solidarity. If they did, the results could be captured in a 1599 painting by Adrián Sánchez Galque of Quito. The three black leaders of a Cimarrón community - a republic of runaway slaves in the Peruvian countryside - are shown richly dressed and adorned with extravagant necklaces and indigenously crafted gold nose and ear rings, each in the style of Don, the prefix for nobility, worthy. The canvas commemorates the treaty by which they returned to the Spanish monarchy and maintained local power in their territory. These, and there were many like them, were the spiritual progenitors of Toussaint l'Ouverture and Nat Turner. Even on strictly controlled plantations, slave communities were able to create self-governing institutions: in Jamaica, the British never succeeded in removing the secret power of the "Obeah men" and "Myal men", whom they denounced as magicians, nor in controlling the banks. of elders, who were the self-regulating justice of the slaves. Although the subject is much discussed

To scholars, as far as the evidence in British North America has been examined, the social orders of plantation life—family structures, relationship regulation, behavioral norms—seem to have been developed by the slaves themselves. Outside the reach of Spanish religious orders, most slaves were lightly evangelized, at best, until the 19th century. The result was that wherever slaves congregated, early modern New World colonial society was more African than European. To the north and west of the plantation world, blacks were already an ethnic minority, made up of servants, concubines, freedmen in unpopular jobs (especially at sea), or, if they came from the right side of Africa, technicians in the mining industry. . . Paradoxically, the less they were compared to other settlers and indigenous people, the easier it was for them to assimilate or induce offspring among white and mestizo elites. At least under the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, the descendants of free blacks enjoyed equality with whites before the law: spectacular cases of exploitation of these rights include Dom Henrique Dias and Dom João Fernandes Vieira, knighted for their services in the Divine War of Freedom against Dutch invaders from 1644 to 1654. In general, however, they were suppressed by administrative discrimination and instinctive racism. Depictions of life in black societies in its American heyday range from the idyllic to the picturesque and from the satirical to the gruesome. But the cat's click can be heard between the lines even in William Beckford's idealized portrayal of Jamaica, where he owned slaves in 1788. “Freedom” attainable as a slave; but here, too, the slaves were free to extort their gold shares mainly through blackmail or prostitution. Whites maintained order through targeted terror techniques, exploiting enmity between rival black nations, and liberal doses of rum and tobacco. THE INDIGENOUS SACRIFICES Your father paid no attention; his mother declared his peace of mind; But this six-year-old boy was covered in pustules, had swollen arms, a dry mouth, and a high fever. It was in Istanbul, in the spring of 1718, that his parents arrived from London on a mission. The boy's mother was Lady Mary Wortley Montague, and she had offered him up as a guinea pig for an experimental smallpox vaccine. The embassy doctor described the "ancient Greek technique that she practiced like this for many years" and that she was chosen by Lady Mary for the operation as "so clumsy to squeeze her hand". She "tortured the boy so much with her blunt and rusty needle that I took pity on him crying out for him." to this practice. Previous efforts by academics to introduce vaccination were "considered virtuous."

amusements"; now, however, Lady Mary fulfilled an ambition which she had considered a patriotic duty when she saw the inoculation taking place at Adrianople, "to bring to England this useful invention." A still darker irony is that smallpox no longer has played its part in the worst demographic catastrophe to ever hit humanity: instead of expanding the New World population in accordance with known precedents, colonization all but destroyed it, and the vast reserves of indigenous labor of the that the early colonial promoters depended on have been weakened or destroyed.In many areas, epidemiology is a notoriously difficult subject to put into historical perspective because it is tiny organisms that cause disease, often located at a volatile stage of development.However , it seems that smallpox, in a virulent form and fatal to the population's immune system through unknown actions, was one of the first and most effective you murderers Demographers have been unable to provide convincing figures on the extent or duration of the collapse, but even by the most optimistic estimates, the population of Hispaniola, where colonization of the New World began, was nearly wiped out, as was the densely populated population. and the exposed areas of Mesoamerica and the Andean region were reduced by more than 80% before a recovery began -very irregular and intermittent- in the 1570s; A general and unified recovery cannot be said to have begun before the end of the 17th century. Even the most spacious environments in North America have spawned devastating diseases. The flu introduced by Cartier into the St. Lawrence in 1535 and the nameless plague spread by de Soto's exploration of the deep south in 1538 began a sorry history in which almost all attempts at European colonization infected the natives. The first English attempt to colonize Virginia rapidly spread a deadly disease "so strange they knew nothing and how to cure it." When a successful colony was established on the Chesapeake a generation later, the Indians complained of the destruction that had taken place in the interim; Worn out by periodic wars of mutual destruction between natives and settlers, the Chesapeake Indians disappeared by the end of the 17th century. Meanwhile, in the tropics, "the breath of a Spaniard" is enough to kill an Indian. The first Spanish navigators of the Amazon saw cities built on stilts on the shores in 1542, subsisting on the intensive cultivation of wild cassava and turtle farming. The Spanish have just passed; By the time of the next visitors, a generation later, this crowded world had disappeared. When a plague ravaged Bahia in 1563, José de Anchieta, the Jesuit "Apostle of Brazil," could not feel the symptoms that rotted the liver and produced the noxious smallpox, but he treated the Indians by "bleeding part of their legs and tearing off almost all their feet cutting corrupted skin with scissors Even if we assume that Indian societies were like the rest of the world and suffered

undocumented plague, it seems undeniable that the diseases caused by colonization were new and the effects unprecedented. For the natives, even the most benevolent attitude of the colonial authorities did not mitigate the colonial experience. The Ch'ing favored the native Taiwanese, but that did not stop the deer herds from depleting. No empire ever enacted laws in favor of its victims with such obstinacy or ineffectiveness as did Spain in the New World. In these cases, the effects were no better than if the regimes had been hostile or indifferent, as in English and Portuguese America. It is impossible to imagine a more benevolent system - in a paternalistic way - than that of the Society of Jesus in the vast territory of Brazil and Paraguay, which was dismembered from the secular domains of Spain by the Spanish Crown for an experiment in building churches. in the Christian Republic. An image from a propaganda piece from 1700 extolling this venture shows its millenary inspiration: a jaguar lying down with a tapir and a small boy leading them. Somehow this utopia had been lost. Baptism records have shown that, in 1650, of the 150,000 people baptized by the Jesuits at their missions in the four main border provinces, only 40,000 survived looting by Portuguese slave traders and the plague. There has long been a debate in Spanish political circles as to whether the Indians should avoid contact with the Spanish or expose themselves to the unlikely enhancing effects of "conversation" in Spanish. In practice, the Spanish custom of leaving much of the judicial, political, and administrative functions to local communities resulted in a self-regulating indigenous interior in most colonies, not unlike the effectively sovereign tribes that served as allies or exiles. of the French and the French. British colonies lined up in North America. In very isolated cases, the Indians remained behind in areas closed to Spanish laymen, under the protection of missions or in religious enclosures. However, the mutual interpenetration that normally prevailed worked in the long run, despite the resulting friction and contagion. The economic and demographic improvement of the indigenous communities under the Spanish Crown in the 18th century was halted in some areas by new fiscal demands in the last years of the century, but it lasted largely until independence, when power passed to the Most. from the old empire, to the multiracial elite that was an enduring consequence of the mix of immigrants and Native Americans. In the Simancas archives, among the documents that record the 278 D E S P R I N G S UN C O I L ED ED ANGLIA and ida de CÈadre ¿fc ab de\Abneida da hCompanhia. de JÙSP daJ)rouinc'uL de \^Èrasil CompoFFa by CB- Simas de WPasconcellos dame^ma Companhia \0nuinciai ria said SProuiticia. Z / ^ ma 0fMat Mk & PÀt * Cttfitt./et&sOn the cover of his life, the Jesuit missionary João de Almeida seems to reflect

England and Brazil as equal mission fields. He was especially praised for his asceticism, fasting, and practice of mortification. A cilice is on his arm and a back scourge is in his hand, along with the crucifix. In the 18th century a curious artifact is found: an eight-pointed star with a red cross in the center, braided in gold and silver and surrounded by an alloy with the words: "Honi Soit Qui Mal y Pensa". Esteban, chief of the Moscos Indians on the Mosquito Coast of Guatemala, by British invaders eager to ingratiate themselves with the natives. The British withdrew in 1783 under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and Stephen presented his medal as a symbol of his continued loyalty to the British Crown. Immigrants from Asturias were acquired to replace the English who left. Likewise, at about the same time on each frontier, attracting Indians to trades and settlements built on principles similar to those used by the Chinese in Dzungaria, or repopulating desert areas with Catholics recruited from the old world or by the Spanish monarchy, taking advantage of the natural increase of the population, now finally general and substantial, made a new attempt at colonization and strengthened its control on the margins of its empire. Imperialism finally began to justify itself in lands far removed from the superficial magnets—gold, silver, and furs—of the American Indians on the Mosquito Coast of Guatemala, and was sworn by him as an oath of allegiance to Spain in British retreat. in 1783. 280 THE SPRING SUN COLD THE FIRST DAYS, or the laborious enterprises—sugar, dyes, tobacco—that were worth the costly stretches of the frontier in the seventeenth century. Historians' favorite question about early modern colonization is whether it created "frontier societies," alienated from their metropolitan models by generational differences and pioneering radicalism, or whether it printed block prints of houses equipped with ancient worlds to adapt a phrase. of Braudel, with a culture of focus (see Chapter 22). The answer, of course, is that it was both. Shaped and transformed by new challenges and opportunities, settler communities generally continued to seek nostalgic images of a homeland that they either resolutely emulated or unconsciously reflected. One of the first apologists for the Spanish Empire saw in this the colonists' obligation to rebuild New Spain on the model of the old. Therefore, the Spanish built arches in earthquake zones. Even Puritans who really consciously wanted to do something new in New England jumped at it by planting and fencing. But the results almost always marked new departures. There were more innovations than continuities. The colonies had to adapt to new environments and, in many cases, to the presence of new neighbors. Sectarian communities, democratic communities, and plantation economies were new to the English experience. A bureaucratic state with little transmission to the nobles

and cities, was unprecedented in Spain. Slavery on an American scale had antecedents in the Middle Ages, but no foreshadowing even remotely accurate. The vast mestizo populations of Spanish and Portuguese America, meticulously classified by administrators fascinated by color gradations, have never before had the opportunity to flourish. Returning to an image, the new countries were a distorting mirror, reflecting the old worlds without reproducing them. To endanger the other, they were the product of an alchemy caused by their environment, transforming humans into them. POINTS OF CONTACT ON THE EDGE OF THE EMPIRE Building the New Worlds of the early modern period took a long time and exacted a terrible price. Just when the company proved successful and praiseworthy, its critics were fiercer. Rousseau and Dr. Johnson, accepting little else, collectively condemned the discovery of America as a catastrophe for humanity that humiliated the noble savage and plundered the environment. Since then, the pursuit of happiness with destructive intent has become an eerily familiar theme in American historiography, and has been rephrased in echo jargon in our modern day. However, when galactic museum owners look back, they will recognize that exploration of most of the colonial frontiers had barely begun in the 19th century. Do not do. The Touch of Empire 281 Quebec, engraved by Thomas Johnston of Boston as a propaganda piece to celebrate the British conquest in 1759. Touted as the basis of the "latest and most authentic French original", it was actually copied from one inserted into a map French, published forty years earlier. As always, the image that colonialism projects of a savage frontier seems distorted by the folie de grandeur. The lofty words of the title - "capital, bishopric and sovereign court" - match the splendor of the skyline with its multi-storied buildings and huge towers and the river full of great ships. The recorded crossing of North America occurred in 1793. Knowledge of the interior of the hemisphere was so poorly recorded that patriots in Washington were unsure where the Rocky Mountains were, and scholars in Europe had to wait until Humboldt's voyage in 1800 to know that the Amazon and the Orinoco were connected. Only a beginning has been made. But what was achieved counted. Modern imperialism had bridged the world's chasms, though it had not filled its gaps. In some of the most impenetrable places in the world, there were contact points of the empire where the colonialisms of rival powers met. In the late 18th century, Chinese and Japanese agents competed to collect tribute from chieftains in Sakhalin, where Russia, too, began to look covetously. In 1755, deep in Brazil, Portuguese soldiers, with Spanish acquiescence, destroyed the last Jesuit missions in a murderous rationalization of a previously vague border. In 1759, small French and British armies decided the fate of Canada remotely, but

respectable towers of Quebec. In 1762-63, the British occupied Spanish Manila on the edge of the South China Sea, where China's purely commercial maritime expansion met the rival armed imperialisms of Portugal, the Netherlands, England and Spain. In 1788, a French expedition anchored near Botany Bay and discovered that a British colonial company, old fashioned with convicts, had arrested them. In 1790 Britain and Spain nearly went to war over the seizure of British ships sent from Sydney in Nutka Sound. In 1796, John Evans, the able Welsh agent for the Spanish Crown, persuaded the Mandan Indians of upper Missouri to raise the Spanish flag and define a new frontier with the British Empire, represented by the old French fort La Souris, two weeks away. . The hand of early modern colonialism may have been weak in some of its lands, but it reached its fingertips all over the world. Chapter 9 THE ACCEPTANCE OF EVANGELISM: REFORM AND EXPANSION OF OLD MODERN RELIGIONS The road to Bali - The internal disbelievers - The spiritual achievements of Christianity - The balance of faith THE ROAD TO BALI Malacca is a disaster. On the receding shoreline, left high and dry by the fort, dilapidated shacks with tin roofs welcome dirty coke factories. Most of the modern city beyond is low-rise and made of concrete. The most monumental square, Stadthuis-Platz, the seat of government during Dutch rule from 1641 to 1800, looks tacky with its garish shades of pink. Before the Dutch, the Portuguese were here. Sample worthy of its presence is a fragment of its powerful fortress A Famosa; but this solid, sombre, heraldic gate is all that survived the dynamite of the last imperial overlords, the British, who blew it up in 1801. The cemetery founded by a Ming princess on China Hill is due to her Chinese ancestry and is neglected and careless. by the Chinese custom of ancestor worship, its inscriptions, four or five hundred years old, are erased and rendered illegible. Brighter reminders of Malacca's Chinese past can be seen at the Cheng Hoon Temple in the city center, which, among brittle idols and pastel incense sticks, houses a stele left behind by Cheng Ho, marking the sudden illumination of Malacca. the "most monumental room" in the city, carved by the Dutch a few years after the British took over. First built in the mid-17th century, the Stadthuis served the British as a "treasury office, post office and general government office". In 1883, Isabella Bird described its "vanishing impotence": its Dutch court garden, its forty or more rooms, the great arched corridors "and all manner of strange stairways and nooks. Dutch tiles, angles, and concepts of all". To see

K. Singh Sandha and P. Wheatley, eds., Melaka, ii (1983), 536-7. transformation in the early years of the fifteenth century from a fishing village to a kingdom and an important trading post. A 15th century sultan is said to have claimed that he could build bridges out of gold and silver, but they never materialized. Today it is hard to imagine in what glory days such a boast would have sounded plausible. But at its height, four thousand foreign merchants lived in the city's neighborhoods, according to one observer, and eighty-four languages ​​were spoken on the streets. Because "the commerce between the several nations for a thousand miles on each side must reach Malacca." Here, the state has provided underground warehouses for the goods of traders from the Indian, China and Java seas as they wait for the wind between the monsoon systems that meet the straits. While geography helped, Malacca's greatness was invented by the Chinese. His political influence gave power to the city. His commercial know-how brought him prosperity. According to the Malay Annals, the ruling dynasty descended from Alexander the Great, who became Rajah Iskandar; but the founder, Paramesvara, was unlucky and expelled from his own kingdom for thinly disguised brigandage. In his search for a new fortress, the tenacity of a mouse-deer resisting his hounds made the Malacca swamps auspicious. He really made his fortune from it when Cheng Ho brought him the seal and royal robes in 1409. He personally went to Peking to pay homage and established a clientele with China that ensured his own enrichment. Chinese trade across the Indian Ocean required the creation of a secure trading post across the straits. Selection for this role allowed Malacca to shed Siamese suzerainty and begin a career of her own in building a trading empire. As China has moved away from long-range imperialism, its tutelage has diminished. More important in the long run were the connections Malacca forged with a source of influence that stretched from the West. A damaged tombstone from Terengganu in the Gulf of Thailand suggests that Islam may have had actual adherents in the Malay Peninsula in the early 14th century, around the time of the first Islamic epigraphs from Sumatra. When Paramesvara married a Sumatran Muslim princess in 1414 and embraced the faith from him, the spread of Islam was associated with the growth of Malacca's power. They both fled together. The first Muslim ruler of Pahang, a major state in the interior of the peninsula, was the son of a sultan of Malacca. When he died in 1475, his tomb was marked with a tombstone imported in bulk from Cambay, with the inscriptions almost complete except for the spaces left to insert the deceased's name. So many of these stones were stored that the Portuguese, when they conquered Malacca in 1511, used them to build improved fortifications. Islam did not spread by dynastic tentacles alone. This would make it a religion of courts and elites, as was the case in much of India, and is unlikely to gain traction among the population or withstand future political changes. in what should

Malaysia and Indonesia, as in the other great scenario of Islamic expansion at that time, in Africa, the means of dispersal were three: trade, conscious missionary work and holy war. The trade shuffled living examples of Muslim piety between cities, employing Muslims as dock guards, customs officers, and agents of despotic monopolists. Missionaries followed: scholars seeking patronage to fulfill Muslims' obligation to proselytize along the way; spiritual athletes in search of exercise, eager to challenge the native shamans in contests of ascetic bravado and supernatural powers. In some areas, crucial contributions were made through the appeal of Sufis, Islamic mystics who could sympathize with the kind of popular animism and pantheism that "finds you closer than the veins in your neck." A Sufi role in the conversion of Malacca cannot be traced, but they gathered there and, after the city fell to the Portuguese, spread to Java and Sumatra. In the late 16th and 17th centuries, Aceh, in northwest Sumatra, excelled in incubating Sufi missionaries; As their writings emerged or circulated, they spread a passionate mysticism of sometimes dubious orthodoxy, like that of the millenarian Shams al-Din, who saw himself as a prophet of the Last Age and whose books were burned after his death in 1630. Trade and proselytizing were widespread and insidious, Islam's progress was steady rather than spectacular, patchy rather than systematic. The ruler of Macassar, in distant Sulawesi, converted in 1603, but East Java besieged a Hindu state until 1614. Even peaceful missionaries tended to see themselves as some kind of warrior waging the "jihad of words." During the 17th century, perhaps spurred on by competition from Christianity, the "jihad of the sword" rose to prominence and the expanding frontiers of Islam became increasingly exposed. 1958, Aya Raka Purnami, twelve years old, Princess of Bangli. Hinduism informs and designs Balinese dances, which are often representations of sacred myths. However, the dance shown here, the Legong Kraton or Dance of the Heavenly Palace Nymphs, tells a centuries-old story from the 12th or 13th century AD: the king of Lasen in East Java encountered a

Girl lost in the woods and locked in a stone house. In order to possess her, she went to war against her brother and fulfilled her oracles by dying in battle. The embrace of evangelization 287 depended on the aggression of the sultans, especially in Central Java. However, a particle on the island world remained invincible. East of Java, Bali had a strange history and was uniquely equipped to resist. Watching the traditional dancers, their overwhelming charm and imposing formality, one can almost feel the suppleness and strength of the island's indigenous culture. The source of Bali's special power to remain peculiar can be reached in a gray-green landscape near Gunung Kawi, on the Pakrisan River, where rock-cut shrines carved from dark stone mold and damp and stifling humidity curdle , are stained by the atmosphere. In a royal burial chamber, the stark profile of a huge stone tower frames a faceless black opening; The priests' cells are carved with the circular ancestors of today's dancers. These tombs were excavated in the 11th century, at the end of India's great era of cultural expansion, when Bali was one of the last overseas territories to be incorporated into the Hindu world. Most of the areas of Southeast Asia that were previously evangelized were home to only small Hindu elites; In Bali, however, missionaries are said to have consciously laid the foundation for a deeply popular religion, ordering the construction of three temples as Buddhism and Islam spread across Southeast Asia and the archipelagos of what we call the late 19th century. XIX century. For centuries, an island of Hinduism remained untouched in Bali, where the rock tombs and priestly cells of Gunung Kawi - the "Mountain of Poets" - were excavated in the 11th century: this was the last and most enduring frontier of Hinduism. great overseas era. Cultural expansion of India. 288 THE SPRING SUN S UN C O I L ED ED each settlement. To this day, the triple temple nest can be seen in every town on the island; Shrines in abundance adorn every home and public building. The persistence of Hinduism in Bali is reminiscent of parts of India where Muslim rule made little difference to traditional devotion. Wherever Hinduism took root among the people, Islam could not replace it. In Africa, as in Southeast Asia, in the rear of Islam, the retreat of paganism was not disturbed by the arrival of European invaders in the early modern period. Beyond the coastal fringes of Christendom, the dominance of Islam was ensured by the same combination of traders, missionaries, and warmongers who spread the faith on the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean. One fateful coup ensured that the great West African power became a militant Islamic state in the 16th century: Sonni Ali, founder of the nascent Songhai empire and architect of its role as

Mali's successor was an imperfectly converted "magic king" who was denounced by imams for the pagan impurities of his personal religion, but the general who seized power after his death in 1493 was wholly committed to Islam. Muhammad Ture, arrogant and usurper, needed the legitimacy of a venerable and numinous source of authority. A pilgrimage to Mecca made him a saint; Diplomacy along the way earned him international recognition. North African intellectuals were easily persuaded to regard their wars against Sonni Ali's heirs and neighboring states as sacred. In practice, however, religious subterfuge rarely turned warfare into a truly useful tool for spreading faith. At least by the end of the 18th century, traders and missionaries appear to have been much more effective. Around 1500 Timbuktu became the center of the guardians of the Almoravid tradition (see Chapter 3); from this point relatively south, they could influence the border. Clans or classes of merchants, such as the Sanaran Arabs known as Kunta, who had the custom of marrying the daughters of holy men, formed the vanguard of Islam. Wandering black scholars known as Toronkawa had instigated revival movements and jihad in Hausaland since the 1690s. Schools with an extraordinarily broad, almost humanistic curriculum played an important role in the spread of Islam among the Hausa, dispersing students with a multiplier effect. . A sheikh who died in 1655 in the school of Katsina, near the present border between Niger and Nigeria, was able to "learn to the full the law, the exegesis of the Qur'an and the prophetic tradition, grammar, syntax, philology, logic, the study of the grammar of particles and appreciating the name of God, the recitation of the Qur'an and the science of meter and rhyme." and sheepskins in front of his book alcove, equipped with its sand tray for typing letters to trace. Maybe in winter he has his brazier and maybe his spittoon for the kola nut shells. Student manuscripts survive, filled with notations of the professor's comment, Katsina: the Yandaka gate in the city wall. In addition to the long tradition of learning alluded to in the text and still going strong in modern times, Katsina was renowned for her fearsome defense. In the late 17th century, when the hegemonic state of Hausaland controlled the northern caravan routes, Katsina had eight miles of walls that proved impregnable until the Fulani jihad invaded in 1807. Even so, the defenders held out. until a lizard in the city took fifty whelks and a vulture took five hundred. See F.D.F. Daniel, History of Katsina (undated 1937?), p. 16. was often in a native language. At the end of the course, the student received a certificate attesting to having received the teachings of a long line of eminent scholars dating back to Malik ibn Anas, the codifier of Islamic law in the eighth century. The infidels within her In 1559, Saint Teresa of Avila, the model mystic, had her first direct experience of Christ when she heard the preaching of a Franciscan recently arrived from the New World to raise funds for the missions. "There is an Indian

here in Castilla", was the weight of the message of the apparition, "also hoping to hear the gospel". religions, including Islam and Buddhism, the call of the unbelievers was at least as urgent as the call to continue evangelizing. penetrated by inhospitable lands or by lack of specialized labor, there were rural communities where the "popular religion" existed, more concerned with survival in this world than with salvation in another city, which generated uprooted and obedient masses to the rhythms , rites and the Di sziplin morals were uprooted from their ancient peoples; there was education for laymen who longed for a more active and satisfying religion, a more personal relationship with God, than the established churches offered the relatively undemanding adherents of earlier periods. Wherever the critical eye sought to uncover them, there were practices—recreational, therapeutic, commemorative, commemorative, social, and sexual—that were condemned as remnants of a pagan past. On one level, this was a conflict between two types of culture: the elite culture that strives to reshape popular mores in its own image, not unlike the attempts of the BBC in Britain or public broadcasting in the United States. United to adjust the tastes of the 20th century for the better”; On the other hand, two sources of accelerated demand converged: the demand of the laity for greater access to the mysteries of religion and the demand of the clergy for a more open congregation and a more committed flock. The parallel nature of elite attacks on vulgar traditions in contrasting settings is illustrated by juxtaposed stories in Peter Burke's brilliant book, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe. Both date from the mid-17th century. Here is a Catholic priest in a town on the outskirts of Paris: I remember that on a feast day I was informed that itinerant actors were performing a farce on a stage they had set up, and I went there with some magistrates. I went up on stage, ripped off the main actor's mask, took the performer's violin, broke it, and threw it off the stage, which I ordered to be knocked down. It had a contemporary counterpart in the Russian Archbishop Avvakum, who, as a leader of moral reformers and liturgical conservatives, was a prominent figure in his country's history: he was zealous in the service of Christ, and I drove them out, and broke the mask of jester, and the drums, and two great bears, which I took with me: one I beat senseless, but revived, and the other I let run in the open. With a little more urgency, without a greater sense of duty, a Puritan cut down a maypole, disfigured a Virgin, or persecuted witches.

the city. No New World missionary was more eager to smash an idol or burn a "magician's" almanac. The Embrace of Evangelism 291 Throughout the early modern period, the reform of religion was inseparable from the reform of morality. Ming intellectuals were as disgusted with the meaningless rituals of popular Buddhism and Taoism as they were with the superstitious beliefs that were thought to underlie them. Wahhabi fanatics of Islam in the 18th century denounced the impurity of the faith, but directed their violence against those who lived impure lives. The Church's struggle against the "Old Believers" in 17th-century Russia was animated by a search for truth in texts that had been freed from error by rigorous study, but was involved in conflicts over external ceremonial forms. The Spanish Inquisition was conceived as a tribunal to test the faith, but it spent more time condemning lax morality. For most followers of most systems, religion is not primarily a matter of belief; If it were, it probably wouldn't be such a powerful force in human affairs, with the energy to create misery and happiness, war and peace. Few people know the doctrines or principles of their faith, and fewer really care and share the indifference of the director in a play by Alan Bennett who, when asked about the Trinity by a catechumen, replied: "Trinity? Three in one?" , one in 3. When in doubt, ask your math teacher Religion shapes society, not because it's about belief, but because it's about behavior Your religion is part of what you do, how you do it you do and who you do it with.Among the pristine shops of an elegant London boulevard, for example, Within a stone's throw of each other stand two massive ancient churches known respectively as Brompton Oratory and Holy Trinity, Brompton. Externally, they are similar, each classical and Gothic monumentality, solid elegance, arched and crenellated grandeur.The design, furniture and fittings are very similar, although the former, being Catholic, has a more Italian grandeur. ianizing and a richer image than her sister the Church of England. Their likeness is the result of conscious imitation. of class or education, wealth or occupation, there is no choice between their respective communities: both are wealthy, well-spoken, well-educated, come from business and careers, although Santí la Santísima Trinidad is visibly younger. Although they belong to different Christian traditions, the few faithful who can give you a coherent explanation of doctrinal issues between them will downplay them and emphasize the common core of devotion to the divine and human Christ. However, the way they are related makes it impossible to imagine them joining forces. The atmospheres they invent in worship are reflected in their lips and body language. The mass in the oratory is submissive, devout, adoring; Numinous music makes you exquisite and tearful art makes you thoughtful. Through the decent obscurity of a learned language, its mystery is enhanced. When it is over, the congregation gathers to re292

"It must be admitted," says the official London Oratory guide, "that there is a certain element of pastiche in recreating the interior of an Italian church in London." Pozzi's painting from 1925 shows the founder of the Oratorians, St. Philip Neri, in one of the ecstasies that overcame him at mass, sometimes so prolonged that the acolyte would leave the sanctuary for two hours at a time, knowing that he would return in time. to resume his duties. His vocation was typical of sixteenth-century evangelization. Like Saint Teresa, he felt called to be a missionary in "India at home", in his case, in Rome itself. The oratory tradition of good music in worship gave the world the well-known art form of public speaking. ; Their London neighbors at Holy Trinity Church, Brompton, favor the everyday spirituality of an ensemble of instruments and voices drawn from jazz and pop and manipulated with electric amplifiers. In contrast to the Oratory, the St. George and Union flags have a confident Anglocentric note. Although the interior is designed as a gallery room, in a model that became common in post-Reformation England and America, it is, in its way, almost as grand as the oratory, with a magnificently uncompromising altarpiece.

of Christ in majesty. The artists, though manifestly outspoken, struck a formal and timid pose. The Embrace of Evangelization 293 was marked by tense good humor and mutual concern tempered by restraint. At Holy Trinity, however, services are lively and joyous, with much joyous noise and lively congregational participation. The sermon and prayers are constructed in up-to-date language, making the Church experience immediate and "relevant." The coffee ritual afterwards is celebrated with the same serious joy, the same sincere cordiality. No member of either congregation could feel completely comfortable with the other. The difference between them is not the difference between the Churches of Rome and England. The oratory atmosphere is replicated nearby, for example at Anglican Saint Mary's, Bourne Street; that of the Holy Trinity is imitated in many Catholic parishes. Worshipers, generally when free to choose, associate with kindred spirits, not doctrines. In highly divisive religions, sectarian and doctrinal differences overlap, and it is possible, even traditional, to define the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism in denominational terms. However, this type of litmus often reveals eerily soft undertones. The doctrine of salvation by faith alone is often considered essential to Protestantism, but it was championed in the 16th century by Catholics of undisputed stature, including Cardinal Reginald Pole, who presided over the burning of many English Protestants. It is often assumed that Catholics are distinguished by their literal interpretation of the presence of Christ in the sacrifice of the Mass; but it was Martin Luther, the initiator of the Reformation and founder of Protestantism, who scribbled or chalked “This is my body” on the table at a conference with a reformer. Few followers of either tradition understand the difference between Luther's Eucharistic teaching on "consubstantiation" and the reference to "transubstantiation" by which Catholics explain how the bread and wine they share are transformed into the real flesh. and blood of Christ. Other common methods for characterizing what separates Catholics and Protestants are almost equally useless. Protestants - Quakers aside - bow to the authority of Scripture, Catholics to the collective wisdom of the Church; but this distinction, which sounds good in theory, breaks down in practice because the Bible is a palpably human document, full of ambiguities and contradictions that cry out for interpretation. Protestant churches have developed institutions to allow interpretation and exclude heretics who do not accept. Protestants reduce the sacramental life of their churches, the ritual channels through which grace is bestowed on believers, and short-circuit the mediators and intercessors in the form of priests and saints who stand between the individual and God. But the most dedicated way in the church to the direct experience of God is mysticism,

in which the Catholic tradition is immensely richer than that of Protestantism, although American fundamentalism, with its glossolalias, its meandering tangles and its personal testimonies, does its best to catch up. All religions seem to need saints in some sense; The Protestants did not drive them out of Christianity any more effectively than the Wahhabis, who tried something similar in Islam. Luther's peasant followers loved the teacher's cheap prints of him. Luther was expelled from the church less for heresy than for arrogance; The defenders of equally subversive doctrines have managed to tighten them in the elastic belt of Catholicism, bowing before popes, councils and inquisitors. But Catholics don't have a monopoly on humility. We look for ways to explain the differences that still seem important to us and were important enough to our ancestors to make them kill for them. However, galactic museum owners of the future will certainly give up the search out of boredom, for the distinctions from sect to sect, from tradition to tradition, are far from meaningless. The movements we call the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation are seen as two aspects of a single powerful evangelistic impulse that dominated the history of the planet in the early modern period. Luther began with himself: a conviction of his own sinfulness and his own redemption through unrequested grace. He looked at the Church, his brothers, religious and teachers in need of reform. His greatest impact, however, was on the broader lay audience he discovered towards the end of his vocational story, spreading the gospel into parts of Christianity that other publishers could not reach, not only in under-evangelized towns and classes, but among individuals. conscience strengthened. . When Dürer thought that the reformer had been kidnapped, "Oh God," he exclaimed, "if Luther is dead, who interprets the holy gospel so clearly for us?" His Nuremberg compatriot Hans Sachs, the doyen of the Meistersingers, celebrated the transformative effect of a teacher who communicated his own revelation directly: "Luther spoke and all became light." Luther's revolution in Christian communication was shared with his fellow reformers and with similarly gospel-inspired Catholic publishers. One of Luther's sharpest weapons was the language of the tabloids, which he himself created and which lives beyond rudeness in images such as the whore of Rome copulating with the Antichrist or the pope shitting lies. The apologists, on the other hand, did the best they could. Movable type has always been recognized as crucial in spreading Luther's message, but the simpler technology of wood engraving was even more important in penetrating the still poorly educated layers of society. Protestants prohibited carved images in worship, but recognized their value as propaganda. From one point of view, the conflict between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation was a war of woodcuts. In some areas, the Roman Church had anticipated the Protestant attempt to make Christianity accessible. cardinal cis

Embracing evangelization 295 Nero, for example, who had been Spain's Grand Inquisitor since 1507, had cheap editions published with devotions in the national language to discourage readers from the vulgar literature of the day. The Christian experience, communicated directly in simple language, is the subject of the entire enormous output of evangelical publications of the sixteenth century, both from Protestant and Catholic printers. The content is often ideologically indifferent. The late 16th century work of the Franciscan Diego de Estella, who was never surpassed as a popular preacher for the beauty of his language or the precision of his diction, had - among many others - a Protestant translator from English who stated in his preface that "although he is a papist," the monk's writings were full of healthy devotion. In the second half of the sixteenth century, catechisms were the most prolific type of printed book in Western Christendom, a sure sign of a civilization in the throes of missionary fever. The further a message goes, the more it gets modified along the way. As the 16th and 17th centuries progressed, Christianity was again expressed in new and strange ways to and by diverse listeners around the world. Jesuits in China adapted it to Confucian rites of ancestor worship. Translated into the Quechua language, the “assembly of saints” arose as the “joy” of the saints. For the Tupinambás of Brazil, God revealed himself under a name that meant thunder in their language. A 17th century Indian artist in Guatemala framed an image of the Blessed Virgin wearing a rain god mask. Just as St. Paul brought a new flexibility to Christianity when he first extended his message to Gentiles, early modern evangelists, often faced with reluctance from church leaders, felt the tone quicken in their hands. The demotic language with which Luther reformulated Christian truths had its equivalent in European painting. When Matthias Grünewald died in Halle in 1528, his drawing of the Trinity was so subversive that he left it hidden in a sealed drawer: it challenged the artist's pious right to make God appear human. The father was wrinkled and ugly, the paraclete warty and chinless, the son scowling and scruffy. But in the last decade of the century Caravaggio was able to knock the inhabitants of the sky out of the clouds with impunity and clothe them in the flesh and cloaks of ordinary men. His dinner at Emmaus is a gathering of peasants, his last supper a scene from the life of a humble tavern. This was the last frontier of the evangelical impulse, where the sacred images were redrawed to make them identifiable to the smallest observer. It is a frontier that is being re-explored today in American televangelism and in the grossly demotic language of the Living Bible. In 1531, in the Valley of Mexico, a Native American boy named Juan Diego achieved a similar transformation from a distant mystery to the images of his own world when, at the site of a shrine to a pre-Christian deity, he collected petals that he printed a wondrous portrait of. of the Virgin in her mantle. No artist has ever portrayed a human god as uncompromising as Matthias.

Grünewald: his dying Christ is strangely twisted and tormented; your dead Christ rotting dead - and no condition is less divine and more human than death. His drawing of the Trinity - a work so impressive that it had to be imprisoned while alive - takes the custom to an unprecedented and incomparable extreme since: "The wrinkled and ugly father, the warty paraclete without a chin, the deep son - dark and disheveled" This is a God who unreservedly shares our nature.The Embrace of Evangelism 297 Just as Europe's expansion abroad was preceded and accompanied by exploration within, so evangelism approached the Christian era of world mission and accompanied her.The mission to the unbelievers within, to the blemishes and blemishes in Europe, and to the pagans in every human being, had parallels in other religions.In China, Chu-hung (1535-1615) and Te Ch'ing (1546 -1623) introduced Buddhism as a religion to practice "at home" filling the hieratic character that previously made lay followers seem inaccessible and incomprehensible. Blasphemy was not lightning, priesthood was not magic; Lai devotees Cos could perform the same rituals at home as monks in a monastery. Laymen could worship the Buddha, fast, embrace vegetarianism, and even don the saffron robe that signified a religious vocation. In the 18th century, P'eng Shao-sheng continued the same line of reform by explaining spiritual prayer techniques that were not stimulated by images. In eighteenth-century Islam, two evangelical movements collided, much like Protestantism and Catholicism in Western Europe: Wahhabi reformers inflamed Islamic consciousness through violent anti-clericalism, savage iconoclasm, sacrifices of heretics, and purges of saints; A Sufi revival responded, as did the Catholic Church in Christendom, by recommending the disciplined use of traditional mediators between God and man, including holy places and people, mystical contemplation, and meditation. In seventeenth-century Russia and Japan, similar movements began to reexamine ancient texts in the spirit of what would be called "humanism" in the Western context. In Japan, the Buddhist monk Keichu (1640-1701) pioneered the recovery of authentic texts of the Manyoshu, Shinto poetic writings of the eighth base of a reborn Shinto, freed from the accumulations of past centuries and from extra-Japanese influences. Among his followers in the following century, Matoori Norinaga (1730-1801) used the Manyoshu as Protestants used the Gospels: to reconstruct a model of primordial purity and denounce the degeneracy of the last days. In Eastern Christianity, as in the West, reform and schism went hand in hand. In 1648, the clerical brotherhood known as the Zealots of Piety came to the attention of the Tsar, and the vulgarities of popular culture were banished from court. Minstrels were banned as a supposed remnant of paganism. Within twenty years, the clergy working together to make these changes were in disagreement over another proposed level of removal of impurities:

the standardization of texts and the harmonization of rituals. The leader of one faction was exiled in 1666, the leader of the other burned at the stake in 1681. A square of land used as a playground marks the site of an Inca ceremonial center. On the east side, fragments of Inca stonework support a small, austere bell tower two stories high, topped by a flat dome. The adjacent building, which once had a corrugated iron thatched roof, looks like a huge barn from the side. The entrance arch, however, reveals its true nature with its entablature frame and pilasters under the remains of a pediment raised like a questioning eyebrow. This is the Iglesia de Santo Domingo, the oldest church in the province, built for the Dominican Mission in the early 1550s. Long arcades, now in ruins, advance on either side to define a vast atrium and multiple arches to display superior construction technology. of the conquerors. All the churches built by the Dominicans in this part of the world are essentially the same: impossibly large, stark classic triumphs of environmental resistance on what was then the extreme frontier of Christianity. Not only the size, but also the number of these churches is incredible. In the second half of the sixteenth century there were never more than forty Dominicans in the province, but they built a total of twenty-two churches in seven towns scattered along the lake, and mobilized by exhortation, without explicit threat of force, labor of up to two thousand Indians at a time. Similar dramatic evidence of the scope and depth of the work of other conquistador religious orders can still be seen in other early modern frontier areas. Headquarters of the Franciscan Mission in Izamal The Church of Santo Domingo, Chucuito, which under the weight of its enormous stones crushed the pagan deities who, before the advent of Christianity, held sacred their high place next to the lake. Chucuito's churches are enigmatically large and numerous, perhaps because their Dominican builders needed an excuse to prevent indigenous labor from being forcibly exploited for secular projects. Embracing Evangelization 299 Mission Santa Barbara, California: Garden still cared for by the Franciscan community founded in 1782 by Junípero Serra. It was one of ten missions stretching from San Francisco to San Diego, established to keep the desert, paganism, and rival empires (British and Russian) in check. The garden was an important source of food; With only intermittent openings to the outside world, the missions were supported by a self-sufficient economy of imported crops. 300 SPRING SUN IN YUCATAN opened shortly after the Dominicans reached Chucuito. The yellow stucco suffocates the Maya masonry from which it is built, though fragments

Carvings can still be seen in some of the cobblestones, beneath towers and arches that rise above the city on the imposing base of a ruined pyramid. Throughout continental Spanish American history, the Franciscans continued to build in the same tradition. From 1769 until his death in 1784, Fray Junípero Serra expanded the Spanish Empire beyond its most remote garrisons, establishing a series of missions along the Alta California coast, where hot desert and icy ocean meet and a annual ship is the only contact with the Rest was the civilized world. Here he converted the environment and its inhabitants, extricated the Indians from nomadism, and uprooted unknown food plants from the soil. In Santa Barbara, where he established the Chumash collectors in one of the wealthiest cities per capita in the world, monks still dig up the grounds of the monastery he designed and dust off the damaged statues of Saint Michael and Saint Barbara that survive from the original gabled façade. At the other end of the empire, where the Jesuits guarded the border until they were expelled in 1768, dozens of dilapidated mission churches have been restored in recent years. They are all impressive, especially in the impoverished railway town of San José de Chiquitos, in the far interior of Bolivia, where the forests known to the Jesuits were cut down and burned dry. Four broad stone facades fill the east side of the square. Its false facades contain the only stone worked for many kilometers. Further on are the wooden and adobe structures under tin roofs that still house the Virgins and Archangels left behind by the Jesuits. These were militant missionaries; although they arrived unarmed, they were true conquerors. Eight or twelve Franciscans were for a long time the only Spaniards to subdue some 200,000 Maya in Yucatan; Alone or in pairs, they toured places no white man had ever been before, dethroning idols and challenging shamans to contests for sainthood. Izamal was home to one of the most violent of all in the third quarter of the 16th century. Fray Diego de Landa was an admirable missionary of undeniable dedication who built relationships of trust with his flock, loving his land and respecting the characteristics of his culture; but when he suspected in 1562 that they had deceived him and continued to worship idols in secret, he unleashed a terrible inquisition in which 4,500 Indians were tortured in three months, 158 to death. A witness in the subsequent investigation stated that "the brothers had large stones placed at their feet, whereupon they were left to hang for a while, and when they still did not allow a larger crowd of idols, they would flog them while they were being hung." they were there and they were sprinkled with burning wax.” The missionary had collapsed under the weight of an impossible responsibility, but he was eventually exonerated and returned to the Yucatán as a bishop after writing hymns of praise in prison. The Embrace of Evangelization 301 The Jesuits of O Canada admired the Hurons, but could also be driven to brutal excesses of correction, becoming staff officers for the Indians in Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, where their duties included both government secular as the common domination of the missionaries.

Wars and defense ministers against secular incursions. In 1637, the Jesuits of the Uruguay Valley lost patience with the raids of slave traders on their mission lands and armed the Indians. The custom spread, and by the end of the decade, the missionary Indians began to win battles against the invaders. The Guarani Indians, armed with oxhide-wrapped bamboo rifles, were trained by former Jesuit soldiers and led by a talented native captain, Ignacio Abiaru. In a series of canoe fights along the Acaragua River, São Francisco Xavier wielded "the balls." In addition to spiritual achievements, the work of religious orders created a kind of colonial enterprise that "lured" Indians from the desert and jungle to agricultural settlements and sedentary lives. The effectiveness of the "spiritual conquest" of the New World is disputed. Sometimes it was prevented by external forces. The Puritan preacher John Eliot launched an extraordinary campaign among the Algonquin Indians of New England in the second half of the 16th century. Inspired by the belief that they were a lost tribe of Israel, he started the only Protestant enterprise in America comparable in energy and sincerity to the efforts of Catholic clergy. His Algonquian translations began with the catechism and ended with the complete Bible. His Christian congregations, led by native pastors in "praying towns," were exemplary attempts to reorganize indigenous societies along the lines of European settlers. They met twice on Sundays to "praise God with song, in which many of them excel" and to hear a reading and sermon "in the English style". Lay enemies condemned the experience of wars of extermination as ruthless as those of the slave traders against the Jesuits. In the minds of most settlers, the conflicts shaped the image of the Indians as unassimilable pagans. Not even the absence of external enemies could guarantee the success of the missions. The experience of Diego de Landa -alienated from his community by the discovery of "idols"- was quite general. The first Franciscan missions were inspired by an urgency that made them reckless: an age-old belief that God's purpose of exposing so many millions of new souls to the light of the Gospel must be accomplished quickly in preparation for the imminent end of the world. Pedro de Gante, who started the Franciscan mission in Mexico and performed 14,000 baptisms daily, did not have time to demand catechism classes. He wanted to convey four points: a Creator God of wisdom and goodness; the Blessed Virgin; the immortality of the soul; Demons and their temptations. Christ is only implicitly included here. If, as is claimed, the Franciscans had baptized over a million souls by 1541, most of the teachings could hardly be more detailed. The Colleges of the Order – 302 D E S P R I N G S U N C O I L ED Stairs of the Church of Santo Tomás in Chichicastenango, in the Guatemalan highlands, where Fray Francisco Jiménez, editor of the Popol Vuh, the Quiché Maya “sacred book,” was parish priest. He suspected his flock of covert idolatry, and ever since the region has been known for syncretic distortions of Christianity and vestiges of outright paganism. The exotic rituals outside the church where

Shamans perform robbery ceremonies, while members of Orthodox fraternities in colorful indigenous uniforms perform counter-ceremonies with indistinguishable incense sticks, creating an atmosphere of holy intoxication. Other believers scatter flower petals, rum, and candle wax. Embracing evangelization in 303, such as that of Santa Cruz de Tlatelolco (see chapter 6), where young Aztec nobles became accomplished Latinists and enacted the Last Judgment as the final play, had a disappointing effect and ended gradually. The church in the border areas has always been understaffed and the quality of the workforce has been uneven. Limits attract the best and the worst. In Manila in 1617, an Augustinian friar administered the Sacrament of Atonement to his awkward reformist superior as he was strangled to death. In Lima in 1580, the mad Franciscan Fray Francisco de la Cruz was arrested in a plot to proclaim himself pope and emperor in a revolutionary Creole theocracy. The case of Diego de Landa shows that the characters Jekyll and Hyde could coexist in the same monk. Even allowing for the holy sacrifice and wonderful energy of the missionaries, they were too few and too scattered to make more than a start. The traditions they established in the early days of the Caribbean, New Spain, Central America, and the Andean region originated in an unreformed Old World Catholicism before Protestant threat and example shook evangelical and pre-conciliar standards. purity and dogmatic conscience. As the missionaries' own expectations grew, they never seemed to get very far with their flocks. It was like aiming at a receding target. An early 18th century pastor like Father Francisco Jiménez in what is now Chichicastenango in the Guatemalan highlands complained of the imperfect understanding of his flock's faith, as had his predecessors. almost two hundred years before. In a series of cases in early 18th-century Peru, "superstition" and demonic deception became obsessive accusations by skinny prosecutors or stereotyped denunciations in neighborhood disputes. In 1701, a twenty-year-old good Christian was arrested simply for having unorthodox medical diagnoses; In 1723, an Indian's private chapel containing six Christian images was condemned as a veil of idolatry; In 1710, a celebrity accused Juan Básquez, a button maker with a wonderful reputation on the streets of Lima, of drawing on Christian creeds, confessions, and acts of repentance in a healing ministry he claimed was inspired by St. He charged for his services. , but disgruntled patients still accused him of conspiring with demons and worshiping pagan gods. Regular official investigations into the Church's incursion into the native world during the colonial era have left much evidence for anthropologists and skeptics who view post-conversion Indian religion as pagan or "syncretic," influencing but not supplanting the old ways. But missionary work was like walking a dog

on the hind legs. as Dr. Johnson said, you don't expect it to be done right; it was remarkable enough to see it done. If the Christianity of Native American peoples remained idiosyncratic, it was no worse than the religion of rural communities in Europe at the same time, when ordinary people still lived in worlds filled with spirits and demons and where the forces of nature were personified. and appeased. . In Spain, where most of the missionaries came from, rat trials and lobster exorcisms were practiced in the 17th century. Fray Benito Feijóo (1674-1764), spokesman for the European Enlightenment in Spain, found the country full of clerical rivals: fortune tellers, false prophets, charlatans, wise men and healers. By adding new layers to people's understanding of the transcendent, evangelism has been more effective than the eradication of folklore in both the Old and New Worlds. The Philippines, where Christianity was in direct competition with Islam, is a good place to test the effectiveness of spiritual conquerors. The islands were further removed from both religions, at the extremes of the simple sources of Christian and Muslim expansion. The Church started late and was able to apply some of the lessons learned in America: teaching only in native languages, taking homework in stride, and bringing existing power structures and social networks into the framework of parishes and fraternities. In the first five years of their mission, the Augustinians baptized only about a hundred people. After 25 years, the number of missionaries increased from 13 to 267 and the number of converts to 288,000. Some techniques have changed little. A Dominican threw the sacred treasures of his herd down a gutter to impress the children with contempt for the old gods. Secular “no-go areas” were established where missionary culture could flourish without being distorted by profane patrons or attrition by exploitative settlers; In general, the relatively small number of Spanish settlers gave the Philippine Church an advantage over those from the New World. In the Philippines, the settler population introduced under colonial rule was predominantly Chinese, who tended to remain in their own ghettos. The missionary work was favored by ethnographic research: Fray Miguel de Talavera, an inhabitant of the islands since he was a child, was the author of what continues to be an essential resource for students of the customs and language of Tagalog, which has become in the most important ethnic group of the modern Philippines. As in China, a compromise with ineradicable native rites was accepted, replacing the sacrament of last rites with a Jesus-invocation ceremony, tolerating traditional sexual irregularities, and softening some penances. Throughout the era of Spanish rule, it left the legacy of the islands' now-vibrant and idiosyncratic Catholic culture, which can be experienced by any visitor who tries the brightly colored delicacies (pale blue plantains and red rice cakes) that round out the distinctive Filipino devotions. : the daily morning mass during Advent, which fills the churches when the first light penetrates the dense and rich

Embracing Evangelization 305 Tropical Night Environment. The Philippines is therefore the only Christian country in Asia. Only in Japan was the Christian message received with comparable enthusiasm in the same period; and there he was the victim of his own success, extinguished by an alarmed official response of insurmountable efficiency. Even in the Philippines, Christian success in direct competition with Islam has been limited. In the Sulu Islands, where Muslim missionaries operated within the protective reach of a strong Islamic state in Brunei, the threat could be met by force of arms but not eradicated by preaching. In Mindanao, no Muslim invaders were reported until the 1580s, who came from the small but immensely wealthy Sultanate of Ternate, Spice Island. Here the Christian mission had just begun and could not be sustained. In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, all the Spanish garrisons on the main islands could do was keep the Exaltados at bay. In general, Christianity has a poor record in direct competition with Islam for the loyalty of souls, except in the Philippines, where distinctive Christmas customs include the breakfast dinner described in the text and the custom shown in this photograph of 1960s, lanterns and hanging stars. crowns of palm trees in the form of the front of the houses. 306 THE SPRING SUN COILED SUN who dared jihad against Luzon. It was enough to ensure that the eastern border between Islam and Christianity was drawn along the outer edges of the Philippines and that the two great Asian archipelagos, Indonesia and the Philippines, both fabulously wealthy, populous and with unrealized potential , they divided. respectively. When it was suggested to Philip II of Spain that the islands were not worth the trouble and that the Philippines should be abandoned for economic reasons, he replied that he would rather spend all the gold in his treasury than sacrifice an oratory in which the name of Christ stands. , was praised. THE SCALE OF FAITH Until his last incarnation, the only non-Tibetan Dalai Lama was the fourth, Sumer Dayicing Qung Tayiji (1588-1616), the son of a Mongolian prince. His training for the role took place in Mongolia, among scholars involved in the systematic translation of the vast body of Buddhist scripture into Mongolian. The context that makes sense of these extraordinary events is that of one of the most powerful examples of early modern missionary efforts: the Lamaist mission to the Mongols, which began in 1576 and lasted until the 19th century. Tibetan monks have shown sporadic interest in converting the Mongols at least since Kublai Khan. However, the decisive initiative of the 1570s seems to have come from Mongolia, from the court of Altan Khan (1530-1583) at Koke Khota, the Blue City, which he had established as a fixed capital, which the Chinese had given to Mongolia. Named after him Kui Hua, or Return to Civilization, near the present-day border between Inner and Outer Mongolia. The cultivation of Buddhism gave the Khanate from him, which occupied a strip

Territory along the northern bend of the Yellow River to the Tibetan border, a distinct identity from the Chinese client states. Altan Khan had the build and habits of an inveterate pagan who treated his gout by kicking the broken body of a human victim with his feet, but he founded monasteries, sent writings to Beijing, and commissioned translations on polished applewood tablets. Shrines and hermitages dotted the mountainsides around his capital. Under his direction and the impetus of the visits of the third Dalai Lama in 1576 and 1586, at least the letter of Mongolian law and customs were reformed. Human sacrifices were prohibited and blood sacrifices of all kinds were restricted. The Ongons, the felt idols in which the spirits rested except when released through shamanic rites, were burned and replaced by the intimidating statue of Mahakala, the seven-armed protector of lamaism. This was too radical a reform to happen quickly. The new religion was initially an aristocratic delight, but in the following century the ongons or ongghot, small felt or wooden figurines kept in a box or, like this one, hung in a felt bag on a shop pole, are the hallmark. more distinctive. memorable. of Mongolian shamanism observed by nearly all observers on record since the 13th century. The souls of the dead "turn ongghot" with the power to help and harm living humans. By using images more as a medium, the shaman can, in his ecstasy, draw the presence and power of these spirits to himself. Wilhelm von Rubruck considered them analogous to the "household gods" of classical antiquity; Marco Polo mistook them for images of deities. Traditional Buddhism spread throughout society and north and east through most of the vast lands of the pagan Mongols.

Young noblemen were enrolled in the priesthood to be preachers of the new faith and agents of its propagation. Altan Khan received one hundred paychecks to celebrate the third Dalai Lama's first visit. Beginning in the 1630s, a mission organized by a western Mongol prince, Neyici Toyin (1557-1653), brought Lamaism to the Far East "under the ten banners of Khorchin" and rebuilt the great yellow temple at Mukden to house a centenary temple. Mahakala statue. He performed "miracles" of healing, possibly due to the superiority of Tibetan and Chinese medicine over the unscientific therapies of the shaman. Manchu political power reinforced the mission: the emperors viewed the Buddhist clergy as potential peacemakers and imperial agents. This had a distorting effect on the nature of the mission in the 18th century to select for imperial favor select lamas from Tibet who were unlikely to exhibit atavistic Mongol separatist sentiments. Like the Catholic missions in the New World, those of the Lamaists among the Buddhists were persecuted by political conquerors and led by spiritual bannermen who vigorously used selective violence. Neyici Toyin burned a tall pyre of four marks of Ongons in front of his tent. The advice for missionaries on the far front, among the Hi in the far west of Mongolia, was in the mid-17th century: "Whoever among the people you see worshiping Ongons, burn their Ongons and take their Horses and sheep, let them shamans gasen, take horses. However, he spends the shamans on dog dung. In practice, of course, the old gods did not disappear entirely, reappearing as Buddhist deities, just as they survived in Christian America as saints and defenders of virgins. They continued to mediate between man and nature, while the lamas did the same job between man and God. Parallel to official Islam, Christianity and Buddhism, the "popular" religions continued to confront the transcendent or seemingly transcendent forces of this world. Despite the shortcomings of the missionaries or their congregations, the enormous expansion of the borders of these three religions remains one of the most striking features of the early history of the modern world. Buddhism and Islam spread to areas adjacent to their existing core territories; By skipping the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Christianity has made a spectacular difference. However, Islam had the advantage of spreading in the demographically strong worlds of Africa, Malaysia, and Indonesia; the millions earned by Christianity in America were deceptively auspicious cocoons that quickly withered; The territories conquered by Buddhism were vast, but sparsely populated. In the long run, what mattered most was the size of the New World. The Catholic dominance of the American missions reduced the losses of followers and revenues inflicted on Rome by the Reformation in Europe to the point of minor local difficulties. The exclusion of Islam from the Western Hemisphere helped the Americas to recover and overcome demographically lost ground in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

By the end of the 20th century, Muslim dominance among the world's civilizations was waning. On the scale of belief, there can be little choice between religions except to a limited eye. In the balance of resources, Christianity has gained decisive additional weight in the era of evangelization. Chapter 10 THE SCROLL OF TRADE: MODERN LONG DISTANCE TRADE ANCIENT Chinese Fortunes - Island Exiles - The Venice of the North - The Feast of the Dead - The Irish Timber Age Chinese Fortunes Except on Jewish holidays, a fat man could to be at the head of a certain Doric column that stands almost every day of the week in the south-east corner of the London Stock Exchange. From the end of the Napoleonic Wars until his death in 1836, Nathan Rothschild filled his seat with proverbial regularity, except one day in 1833 when a clever prankster struck him on the spot by waking up early and forcing him to retire. nervous and heading to the back seats. The Lord. Rothschild and his twin "Pillar of the Stock Exchange" became inseparable subjects of caricaturists' double portraits. Dying, Thomas Jones drew the pillar accompanied by its shadow. Perhaps even more surprising than his rapid rise to unprecedented fortune is the Rothschild's success in institutional life in England. Becoming a "pillar" of business and government was an incalculable success for this steadfast outsider with his indecent corpulence, quivering lips, supposedly rude table manners, German accent, foreign faith, and, since 1822, Austrian title, which he earned in English society never. he dared to lead. He did it because it was necessary. As representative in London of the company M.A. Rothschild and Sons of Frankfurt, he was at the nerve center of an intelligence gathering and intelligence system. It is one of the most important events for the city and perhaps for Europe that has been taking place for a long time. His financial dealings permeated the entire continent of his time." His shadow, holding the four keys that symbolized his brothers, still loomed before him.

Cartoonist Thomas Jones will stalk his usual mainstay on the Stock Market. Exchanges that enabled him to make impeccable judgments in the money markets, transfer gold and money across Europe on an unprecedented scale, and manage financial affairs at the critical moment when the Rothschilds became "the richest people in Europe." against Napoleon. He exchanged money on the London market for the Prince of Hesse-Kassel and the King of Prussia, taking advantage of wartime conditions to earn enormous revenue from delays in the transmission of funds. He borrowed the money that kept Wellington's armies in Iberia paid for. He traced the routes by which British subsidies reached the continental allies and the means by which British products defeated Napoleon's attempted blockade. When the war ended, he was the fixer who provided capital for the rebuilding projects. In 1825-26 his intervention is said to have single-handedly halted the failure of the London banks. Although his arcane methods make valuation difficult, his capital was plausibly estimated at over £28 million in 1828. No circumstance could be more favourable, no keener eye, for making a fortune in Europe at the turn of the century. XIX. The Americas could produce no match, though the Astors demonstrated the wisdom of investing in Manhattan real estate. But the richest private individual in the world at the time was probably neither a Rothschild nor any other Western business magnate. The name of Wu Ping-Chien has practically sunk into oblivion. Even under his trade name Howqua, he is now an obscure and overlooked figure. The portrait of him appears in some surprising places. Above the fireplace in the living room of one of the oldest mansions in Newport, Rhode Island, the King family—doctors, merchants, and sailors—gave pride of place in their home to an icon of this lean, serious old man with a thin beard and spacious coat. A version of the same portrait hangs in the East India Hall of Fame in Salem, along with much larger images of local merchants who prospered trading with the Far East in the early 19th century. His image graced the homes and public spaces of many New England merchant communities of his day. They owed him much: his power and generosity made it easy for them to enter what was then the richest trade in the world. Howqua was born in 1769; Napoleon and Wellington were among his almost exact contemporaries. Like the Rothschilds, he benefited from a family background: the Wu formed the largest trading clan in Canton and the Fukien coast. In 1789, his father was one of the few privileged merchants trading with the foreign factories of Canton, where the world clamored to enter China's barely opened door. All European and American trade in search of Chinese tea, silk, rhubarb, and porcelain passed through this narrow opening. The barbarians paid in silver, since they had no goods officially offered by China.

accept in bulk In fact, Howqua ruled this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to get rich from the turn of the new century until his death in 1843. Wealth attracts predators and, like other privileged Chinese merchants, he suffered persecution from the Mandarin elite. . His father was forced to relinquish his trading privileges due to punitive taxes that hit Canton's leading merchants so hard that Howqua, of all people, was able to keep his creditworthiness alive throughout his career. of the. In 1831, his youngest son was arrested for opium smuggling. His concern about the snobbery that merchants endured under the mandarin's arrogant nose is betrayed by his nickname, which means "Great Officer." In China, such a title had a mocking resonance when applied to an ordinary merchant, but rich in informal power. His greatest wish was for his eldest son to join the ranks of scholarly bureaucrats, but the boy disappointed him by failing his exams. The extent of his fortune and the nature of the reputation on which he built it are evident in the many stories of his honesty and generosity. 312 D E S P R I N G S UN C O I L ED Portrait of Howqua in the East India Hall of Fame, Salem, Massachusetts: His features are a common sight in New England, where merchants trading with China had good reason to appreciate his favor. His career as Canton's leading merchant in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which is said to have made him the world's greatest fortune, coincided with a revolution in the terms of trade between China and the West. By the 1870s, China's favorable trade balance had disappeared. “You and me, number one, olo flen. You belong to an honest man,' he told himself in characteristic jargon to an American merchant whose IOUs he was tearing up. When the price of mercury unexpectedly rose, he paid the new price to an American seller. The credits he made to other merchants amounted to a million silver dollars each, and his share of remittances was regularly three or four times that of his peers. The public benefits of it were enormous. In 1831 he repaired the Pearl River levees at his own expense. He set aside millions to improve the fortifications when war threatened, and after the Opium War of 1839-42 he subscribed $1,100,000 in silver for repairs. During his career, he saw China's favorable trade balance eroded by opium being smuggled or forced into the Chinese market from its production base in India by British suppliers. Opium was the only foreign product controlled by Western suppliers that Chinese consumers wanted or wanted in large quantities. As with the milder drug exported in exchange - Buddha is said to have discovered tea to stave off sleep - demand seems to have been driven by supply. When China first banned the trade in 1729, imports were estimated at two hundred chests a year; In 1767 a thousand chests were registered; When the trade reached war-dangerous proportions in the late 1830s, more than ten thousand boxes arrived in China each year. His exclusion from the Chinese government was a matter of economic interest and moral rectitude;

For Britain, accessibility to the Chinese market was not only a material imperative but also a symbol of free trade. When China actively tried to stop imports, Britain invaded. The defeat of China was one of the great turning points in world economic history. Howqua heirs could make lucrative deals in traditional estates, but could never again patronize Western barbarians: the dependency relationship was permanently reversed. Howqua died on a broken world and his body was given over to mutated worms. Conditions of trade, hampered by rising quantities of opium, were generally worsened by the relaxation of tariff barriers, which favored more competitive Western products as industrialization spread westward. At China's worst moment, a new tax policy caused the Thai kingdom to lose interest in trade deals that favored merchants from the heavenly empire. Within a generation, China's favorable trade balance dwindled to near zero, disappearing by the 1870s. Since ancient times, persistently and vigorously since the days of Marco Polo, the Far East has evoked images of enviable wealth. for the poor relations of humanity. in the West. Western trade was the "barbarian" client of the Chinese empire. Western silver flowed east, and as Europe appropriated American silver, it made China even richer. A 17th century Jesuit commented that China had more wealth in a street than Flanders or Italy in a city. When Matteo Ricci redrew his Great Map of a Thousand Lands for the Chinese court and placed China at the center, he not only flattered the self-esteem of the Chinese, but also reflected where the world's economic center of gravity was. In 1601, the Chinese court annals reported: “The eunuch Ma Tang of Tien Ta'in brought Li Ma-tou, a man from the Western Ocean, to court, who had some rare gifts for the emperor. The Emperor sent the eunuch's monument to the Committee of Rites, which replied: "...The images and paintings of the Lord of Heaven and a maiden offered in honor of Li Ma-tou are not of great value. Offer a scholarship, in the that says they exist. the bones of the immortals, as if the immortals, when they ascended to heaven, did not take their bones with them... he must be sent back to his own land.'” However, it was the beginning of a fruitful relationship between Matteo Ricci and the Chinese court. He was particularly valued for his skill in Western cartography. His map of China was the first to be drawn on a global projection. However, it was based on a prototype by Chu Ssu-pen (see p. 137). The Gobi desert appears as a black ribbon, the Great Wall as a twisted stockade. Ricci's portrait in a cartouche suggests that he was the recognized author from whose work this engraving was made for Samuel Purchas's great compendium of travel literature. According to Ricci, Ricci's world map caused a scandal: "When they saw the world so big and China in such a small corner, the ignorant made fun of the map." The tangle of trade 315 after one of the ministers of Louis XV, what was 18th century France

"an injection of the Chinese spirit" is needed. From the same time, a memorandum kept at the Central State Archives in Moscow makes a similar recommendation: Russians should be like Indians and Chinese who sell to the West for money, "the method adopted by these nations has always been used." known in history" buys almost nothing. Napoleon's conviction that he had to move his base of operations to the East because "great reputation is acquired in the East" was based not only on the memoirs of Alexander and Genghis Khan, but perhaps also in a rational calculation of where the potential initiative lay at the time. The invasion of the Pacific and Indian Oceans by European invaders in the 16th and 17th centuries gave a false impression of the balance of economic power in that period. Parasites were a compliment, not a threat to the richness of host cultures Arose out of European empires, most were transported by local shippers and traded by eaters local rciants. might inflate Howqua wealth beyond the reach of Western greed, as it was confined to a privileged few, but its total value was surpassed by trade on the Fukien coast, where the average in the 17th and 18th centuries was 200,000 tons of cargo a year, millions of rials of silver and tropical imports from Southeast Asia. In many colonial posts, the actual settlers, who populated the cities in large numbers and exploited the economy on a large scale, were Chinese, although the nominal authority, garrisons, and guns were European, or at least among the European officers. With no metropolitan government of their own committed to overseas imperialism, they used Western empire builders as proxies to protect and promote their own activities. No example is better than Batavia. Ancient Batavia, the predecessor of modern Jakarta, which surrounds the site on the north coast of Java, received the Roman name Holland because it was the overseas capital of the North Dutch trading empire in the 17th century. Dutch traders managed to break into the spice trade suddenly and with devastating effect, for in 1616 they opened a new fast route across the Indian Ocean, heading east from the Cape of Good Hope with the Roaring Forties, emerging on the Sunda Strait and flanking Malacca. . The Batavia site was unpromising, low and swampy, but its geographical location was ideal. Its inventor and commander was Jan Pieterszoon Coen, a warrior by vocation for whom the city was both a viable haven for privateers and a center of commerce. Settlement entrepreneurs, creators of the local and regional economies that sustained Batavia in its heyday, were Coen's two most important Chinese collaborators, his hostess Su Ming-kang, commonly known as Bencon - the godfather figure of the community china-and the energetic agent clerk named Jan Con. The driveway to Bencon's country house was lined with lanterns with

The original founder of the region. In the eyes of the Chinese, the Dutch role was secondary. While Bencon was the town's fixer, Jan Con was its businessman and entrepreneur. He was a Muslim artisan who came to Batavia in 1619 or 1620 in response to Coen's policy of attracting Chinese settlers. Nostalgia never left him, and as he grew wealthier, he made regular moves home as compensation for his far from childish departure. Most of the money went directly to China's corrupt tax racket system. The original origin of the capital of it is unknown. He was first recorded in August 1620 borrowing a coconut grove and within months he became a major local capitalist, cultivating gambling taxes. In 1624 he added the Rinderzollhof to his stables. It seems that he owes his promotion to Bencon's favor: in 1622 he kidnapped the man who had betrayed his godfather and demanded compensation for Bencon. Thanks to the benevolence of the Dutch governor, who was able to count on the good will of the local Chinese, no race was harmed by this autocratic zeal for justice. Jan Con's main business was importing labor and hiring coolies year after year in Fukien for the canals and defense work that first made Batavia viable and then impregnable. He was also a buyer, advising Dutch merchants on markets, and was himself a developer of the interior of the colony, planting sugar and harvesting timber. His empire expanded to include salt washing and lead minting, giving Batavia a brief and faltering heyday in the 1630s. But it was already overburdened and continued only by the ever-renewable order to build and expand defenses. By the time of his death in 1639, he was bankrupt, defeated by a combination of low sugar production, desperately high salt production costs, and the disastrous policy of Batavia's English competitors of casting lead coins. The authorities did not even suspect his anguish. His Dutch creditors lost fortunes. The Dutch never fully trusted Chinese businessmen again. But the Chinese character of the colony was already indelibly imprinted on him. It was part of what would be called an "informal empire" in the 20th century, in which a local authority, in this case the Dutch, took political responsibility while China siphoned off profits in the form of remittances home, trade surpluses, and profits. of investments. The Chinese community grew, especially when the mainland government relaxed restrictions on overseas migration in 1684; in the 18th century, with the overall population declining, the number of Chinese continued to increase. Chinese shipping at the port was generally greater than any other country by at least two and a half to one year. Meanwhile, Batavia was destroyed by ecological change. The exploitation of the sertão for sugar consumed the forest, poisoned the water and transformed the city from "the best city in the world" into a cemetery according to contemporary perception between the end of the 17th century and the end of the 18th century. protected from attack only by its unsanitary reputation. As long as Batavia remained large, the Dutch were dependent on the Chinese.

trade and work; only in decline could they lose patience with their collaborators. The brutality of the 1740 massacre, which killed some 10,000 Chinese, was remembered with shame by participants such as apprentice carpenter Georg Schwarz, who took advantage of the chaos to steal the fat pig from his Chinese neighbor. "When my boss, the master carpenter, saw this, he hit me and ordered me to kill the Chinese first and then loot them. So I took a rice press and used it to beat my neighbor to death with whom I had drunk so many times. and we drank, we ate together." In the nominally Spanish Philippines, a series of similar massacres—occasionally Spanish-style turned into mere expulsions—were the result of comparable Chinese superiority in trade and, to some extent, in manufacturing on these islands. and flourishes adorn the This part of the fort in Santiago, Manila is now home to a popular theater St. James the Moorish Killer looms over the gate: this turned out to be an apt image as the Philippines became a frontier of conflict between Islam and Christianity (see p 305) The site at the muddy mouth of the Pasig was the site of pre-Hispanic stockades; but the fame of the fort in colonial times was more like a prison where the dungeons flooded when the tide went out and José Rizal, waiting for his execution, wrote his farewell poem "My last goodbye". Note the stocky conquistador carved in Indian style on the far right pilaster. 318 SPRING SUN AND SURROUNDINGS The Sanctuary of the Church of San Agustín has survived almost four centuries of earthquakes; The heavily fortified corners of Santiago's polygonal fortress enclose monuments of Spanish rule, from gun barrels emblazoned with coats of arms to the yellowed collars of José Rizal, preserved as sacred relics of the hero of Philippine nationalism. The colonial-era elite extolled the Spanish character of their islands and perhaps really saw no other. In a lavish allegory that illustrates the mercantile theses defended in one of the two universities of the archipelago in 1759, the Philippines is presented as the pedestal on which the Spanish monarchy rests throughout the world. In reality, however, the islands almost always represented a net loss to the imperial treasury. Although a tenuous direct connection with Spain was occasionally attempted in the eighteenth century around Cape Horn, the only effective and regular trade in the Philippines, "what is striking is the coincidence of the feet of this symbolic figure of the Hispanic world , which are these Philippine islands... with the feet of the Judith caste, as well as what most enchanted the soul of Holofernes...

Islands, like the sandals of the Hispanic world”. The implicit message of Vicente de Memije's explanation of his allegorical figure of the Spanish monarchy is a plea for more means to defend the Philippine monarchy, which carried the annual galleon that sailed between Manila and Acapulco and Mexico exchanged silver for Chinese silk. Filipino connections with China were vastly more important, and the Spanish colony dwarfed in number compared to the large number of Chinese settlers who arrived, under Spanish protection and mercy. Indeed, although Japan continued to engage in trade, even Japanese shipping and colonization dwarfed Western arrivals. The islands' reliance on Asian and mestizo traders is well illustrated by the failure of a mid-18th century governor's policy of expelling all of them, thankfully except for over a thousand who the Dominicans managed to keep, claiming they were in the catechism. class - and assembled a limited society of acculturated Spaniards and mestizos to replace them. The capital exhausted, the religious orders were looted to maintain the company; even so, it had to be liquidated after another year of losses. Other indigenous trading communities were less robust than the Chinese, but succumbed to foreign rivalry during the remaining ruins of the English trading factory on the Hirado coast, where foreigners were welcomed in the early 17th century by Matsura Hoin, the daimyo, who I waited for foreigners. to restore the fortunes of his port after the damage caused by the Nagasaki competition. The English stayed for only ten years and withdrew in 1623, having contributed to the general decline of Japanese foreign trade with their unsuccessful attempts to trade in wool. 320 THE SUN OF SPRING Beginning in 1592, Hideyoshi issued Japanese shipping foreign trade companies under the "Red Seal". At first they had Portuguese pilots, later supplanted by the Dutch; but native

The pilots soon became competent. Licensees included daimyos and high officials, as well as merchants. Until the trade was abolished in the 1630s, about ten trips a year were for crafts, copper, silver, and food, mainly to Macao, Vietnam, Siam, and the Philippines in exchange for silk. In this silk scroll from around 1630, the Kyoto Chaya family's red seal ship is towed into the river estuary by Vietnamese galleys. The screens indicate the market in front of the Japanese Quarter. The three long houses on the other side of the river represent Chinatown. For both Chinese and European competition, or in the case of the Japanese, it was a self-imposed retreat from a loathed arena in the 19th century. In the era after Hideyoshi's death, Japan did not immediately lose its taste for empire or its sense of the value of trade. The Ryukyu Islands, which stretch like the tips of a fan between Japan and Taiwan, were conquered by Hideyoshi's imperialism in 1609 in the last contraction of the corpse. They became a useful and enduring center for trade with China: in 1719, a sedan bearer on a Chinese mission to Okinawa had in his baggage 45,000 pieces of benzoin, used to make fragrances and incense, and 80 pairs of glasses. . This fit the pattern of Japan's foreign affairs as it developed and dissolved in the 17th century. Tokugawa Ieyasu, effectively Hideyoshi's successor as the strongman of all Japan, began his reign as shogun with great faith in commerce. Dutch and English factors were welcomed in Japan. Some layers of carved stone on the Hirado shoreline are a reminder of how well built their trading posts were. Japanese ships visited Macao, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Siam. The reversal, when it occurred in the 1630s, was the product of cultural rather than commercial antipathy: decrees prohibiting Japanese from trading abroad were accompanied by decrees rewarding the denunciation of Christians and the expulsion of mixed-race children. . From 1639, contact with the West was confined to a small Dutch trading post on a desolate island, "or rather a prison", as one of the first prisoners put it, near Nagasaki. For Chinese trade, the Ryukyus served as a similar airlock against outside contamination, while trade with Korea, if there was any with that equally fanatical lockdown status, was confined to Tsushima. Marginal luxuries like watches and narwhal tusks traded like unicorn horns were traded for the abundant silver and copper Japan produced. ISLAND OUTINGS Normally, European barbarians in East and South Asia were good at local and regional trade. They have increased demand through their own presence and by linking existing voyages to far-reaching ocean networks. In the early 17th century, Portuguese hands controlled 10% of the Malabar pepper in a good year. This was probably enough to meet the needs of Western Europe, but it left most of the old traditional traders' trade with the Middle East largely unchanged. The greatest influence of the Portuguese businessmen did not come from the Ruta del Cabo that they created, but from their new long-distance business initiatives within the traditional

Sands of the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. Sometimes Portuguese "natives" outside their own colonies pioneered new routes or traffic between regional destinations. The mestizos found a way out of limited social opportunities in trade to enrich the regional economy together. The possibilities are multiplied for longtime guests, the Gujeratis, Armenians and people from the Middle East who call the platters "Persian". The versatility of the Armenians equipped them for the role of mediator whenever it was necessary to bring together new religiously or politically divided trading partners. They were, as a representative of the East India Company declared in 1697, "the oldest merchants in the world", responsible for the textile trade since the first cloth was woven. Linking Protestant trading posts in the Malay Islands with the impenetrably Catholic Philippines, they broke down the barriers of isolationism and protectionism. In 1724, an English superintendent in Canton complained that all the tea in the port had been mortgaged to the Armenians. However, there were some cases where indigenous or established trading communities suffered from competition or hostility from European newcomers. In the long run, perhaps also from the perspective of historians looking at our millennium from the distant future, these eccentric notions would establish a new dominance. The destination of the great maritime tradition of Java and Sumatra is the most striking example. The boisterous Venetian adventurer Lodovico Varthema, who claimed to have been here in the early 16th century, found the seas ruled by the lords of these islands, with his "wonderful knowledge" and precise charts copied by the first Portuguese invaders. Until well into the 17th century, its function hardly changed. Japara's gigantic junks, as big as Dutch and Portuguese ships built to cross two oceans, provided the basic needs of Makassar and the Spice Islands. Jambi, a pepper-producing region on the Batanghari River, benefited from the cruelty of Dutch trading methods: when the Dutch drove the Chinese from the river, Jambi's men brought their pepper to Batavia on their own. Aceh was a commercial center for the first three decades of the century, followed by Bantam for most of the rest, handling more traffic, in terms of tonnage, if not value, than either Malacca or Batavia. But even in a world of booming markets, competition brings losers and winners alike. In 1657 Japara had to hire Dutch or Eurasian pilots to lead their fleets "because the sea is great and the Javanese cannot sail it." Jambi was rarely free to deal with Dutch competitors. Bantam, like other states in later Indonesia, grew with the increased demand for pepper in China and Europe in the 16th century. The land was converted and the country became a net importer of food. When the Dutch arrived in 1598, they found established merchants operating on a large scale, such as Sancho Moluco, who wore velvet and could ship 200 tons of pepper at a time. Eighteen thousand bags of pepper

of indefinite size were sold annually to China and 3,000 to Gujerati merchants for trade elsewhere. The Dutch could only handle nine thousand a year, but they could not be indifferent to the scale of Bantame production, giving the natives and their eastern customers much control over prices. After a series of disputes, Jan Pieterszoon Coen decided to use Batavian naval strength and firepower to destroy the Bantam trade. The war, waged intermittently but relentlessly from 1618 on, reduced the sultanate's pepper production to a total of less than 8,000 bags in 1629. Ironically, Lim Lakko, the Chinese adviser to the ruler who organized the price cartel that ended with Dutch patience, he had to move to "absolutely degraded" Batavia to start a new fortune in trade with Taiwan. Bantam began producing sugar for the Chinese market. When pepper production revived for English customers in the 1670s, the Dutch returned and forced the sultan at gunpoint to sign a humiliating treaty in 1684. Makassar, a small sultanate on Sulawesi, insulated from the devastating mutual rivalries of Javanese states, was one of the most stubborn survivors of the early modern period in the eastern seas. Refugees from Dutch aggression elsewhere gave it a dynamic "frontier culture" in the 17th century. The Malays reinforced their ship crews, the Moluccans brought with them spice savoir-faire, and the Portuguese from Malacca introduced their far-reaching trade contacts. It became their "second and best Malacca" and, according to a Dominican who visited them in 1658, "one of the great and pleasant places... bare waist, assembled a library of Spanish books and kept a globe and clock "The career of Portuguese adventurer Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo was representative of the range of possibilities, yet extraordinary in the magnitude of its achievements. Like many miserable Portuguese soldiers in the east, he turned to trade for a living. He was a chameleon, navigating the islands colored between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea with ease. He served as envoy to the Spanish governor of Manila in Cambodia in 1642, and even after the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, united between 1580 and 1640, were irretrievably separated, he continued to associate with Spanish dignitaries in business ventures. As long as there was a truce between the Portuguese and the Dutch, he happily worked with the Dutch Company. from the East Indies, and when a diplomatic revolution made them enemies, he continued to sell them sandalwood even as they hunted down and burned their ships. He became the trusted adviser of the King of Makassar, the envoy of the Nawab of Golconda, and the business partner of both. In 1652 he proved that he could escape from prison as easily as he could enter a court of law: his barred jailer, the ruler of Mataram, sentenced the English agent, whom he tortured, and the Javanese servants, of whom he killed thirty and five. six. , responsible. According to English reporters, Vieira's objective was "the acquisition of wealth"; however, he was such a useful political agent for Portuguese interests that the

The viceroy forbade him to return home; and he proved his reputation for Catholic piety by telling his royal and Muslim patrons that Muhammad would burn in hell. Like Howqua, he delivered. "I have always endeavored to scrupulously keep my promises," he said. Although he often spoke of returning to Portugal, he felt so at home in the Orient, where he could rise to the rank of knight and accept the friendship of a prince, that it is hard to imagine him in any other setting. He was a model of happy uprooting, his life turned to mobility: in Makassar he lived in a bamboo hut like other foreigners who were forbidden to build solidly or show durability, but his real palace was his sumptuously decorated yacht. As a merchant, his first interest was in Coromandel cloth, where his fortune grew like a pumpkin. He specialized in sandalwood from the Lesser Sunda Islands, but also traded gold and silver from Sumatra and the Philippines, sappan from Indochina, and cloves from the Moluccas, once the heart of Makassar's commercial center. Jeal324 THE COOL SPRING SUN beating down on the spices was the root of the Dutch-Makassar war which broke out in 1652, but the immediate provocation was the seizure of the Vieira ships, in which the King of Makassar took a great interest, by the Dutch authorities. , those who seek to take advantage of the end of the armistice with Portugal. Arming a fleet of galleys to harass the enemy, Vieira fomented the war with well-intentioned but empty promises of Portuguese intervention on Makassar's behalf. When the new and young King Hasanuddin sued for peace in 1656, "without gunpowder, without ammunition, and with no one to supply it", the natives tended to blame Vieira as the sole cause of the conflict. Dutch arrogance led to more fighting in 1659. "Do you believe," asked Hasanuddin, "that God alone has reserved islands so far from your homeland for your trade?" The size of the naval task force that the Dutch expected at Batavia seemed to justify this arrogance. The peace they imposed included the expulsion of all Portuguese. Vieira slowly made his way to Timor in 1664, while his compatriots dispersed with English and Malay exiles to Siam, India, and Macao. When he died in 1667, fighting to pacify warring East Timorese tribes in the interest of sandalwood production, Makassar became a Dutch colony. It was the most important of a series of conquests that transformed the Dutch from invaders of trade to controllers of production. Makassar was already full of refugees from previous wars when it fell. In 1628, Sultan Agung abandoned his vision of reuniting Java when he failed to conquer Batavia. When his successor made peace with the Dutch in 1646, the newcomers were still considered "powerful vassals ruling lucrative but uncivilized coastal territories". Like the Spanish in Mexico or Peru, the Dutch were small and insidious enough to engage in local wars that they could direct and exploit. After Makassar was subjugated in 1669 (its forts looted and its walls destroyed), only Bantam, a major spice producer, enjoyed effective independence. up to 1683

their resistance was eroded and their pepper production mortgaged. An "era of commerce" came to an end as indigenous farmers "withdrew from the world economy" and gave up valuable crops that once made their farmers rich but now only seem to attract foreign predators. In 1686, the Dutch found nutmeg and cloves on Magindanao, which were uprooted by disgruntled locals to make their land unattractive. In the end, this type of imperialism did little to help the Dutch. Their strength lay in their navigation, and a naval and pirate empire suited their talents and technology. His weakness was in his workforce. Territorial acquisitions, by which the appetite increased with food, gradually subdued and exhausted them. They arguably had no choice: unlike the Spanish and Portuguese, they had little to no access to tradable goods, such as mineral resources and slaves, with which they could trade against the fall of Makassar. June 12, 1660, painted on parchment by Fred Woldemar. Vieira's ship is on the left; The Portuguese colors are also followed by an award that the Dutch had already won. Samboupo castle, Hasanuddin's palace, exchange of fire with the Dutch ships. The English factory, neutral by treaty, flies the flag of St. George. The crucial moment of the encounter is recorded: the garrison of the Pankoke Fortress marches to the aid of the Sultan, allowing the Dutch to land a raiding party and capture the fortress. riches of the east They had to take the spices or the land they grew on by force. They ended up with an empire whose costs exceeded their profits: the gap was not closed until the eighteenth century, when much of Java converted to the coffee culture, the anti-opium of the Rococo West, the would-be thief featured in the satirical cantata of Bach. of coffee. Meanwhile, in the East Indies, the Dutch were slipping into a vicious spiral, forced to operate under wartime conditions at enormous costs, which could only be paid for by charging high prices. As they devastated their rivals' lands, uprooting surplus crops and destroying competitors' ships, they took the conscious risk of ruining the entire region and being left "in wild lands and empty seas" with no profit. The practical limits of their victories protected them from the adverse consequences of too great a success. Even at its height, its monopoly on the rarest spices—cloves, nutmeg, and mace—was a leaky ship, and its shipment by sea never accounted for more than a seventh of Asia's total. Makassar's demotion to subject status, for example, did little damage to the local native shipping business. But the fall of Makassar, however modest its impact on the lives of some locals, changed the world. It completed the Dutch ring of power around the Spice Islands: now the Dutch could control the supply at the source of production and at the first level of distribution. Their response was ruthlessly destructive, with clove, nutmeg and mace plantings rapidly falling to a quarter of their previous levels. Until now, the new routes added to world trade by European invaders in the East have been like the epicycles created by

Copernican astronomers on the theoretical motions of the planets; they supplemented and confirmed the existing system, expanded it into Bach's coffee cantata, "a satire on the anti-opium of the Rococo West", defended the new drink against charges that it undermined family life, distracted women from their marital duties and defended the new Beber spent time in demanding rituals. The honoree owned the café at Catherstraße 14, Leipzig, and another, shown here, the cake garden in the Gaststätten district. large volume without altering its essential character or displacing its center. Now a valuable part of the glorious Orient was being retained in the form of taxes, and the economy of a part of the Orient was being impoverished for the benefit of the shareholders of the Dutch East India Company. This was a reversal of the old balance of trade that enriched the East at the expense of the West. Until now, the impact has been limited to where Dutch imperialism could be deployed: the Dutch had only one base in Japan; they were almost banned in China and Indochina; They were gradually ousted from most of their positions in India and Ceylon. The products they controlled were for the most part high value, but they represented only a fairly small part of the total world trade in spices, such as pepper, which they never fully understood, normally making up 70% of the total and still growing. . almost non-stop, steadily increasing the total world trade and maintaining supply to traditional routes and handlers. The Dutch, however, set a fatal example of hacking and crushing a supplier's economy to meet a customer's needs: in India in the second half of the 18th century, and in much of the rest of the world in the 19th century. , other European powers would find the means and opportunities to carry out similar transformations. This is why the galactic museum keepers are more concerned with events on the Banda Islands and Sulawesi in the early modern period than with the fate of European rebellions or the mischief of European kings. Neither the English Civil War nor the wars of Louis XIV seem worth that much window space. Meanwhile, Dutch imperialism was also transforming Europe, as the wealth of the spice trade that had enriched Lisbon and Antwerp, or eventually expanded the reach of Venetian portraiture, now fell into the hands of the burghers of Amsterdam. God took their riches from other cities, says a popular guide from 1662, "and poured them into our bosom." THE VENICE OF THE NORTH It is said that this city is very similar to Venice. In the upper strata of society, this observation by a 17th-century English traveler could not be confirmed: by the end of the century, Amsterdam patricians had, on average, just over half the wealth of their Venetian counterparts. The Englishman, however, was more impressed by the diffuse wealth that reportedly put £10,000 worth of pawns his way. Indeed, in relative terms, Amsterdam's wealth grew enormously over the century - "by the hand of God", the 1662 guide said, by 30,000

The habit of retiring to the country with the profits of urban business affected even the most experienced elite in Europe: the early modern bourgeoisie in Amsterdam. Some of the most magnificent villas were located along the Vecht, such as Gunterstein Manor, built by the councilor Ferdinand van Collen (1651-1735) as a summer retreat. The inhabitants in 1585 were on a par with Venice at around 130,000 in 1650, which in favorable comparison with the static wealth of Venice was understandable. The two cities had more in common than canals and spices. Its elites shared a republican, bourgeois ethos and a culture of consumerism. Being sent to The Hague was exile for a patrician from Amsterdam who needed to be close to the stock exchange and the port, but at least a third of city officials had pleasure homes in Amstel in the late 17th century; By the mid-18th century, country house owners made up over 80% of the patriciate, and the town council rarely met in June and August. On a smaller scale, corresponding to the interior closer to Amsterdam, this change to a seasonal arcade corresponded to the flight of the Venetian aristocracy to the Palladian villas of Terraferma. Both movements were accompanied by a trend in the economic status of the patricians from entrepreneurs to rentiers. Taste is the best guide to values, and in all of Europe, that's why one of the most astute economic theorists of the late 17th century is in Amsterdam." The citizens managed to retain their traditional image of the economy, both from the exhibition to inside their houses Planning regulations kept the façades narrow, although the most prominent ones could create double-width landscaped fronts or double their façade in collaboration with a neighbor. The exterior can be enlivened with heraldic pediments, richly molded entablatures or decorative urns and busts. , as seen in the early 17th century, were favored by the arbiter of elegance, Hendrick de Keyser.Examples still exist on the Keizersgracht and Herengracht.In general, however, Amsterdam's buildings were modestly dressed, with clean lines, sober moldings and many well-glazed windows, only the baroque flavor of a Ries de Graeff could rival the occupants of the s Venetian palaces of the month month period. By comparison, the 17th century is reputed to be a lean period in the history of Venetian palace building, but the seven palaces of this era testify to an enduring wealth that is often underestimated by historians eager to send off the "fallen" Mediterranean powers. The bolder-spirited baroques, however, reflect the dubious fate of the families that commissioned them. In 1652, Palazzo Pesaro, with its oddly structured façade, unconventional rustic appearance, and intense contrasts of light and shadow, celebrated the enduring status of one of the city's oldest self-proclaimed families.

dating back to "Jove, King of Tuscany and Emperor of the World": but his finances were shaky and the palace remained unfinished until 1710. Due to the patron's debts, it was still unfurnished when his heirs passed it on to the distinguished 18th century. The Rezzonico family sold it. While the splendor of Amsterdam rested on solid foundations, the splendor of Venice was attributed to the prodigal misuse of credit that concealed the true decline: a thin layer of gold over absinthe. There were undeniable economic advantages to doing business in Northern Europe over Southern Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Inflation, built into the economy with a regularity unprecedented in history, flowed from south to north, fueled by new sources of gold, new forms and higher levels of credit, and the demand created by population growth. The Scandinavians used their price advantage to venture into the Mediterranean in the late 16th century, where the demand for their ships helped them: bringing in grain, filling food shortages, making up for losses at the hands of Muslim privateers. The Dutch became familiar newcomers, much like the Portuguese in the late Middle Ages, and with similar consequences: the expansion of the sailing orbit of these previously poor and marginalized peoples pushed them into a role as empire builders. global. The Dutch had a long apprenticeship as the dominant shippers and fishermen in the Baltic Sea in the 16th century; They were the Orang Laton, the sea gypsies of the west, with experience and equipment to draw upon when longer shipping lanes opened up for them. His penetration of the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Indian Oceans seems at first sight all the more remarkable since it occurred during his long struggle, from 1572 to 1648, to break with the Habsburg monarchy, but the effects of the war were positive in decisions more decisive. . Sage: It bolstered the enterprise, it encouraged piracy, it justified the invasion of Spanish and Portuguese waters, and most importantly, it was accompanied by a population purge that caused some of the big capitalist families in the southern Netherlands to flee to the north in search of the safety of Amsterdam. The grave of one of the greatest of these immigrants, Isaac Le Maire, proudly records the wounds of entrepreneurship: the loss of one and a half million guilders. The infusions of cash brought by the immigrants allowed Amsterdam to seize the historic opportunity of the early 17th century. It was a triumph of business values ​​associated with cheap money. At 2 1/2.5%, interest rates in 17th-century Amsterdam were the lowest in the world. Even so, it was suspected that the Dutch also had an ideological or psychological advantage. “What made this despicable piece of land so significant among the powers of Europe,” opined the author of The Fable of the Bee, “is its political wisdom in transferring everything to trade and navigation, and unrestricted freedom of conscience that those below enjoy”. evidence is lacking, it seems

Some wealthy immigrants from North Holland were drawn to religious tolerance, or at least repelled by the indiscriminate punishments of inquisitions elsewhere, which almost reached the status of non-commercial risks. Venice was also notoriously unzealous in pursuing heresy. In Amsterdam, Protestant Venice, the dominant ethos, the tone of sermons everyone had to listen to, is sometimes thought to have fostered the accumulation of capital in two ways: by promoting a puritanical aesthetic hostile to the cost of luxury and by devaluing the worth. charity, because salvation cannot be bought with works. However, the consumption habits of citizens seem to show that sermons received as little attention in early modern Amsterdam as sermons in general. THE FESTIVAL OF THE DEAD The largest and most expensive apartment in Seville's Hospital de Caridad is the chapel. By the end of the 17th century, the power of prayer was probably as effective as any other therapy; The inmates this chapel was designed for were decrepit, terminally ill, or beyond human assistance. The foundation existed to heal the souls of caregivers as well as the bodies of patients. Carefully designed to make the faithful feel better, the chapel's décor guided them as they approached the altar and back to glimpse the sky and back to their seats on a sacramental journey. The same trip can be made today by a leisure visitor. Entering from the west end, you find yourself caught between two of the world's most haunting paintings: Memories of Death, painted by Juan Valdés Leal with his typically impatient and biting brushwork. One is dominated by a skeletal Reaper, limbs outstretched, surrounded by the respectable vanities of this world: the books of the wise, the weapons of the brave, the monuments of art, the triumphal arch. Next door, a knight decomposes on his deathbed. The believer's pilgrimage through the corridor, therefore, begins with a call to penance. Slightly closer to the altar are Murillo's Works of Mercy, whose creamy, comforting color conveys the hope of salvation as gently as Valdés Leal's savage style threatens hell. The uncompromisingly Catholic message is faith strengthened by effort. Not all of the original paintings survive, but the emphasis is evident on the vocations inherent in hospital work, as Saint Elizabeth of Hungary gleefully tears off the head wounds of the poor above the south aisle. It was the duty of the rich and noble members of the hospital fraternity to care for the sick with their own hands. Even closer to the sanctuary, high on the walls are sacred allegories of the Eucharist: Murillo's scenes of the Children of Israel cooling off in the desert and of the miracle of the loaves and fishes. For a dying devotee who is preparing to receive the sacraments, contemplating the images of revenge and redemption that take shape in his path, no scene could be more endearing than the one that adorns the main altar, where one of the most dramatic compositions of the the skilled Baroque woodcarver Pedro Roldan is shown

Christ in his most human form: the dead Christ, recently taken down from the cross, surrounded by the inhabitants of heaven in extreme worldly agony. Identified with his Redeemer, the communicant turns away from the altar to behold a triumphant vision of the exaltation of the cross above him. He can return to his place, frightened, exhorted, edified, comforted, nurtured, and reassured. In this decorative scheme one can read not only the situation of the sick and the theology of the Church, but also the economic fortune of Seville in the seventeenth century; Evidence that although the new transatlantic trade of the early modern period was small in volume, like the rest of the world's intercontinental trade in its early stages, it could have a tremendous impact where its effects were concentrated. The hospital was established with money amassed during the boom times by the "nawabs" of the Atlantic trade to mitigate the social consequences of the mid-century crash and turn-of-the-century crisis. Seville was a western canton with a commercial monopoly in the Spanish New World. In the second half of the 16th century, when the veins of the richest silver mines in the world, in Mexico and Peru, flowed inexorably into the Atlantic, Seville became a gold mine of duties for the brothers of the brotherhood that ran the Seville Hospital. Charity. The sculptures by Pedro Roldán on the main altar therefore represent the burial of Christ. Roldán was one of the last great sculptors of the Sevillian Baroque: in the ethereal setting designed by Bernardo Simón de Pineda, this altarpiece represents a characteristically emotional concept of the Baroque: the paradox of the inhabitants of a glorious sky sharing the misery and suffering of a earthly life City, the "Babylon of thieves" of Cervantes, inhabited in suburbs and shacks by 100,000 poor uprooted from a disadvantaged countryside. In 1610, 70 religious communities moved to evangelize them. The "golden age" painters of Velázquez's generation of friends and contemporaries worked hard to produce corresponding devotional aids.

In the 1640s, the climate changed. Gold imports fell as production problems in the mines multiplied as New World economies grew and absorbed more species. Devastating mid-century plagues destroyed trust. The age of religious foundations has given way to a new devotional age dominated by cold penitent confraternities whose sacrificial Easter ordeal remains an inescapable part of everyone's urban landscape. Francisco Zurbarán and Francisco Herrera el Viejo—the most prized painters of the previous generation—first turned to the export market, then died in poverty. The golden youths of the prosperous years became the gloomy brothers of the Hospital da Caridade, burying the dead of the plague and tending the wounds of the poor with their own hands. Its prosperity, like the festivals of Don Juan, had become a festival of the dead. Within Europe and the East, between Europe and Asia, the first modern developments changed the old patterns. Atlantic trade was brand new and therefore may have more potential to reshape the economies it affects. Throughout the period, silver was America's staple, and nothing is more powerful than precious metals in altering prices or, in turn, creating new sources of wealth. Colonization in America, a project that was almost a Spanish monopoly until the mid-17th century, created a captive market for supplies and products that could not, initially at least, be obtained locally. However, silver flowed through Spain like Jollop through maldigestion, and there was no industrial revolution or agricultural boom, except in a few limited areas, in response to the needs and opportunities of the Empire. In the world's most privileged economy, capitalism did not succeed imperialism. It was the imperial laggards, England and Holland, who developed the East India Companies and the banks of England and Amsterdam, institutions that had no real or lasting parallel in the early empires of Spain and Portugal. Historians have blamed the accuracy of the bombers. Contemporaries influenced by Stoicism and Christianity, eyeing envious saddlebags too thick for the eye of a needle, blamed the corrupting effects of Spain's excessive wealth, which became something of a Midas curse. Later analysts blamed bureaucracy, Hidalgo's values, the Inquisition, deficit spending overruns, and the "colonization" of the Spanish national economy by foreign bankers (German, Italian, and French) siphoning profits from an empire substitute. In reality, however, US products and markets developed too slowly to produce spectacular effects, except in relation to gold. Apart from cod from Newfoundland and sugar from Brazil and Hispaniola, the Americas were relatively undeveloped for other large-scale exports until the 17th century. The diverse New World that took shape in the 17th and 18th centuries, with its widely separated manufacturing centers and its vast production of natural products and low-unit-value cash crops, could not be controlled or exploited for its benefit by a single power. Spain maintained control of gold shipments with remarkable stubbornness; accepted by her throughout

decline, their convoys were almost invincible. But he happily cultivated the slave trade and carelessly ceded sugar and tobacco estates along the Atlantic coast to competitors. The development of the Atlantic economy was suggested by several measures: by the increase in the number of slaves from the New World and by the exhaustion - perhaps the backwardness - of the economies from which they were exported; the stimulated production of metalware and cotton cloth in proto-industrial Britain, where the export of these manufactures to North America and the West Indies accounted for most of the 1.5% compound annual growth rate in trade during the eighteenth century; or the rate of emergence of a political consensus in Britain, where "only the Jacobite monsters raged in the desert against Britain's 'blue water' policies." The "Americanization of British commerce," say the most savvy analysts, transformed Britain from "simply part of a traditional European trade network with growing interests in the American and Asian markets" into "the center of an Atlantic economy." However, the complexity of eighteenth-century Atlantic trade is best appreciated at the narrowest part of the tangle, from the perspective of a dynasty of Irish merchants based in the port of La Orotava on the island of Tenerife, in the heart of the Atlantic wind system. . Until recently their activities were almost unknown to science, but their place in the commerce of the time was of paramount importance and centrality, and their enterprises touched almost every inhabited Atlantic coast, from New England to Brazil and from Waterford to Guinea. The founder of the dynasty was a refugee from the Protestant government named Bernard Walsh Carew (1663-1727). From 1692 he combined the life of exile and merchant, first taking up residence in Nantes and then moving south to Lisbon in 1707 and Tenerife in 1714. He was a sickly gouty melancholic with a fondness for spacious houses, lush gardens and good books. The houses that he built in La Laguna and Tenerife were famous locally for their gardens and libraries. He collected only religious images and in exile he continued to accumulate donations for the family foundation, the Hospital of the Holy Spirit, at his Waterford home. His daughter, having inherited his aristocratic tastes, successfully applied for a patent of nobility under the Spanish crown. The true continuation of the family fortune, however, was John Colgan White, who married Walsh's granddaughter in 1742. From his native Dublin he joined an emigrant branch of the family in Cádiz, which by this time had taken over Seville's monopoly on the New World trade: and he was doing his commercial apprenticeship in the trade between Spain and Mexico. His business practices reflected the benefits of being Irish. The solidarity of the clans and the sympathy of the exiles allowed him access to Irish circles in all useful ports. He was able to challenge the laws of mercantilism by exploiting privileges.

a Castilian subject in the Spanish monarchy and the rights of a Briton in the British crown colonies, though his private loyalties were Irish and Catholic. If the grandfather was an aristocratic Manqué, a businessman by obligation, he was a businessman by nature who increased his capital between 10 and 25 percent a year by taking risks: he often had more than 60 percent of his capital tied up. in stocks at the time, when it diversified into the banking sector. The European business of his was mainly in the English Channel and the North Sea; his letters of credit circulated between London, Amsterdam and Hamburg. His US markets included New England and New Spain, and his correspondents could be found in various ports from Boston to Caracas, with an inland outpost in the silver-mining center of Zacatecas, Mexico. The basis of his business was Canarian wine, which could be shipped from Tenerife for a relatively short voyage to America or India, or to satisfy specialized tastes in Europe. The Malvasia grape was brought to the Aegean islands by Genoese planters in the 15th century; Its cultivation expanded as demand in the New World grew and the Norsemen began to appreciate its sweets, liquors, and common goods. Prized by Falstaff and Sir Toby Belch, the 'Copa de Canarias' was the most important export from the islands in Shakespeare's time. The archipelago was known to Bostonians in the late 17th century as the Wine Islands. The royal historian of Charles IF, James Howell, praised this "richest, firmest, fullest, most enduring wine, and the most defiled of all earthly harshness." But in the time of John Colgan, the thriving trade was threatened by competition from Madeira, which had supplanted the Canaries in northern esteem and, with its unique adaptability to tropical temperatures, cornered the East Indies market. Tenerife has always had a wine made with second-rate grapes, known as Vidueño, made at low cost with mediocre results and reserved for the local and South American trade. Whether or not Colgan first came up with the idea of ​​turning these wines into a kind of fake Madeira to undercut Portuguese suppliers, it was he, more than anyone else, who strove for perfection in the 1750s and 1760s and promoted the wine of Tenerife. dedicated new wine Colgan made sure his product had the necessary richness and color; he offered it at competitive prices in tubes an eighth larger than Madeira. From 1766 he exported them to the British East Indies at £10 a pipe against £24 for Madeira. This "monstrous" difference, he hoped, would induce the East India Company "to send all their ships to this island, at least when the directors-general are acquainted with their quality." As a publicity stunt, he conducted a tasting on a merchant ship bound for Madras, "the quality of which, the captain and gentlemen assured them, pleased them as much and even better than any Madeira they had ever drunk." White's wine buyers' cartel outraged the local aristocrats who grew the grapes. The Marquis of San Andrés accused him of "squeezing the earth like a sponge and sucking its blood like a leech." to the marquis

de Villaneuva del Prado was a "despot merchant". But his fake Madeira helped save Tenerife's economy. His market penetration was never very strong in Europe, but he enjoyed enormous popularity in the Anglo-American colonies, which the American Revolutionary War only increased. Colgan's efforts in the East Indies met with some success. His "Madeira" has established itself as an evening drink: a cheap taste of big-city life in remote colonias. Seville never recovered its old place in this new Atlantean world of corroded commercialism. The flow of gold recovered in the second half of the 17th century, but it was diverted from the muddy Guadalquivir to Cádiz, and during the 18th century foreign trade from Spain to America was opened to other ports. Seville's elegant mint, where bullion was once turned into coins, is now a conveniently abandoned icon, a maze of dilapidated houses and sweaty taverns that get a facelift and, I write, become tourist attraction and pricey apartments. . PART THREE THE ATLANTIC CRISIS Western civilization? I think it would be a good idea. attributed to GANDHI Chapter 11 THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE: CRACKS AND FRACTURES IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD The New Canaan - Evidence - The Feathered Serpent - The Creoles of the Yankee Land - Riding the Crocodile - The Saliva of Democracy THE NEW CANAAN An essential knot in the Atlantean trade web of the late eighteenth century was woven by John Brown of Providence, Rhode Island. In 1771 he left the safety of the family business, which made grease candles, and launched into a series of speculative ventures, knowing "what property was, and consequently what a contemptible figure in life he would be without a share in it." . in it.". endeavors with almost constant success. He trafficked in slaves and rum, pig iron, and whale products, and later pioneered the Providence trade in China. Among the luxuries his ships brought home was his porcelain bowl, painted with the blue facades and tiled courtyard of the American factory in Canton that he helped found. The enduring symbol of his wealth is the palatial home he built on Benefit Street in his hometown. This is the street that calls itself the oldest in the United States for its unrivaled succession of immaculate eighteenth-century buildings. Even in such company, the John Brown House stands out in a unique way. He called it homestead, a noun that evokes an artificial simplicity and a 339

John Brown's china punchbowl, purchased in the late 1780s or early 1790s: a luxury of the sort he imported to New England from China. The decor shows the American Hong in Canton overlooking the Pearl River. Imperial and Swedish factories on the left, French and Spanish factories on the right. See page 311. The world of all American values. More accurate, however, were the evaluations of visitors who, for example, described the house as "one of the greatest in the country", characterized by a "splendor and good taste" that "would seem remarkable even in Europe". A visitor to Philadelphia - then generally considered the largest and best-built city in the United States - pinpointed her inspiration when she noted that it was "built to the plans of some of the noblest estates in England, and by far anything that I have seen exceeds." From the outside, the house looks like a transplanted slice of old England, with its Georgian symmetry, understated moldings, and classic details. The interior was extravagantly papered and wonderfully carpeted; the tables were set with English silver and Chinese china. Nothing tasted provincial, much less colonial; although the carpenters were from Newport and had a distinctive style, the firm of Thompson and Goddard was unrivaled in craftsmanship or artistry anywhere in the ancient world. the separation of the cop planned and celebrated the ethical ties that united the colony with England. John Brown was one of America's fiercest patriots, having foreseen the Revolutionary War by ambushing a pilot ship in Narragansett Bay in 1772. He was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, a confidant of George Washington, whose photograph hung in the house of the United States. United States, and host Washington and Jefferson at a grand dinner at his home to belatedly endorse the US Constitution. in Rhode Island Year 1790 to celebrate. This was a typical Atlantic story. Laboriously created colonies, meticulously decorated in the image of metropolitan society, gradually drifted away from their homes and eventually collapsed. Creole sentiments and values ​​began to develop almost as soon as the colonies were established. The Atlantean civilization was instructed to stop for the first 300 years of its existence. It began to take shape around the shipping lanes opened up by The Atlantic Chasm 341

John Brown's Providence "farm" investigation: a classic case of imitation of a metropolitan aristocracy by a colonial thalassocracy. His other construction projects in Providence included the shipyards that served his ships, a bridge that shortened the distance to Newport by a mile, and a footbridge over a hill to the coast. Columbus in the central latitudes, Cabot in the north, and Cabrai in the south, in a concentrated spasm of exploration between 1492 and 1500. Together, these three explorers found and mapped the routes that would link ocean shorelines for the remainder of the Age of Sailing. . . The trade of goods, ideas, and people made it possible to think of a single civilization that spanned the ocean. But communications were bad, the future uncertain; some settlers arrived to escape their home countries; others, bent on reshaping the border in the image of their homeland, however, were seduced by the novelties of the New World, turned their backs on the ocean, headed inland and sought a new identity. In a way, the New World tended to move away from the Old once the coasts were connected; the newly tied restraints began to slip. Domestic economic systems developed, followed by new loyalties and eventually political independence. The America that broke away from Great Britain, for example, in the war of 1776-1784 was, in many ways, an entirely new society, though its origins go back more than 150 years. By the mid-18th century, settlements were sparse and scattered, clinging to the mainland's shorelines. As an immigrant destination, the North American mainland was surpassed by the attractions of the British West Indies. After one hundred years of colonization, the total white population was less than a quarter of a million. The most successful colonies were conscious experiments by utopian planners and pilgrim communities; Financial self-improvement had been the express goal only of those desperate enough to sign their release and work for the duration of a work contract to buy themselves an escape from home and some tools and clothing to start an independent life. were there, bail was paid. In the eighteenth century, as colonial horizons broadened and prospects for a good life in America became more defined, the sentiments of immigrants changed and their numbers soared. On the eve of the revolution, the total population was probably around two and a half million. This incredible increase, by a factor of ten in three generations, was unprecedented or unparalleled anywhere in the New World. It was a fast-paced process, concentrated mainly in the last third of the short period of time. Between mid-century and the outbreak of the Revolution, the number of annual town foundings in New England nearly tripled, as did the populations of Georgia and South Carolina. In the 1760s, New York's population grew by nearly 40% and Virginia's more than doubled. The immigrants who stimulated and fueled this growth came from sparsely populated societies, even though they were beginning to experience the demographic boom that inspired and nurtured Malthus.

The industrial Revolution. Scotland was disproportionately represented and, within Scotland, the Western Highlands and Isles. Here the depopulation was cause and effect of the ruin. Around the trauma of the 1745 rising, when an army of Highlanders conquered most of Britain, the fearful victors wreaked destruction on clans, chieftains demoted or exiled, countrymen massacred or dispossessed: the vivisection of an entire people by part of an English and lowland establishment is understandably fearful of a culture of rebellion in a society organized for war. The emigrants from England were almost all young, the kind that society has always wasted on war. Entire families immigrated to the United States from western Scotland, eroding the country's demographic base and helping create stable, settled lives in the colonies. In America, the results included the burgeoning world and expanding frontiers described with wonder by writers of the generation before the Revolution. Beginning around 1760, a wave of settlers scaled the previously impassable west face of the Appalachian Mountains to found "a new land of Canaan" between Susquehanna and Ohio. Michel-Guillaume-Jean de Crèvecoeur, who would become one of the architects of American identity, envisioned himself joining a mass of immigrants making their way from Connecticut to the Pennsylvania wilderness, where he “found a surprising number of of homes creating, cultivating fields, this great field of industry opened up to a bold and tireless people. On the day the Fort Pitt land registry opened in 1769, 2,790 claims were filed; In 1771, 10,000 families lived on this border. The most adventurous fantasies were overwhelmed by what they saw. In the 1760s, George Washington dreamed of "laying the foundation of a noble estate" on the Ohio River "with very little money." He was disappointed and after a while had to be content with the presidency of a fledgling democracy. COMMENDABLE TRUTH George Washington's aristocratic aspirations and the nobleman's plan for John Brown's house are a reminder of how deeply Old World values ​​infused America's elite. Even at a time when the struggle for independence stimulated the search for a distinct American identity, the new Canaan was full of Pharisees. The aspirations of the American revolutionaries were not original. Demands for tax exemption would not have surprised a mid-17th century nobleman. That the institutions that represent the people should at least share sovereignty with the Crown was a slogan of the English Whigs. The Minutemen, side by side on Lexington Green, followed in the tradition of the citizen armies imagined by Renaissance humanism. In his world, the language of the right and republicanism, a secular language that can be traced through a series of writings from the members of the Commonwealth to the English revolutions of the seventeenth century, resonated in an atmosphere of religious sectarianism that was strong enough and fanatic. it was enough to provide manpower for the revolutionary armies. On a level that

The American War of Independence was another English revolution, on another level, on the level of many members, a "religious war" in the old European tradition. The new demands of the pre-revolutionary years came from an England eager to demand efficiency from her empire, and it was the threat to the comfortable colonial habit of effective self-government and cheap government that provoked the confrontation. Washington and Jefferson were provincial English gentlemen who were only slightly further removed from court than the traditional rural party leaders in English politics. The official rhetoric of the revolution was borrowed from Europe and its leaders pursued an outdated self-image. The point is best borne out by textual analysis, but is best illustrated by a look at Thomas Jefferson's quaint country house, recently resurrected by restorers to its former glory. Jefferson was his own architect, and Monticello says as much about his personality traits as it does about the ideological background of the revolutionary elite as a whole. On a grand scale, it's the eccentric folly of an enlightened amateur. It was the obsession of its owner, that it took him fifty-four years to build it and rebuild it, beautify it and perfect it. By placing him on top of a mountain at 867 feet, Jefferson proclaimed the strangeness of him and determined the peculiar and exhausting character of him. He incorporated many challenging innovations of his own design: the narrow, steep and almost impassable stairs that are the only access to the upper floors; alcove beds; the two-story windows; semi-octagonal rooms added later; the expensive vaulted room, which had to be downgraded to a game room or storage room because it was too difficult to move; the contraptions that minimized the work of Rube Goldberg, from removing wine from the cellar to duplicating documents. This is the home of a perfectionist: the colonnade columns had to be dismantled and rebuilt half a dozen times to make them straight; but more than that, it is an idealist's home, designed after the pattern of Palladianism, in a deliberate aversion to the practicality and English-inspired charm that characterized Virginia mansions and public buildings at the time. In describing the sublime environment, Jefferson used the language of Enlightenment science—"to look into the asylum of nature"—and the late 18th century cult of "enthusiasm"—to "cultivate emotions that spring from the sublime." But he, too, directly followed Palladio's advice to "build on an eminence." Inspired by Italian writings and engravings, Monticello was completely revised after Jefferson served as United States Secretary in Paris; He returned with notebooks full of French recipes, a $300-a-year French chef, 250 bottles of Château d'Yquem, and a determination to transform Virginia into the traditions of Parisian comfort and the spirit of Roman Nîmes. At the same time, perhaps paradoxically, Jefferson was groping for an American identity and flaunting his own patriotic pride. His home museum was rich with American specimens and native artifacts. His living room was decorated with painted buffalo hides and inhabited by "wild" sculptures unearthed in Tennessee instead of

The atrium of a Renaissance palace might be filled with Roman inscriptions and statues. He ordered his booksellers in Paris and Madrid to send him everything related to America, and he adorned Monticello with portraits and busts of would-be creators of the New World: Columbus and Vespucci, Raleigh and Franklin, Washington and Lafayette. Yet he was always a strongly European American, inhibited by a feeling of inferiority. He imposed a Roman temple-style state capitol in Virginia to "honor our country, enjoy our childhood." In a way, the thirteen colonies scattered along the Atlantic coast were fertile ground for revolutionary ideas precisely because they were exposed to Old World influences; Similarly, the revolution in South America was about The Atlantic Abyss 345 Jefferson's Monticello Hall was decorated to celebrate a specifically American Enlightenment, adorned with indigenous trophies and native art, “rather than the atrium of an inscribed Renaissance palace Roman and may be full statues." spread from Caracas and Buenos Aires in the second decade of the 19th century, encouraged by readers of Rousseau, Machiavelli, and Tom Paine, and carried in part by gentlemen of fortune recruited from Great Britain, Ireland Those who employed these volunteers were, in some cases, so steeped in European precedent that they drafted constitutions such as that of Colombia's first republic, described by the nation's celebrated founder as "a Greek temple on a plinth." gothic". free trade, which in practice might be expected to multiply transatlantic contacts, even if independence means It was the rupture of some traditional ties. In Canada, the King of England's newest subjects, the French Canadians acquired by war and treaty in 1763, preferred London government as the lesser evil to Boston or Philadelphia government and avoided the Revolutionary War. In other parts of the Atlantic world, however, the unity that spanned the ocean depended on the compassion that united colonies and mother states. A sense of distinct identity, a "creole consciousness," was a prerequisite, or at least an essential part, of a successful hemispheric revolution; To document its origins, it is best to start in the south. THE SERPENT OF BINE FEATHERS “Let's go see it” was the practical response of the Jesuit Manuel da Nóbrega when he was told about a rock near Bahia in Brazil that had the footprints of the Apostle Santo Tomé's feet. The well-defined footprints with well-buried fingers convinced him immediately. The conviction was reinforced by the discovery that the local word for shaman was zume: in his opinion, it was too similar to "Thomas" for the etymology to be doubtful. The wondrous rock became a pilgrimage site where Jesuits and their Native American neophytes would gather to sing hymns and erect crosses. The apostle's footprints in Brazil were surprising, but not entirely incredible.

The tradition that St. Thomas was the original evangelist of India has been well established and corroborated by the discovery of his supposed followers and the supposed sanctuary at Mylapore. The relationship between India and the hemisphere that the Europeans called India had not yet been clarified by exploration, and it was possible that Nóbrega honorably overestimated the accessibility of the Asian Bays. Still, stronger evidence or more obvious self-interest would be needed for the cult to grow. The test never came; In fact, as knowledge of the greatness of the world increased and science subverted pious delusions, the scope of St. Thomas's supposed mission in America diminished. But the self-interest of the followers of the cult grew over time, and slowly but surely the doctrine that Saint Columbus preceded him acquired the quality of dogma for his believers. The first to see the potential utility of this idea were the missionaries, confronted with evidence that seemed to the pagans of the New World a partial revelation of the truths of Christianity. In the 16th century, for example, the consciousness of a supreme being was attributed to the Arawaks, the practice of confession to the Aztecs, baptism to the Mayans, and tonsure to the Tupinambás. For missionary purposes, these foreshadowings of Christianity became protective talismans among the Indians, with the power to repel the looting of slave traders; According to legal traditions established in the 13th century, pagans could not be enslaved "solely because of their paganism", but had to be guilty of crimes against natural law to justify their victimization. Evidence of their native sense of justice or truth - naturally derived or mediated by God - elevated them above the herd of beastmen naturally fit for slavery. One 16th-century apologist even argued that human sacrifice, which seemed like a flagrant violation of natural law, was just a test of excessive piety. This was the beginning of a mindset that would eventually dismiss human sacrifice as a distorted memory of the Eucharist. A reasonable conclusion from such evidence was that there was a common core of "natural" religion which, like natural law, was available to all reasonable men and all fully human societies. However, naive or adventurous intellectuals were willing to go further and postulate St. Thomas as the source of anticipatory Christianity in pagan America. One of the most complete expositions of the theory was that of the Augustinian Father Antonio de la Calancha in 1639. His response to the skeptics who rejected it was animated by a spirit of charity reminiscent of Erasmus's response to Luther. Taking the Scriptures as his starting point, he argued that the gospel prophecy that the word of Christ would be heard throughout the earth would be fulfilled in apostolic times; America, therefore, could not have been exempt from such a blessing. Like Erasmus, he went beyond hermeneutics to appeal to the Christian understanding of God's loving nature. Just as Erasmus refused to accept that a loving father could capriciously condemn his children, Calancha found it incredible that a just God would deprive anyone of

Part of humanity for so long in the light of His Word. Calancha did not show any vulgar enthusiasm; he assumed Tomás's mission was only "probable," but he followed the saint's footsteps through obscure sightings and rock markings from Brazil to Paraguay and his own province of Peru. Already in the time of Calancha, the controversy surrounding Santo Tomás gained political contours. Spain's dignity and prestige among the peoples of the Old World derive in part from its privileged past as the chosen object of apostolic ministry. Saint Thomas could do for America what Santiago did for Spain. The missionaries' interest in spreading the cult of Tomás was thus joined by an even stronger interest: that of the Creoles, who demanded greater autonomy for the colonies and equivalence in the distribution of positions with the peninsular appointees. In criollo hands, the effigy of Santo Tomás was curiously remodeled. He has been identified with a god or cultural hero of the Mesoamerican past: Quetzalcóatl or Kukulcán, the most prominent figure in the pre-Columbian pantheon, usually depicted as a feathered serpent. This transformation can be traced in the sources down to the smallest detail. To a Dominican missionary of the late 16th century, the Toltec culture hero Topiltzin seemed to resemble Saint Thomas. Living in chastity and penance in a cell, he prayed on his knees and taught his followers to pray and preach. He also foresaw the Spanish conquest, as Quetzalcoatl is said to have done in other traditions. In Dominican texts, this Tomás-like topiltzin is known by another name as Quetzalcóatl. The leap to the assumption that Quetzalcóatl and Tomás were one had to cross a narrow logical chasm. In the 1740s it was taken for granted that the apostle was "to the Indians the feathered serpent." But the myth of Santo Tomás-Quetzalcóatl was never as popular among the Indians as it was among the Creoles. His explosive political power was demonstrated in 1794, when a Dominican arsonist named Servando de Mier made him the subject of the official sermon that is regularly preached to all the notables of Mexico City each year on the feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe. . He maintained that the cult of Guadalupe was a legacy of Saint Thomas, which was then hidden for hundreds of years during the period of the Apostasy of the Indians. Mier was already known as an admirer - with reservations - of the American and French revolutions, which were said to be "against the rights of the king and against Spanish rule". Fleeing the uproar caused by his preaching, he fled to France and then to radical, anti-Napoleonic, “constitutional” Spain, where he served as colonial representative to the Constituent Assembly. He returned to Mexico to join the rebellion against Spain that broke out in 1810; As a member of the Constituent Congress, he helped shape the republican destiny of independent Mexico. He never stopped defending the cause of Santo Tomás-Quetzalcóatl, who became not only a cultural hero but a kind of founder of the Mexicans.

Nationality. Meanwhile, the peasant armies fighting for Mexican independence drew inspiration from a similar syncretic deity, with whom Mexicans could identify as their special patron saint: they marched into the country with the cry of "Viva Nossa Senhora de Guadalupe!" Battle. At the end of the battle, captured Spanish flags were placed in the sanctuary of her. Mier, a member and spokesman for the criollo elite, professed to be a descendant of an Aztec emperor. His resentment against the invading officials of the peninsula began in his Dominican order, where he and his fellow criollos felt excluded from power. He spilled over into the broader political arena. "America belongs to us," he wrote, "because we were born in it" by the "natural right of all the peoples in their respective regions. God has separated us from Europe by a vast sea, and our interests differ." The Atlantic, linking the coasts that had been crossed for three hundred years since the time of Columbus, now looked like a divide again. saw the benefits of remaining in the Spanish monarchy as almost sole providers of colonial goods under protected trade terms, yet all the mainland colonies were effectively independent by 1828. In terms of the development of political trust, the most surprising laggard was the Portuguese Brazil, which bloodily conceded independence in 1822. It was a vast world divided into isolated and selfish communities, according to his own observations in Brazil in the 1830s. Heavy muskets look old-fashioned, but they only convey an air of deadly superiority . Padded armor is arrow proof. through its obstinate geography. Back in the 17th century, São Paulo was the capital of a culture of rebellion: the paulistas, in their remote redoubt, with their self-sufficient economy, were free of sentimentality, ruthless in pursuit of their own interests, unbridled by laws, and little touched by institutions of the government . Engravings of travelers' encounters with them up to the 19th century show how they looked and lived: tall, well-fed, muscular men, their girth enhanced by folds of quilted armor, fully armed and protected by hats of roughly woven rushes, Terrify to the natives with confidence. They prospered by enslaving Native Americans in technical defiance of the law. Their society was lawless, a natural state that worked due to a general balance of terror among the patrons. If they never proclaimed their independence, it was because it was not worth theoretically affirming what they really liked. When they revolted in 1710, it was in defense of their traditional, informal politics in the face of frenzied immigration drawn to the region by newly discovered mineral resources. In other parts of Brazil, distancing from metropolitan culture was slow. The two colonial provinces of Maranhão and Bahia were closer,

measured in days of navigation to Portugal than each other. Most of the Spanish rural settlements were much further from home in terms of travel time. The Portuguese sentimental community could more easily encompass a relatively compact Atlantean empire. In the Spanish colonies, among colonizers who had never seen the metropolis, Creole sentiment was fed by large and rich universities capable of inspiring their graduates with as much pride as almost no other in the old world; the Brazilian elite, on the other hand, had to be educated in Portugal and cultivate a sense of belonging that could be sustained across oceans. Only at the end of the 18th century did a form of Brazilian identity emerge that could seriously compromise imperial unity. As in the British and Spanish empires, intrusive reforms aroused a parochial feeling. Local academies and literary societies arose to fill the lack of an intellectual focus for Creole patriotism. In 1788, a rebellion inspired by the American Revolution broke out in Minas Gerais under a banner with an Indian breaking his chains. The governor of the region thought that even with a gallows at every crossroad it would be ungovernable. In 1790, a report from Rio de Janeiro generally accused Brazilians of disloyalty to the crown. It was said that Americans overestimated the greatness of their homeland and believed that Portugal would be nothing without the riches of Brazil. The development of an openly rebellious spirit was interrupted by the flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil during the Napoleonic Wars. But not all the effects of this forced proximity were positive. The Portuguese, who had always cultivated a comical stereotype of the colonial jerk, exuded an offensive superiority. The pamphlets of the English consul's wife, Maria Graham, in the 1820s, portraying Brazilian courtiers as dwarfs, cripples, and obsequious grotesque monkeys, stand in the tradition of enforced metropolitan superiority and capture well its dismissive tone. and racist. An 1830 pamphlet calling for a Brazilian-born Emperor of Brazil shows how Brazilian sentiment had reached the Creole precocity of the Spanish colonies; but it also shows its backwardness and limitations. At the time, Brazil's independence had been won under a cadet dynasty of the Portuguese royal family, and the prince, hailed in the brochure as "black [goat] like us," was the blue-eyed, golden-haired boy, Prince Peter. COUNTRY YANKEE CREOLE Michel-Guillaume-Jean de Crèvecoeur often had identity crises. He changed his name between English-Hector St. John-and French versions. During and after the American Revolution, he vacillated between legalistic and patriotic sympathies. He took on the role of narrator in his most famous book, Letters from an American Farmer, so successfully that readers in his day and ever since have been fooled. He regained French citizenship after accepting British citizenship, thus making a key contribution to the invention of the American identity. He was hardly right for this role. In a way, that was his idea of ​​America.

as European as the Jeffersons. She got her arcadianism and her belief in the noble savagery of the French Enlightenment; she thought that American liberty was a transplant of the English "national genius." At best, he was an ambiguous American. In 1782 he fled the rural America he raved about for his favorite Parisian salons with evident delight. The Revolutionary War experience corrupted his idyll, and his later "sketch" of American life is bloodstained with horror stories. It was not until 1904 that the work that did so much for the self-definition of American citizens and that attracted the admiration of various luminaries, including the Count of Buffon and Benjamin Franklin, a precocious American poet, was reprinted after the 1793 edition. dream inspiring speaker. He concocted the image of the "melting pot," the ethnic melting pot in which the "world's poor" gather, and it stirred like a magic potion on the transformed nation. The American, he declared, "he was neither a European nor a descendant of a European... Here, individuals from all nations merged into a new race of men whose labors and descendants will one day produce great changes in the world." He captured the tones by which Americans identified with freedom: here there are no aristocratic families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical government, no invisible power that gives visibility to a few. . . no prince we work for starves and bleeds; We are the most perfect society that exists in the world right now. Here the man is free as he should be. He was also prescient in his emphasis on religious tolerance that arose from the mixing and intermarriage of sects. Crèvecoeur was an outsider in his own utopia: a French Anglophile with a Catholic background and Quaker sympathies. Joel Barlow was better prepared to speak Yankee Creole because of his birth and background, though his analysis of what it meant to be an American was less astute and less lucid than Crèvecoeur's. He was a humble Connecticut puritan, a Yalie, educated above his talents and below his ambitions. His belief in meritocracy arose from his self-pity for being, he said, deprived of friends and fortune; but he found solace in the belief that "if virtue is to be rewarded, it is in America." He had the vocation of a poet without gifts. However, quantity of his took precedence over quality, and after the publication of his protoepic poem, The Vision of Columbus, in 1797, he enjoyed a limited reputation as America's Poet Laureate. The choice of Columbus as a hero is intriguing. The Genoese Catholic mystic who founded a Spanish-American empire and never came close to the future United States had no real qualities to recommend him to a Yankee revolutionary. But at the time of the Revolution there was a strong feeling in the ranks of the patriots that identified Columbus as a co-founder of the new America. Jefferson, as we have seen, had his picture on the wall. In Baltimore, Maryland, where Columbus had a large following, a statue of him was erected in 1792 by public subscription. In Barlow's poem, his Catholicism was suppressed,

together with everything that the author considered a human vice; the Reformation was one of the events that he was to foresee with consent. This poetic Columbus sought "a happier coast, free from the lusts of empire" and greeted the United States "with a father's smile." Barlow's America bore some of the same distinguishing marks as Crevecoeur's: how the merry shore, by Heaven's highest command, overcame the wave, presenting a new-found land, bearing richer fruit and spreading more fertile soil, and with greater provisions the Hand labor paid for, Called from the chains of slaves, a bolder generation, With more majestic step will track these fair dwellings; Their free-born souls, with boundless genius, cannot be poisoned by laziness or bound by a tyrant. Speaking of "race," Barlow proposed a different doctrine: America's improved environment would combine with the civilizing effects of colonization to act immediately on natives and settlers alike to produce a new race without the pathetic necessity of interbreeding. Aided by sedentary culture, "softer arts," social pleasures, and "new beauties in the rising spirit," the tribes "showing the savage complexion of the place will blush and exalt the race." Meanwhile, on reaching the New World, "the noblest pride of fair Europe" will "assume a redder hue and a deeper hue" and "parade in more stately figures across the plains." The thesis is supported by a footnote that states that Americans are darker than their European relatives. The American insistence on "grandmother" is understandable in the context of the eighteenth-century debate over which hemisphere reproduced the largest and best specimens of the species (see Chapter 8). Here is a form of Creole identity evoked parti pris by a bad observation. RIDING THE CROCODILE Metropolises that have turned their backs on the Atlantic in disgust may shy away from colonies that are unwilling or unwilling to gain independence. After a French expeditionary force succumbed to yellow fever in Haiti, Napoleon of The Atlantic Chasm 353 decided that most of what was left of France's American empire had to be abandoned. Apart from the king, the English seemed indifferent to the loss of thirteen colonies in North America. Though probably the main reason for the surprising success of the rebels was England's ineptitude: for the first time in all of her wars in the 18th century, she broke out with enthusiasm and relief. The new war against the United States in 1812-14 was fought with the ferocity of revenge, without any hope of reconquest. Although the Spanish crown was reluctant to nullify the American empire, by 1813 most subjects on the eastern side of the ocean shared the sentiments of a Barcelona merchant who "didn't care if we said goodbye to that rabble." It can be said that America separated from a Europe that was going through a period of egoism of exceptional intensity - a

a kind of pause between two eras of expansion. In the Middle Ages, "Europe" was a geographical term encompassing the heart of what could be treated in parts one and two of this book as the two separate civilizations of Western and Eastern Christianity. That usage has now been challenged or supplemented by a new one, in which the term has gained meaning as the name of a culture perceived as distinct and coherent. In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Queen Christina of Sweden and Peter the Great of Russia pushed the boundaries of "Western" and "Mediterranean" tastes and ideas to embrace their once marginal realms. Stockholm and St. Petersburg took on the look of Paris or Rome, with baroque buildings and clean-shaven boyars. At the same time, religious tolerance began to rebuild the divisive fragments. The international status of the French language, the shared cults of reason and experimental science, and the unity of neoclassical and Enlightenment taste made it possible to slip across widely separated borders with little more cultural distortion than a modern traveler queuing at theaters. airport. to feel. . Amid his decadence and decline, Gibbon was able to formulate a "European ideal": "It is the duty of a patriot to favor and promote the exclusive interests of his native land: but a philosopher may be allowed to widen and broaden his views. Think of Europe as a great republic whose diverse inhabitants have achieved almost the same level of civility and sophistication. For a long time, the belief in this common European culture was inextricably linked to the conviction of European superiority "that distinguishes it from the rest of the humanity." ". In the 19th century, Napoleon Bonaparte almost gave political shape to this European ideal by creating an empire across Europe. He was a Corsican adventurer who rose to power in the chaos of post-revolutionary France through unprecedented military talent. His own talent and the invincible power of the mass armies launched by the revolution gave him the opportunity to conquer Europe bit by bit, only at its extremes, in Spain and 354 OSSIAN ENTRY ROAD. Ossian's works - which contributed so much to the rise of the romantic spirit - were forgeries by James Macpherson. Napoleon was one of many readers deceived by them, and in 1803 he commissioned Girodet to paint the bard welcoming a Napoleonic army to Valhalla, surrounded by Valkyries. This absurd mix of Celtic and

The Tutonic myth provided the romantic counterpoint to the classical and Roman iconography that characterized Napoleonic propaganda. Ingres's painting, done for Napoleon's palace in Rome in 1813, reflects the theme. Russia, its reach has expanded. He was an opportunist whose ambitions were not constrained by finite goals; but he also had ideals that overlapped with those of the Revolution, which he intended to fulfill. He was a son of the Enlightenment who read Rousseau in his youth and picked cherries with his first girlfriend as a Rousseau hero. And he was a technocrat who came to command the artillery and conquered campaigns with meticulous attention to logistics. In a way, it was a decidedly barbarian empire, descended from both Charlemagne and Rome. Ossian and the Valkyrie watched from the sky, in propaganda pictures painted by the promising young Ingres. The appeal of it was at least as much for the nascent romanticism of the 19th century as it was for the decadent rationalism of the 18th century. But Napoleon's vision was a Europe built with artilleryman's precision and softened by uniform laws. From 1802, when he decided to sell Louisiana to the United States, until 1814, when he briefly considered retiring to America, he had no time for the New World. If Europe could inspire indifference to the United States, it would hardly be possible for the United States to respond in kind. In 18th and early 19th century allegories, America was commonly depicted as a beautiful and strong native. The Atlantic Chasm 355 "America the Rich" engraved by G. B. Goëtz circa 1750. The parrot and crocodile represent domesticated savagery. His cornucopia promises riches. Its plumage reflects the exoticism of the environment. On the left is the arrival of Columbus, based on a famous 16th century engraving by De Bry. Africans, Asians, and Native Americans collectively hold the globe in the foreground. in a feathered headdress, usually accompanied by similar figures symbolic of other continents, emphasizing the interdependence that global trade has brought. The allegory can seem seductive. In a mid-eighteenth-century version by Gottfrid Goëtz, the United States extends its arms in a welcoming embrace, offering along with its own somber beauty and nakedness of jewels and feathers, arms laden with riches and a gnarled cornucopia of rare fruits. Only the snarling mouth of the crocodile he rides reminds the viewer of the risks of conquest. But this was an image of the outside. Most of the elites that ruled the postcolonial states in the New World failed to meaningfully or convincingly adopt an indigenous self-image. They were very white, very close to their European roots and, in most cases, very involved in hostility towards the Indians. Even in Bolivia and

In Paraguay there was little enthusiasm for a national feeling clean of European contamination. Simón Bolívar, the "liberator" who gave Bolivia its name, imposed on the country a rhetorical tradition imbued with César and Solón, but innocent of Pachacuti and Túpac Yupanqui. Even the Andean republics, with their glorious pre-conquest civilizations, were slow to exploit the indigenous past to create national myths. In post-liberation Argentina, the dilemma to be resolved was not whether the new State should hold a spectacular position. Archaeological finds discovered in Xochicalco and under the cobblestones of Mexico City's main plaza seemed to vindicate the claims of pre-Columbian America as home to great civilizations. Aztec apologist Antonio León y Gama expressed particular satisfaction with this sunstone, or "Aztec calendar," unearthed in 1790 because it seemed to demonstrate mathematical prowess and elevate its creators from "superstition" to "science." The calendar glyphs surround an image of the deity Tonatiuh (see p. 221), crowned with a sunbeam and decorated with images of a jaguar's head and claws, a heavenly serpent, a feathered shield with the emblem of the sun and a basket filled with the remains of a human sacrifice. Atlantic or transatlantic identity, but whether it should be dominated by the European civilization of the cities or by the Asian barbarism of the pampas, where wild gauchos, powerful enough to impose dictators of their choice on the country, were compared by disgruntled inhabitants from the city with Tartaros from the steppe. The Atlantic Abyss 357 The ruins of Palenque were among the most exciting of a series of dramatic archaeological finds in late-eighteenth-century Mexico: a magnificent city, largely excavated from the Usumacinta River in Chiapas. On the right, in front of the curious tower of the palace complex, is the tomb of King Pacai (r. 615-83), whose dynasty was in charge of all the monumental construction. In 1787, Carlos III ordered from Spain, who as King of Naples had become accustomed to the custody of antiquities even before his accession to the throne, to commission Antonio del Río to measure the remains. Only Mexico hoped to return to its pre-conquest roots in search of a viable national myth. The legend of Santo Tomás-Quetzalcóatl helped in this. Likewise, the fact that the Virgin of Guadalupe chooses to reveal herself to an Indian. Likewise, the willingness of the Creole ruling caste to recognize its own indigenous blood. Crucial was the abundant evidence of the higher material culture of the ancient Mesoamerican civilizations that surrounded the Mexicans. Archeology was not neglected among the sciences promoted by the Spanish monarchy at the end of the 18th century; but this altruistic scholarship had a partisan effect: the shells of the scholars produced objects of patriotic pride. Three discoveries among many were perhaps of exceptional importance. In 1784 the ruins of Xochicalco were turned into a magnificent palace, built in the

The opinion of local scholars finally exonerated the Aztecs of the charge of barbarism. An exiled Mexican Jesuit took the opportunity to point out that the highest achievements of civilization are within the reach of all races in all climates, but for the rigorous purposes of criollo patriotism it is not necessary to go that far. In 1790, paving work on the main square of Mex358 THE ATLANTIC CRISIS The city unearthed a great trove of buried Aztec masterpieces, including the Calendar Stone and other calendar materials. Now the Mexicans could admire their Aztec predecessors in both their science and their arts. Meanwhile, in the far south of the country, the rediscovery of the lost ruins of Palenque, a magnificent Mayan city dating mainly from the 8th century AD. C., has aroused real curiosity at the edge of the tropical jungle. One expedition produced detailed drawings that, although not published until 1838, convinced scholars that Mesoamerica's glorious antiquities were not limited to the area around the Valley of Mexico, but encompassed a variety of contrasting settings. As a partial consequence, Mexicans were able to interpret their experiences in terms accessible only to them. Its independence was a reconquest and its state a successor to its former glory; the first truly independent modern Mexican state called itself an empire, and its seal—with an eagle on a prickly pear—reproduced elements of an Aztec glyph (see above, p. 218). By comparison, regimes in other "liberated" parts of the New World seemed to be extensions of the colonial past. THE PEAK OF DEMOCRACY Young America had no Aztec past to admire. Jefferson's hall sculptures aroused curiosity or disgust in his visitors, but never admiration or admiration. Instead, the new republic created an identity, a common purpose, and a special place in the world by creating a new political culture. At first it was not a democracy. Although the principle of elective office was firmly established and widespread, the right to vote was restricted. Even before the revolution, its borders were more generous than Europe's, encompassing perhaps 60 to 80 percent of the adult white male population state by state. Democracy was also not a dirty word like it was in Europe. Democratic reforms were embodied in some of the guiding assumptions of late colonial society: the notion of universal citizenship, that is, white man, of course; the belief inherited from Renaissance humanism that citizenship conferred a share in civic duties; the belief, expressed in the Declaration of Independence, in common and equally shared “human rights”; the Puritan doctrine of the "call," which called men to social duties as well as church membership. When Rhode Island, the last state to settle for democracy, introduced white male suffrage in 1842, hitherto restricted to homeowners and their children by state charter of 1663, it was written into the legislation's preamble as a return to the ideals embodied by Roger Williams, the founding Baptist of Providence Plantations. The 1830s was the decade democracy began, for Levels The Atlantic Chasm 359

turnout increased to accommodate the gradual expansion of the electorate. Two and a half million voters participated in the 1840 elections, more than double the number in 1832, while the population had grown by 30%. Democracy was as much a political style as a doctrine. The forceful populism - even vulgarity - of Andrew Jackson, elected president in 1828, set a new tone. This Tennessee Cincinnatus, this old soldier remembered from his farm to the civil service, with his plain words and rough manner ignited whoops of enthusiasm and mass enthusiasm; His methods shaped the global image of the presidential campaign until the late 20th century, when rallies and conventions were sanitized to allow safe viewing of television. Alexis de Tocqueville inherited American democracy when he arrived in 1831 determined to undertake a scholarly study of American society. Like other visitors, he criticized American customs; he sadly felt the need for an aristocracy to raise common standards. The result was dull cities, pompous oratories, elegant women, and barbaric table manners: meat before fish, and oysters for dessert. All travelers of this period found American customs rude; even in the best company, tobacco balls were chewed and the yellow juices spat out disgustingly. Dickens, who visited in 1842, found saliva-stained carpets in the White House. There seems to be hardly a remark from the United States on record in old world times without a lively comment on the hypocrisy of a people who spoke of equality and practiced slavery. Overall though, Tocqueville went home feeling that he had seen the future and found that it worked. Dickens was more skeptical: "a lover of freedom, disappointed" by what he saw; but even he found that the effects of spitting and slavery were mitigated by model prisons, decent schools, enlightened madhouses, and morality factories. Tocqueville was aware of the dangers of democracy: in ignorance and equality, a people could elect a tyrant. But, in his opinion, he felt that the United States was immune to risk and that other societies, steeped in aristocratic privilege, would sooner or later do the same. The sense of being a role model to the world shaped Americans' self-image and sustained the Union through all the trials of the century, including the Civil War. From an objective point of view, it might seem that only blatant hypocrisy could allow Lincoln to justify fratricidal wars and disregard for states' rights on the grounds that "the government...of the people is not of the land it must vanish". But in light of Americans' self-perceived calling as champions of republicanism and democracy, at a time when democracy was still the preserve of their own country and the world was far from safe for republicanism, the seeming paradox made sense. for all. In the long run, the spread of democracy would help restore the destiny described by John Gast in 1872, the spirit of "American progress."

on the march of white settlers west, following a telegraph wire as the land behind them is converted to agriculture. Symbols of technological progress run across the prairie. Instead of leading the march, the Native Americans flee to the left, shooting worried looks at their pursuers. No irony intended: the fervor for the Centennial was growing. moral unity of the Atlantean civilization that the revolutions of 1775-1828 had shaken or destroyed. In fact, the crisis of the Atlantean civilization was barely over when its fragments came back together. Noah Webster, the lexicographer who decided to reform the American language to make it less like English in England, regretted his decision; Anglo-American political cooperation helped ensure the victory of the rebels in the Latin American wars of independence. Having "created the New World to restore balance to the old", Britain enthusiastically embarked on a strategy of economic recolonization of the former Spanish Empire in its own name. As we shall see, the economic ties, intellectual exchanges, and human contacts that multiplied with the enormous increase in the volume of transatlantic migration in the nineteenth century were greater after independence than under colonial rule. Meanwhile, America, not forgetting about the ocean, turned west. Although the United States maintained its moral distance by taking a high stand against European imperialism, it practiced imperialism to pursue its "obvious destiny" in its own hemisphere. In the popular propaganda images The Atlantic Chasm 361, Manifest Destiny appears as an angelic figure spreading charity while leading the settlers; but he appeared as a different kind of angel to the exiles from Eden who filled the margins of the print when the United States invaded Indian, Canadian, and Mexican lands. Ironically, US imperialism was sanctified by democratic instincts. When William Hickling Prescott published his History of the Conquest of Mexico one hundred and fifty years ago, another conquest of Mexico was imminent. Prescott, befitting a sober and erudite Bostonian, lacked journalistic sensationalism. He didn't love or need current affairs; but as he searched for a new historical subject in the late 1830s, by the late 1830s work on the history of the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella seemed increasingly certain that the American-Mexican War would not be long in coming. On March 2, 1836, Texans of American descent proclaimed their independence from Mexico; After the humiliating defeat of the punitive expedition that followed and the capture of the Mexican leader, General Antonio de Santa Anna, who commanded it, the United States recognized the sovereignty of Texas. When Prescott decided in 1838 to devote his next project to an earlier conquest of Mexico, the Texas War continued to flicker on, with neither side officially abandoning it. Less than two years after Prescott's book was published, the United States announced the annexation of Texas and, on September 13, 1847, a new army.

of the gringo conquistadors invaded Mexico City. Like other New England intellectuals, Prescott was ambiguous about the morality of his country's politics. He did not go as far as Thoreau, who withheld his taxes and urged others to do the same, but when asked to write the history of this "second conquest" of Mexico, he replied: "I prefer not to involve myself with heroes, who have not been underground for at least two centuries. The success of his account of the first conquest, however, benefited from his haphazard punctuality, and despite Prescott's stated goal of judging the past by his own standards, his view of the Subject was obscured by the smoke of the South. The Aztec empire was doomed by Prescott's democratic lights: his fate may serve as conclusive proof that a government that does not depend on the sympathy of its subjects cannot last long; that human institutions, if not connected with human prosperity and progress, must fall, if not before the dawning light of civilization, then by the hand of violence, by violence from within, if not from without. And who will mourn his fall? Thus, subtly and without apparent violence against Prescott's vocation as a historian, the story of the conquest of Mexico became an excerpt from the times, the example of Cortés an encouragement to the Texan rebels, and the fate of Moctezuma a warning. General Santa Anna. Of course, there was no necessary connection between imperialism and democracy; Universal male suffrage was briefly introduced into European constitutions by the widespread, and consistently unsuccessful, "intellectual revolutions" of 1848. However, it spread relatively early to a declining imperial seat like Spain in 1868, or to the metropolises of burgeoning empires. like France. and Great Britain in 1871 and 1884 respectively, or to anti-imperialist states like Switzerland in 1874. This painful advance was made against deep prejudice. Embora democracy was sanctified by its origins in the world universally admired in classical antiquity, learned knights could hardly resent Aristotle's warning that "extreme democracy is tyranny", or Plato's that "democracy is at the bottom of the good constitutions, embarrass the best". . or Homer's that "it is not good to have dominion over many." A democratic right to vote in a monarchical state was, according to ancient wisdom, the worst combination: it was a major impediment in 19th-century Europe, where Switzerland was the only state still a republic at the time. Disraeli, who as UK Prime Minister greatly expanded British suffrage, identified the "fruits of democracy" with the typical rational reticence of European elites: impatience with taxes and increased spending; passionate wars ending in shameful peace; depreciated property; and restricted liberty. From our late 20th century perspective, when democracy has been cleansed of all the impurities of a dirty word, we forget how long it took democracy to rise to the top of the "despicable pole" of competing political systems.

(Video) Why should you read "One Hundred Years of Solitude"? - Francisco Díez-Buzo

The slow spread of the democratic principle continued in Europe until after World War I, when it was encouraged by the enormous political influence of American armies (see Chapter 13): Democracy in Europe may not need American patronage to succeed, but it certainly helped. Even so, the eastern side of the Atlantic was not safe for democracy until a virulent anti-democratic response was issued. Most of the great powers of continental Europe renounced democracy sometime between 1918 and 1940; in Western Europe it was not generally restored until after World War II, and even then it remained precarious in France and kept outside the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the countries on the south coast remained undemocratic or imperfectly democratic until the 1970s; Some did not return to the fold until the 1980s or 1990s. East of the Elbe, democracy was only restored after the 1989/91 revolutions (see Chapter 16). Nevertheless, democracy became a defining characteristic of the "western world", embodied in the political culture of some peoples, such as the British and the Swiss, and stamped as an ideal in that of others, such as the Hungarians and the Czechs. In the early 20th century, and with a renewed commitment after World War II, democracy became the glue of an Atlantic alliance that united like-minded states on both sides of the ocean in a defense agenda and a sense of shared values. (see Chapter 13). From the perspective of that time, when the Atlantean powers were concentrated around the ocean, while the ties that united the Atlantean peoples in friendship were fully restored by the World Wars and the Cold War, the Atlantean civilization seemed inevitably to have grown to dominate. modern times. history. The Rise of the West and The Triumph of the West were the titles of two of the most brilliant and successful stories in world history written during this period. However, the fragility of the ties of the "West" in its first three hundred years, the depth of the abyss opened by the revolutionary era, and the slow process of restoring moral unity and political interdependence, perhaps the guardians of the galactic universe. the museum will do things well, see another way. For them, the ocean-crossing colossus will be a latecomer among the wonders of the world, with a very short-lived supremacy. The next few chapters, this part of the book and the next, will chart a path across the bridges and fissures of Atlantean civilization through its long climacteric period. Chapter 12 THE BOUNTY VOYAGE: REDISTRIBUTING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES Dandelion Empires - Precious Resources - The Industrious East - The Snarling Tiger - The Industrial West Dandelion Empires Suppose Columbus was right. Assuming that the company he sailed with in 1492 was practical and his geographical assumptions were correct:

a world 25% smaller than it really is; a world without a New World; a direct ticket from Spain to China or Japan without an intermediate hemisphere; an easily accessible Orient, hastily recounted and vividly portrayed in his early Accounts of America, where Asiatic merchants appear in jaunty woodcut hats, consorting with naked natives. Had there not been a New World to restore the economic balance of the old, Western Christianity might have remained in the traditional position of inferiority in its relationship to Islam and China, perhaps lowering itself to a subservient position. Columbus, if he had reached Japan, would have been hailed as an exotic aberration and ridiculed for eating with his hands; and in China he would have been received as a primitive tributary with ridiculous gifts. Shortly after seizing control of much of America's vast under-exploited resource base, the peoples of Western Europe established the farthest empires the world has ever seen and, collectively, the most comprehensive civilizational hegemony ever achieved. Since the late 18th century, observers of the "Rise of the West" have questioned whether there is a connection between the American takeover and the Resource Revolution that obliterated millennial supremacy. An insider observer at a turning point in the trend was Scottish economist Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations appeared in the year of the United States Declaration of Independence and whose name has been synonymous with the cause of global free trade ever since. then. As an opponent of mercantilism, he could hardly be a friend of imperialism. He claimed that Britain would be better off with an independent America than an expensive and ruthless empire. He lamented that "it was not wisdom and politics, but the disorder and injustice of European governments that populated and cultivated America." Yet he could not join so many other European Enlightenment moralists in condemning American business in Europe in the strongest possible terms. He considered the discovery of a route across the Atlantic, along with the discovery of a sea route from Europe to Asia, the most important event in history and was convinced of its general usefulness. In particular, he saw American gold as a springboard for reverse fortunes, helping to offset Christianity's negative trade balance with Islam and China, while providing abundant natural resources and flourishing new markets for the exclusive domain of gold industries. Western and Central Europe. Despite its common sense, it is difficult to attribute the detailed facts to this hypothesis. New World markets, as we have seen, were small, and as they grew they moved further and further away from their original economies. The precious metal hardly made its merchants rich, and much of it benefited exporters in the Far East. It is true that the world's unrivaled lands are concentrated in the North American Midwest and along the Río de la Plata as producers of food in unprecedented quantities, but these regions

they were not explored until the mid-19th century. Colonial America was built on relatively inferior soil. The true treasures of the New World are sometimes referred to today as native food crops, particularly corn and potatoes, the staple food that revolutionized Old World diets. That's a compelling view, as we'll see shortly, but Western European civilization wasn't the only beneficiary of such treasures. If the United States made a difference, it was a difference that was delayed and marred by more complexity than is generally acknowledged. It must be understood in the context of a very slow change in the balance and distribution of global resources, unevenly paced and sometimes reinforced by irregular accelerations. Even today, markets bombarded by statistics make impressionistic judgments, and stocks or currencies rise or fall based as much on rumors as on their recorded performance. For most of our millennium, reputation was worth more than objectively measured wealth, and therefore, to the historian, qualitative evidence is better than quantitative. Even when economic historians have pieced together the statistics, the crucial numbers tell us less, because they tire us more, than the contemporaries' conjectures that actually shaped events. The revolution in economic prestige between, say, China and the West during the second half of our millennium is reflected in the astonished gazes from what we might call the windows of history, marveling at other people's wealth. One of China's earliest window-buyers, for example, was Fernão Mendes Pinto, the Portuguese Sinbad, who claimed to have sailed east as a knight of fortune from 1521 to 1558, penetrating every corner of the accessible Orient and surviving over shipwrecks. slavery, battles, storms on the road, and twists of fate that any reader could reasonably believe. His account of his adventures is a mocking masterpiece, with many charming asides, both sentimental and satirical. While his description of China in Voyages of Bounty 367 is no more verifiable than the rest of his book, it is a reflection of the country's image among his contemporaries. In the tingling of the senses excited by the excess of everything, there is even the story of an eyewitness who, for example, in the markets of Peking "went crazy" with the quantities of "silks, lace, canvas, cotton and linen ". clothes, sable and musk and ermine, delicate china, gold and silver plates, pearls and pearls, gold dust and gold ingots"; and as for base metals, precious stones, ivory, spices, spices and provisions, "well , all these things must be had in such abundance that I feel there are not enough words in the dictionary to name them all." Behold how generously the Lord our God shared with these insane men the fruits of the earth which he had made. For what generosity his name be praised forever." But this land of plenty gradually became, in the eyes of the West, a land of poverty where today the common citizen survives.

two-thirds of an American's daily calorie intake, and where Western students feel queasy after a few days eating in a university cafeteria. A few years ago, when the wife of American journalist Fox Butterfield dined with a friend in a provincial restaurant, "eight other diners, all men in patched and faded blue dresses, arranged their stools in a semicircle around the foreigners' table. Some Some of them joked, 'We felt like we were the entertainment for the night.'" The jealous and hungry eyes that Fernão Mendes once cast on Chinese markets are now reflected on Western visitors. Over the same period of some four centuries, the same contrast can be illustrated in the relative economic esteem expressed in Western sources for India and parts of the Middle East, once arousing Western greed and now arousing Western pity. the ongoing transition Really Recognize - you can really grasp some of the relevant changes that took place at a time that seems to have been crucial in reorienting Christianity towards traditional balances of production and trading conditions. It is here that statistics can be tentatively consulted to help confirm what the impressionistic evidence suggests: an increase in the number of human beings on a very broad front. In almost all places and times, except where the statistics are irrefutable, one can find sources deploring depopulation and labor shortages; Therefore, when contemporary observers join, or at least join freely, in claiming otherwise, they deserve respect. The eighteenth century had many prophets of depopulation, particularly in certain rural areas from which immigrants fled or in urban areas where thousands were burned by the plague. Overwhelming, however, is the general trend of Thomas Malthus, portrayed by J. Linnell in 1833, the year before his death, as the internationally renowned wise old man. His Eminence was based solely on the Essay on Population, which remained his only substantial work. The son of a Rousseauian perfectionist, he formulated his sinister version of humanity's future in response to the philosophy he was taught. He borrowed his statistical projections from the arch-optimist of the Enlightenment, the Marquis de Condorcet. In fact, Condorcet's interpretation of rapid population growth as a symptom of a stage of "progress" is reversible.

with increasing prosperity it proved more consistent with trends observed since then than Malthus's belief that only a catastrophe could avert overpopulation (see p. 723). he was recognized as ascendant. In many places, it rose far enough and fast enough to induce Malthusian nightmares. In the second half of the century, when demographic change can be documented in detail across the board, the population skyrocketed. In 1837, a British researcher reported that the population of the lower Ganges delta had doubled under British rule since 1765, while that of Madras had increased at about the same rate as that of Wales. According to official census figures, which are obviously underestimates, the population of the Chinese empire increased from 275 million in 1779 to 430 million in 1850; an even larger increase is likely over the last half century, but difficult to estimate due to lack of data. Economic theorists in China vied to praise the growing number of producers or to predict Malthusian effects. Taking Eastern and Western Christianity together, the number is expected to rise from just over 140 million to nearly a quarter billion in the century after 1750. Thomas Malthus's fateful theories were therefore out of time: a voice who wept for the absence of a desert, a serious and sensible minister scrutinizing with anxious charity a serious new world of overpopulation tempered by catastrophe. In the United States, where far fewer were disproportionately affected by immigration, the total doubled in the second half of the 18th century and then doubled again to about 59 million in 1850. For Islam west of the India, the evidence is conflicting: collapse in parts of Iran, Syria and Palestine, carnage in plague-stricken cities that 'devoured' people, outbreak in rural Egypt and European Turkey; but generalizations in the past about overall decline have been made too lightly. Neither the expansion nor the rhythm of the demographic jump can be convincingly explained. General phenomena require general explanations, but this population growth has occurred in too many different settings and in too many different economic contexts for these explanations to be reliable. Some consequences are clearer than the causes: during the 18th and 19th centuries as a whole, Europe's relative share of the world's human resources rose dramatically from around a fifth to over a quarter, despite rapid growth. of the population in some parts of Asia. If we include the United States and other Atlantic destinations of European emigrants, the constituent states of the "Atlantean civilization" probably comprised more than a third of humanity in 1900. Much of this relative growth came at the expense of parts of Islam: the slow rearrangement of the demographic classification relationship of Islam and Christianity, which, as we saw above,

(Chapter 3) seems to have begun to gain momentum in the late Middle Ages. For example, it helps to understand the demise of the Ottoman Empire among the world's great powers to know that the ratio of its population to that of Europe as a whole fell from perhaps about 1:6 in 1600 to about 1:10 in year. 1800. .Space makes people phyloprogenitive. Population growth in the United States was fueled by exceptionally high immigration and birth rates. Therefore, it can be said that the New World increased the human resources of Western civilization by increasing its space resources. Furthermore, in the temperate parts of the Americas (and the lush lands farther away in New Zealand and south-eastern Australia), space could be colonized by European food crops and livestock, eventually making these regions providers of food for the world. In this transplant of old world ecosystems, wheat was key; throughout the world it remains by far the dominant staple food of humanity. Almost as important as weeds, particularly purslane and English foot, they created what Alfred Crosby brilliantly called "dandelion kingdoms." Weeds "healed the gaping wounds opened by invaders," bound the soil together, protected it from erosion and desiccation, replenished "empty eco-niches," and fed imported livestock. Not far from the kingdoms of dandelions are the supply lands of the kingdom of candy. Hoffmann and Tchaikovsky's fantasy land was replete with transplanted coffee and sugar and native New World chocolate. Of the products that the kingdom's court dances represented, only tea had no associations with the New World, and even then. Where they could not control production or transfer it to areas they did control, Europeans continued to be supplicants for exotic goods throughout the modern era: be it negotiating concessions to buy nutmeg and mace, as in the Dutch engraving of a merchant from the XVII century. with the Sultan of Ternate (see pp. 321-327) or, in the early 19th-century scene, top-hatted European merchants haggling for samples in a Chinese tea warehouse. Voyages of Bounty 371 had a similar story: it was transplanted from China to India and mass-produced through plantation production. However, two caveats should be heeded: First, the inclusion of American space very gradually contributed to a "Western" power advantage over other civilizations throughout the 19th century, as more productive spaces and the chasm of land were colonized. value divided the Atlantean world. , was re-evaluated. Second, a significant part of the additional productive capacity of the New World lay not in the extent of the land, nor even in its quality or adaptability to an imported ecology, but in the native crops that could sprout and be grown elsewhere. In other words, it was an exportable form of productive capacity. In China, where space was scarce,

even in the settled suburbs and highlands of the early modern period, population growth was greatly aided by America's new adapted food sources. In the 18th century, corn and sweet potatoes became staple foods for the poor in faraway provinces. PRECIOUS RAW MATERIALS The impact of these harvests was felt in a Chinese landscape rocked by a disturbing and sometimes violent state revolution. An incident from 1645 shows what was happening: Huang T'ung, a poor relative of a powerful rural clan, planned an attack on his urban relatives in revenge for desecrating his father's grave. Together with the tenants "for the fun of settling their petty grievances", he stormed into the district capital and, after looting and bloodshed, tore down part of the walls. Serfdom, undermined by peasant revolts in the 1640s, was gradually abolished. In 1681 peasants could no longer be sold along with the land they farmed, but were free to "do as they please." The last vestiges were swept away at the beginning of the 18th century. It made tavern life less attractive. Land was still valued as a source of prestige or security, but agriculture was despised as "the work of fools," while peasant rebellion made rent-collecting a "way to be feared." Lands fragmented by divisible inheritance were no longer restored by individuals determined to accumulate traditional inheritances. Eighteenth-century China became more and more of a "small farmer's world." Rural investment took the form of loan sharking by city moneylenders to lend for seed crops. It began a story of enmity between the town and the countryside that continues to this day. These conditions favored the proliferation of crops of American origin, perhaps because their farmers were able to exploit marginal lands out of reach of problems, or because the growing independence of farmers facilitated attempts at cultivation. Occasionally production was encouraged by officials eager to feed the growing population while increasing their own tax revenue. It is said that in 1594, a governor of Fukien recommended sweet potatoes when more conventional crops failed. In the 1770s, officials in Hunan, urgently encouraging double cropping in rice fields, warned that the lack of arid land available for further production could be made up for by growing maize and sweet potatoes in the hills. These plants reached China incredibly quickly after their discovery in the United States, so quickly that some scholars insist on earlier, undocumented transmission. Initially they were treated as exotics of little practical use. Known as "precious grain", corn may have arrived by two independent routes: overland from the west as tribute brought by western frontiersmen and first mentioned in 1555; and by sea to Fukien, where a visiting Augustinian saw them grow in 1577. In a standard early seventeenth-century agricultural compendium it was little more than a footnote. First mentioned in Yunnan, near the Burmese border, in the 1560s, the sweet potato may have arrived overland from the south. Its taste had a bad reputation among the Han Chinese, but it was especially appreciated.

in the Fukien mountains by immigrants and later in Hunan by native and foreign settlers. In the 18th century, along with corn, it transformed much of China. The previously forested uplands of the Yangtze River basin were developed for cash crops (indigo and jute) by "hut people" who subsisted on corn grown on the sunny side of their slopes and yams on the shady side. Similar results emerged from the complementarity of these cultures in Fukien, Szechuan, and Hunan. By the turn of the century, sweet potatoes had conquered enough palates that Beijing street vendors were selling them boiled and roasted. Even in China, corn and yams were only a supplement, not a substitute, for the native staple, rice; They had the effect of expanding, not replanting, cultivated land. In the rest of the world, its impact was even more limited. India has rejected both, and nowhere has the sweet potato been more widely adopted than in China. In the Middle East, in the late 18th century, maize became a staple food for Egyptian farmers who grew other crops just to pay their taxes, but in the rest of the region maize remained a marginal crop. In Europe, which had privileged access to New World agronomy, corn was unsuited to the climate of many of the best lands and unpalatable to people elsewhere. It was of limited but vital importance in the Balkans, where in the 18th century it enabled life at relatively high altitudes, effectively nurtured self-governing communities beyond the reach of Ottoman tax collectors and the reach of Ottoman administrators, and it fostered the future political independence of Greece, Serbia, and Romania from their mountain cradles. Indeed, in this corner of Europe, one American asset arguably may have contributed directly to adjusting the border with Islam in favor of Christianity. Voyages of Bounty 373 Potatoes surpass corn in nutritional value. Both crops have a significantly higher caloric yield than any other staple food except rice, which is almost the same, but potatoes, unlike corn, provide all the nutrients humans need. Thanks to the adaptation of this Andean root vegetable, the influence of New World cultures on Old World regional agricultural sciences was probably greatest in northern Europe, where the potato achieved a dominance that maize never could in China, and rye was supplanted as the diet of a vast swath of humanity from Ireland across the northern plains of Europe to Russia. It was propagated by war, when peasants escaped requisition by gathering crops that could remain hidden in the ground and subsisting on potatoes when other foods were scarce. Experimented with success in the Basque Country and Ireland, the potato began its wartime career of conquest in Belgium in the 1680s, under the influence of Louis XIV and his quest for a healthy French frontier. The turmoil of the next century seeded him in Germany and Poland, and the Napoleonic wars took him to Russia, where he conquered territories that Napoleon could not subdue with the entire Grande Armée. The area planted with potatoes increased with each European war up to and including World War II. On his way, he had the patronage of scholars and monarchs.

Catherine the Great endorsed it in 1765. Marie Antoinette -mistakenly considered the patroness of the cake to the masses- made its virtues known by wearing potato flowers on her dress. She supported some of the surplus populations from industrialization and urbanization in the 19th and 20th centuries in Germany and Russia. In Ireland, the failure of it in 1845-46 freed immigrant workers for the British and American industrial revolutions. Thus, it can be said that he helped make possible the new means of production that gave the 19th century West a competitive advantage with the rest of the world. Other New World products, without achieving mainstream status, reached mass markets and helped transform cultures. Peanuts fascinated the Chinese because they "were born from flowers that fell to the ground" and had seeds like silkworm cocoons. Ideal for the sandy soils south of the Yangtze River, they might have been exploited as a staple food, but perhaps because of their mysterious generation, they remained a luxury endowed with magical properties by reputation: "long-lived nuts" used at banquets in Beijing they were considered indispensable at the end of the 18th century. Tomatoes enriched the palette of Mediterranean cuisine, and chilies accentuated the tastes of Indian and Thai cooks in a part of the world where other American plants found surprisingly unappealing. Two other products of the New World have made important long-term contributions to the redistribution of the world's resources. The first was tobacco. A weed destined to go up in smoke was a fitting symbol of vanity in early modern Europe. A Dutch emblem book of 1627, for example, showed the tobacco emblem from James Cats' illustrations of popular moral philosophy, Proteus ofte Minee-Beilden Altered to Sinne-beelden (1627). The properties of tobacco were considered more digestive than erotic; Cupid carries the pipe and the smoker's bag because tobacco, like love, is a fleeting pleasure that soon goes up in smoke. pid as natural tobacco. But as a means of spreading the use of opium, since the pipe in which the opium was mixed turned out to be an ideal medium for inhaling the drug, tobacco played an important role in reversing the traditionally favorable conditions of the Chinese trade in the 19th century (see Chapter 10). ). Quinine also played an important role in the "Rising of the West", helping to equip the white man to dominate the tropics. A Native American malaria remedy borrowed in the 17th century by a Peruvian viceroy desperate to save the life of his wife was transplanted to India in the 19th century and cultivated under plantation conditions for industrial processing. Traveling the Bounty 375^ ESTHIONMO^AL, ™ Si ei Chocolate breaks the Ecleliafric Fast. I try other sweet drinks andyieß'vßn in several Provinces p. Gama uA-yniané^y Haro Conde de Caflri fó de m Can':í-u-Ma#.

Comendador ¡fé'ía Ofre'rta dé 'of Conféjpjdé'Esìadcv Cjuérra Cahüfay CarnarayQové-nadoK detR¿afde' (a/ India/. 'or eíLie. Antonio ~^0 de Leon Pimío. \tùetr.iil:ci)s quÀl 'InM .erg. IvTTx old. X*n"ihxjuß?^n ÇîefzçaUz .AiU. :03o.] The "moral problem" posed by chocolate and addressed by Antonio León Pinelo in this work of 1Ó36 was whether one could drink a cup of chocolate before mass without breaking fasting. But he took a broad view, suggesting that chocolate is not only a moral threat because it's nutritious, but also because it's luxurious. The controversy was serious: it sparked the riots in Mexico described in the text. In an oddly parallel story to that of quinine, discovered by the conquistadors at the court of Moctezuma, industrial processes transformed chocolate from a luxurious drink into a concentrated source of energy for mass consumption in the West.The first doubts among Westerners who experienced whether it was really a source of food are illustrated by a curious seventeenth-century controversy concerning its permissibility during fasting.In a work of 1648 generally credited with introducing England to the In the virtues of chocolate, Thomas Gage recounted the ramifications of this controversy in a remote New Spain diocese, where the bishop tried to prevent ladies from coming in with full glasses to cool off during mass. When the excommunication failed, he caused a riot in the cathedral by ordering the priests to stop the distribution of chocolate, and when he mysteriously died, rumors persisted that a poisoned cup of chocolate was to blame. "And then it became a saying in this country: 'Beware of Chiapas chocolate!'" The new drinks spawned by imperialism and world trade created new social rituals and reinforced old ones. Tea, coffee and chocolate had to be prepared in an elaborate way and served in a decorative way. In these 18th century Catalan tiles, it is more difficult for a groom who does not have a cup of chocolate to attract the attention of a lady than for the most gifted.

counterparts While Gage, who knew chocolate in its natural habitat, found it a good economic stimulant, he also conveyed its adaptability to a unique market. He described blended concoctions with cinnamon, cloves, and almonds that would be enjoyed in Europe, as well as dark chocolate and chili stews that were traditional native recipes. The high status of the drink in 18th century Europe surrounded the consumption of chocolate with rituals of social differentiation and images of wealth. At the Barcelona Ceramics Museum, period tiles painted in honor of the cult of chocolate show goblets offered by wigged, kneeling gentlemen to sumptuously dressed ladies beside the fountains of a Hortus Conclusus pavilion. To materialize its potential as a cheap food, it was necessary to create mechanized factories to press the cocoa bean; such factories existed in Barcelona and Bologna in the last decade of the eighteenth century, but they continued to produce an expensive product for an exclusive clientele. It was also important to create the right cultural climate. The technology came from continental Europe: from Spain and Italy, where cocoa presses were first mechanized; from Holland, where Conrad van Houten made Voyages of Bounty 377 der cocoa powder; from Switzerland, where the Caillier and Nestlé families, by marriage, joined to produce milk chocolate. But it was the English Quaker cocoa farmers who did the most to revolutionize the attitudes of society. In 18th and early 19th century England, civil deficiencies forced Quakers into business. She was especially drawn to the chocolate business because of cocoa's potential as a mild drink. Reducing the price and affordability of the product to mass market levels was a task that, for families like the Frys of York or the Cadburys of Bournville, linked God with profit. The chocolate bar, introduced by Frys in 1847, was the natural result. The entire history of chocolate, from colonial harvest to industrial product, is encapsulated in Roald Dahl's fictional chocolate factory, inspired by the work of American inventor and candy millionaire Milton Snavely Hershey. Here, cutting-edge technology magically combines with the labor of a small race of slaves. The full effects were not felt nearly a century after the first bars: During World War II, quinine pills and Hershey bars helped Americans run successful campaigns in tropical environments. THE INDUSTRIAL EAST Quinine and Chocolate: Colonial Florilegium plants transformed by technology over long stages into powerful expanses of resources Roald Dahl's hero Willie Wonka climbs to the banks of the Chocolate River "where everything was edible" to recruit" hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of little "Oompa-Loompas" for his chocolate factory The Oompa-Loompas are a rather ambiguous picture of the effects of exploiting colonial settings for consumer goods: in Mr Wonka's chocolate factory they are effectively trapped and enslaved, and still exude happiness and enjoyment.

Loyalty. Illustration is by Michael Foreman for Charlie and the Great Glass Elevator. 378 THE ATLANTIC CRISIS Atlantean civilizations: remember how much the Industrial Revolution contributed to the material advantages of the Western world in the recent past. Yet even in the eighteenth century, the world's great industrial centers were in China and India, where traditional technology could support enormous concentrations of production and remarkable degrees of specialization. There was no "workshop in the world" yet, but the largest workshops in the world were in the East. For example, according to early 19th-century accounts, the Beneficial and Beautiful wholesale company, founded two hundred years earlier by Mr. Wang of Hangchow, increased its sales of fabric to a million lengths a year by offering deep discounts to tailors. The Lord. Wang employed 4,000 weavers and spinners several times as many. Their dyeing and finishing were organized in a large shopping center outside Chang Gate, where in 1730 10,900 workers gathered among 340 contractors, "and for two hundred years there has not been a place, north or south, that had benefited and beautiful fabric not considered beautiful. Other businesses were organized on a similar scale. An 18th-century porcelain center in Kiangsu province "shaked the ground with the noise of tens of thousands of mortars." In Szechuan there were smithies that they employed two or three thousand men.In Kwangtung, water-powered hammers struck incense "effortlessly. In Kiangsi, hundreds of similar rice husking machines lined up. In Fukien, the water-powered papermakers buzzed "in a class of their own both in terms of technical skill but in terms of volume of production and degree of development specialization, some eighteenth-century Indian industries hardly less impressive than China In Bengal, where it seemed to a British examiner that "every man, woman or child in every village engaged in cloth-making", each main variety was produced by a different sub-caste.At Kurnool, on the Krishna River , it is said that between 30,000 and 60,000 miners gathered in a town with a total population of just 100,000.At the height of their production in the mid-17th century, shipyards in the Maratha states would have made 200 warships for King Shi vaji A Dutch silk mill at Kasimbazar in Bengal, employing 700 or 800 workers, followed fewer European precedents than the official Mongol-sponsored textile mills oles to supply rich fabrics for the imperial wardrobe. While the tax demands of the Mughal state, which demanded perhaps 50 percent of the Empire's gross product, may seem dismal by conventional European economic standards to any flourishing industrial spirit, they may in fact have encouraged concentration of production through the concentration of demand and the creation of a vast administrative class with trips exceeding 379 Bounty

purchasing power. Although most Indians wore skimpy clothing, skimpy shoes, and modest homes by European standards in a country where, according to a 16th-century envoy, "pigs lie better than all men," the size of the market kept demand high. . . The habit of hoarding undoubtedly inhibited trade, but one aspect of the prevailing value system favored the production of artisans in a society where women were "handcuffed with gold and silver, the stocking with brass and glass" and where jewelry was compulsory. made of gold, or at least of copper, ivory, shell, metal, or bell tin, "even if the whole family starve." Consequently, in the eighteenth century India was a major exporter of manufactures - the Mughal Empire was almost certainly the most prolific state in the world in terms of manufactures for export - despite the modest technical equipment with which its industries. Indian workers cut bolts without a lathe and make unspun muslin. Water powered mills were rare, cast iron unknown. Even the Maratha shipyards were a scrap business with an ad hoc workforce. In 1675, the English physician John Fryer observed with fascination an Indian coral worker in Surat bent over his work, "the hands and feet were all vices and the other tools misshapen pieces of iron." Nearby, a Muslim cut all kinds of precious stones, except diamonds, with a sharpened wheel filled with molten lacquer and powdered stone. Some of the same incentives and restrictions coincided with industrial development in the Middle East. Here, too, raw materials abounded; The vitality of the luxury market impressed all European visitors. The selectivity of Turkish talent for industry and the backwardness of technical inventiveness in important trades were well described by a keenly critical observer in 1807, at a time when the empire seemed to be reeling under the effects of the Wahhabi revolt: I do not know if Europe can do the same, but it certainly can't beat them in several of their manufactures. Satins, silks and velvets from Bursa and Aleppo, twills and camels from Angora, crepes and chiffons from Thessaloniki, patterned muslins from Constantinople, rugs from Smyrna and silks, linens and cottons from Cairo, Chios, Magnesia, Tocat and Castanbol provide an atmosphere favorable but not unfair judgment of your skill and general industry. "In many of the menial trades" the Turkish workers were equal to those of France, but, as in India, their methods were narrow-minded. "They still practice whatever they find practiced, but because of inertia in innovation they have not introduced or encouraged many useful arts of later invention." The industrial potential that the region still had was destroyed by European competition. According to a mid-18th century navigator, 380 THE ATLANTIC CRISIS 'Britain Receives the Riches of the East' by Spiridione Roma, 1778. Commissioned by the East India Company for the ceiling of the Company's Committee of Revenue Room

Based on Leadenhall Street in London, the painting is a curious mix of the classical and the exotic. The river god in the foreground is modeled after Father Tiber. Hermes tops the tributary row, headed by India with pearls, while other bearers feature Chinese porcelain, a tea box, bales of unspecified contents, spice capsules, an elephant, and a camel. Bairam, the expansive consumption habits of local figures, mainly benefited French importers. In the second half of the century, the Ottoman Empire's shipping trade passed entirely into foreign hands, mainly French, English, and Venetian hands; In 1775, Tunisian porters gave up their heroic efforts to defeat protectionism and the dirty tricks of the Marseillaise trade. Persian silk and Egyptian linen declined or disappeared from export lists. Although India was somewhat better equipped than the Middle East to experience an industrial revolution, the magnitude of its own industrial collapse during the same period is staggering. The ancient flow of silver from Westerners to India was reversed in Bengal in the 1770s. In 1807 John Crawfurd reported that useful businesses in Bengal were replaced by "kite makers, falconers, astrologers and snake charmers". in British India." The analysis of a French missionary was candid and forceful: Europe is no longer dependent on India, having learned to defeat the Hindus on their own soil, even in their most distinguished manufactures and industries, of which they have always we depend on you. In fact, the tables have been reversed and this revolution threatens to completely ruin India. With a precision rare in history, India's industrial debacle coincided with the establishment of British domination or hegemony over most of the world. part of the subcontinent, and in particular over its former industrial heartland. The speed of change astounded contemporaries. For Edmund Burke, this was one of the "incredible revolutions that have occurred in our age of wonders." Its dual, political nature and commercial, adorns the roof of East India House in London's Leadenhall Street, where Britannia, enthroned, accepts the riches of the East from a pathetic procession leading hoarded by Indians, neglecting the present plate of inspected jewels and pearls. The question naturally arises: how, if anything, were India's political and economic fortunes linked? Economic explanations for India's industrial frustration are best addressed by comparing it to China, where industry was just as productive and specialized, and even more technically competent. Indian technology, like Chinese technology, may have been caught in what Mark Elvin called a "high-level equilibrium trap." Industries that met huge demands with traditional technologies had no room to increase production through mechanization. Britain managed to triple cotton production between the 1740s and 1770s from a low plateau. A similar increase in Chinese production would have swamped the world. The total global supply of raw cotton would not have been enough to meet a comparable increase in Chinese demand. In the 1770s or 1780s, only one Chinese province imported

annually, on average, six times more cotton than all of industrialized Britain. Cheap labor is good for an industrial revolution, but cheap capital is better. In the "proliferative" worlds of India and China, labor costs relative to capital costs may have been too low for the industry to thrive. There was no point in spending the latter to save on the former. As Elvin identifies it, "a rational strategy for farmers and merchants was not so much toward labor-saving machines as toward saving resources and fixed capital." Typical of this pitfall was the experience of a Chinese official in 1742, who suggested saving the peasants under his care four-fifths of their labor by installing copper pumps at the head of a well; Horrified by the immobilization of so much hard wealth, the peasants preferred to continue drawing water by hand. The frustration some of us feel today in our continued reliance on internal combustion engines and fossil fuels shows how progress can be held back by the inertia of inferior technologies that, like evil, suffice even today. 382 THE ATLANTIC CRISIS Explanations such as these, which focus on the immobility of certain Asian economies or on the traditionalism of some Asian technologies, can satisfy curiosity about the limits of the expansion of the industrial revolution. They seem insufficient to explain the industrial extinction of India, the "de-industrialization" of India under British rule. Some contemporaries tried to exonerate the new masters by claiming that the economic problems began before they arrived. The decline of the Mughal empire, pierced at its heart by Persian and Afghan invaders, frayed at the edges by usurping officials and tribal warfare, deprived native industries of courtly markets. After the sack of Nadir Shah »« »These animals are faithfully represented as we saw them in the Holy Land«, says Breydenbach's 1486 Pilgrim's Guide about this illustration. The illustrator admits that the baboon's name is unknown, but the confusion between the different monkey species was understandable at the time. the baboon, the orangutan,

and gorillas were considered part of humanity at different times: the human capabilities of this specimen are suggested by its use of a stick as a tool and its ability to tame a camel. Opinions on the Hottentots were divided, but Sebastian Cabot's 1544 world map romanticized them as participants in Renaissance conversation, wearing decent trousers and wielding tools. Indeed, the jurists and theologians of the Late Middle Ages seem to have worked for a world in which no "barbarian" was excluded from the communitas mortalium, the category that encompasses all of humanity - in which, according to a famous tautology of the 16th century, "all the peoples of mankind are people." Darwin preferred little Jenny, with her pretty clothes and shy self-control, to the stubborn Fuegians, but earlier observers were less discerning, espousing classical body shapes and postures. around the Strait of Magellan, where Darwin alone saw a greater difference between savage and savage... civilized man than between a savage and a domesticated animal." Early observers viewed the practice of social nudity with reverence, as a vestige of a golden age of forest innocence sung of by classical poets, or as evidence of nearly flawless prehistory. - lapsaria. For Darwin, the same phenomenon was another example of animal adaptation, which allowed the Fuegians to endure the intense cold of their habitat without clothing. The apes rose to help him gather. novel in which an orangutan was the hero. Peacock was a comic genius and historian, a satirist of the "steam intellect" and a promoter of steam navigation. His ape character Sir Oran Haut-Ton revealed the dilemma of making a clear distinction between the wild and the beast. As Sir Oran seemed to have all rational faculties beyond the use of language, he developed a reputation as a "deep thinker, but be cautious"; for which he was elected to Parliament and raised to the barony. The clever name alludes to the idea that orangutans could be taught to play the flute, a view held by Lord Monboddo (died 1799), the great champion of ape humanity, whose theory of social development taught humans gradually to animals, was similar to, and perhaps contributed to, aspects of Darwinism. It was fitting that this species of ape was so adamant about its association with humans, since the Malay root of the name orangutan means "man of the forest." If orangutans could be welcomed into the herd of humanity, pygmies or Hottentots or other unfavorable groups might be excluded; in practice, however, pre-evolutionary methods of classification tended to err on the inclusive side, albeit with many exceptions.

STATE OF NATURE Natural man was later replaced by the noble savage, the primitive exemplar whose social and moral world could teach his civilized cousins ​​how to behave. But his ascent hasn't been smooth, fast or unimpeded. The foreigner, whether good Samaritan or merciful barbarian, has always been used by moralists to point out the shortcomings of audiences and readers; However, the idea that primitives could provide useful social models seems to have arisen in Western Christianity in the late Middle Ages and early Modern Ages, due to the unprecedented variety of contacts between travelers or settlers and cultures they perceived. like savages. In a famous phrase, Jules Michelet characterized the Renaissance as the time of the "discovery of the world and of man." He was referring to man's individuality and the newly realized nature of man's superiority over the rest of creation, the concept of "the measure of all things" and the vague collective narcissism of "What kind of thing is man?" men!" He combined geographical discoveries with what amounted to the speculations (or reasoning) of moral philosophy. But there was also a "discovery of man" in another sense. Geographical discoveries brought with them anthropological revelations. Expanding the frame of reference of the discussion Cemeteries of certainty 473 - ~ f c .-* •••ym--.^-iii^p.-i-~.-— .•. -- » #. : • • • . . ^ . ,.-,., If there were doubts about the relationship between humans and apes, it is not surprising that some newly discovered races of the Late Middle Ages were slow to establish their place in the landscape of humanity according to European classification schemes. Sebastian Cabot, however, seems to have had no doubts about the status of the Hottentots when he compiled his 1544 world map, which shows them armed with staves and engaging in civil conversation. This contributed to adjustments in the self-confidence of those interested in philosophy. The origins of both scientific ethnography and the myth of the noble savage—to cite two contrasting examples rich in implications for the development of traditions about man's relationship to the created world and to the metaphysical world—are commonly attributed to the discovery of Amerindians. and the debates they sparked. Like most of the supposed characteristics of the Renaissance, the "discovery of man" in this sense lies deeper in the Middle Ages. The encounters with the blacks and, in particular, with the natives of the Canaries, which took place during the first Atlantic exploration in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, mark a decisive beginning. When their homelands and societies were first exposed to European explorers, blacks as individuals were a familiar sight that could easily be placed in a category not far removed from apes, as humans degenerated by sin. The tradition of the sons of Ham being cursed with blackness and condemned to slavery strengthened the mind.

The associations evoked by a "diabolical" color are generally preferred to represent demons and denote sin. The Portuguese chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara found the first slaves shipped directly from Africa "so deformed in their faces and bodies that they almost resemble shadows from the underworld." Despite, or perhaps because of direct contact with black societies, these images were difficult to dispel (see Chapter 6). The Venetian traveler Alvise Da Mosto, writing in the early second half of the fifteenth century, was almost singularly sensitive to the virtues of black civilization observed among the Wolof of the Senegambia region. Although their towns and villages consisted solely of thatched huts, they were recognizable as urban. And the caciques were true "lords" because "such men are lords, not by virtue of any treasure or money, but by ceremonies and following men, they can truly be called lords." Da Mosto emphasized the impressive courtly ritual of the cacique, whom he called Budomel, of whose friendship he spoke with pride. Budomel rode, went everywhere with two hundred men, frightened his subjects with his haughty behavior and his arbitrary power, and was courted by servile suitors, who constantly shook their heads when they addressed him. On the other hand, Da Mosto seems to have no doubts about the general inferiority of blacks. He ridiculed his scanty clothing, scorned his bestial table manners ("they eat like animals on the floor"), dismissed them as cheats and liars, and criticized them as incorrigible lust. Budomel, impressed by the white man's mysterious knowledge, asked Da Mosto to tell him how to please more women. Even to minds accustomed to the permissive and accommodating categories of humans and subhumans developed or adopted by medieval encyclopedists, the discovery of canaries was a sudden and startling phenomenon. The native breeds are now extinct and the evidence for their origins is conflicting, but they were probably a pre-Berber people of North Africa, similar perhaps to the Znaga of the western Sahara coast today. When European visitors began making ethnographic observations in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they attracted much more interest than did black societies; The Canaries provided a much better copy for humanists and missionaries sensitive to the splendor of natural man. The author of the oldest known account of how Columbus faced the Taínos of the Antilles 150 years later noticed his nudity for the first time. Giovanni Boccaccio, who copied the text in 1341, understood it as a sign of innocence rather than savagery: they were shown gold and silver coins, but they were ignored. They were equally innocent of knowledge of weapons. They respected natural law. They seemed to ignore individual ownership but shared everything equally. They spoke a "polite" language like the Italians, sang sweetly, and danced "almost like the French." Their homes, actually caves or huts, are said to have been "wonderfully ingenious". His "temple or oratory" was adorned with a suspiciously classical-sounding statue, the likeness of a

man carved in stone with spear in hand. Finally, as if these guarantees were not enough, there is no room for doubts about the human condition and the rationality of the indigenous people. They were physically "normal"; This was important because the encyclopedist Albertus Magnus had denied that reason could exist in a monstrous structure. And they were "of great understanding." Boccaccio's humanist utopia, which transformed this early narrative of hitherto unknown primitives into a golden age setting and a reminder of his time, was an influential image. At the beginning of the 15th century, when the first permanent European settlements were established in the archipelago, the illuminator of Roman de la Rose's Vienna Codex apparently chose the Canary Islands as the setting for his version of that happy time, with aborigines amidst trees. and mountains. peace. However, not all perceptions were equally generous. During the 15th century, missionary and humanist writers had to defend the native Canaries against comments from slaveholders, conquistadors, and colonists, who compared them to dogs and apes and accused them of barking or howling, poor table manners, and raw food. . food, much like Sir John Mandeville's hairy race of islanders who "eat raw meat and fish." Traditional heraldic savages (see Chapter 5) became almost naked islanders, bearing the crest of a conquering family. In practice, the negative evaluations of the Canary Islands overlapped. When the interest of missionaries and humanists was diverted by the discovery of more numerous and promising primitives in America, the Rose's canaries represent a rosier version of the wild man image than was common at the time. See page 180. Here the natural activities engaged in by these happy savages include hunting, gathering, and sexual intercourse. The landscape and the combination of troglodyte dwellings and rudimentary huts, together with the serene innocence of the characters portrayed, suggest the influence of Franciscan and humanist representations of the world of the recently rediscovered Canary Islands. shortly before the annihilation. As the Native American debate raged, the relevance of the Canary Islands was all but forgotten. In the late 16th century, when the islanders were nearly extinct, some ethnographic information was collected by amateur antiquarians, perhaps borrowing from the great collections of missionaries in the New World. In a work from the 1590s, a Dominican apologist, Alonso de Espinosa, tried to demonstrate the natural piety of the Indians before the conquest. In other literature, born from stories or memories of the Canary Islands, his image is completely abstracted from reality and adapts to the fashionable words of another popular genre of the time: pastoral literature. In a play by Lope de Vega and in the poems of the elegist shepherds of the early seventeenth century, the Canary Islands did not live a real life, but rather a bucolic idyll, in an idealized simplicity, animated by timid love affairs. "nature man"

he had succumbed to another even less accurate literary stereotype. In the meantime, however, the United States had resumed demand for valuable images from both primitive and up-to-date sources of supply. Almost immediately after first meeting the peoples of the New World, while mentally struggling to fit them into his supposed image of humanity, Columbus developed three mutually incompatible views. On one level, his nakedness suggested animality, fit only for exploitation or enslavement; in others, he reminded her of the nakedness of Saint Francis of Assisi undressing in a public square to show his total dependence on God, or the naked simplicity of the golden age, innocent and almost innocent. From this initial conflict of perceptions grew all the later inconsistencies of Columbus's native politics, which in reality hovered between reverence and contempt. The same uncertain range was reflected in the voices in the ensuing debate over how to deal with Native Americans. Their great diversity was astounding. Even during his first brief Caribbean cruise, Columbus was acutely aware of the vast differences between the simple and impoverished material culture of the Bahamas and the relative opulence of Hispaniola, with its stone patios, carved thrones, and formal political ranks. The continent included examples of every type of government known to man, including some (city dwellers, stone buildings with specialized economies, and large professional and academic classes) that seemed to demonstrate arts and virtues that European viewers would recognize as of the highest. level. . Albrecht Dürer thought Aztec looting equaled any craft he had seen; his ideal city seems to have been modeled on reports from Tenochtitlan. For the capitals of his palace, begun in 1527, a bishop of Liège was inspired by Aztec masks. Amidst this diversity, he continued his search for truly "natural" humans, hunted like Amazons in the remaining spaces of the map. As Miranda imagined the man's potential, Caliban's snort could be heard in the background. The idealized image of the natural man with which observers of Christianity approached the New World in the sixteenth century as an instinctive being, regulated by passions rather than laws, and according to the observer's prejudices, demonstrates that the general fallen condition of man could, or more commonly, his God-given goodness in a state untouched by society. Such expectations were frustrated by the frustrations of imperialism's experience and priorities. In the 1530s, the first detailed attempt at a general history of the New World, encompassing description of the environment and inhabitants, portrayed them as unnatural and unnatural people, at the mercy of sexual and dietary perversions that kept them out of the world. kingdom. . of the exposed natural law. Missionary ethnographers, working among native peoples or interpreting the findings of such field workers, have invested even the wildest hunter-gatherer communities with rudimentary civic institutions and endowed them with a past. Although nearly all seventeenth-century social projectors were named

Cannibal capital or ideal city? Cortés affirmed that Tenochtitlán, before he razed it, was the same as any city in Spain. Published to illustrate the 1524 edition of the Mexican reports of him, the plan shows similarities to late medieval urban planning models: Eiximenis recommended that four main streets radiate from a central plaza to the gates at the cardinal points. The magnificent towers and spires of the cityscape presented here testify to a belief in beauty and opulence in tune with European tastes. On the other side, the Temple of Human Sacrifice, the shelves of skulls and the elegant headless corpse in the center stand out. to Indian examples—to provide rhetorical vocabulary, platitudes, and supporting panaceas—confidence in the usefulness of the New World as a laboratory for the state of nature waned. When Thomas Hobbes sought to advocate strong government after the English Civil War, he presented sovereign power as the people's collectively chosen refuge from primitive insecurity, when everyone raised his hand against his neighbour. However, he found little support for his claim that ungoverned peoples, "except the rule of small families whose unity depends on lust," could meet to prove his case in the New World. PEOPLE EAT Meanwhile, another tradition in New World ethnography was working on a concept that had long been incompatible with imperialism: cultural relativism. The first bright spots came from the work of sixteenth-century missionary ethnographers, who recognized that, in order to convert, a culture must first be fully understood on its own terms. "Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner" and the earliest ethnographic compilations testify to a generous spirit, especially when missionaries used the technique Anthony Pagden calls "attachment" to understand foreign societies: echoes of their own culture "to detect". their new environment and, consequently, the recognition of indigenous property over equivalent elements of civilization. As we consider some of the atrocities depicted in the illustrations that accompany his work, we must try to see them through the eyes of missionaries. For example, the Mendoza Codex (see Chapter 6) contains an ethnographic compendium in which scenes of child rearing and male Oblate training inspire chilling horror as victims are beaten with sticks, devastated with agave tips and charred with burn marks. . , and forced to inhale smoke by hitting their heads over sweltering fires. The purpose of these inserts was not to condemn Aztec savagery but to extol Aztec discipline: The missionaries belonged to ascetic orders with strict standards of penance and came from a society in 16th-century Spain where flogging with fire was a popular devotional practice. However, even the most sensitive missionaries could not support the idea of ​​the moral equality of pagan and Christian societies. Cultural relativism, tout court, was a conclusion they abandoned

to your readers at home. While the mission writers promulgated the laudable principle that alien societies should be judged by their own standards, it was secular readers who concluded that, from a neutral point of view, any human society is as good as any other. Montaigne's Defense of the Cannibals was a notable early example. His source for the cannibalistic habits of Brazil's native peoples was the Protestant pastor Jean de Léry, who gently dismissed cannibalism as a product of superstition and fear. Montaigne went further: European practices of torture and slaughter were at the 480 level. Bringing supplies and weapons onto the battlefield, the young man is disciplined by being beaten with sticks, his blood collected with maguey spikes, and his hair singed before to be allowed to canoe to the temple after completing his initiation. This should not be understood as an attempt to denounce the barbarism of the Aztec priesthood, but to extol its prudent austerity, which recalls the humiliation valued by some Christian religious orders of the time. no better than cannibalism, and on the other hand even more deeply affected by hypocrisy. "It is more barbaric to eat people alive than to feed on them dead." For a long time, cultural relativism was embedded in other traditions: myths of the good Samaritan and the noble savage. Montaigne combined them, chiding his contemporaries for failing to measure up to savage standards, declaring: "If I had lived among those nations who claim to live under the sweet freedom of the first and unadulterated laws that live in nature, I assure you who would have preferred to portray me whole and naked". More than a hundred years later, Dryden weaved the same three traditions together into a couple of couplets (perhaps surprisingly placed in Cortés's mouth): savage and illiterate are terms only we invented for fashions different from our own. Well, all their customs are created by nature, but we unlearn through art what nature has taught. Relativism developed most strongly in the early eighteenth-century work of Louis Armand de Lorn d'Arce, who called himself Sieur de Lahontan after his distant family title. He not only read the Jesuit accounts of n North American Indians, but collected his own ethnographic observations before his expulsion from Canada in 1693. He Walked through the woods with the Hurons. He was an anticlerical freethinker who did not hesitate to use his native speakers as mouthpieces for his own irreverent messages. "How can I believe the truth of these Bibles," the common-sense savage asks you, when "they were written so many centuries ago, translated from so many different languages ​​by ignorant people who had no understanding of their original meaning or who are the liars who altered or diminished the words we find today?

Like many enthusiasts of noble savagery, Lahontan had a lustful interest in sex and respectable society for the freedom with which he practiced love. The engravings of courtship rituals he described were delightfully embellished with delicate eroticism and decorative classicism for an eighteenth-century reading public. A ferret, resembling a revived Greek statue, enters his lover's room with a torch; The lady signifies approval by turning off the light. Lahontan conveyed compelling images of free thought and free love to viewers of the wild philosophers of the Enlightenment. His fellow native Adario was the source of Voltaire's "sincere ferret." Direct conjugality was part of the appeal of Rousseau, the epitome of the noble savage ideal, who wanted Western concubinage contracts to have the same directness that Lahontan had attributed to Native Americans. Rousseau foresaw, if not fulfilled, the scientific anthropology that would develop out of the ethnographic and ethnological traditions of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. He summoned philosophical travelers, freed from the yoke of national prejudices, enthusiasts of noble savagery. . . they valued societies in proportion to the freedom with which they practiced love.” Bernard's engravings are intended to illustrate Lahontan's descriptions of Huron courtship rituals. De Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples idolatres (1723-43). the diversity of human societies and classify them "according to their similarity and their difference". The image collection was supplemented by extensive exploration of the Pacific in the late 18th century. The nobility of the savages was confirmed by the specimens that the explorers brought home. A restless stranger from Polynesia, Ornai was adored in England between 1774 and 1776, praised by duchesses for his naturally graceful manner and painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds to represent the balance of genuine dignity. Lee Boo, from Palau, Micronesia, was even more adept at acquiring chivalrous conquests; when he succumbed to smallpox in 1783, he was buried in Rotherhithe churchyard with the inscription "Stop, stop readers!". Let nature claim a tear: a prince of mine, Lee Boo, is buried here. Visitors to the Pacific found a haven for lust painted by William Hodges, who sailed with Captain Cook in 1772. His photo of Tahiti shows an impressive nymph habitat in the foreground: one attractively presents William's view of Tahiti Hodges, recalling the artist's experiences. as artist-in-residence on Captain Cook's 1772 expedition: "a connoisseur's paradise...a habitat for nymphs." See Gauguin's Icon of Tahiti, p.448. another swim on your back under a transparent film of water. The island's sexual hospitality tested the discipline of Cook's men and broke Bligh's. In short, the Pacific had the perfect combination of freedom and debauchery that ennobles the savage in the eyes of the right minds.

The self-described "scientific anthropologists" of the 19th century responded to the subjective unrealism of noble savages and related traditions. Like the missionary ethnographers who were their distant spiritual ancestors, they constructed sequences of development in human culture: from, in the 1870s, for example, promiscuity to polyandry to monogamy, from animism to polytheism to monotheism. , from savagery to barbarism to civilization. Although earlier models of social development emphasized common humanity, suggesting that European societies had passed through the same stages as those abroad, the implications of the new anthropology were racist. The skull gauging fad convinced many practitioners that the most highly evolved races had the largest brains. Imperialism was implicitly supported and much of the world was condemned to servitude or submission. Anthropology's tendency to propagate the message of cultural relativism only picked up in the last decade of the century, thanks in large part to a little-known hero of the Western liberal tradition, Franz Boas. This German Jew, who became the dean and leader of anthropology in America, not only exposed the fallacies of racist craniology, but also refuted them. "She lived like a visiting young village princess. She wanted to know: in return, she danced every night." The photo shows Margaret Mead dressed in native dress in connection with her theme in Vaitogi with her collaborator Fa'amotu her liberating experience. From the world's largest, fastest growing, and most influential national school of anthropologists, the idea that societies can be classified in terms of a developmental model of thought. People, he concluded, think differently in different cultures, not because some have superior spiritual equipment, but because each thought reflects the traditions to which it belongs, the society that surrounds it, and the environment to which it is exposed. Boaz was a field explorer in his youth and a museum owner in his maturity, always in touch with the people and artifacts he feels he loves; His students had to study Native American villages near a railroad. The habit of fieldwork, shared by British anthropologists with access to a vast empire in Africa and Australasia, tended to reinforce the relativistic trend by accumulating huge sums of money.

different dates that could not be handled with the roughly hierarchical schemes of the 19th century. Cemeteries of Certainty 485 After a long marginalization, the noble savage has reappeared among anthropologists, drawn back to the Pacific like the lovestruck sailors of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the most influential of all anthropological books was Margaret Mead's Coming of Age in Samoa, published in 1928 and based on fieldwork with pubescent girls in a sexually repressive society. Critics have hotly debated whether the paradise portrayed was real or imagined. The image, however, was seductive, of a non-competitive world creatively fertilized by freedom, protected from the annoying constraints and inhibitions that psychoanalysts were busy uncovering in Western cities and suburbs. The extent of the influence attributed, if not equaled, can be gauged by the vigor with which the work was attacked during a backlash shortly after Mead's death in 1976 against the social and educational panacea that had meanwhile reshaped Western youth. : no competitive schooling, stick friendly discipline and cheap contraception. Mead was certainly an advocate and lobbyist for these innovations, though the implication that her scientific work helped oil their flow rather than reflect a permissive zeitgeist may have been overstated. She was charged with falsifying evidence, projecting a spinster's frustrated fantasies onto her subjects and importing 1920s American excitement and hedonism into Samoa. The status of her reputation is still in question. Her story shows how cultural relativism drags moral relativism in its wake. If what is wrong for one society may be right for another, then what is wrong for one generation may be right for the next. If Western educators could learn from the wisdom of Samoan youth, what right or hope did white teachers have in the dying empires of the 19th century? In a world devoid of barbarians and "savages", in which the differences between "primitive cultures" and "advanced civilizations" were rephrased in value-free language as "elementary and complex structures", such an empire could not survive. Where all peoples had their collateral share of earthly bliss, unwanted distinctions disappeared. Chapter 16 The alibis for the stumbling block: Domestic difficulties in the modern West The skeleton of pessimism - Nervous disorders - Militant tendencies - Today, the struggle - Barbarism, freedom and technology - The private enemy THE SKELETON OF PESIMISM The night of June 27, 1787 , Edward Gibbon, the epitome of an enlightened gentleman's self-confidence, recounted a walk down an acacia-covered path in his garden in Lausanne. "The air was mild," he said, "the sky was clear, the silver orb of the moon was reflected in the water, and all nature was still."

He was a conscientious historian but an unreliable autobiographer, and this web of commonplaces is impossible to take literally. The locus amoenus, the sympathy of man and his environment, the personification of nature: all these are grand but conventional devices of classical rhetoric that enhance pleasure while destroying credulity. Even the acacias seem to have been exaggerated or misremembered. Gibbon had an acacia outside his window which he was particularly fond of, but according to letters from him it was "very closely pruned" in March 1786 and did not recover until December 1792 "from the gardener's cruel clipping". In Gibbon's mind, the single plant grew to the size of a walkway. The walk was intended to celebrate, with philosophical restraint, an important event: the completion of The Story of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the world's most enduring history book, the only one that still reads as such for more than two years. centuries later. it was written. . The author can be forgiven or applauded for adequately satisfying his personal achievement, but his pride was deepening. He embraced the civilization of which he was a part and went to the heart of the tradition to which he belonged. Proud of his country and language, he glimpsed the benefits of the global English-speaking community beginning to take shape in his day; he was particularly proud of Europe and of the record of human culture, public service, material progress, and noble duty that marked a long period of the continent's past and "elevated" its peoples, in his own estimation, above the rest of humanity. Gibbon was not an imperialist. He knew too much about empires to like them; but he liked the superiority of a civilization that spanned the globe, manipulating the environments of distant places and displaying a kind of mastery of mapping the whole. The worldview of his class and time is captured in miniature in an engraving that adorned the frontispiece of one of the atlases in his library: a cartography workshop that showed the world arranged and ordered for the instruction and entertainment of gala ladies and gentlemen. . The fall of the Roman Empire was of great concern to Gibbon's contemporaries because it seemed like an exception in the course of history: a valley or curve in linear progression, an impediment to "improvement". Gibbon never achieved the shallow gurgling of a Pangloss, smugly enjoying the "best of all possible worlds"; he appreciated the fragility of progress and feared it would stop. However, he liked to say that the experience of four thousand years should increase our hopes and lessen our fears: we cannot determine what heights the human species can reach in its progress towards perfection; but it may safely be presumed that no people will return to their original barbarism unless the face of nature is changed.

The security of that assumption was repeatedly devastated and shattered over the next hundred years by the onslaught of an inveterate barbarism that lurked under the skin of Western civilization. Moons with irregular phases made the transformation of werewolves unpredictable: a famine or some mysteriously generated "great fear" could trigger a peasant revolt; fast-growing cities can harbor dangerously uprooted crowds; ruthless and rapid industrialization could produce an uncontrollable proletariat; Ideological passions could incite urban elites to mutual malevolence. fXuffiff t*v«J. -F. fvJttm* éumt ttxfc Atlas, once the image of an arduous universe, becomes the manipulator of an accessible world on the cover of a 1730 Dutch edition of Guillaume De Ilsle's world atlas. The atlas was based on the keen worldview of the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris, where latitude and longitude coordinates from around the world were collected. The scene depicted is a cartographer's workshop in which the entire world is charted and ordered, reduced to order by the scientific application of reason. and turn cults into fanatics; Wars could drive out the masses; ethnic hatred could crush massacres. The monsters from earlier fantasy that roamed the spaces on the map have been replaced by 19th century monsters that lurk where Frankenstein or Dr. Jekyll were created. At both ends of the 19th century, particularly bad wars fueled pessimism. At first, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars drove nails into the body of optimism, and in the end, World War I hammered it. Napoleon, who considered war an art "like everything that is beautiful and simple", wept at the magnitude of the massacre at Camp d'Eylau in 1807. Goya, decorating his dining room with a scene of cannibalism, reinvented war, through of the victims' eyes, like a giant wandering through the mud and blood. The unforgettable realism also impressed readers of Baron Larrey's haunting medical-surgical accounts of the wounds of victims on Napoleonic battlefields. The general optimism of the Gibbon generation became controversial after the conflicts of 1789-1815: broader and more destructive conflicts to divert Enlightenment ideology into the dark and bloody paths of the French Revolution, produced scenes of witchcraft and torture for The Duke and Duchess of Osuna. Yet it was the War of Independence from Spain, the Peninsular War of 1808-14, that unleashed colossal monsters like this from his imagination: an image of war that roams the earth, shadowing the remains of life. . This painting must have been made before 1812, according to an inventory made at the time of the death of the artist's wife. 490 THE TURN OF I N I T I A ​​​​T I V that the whole world has experienced in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. 1816 Shelley's friend and contemporary Thomas Love Peacock joined

his fictional Headlong Hall characters come from his circle of acquaintances and are representative of the course of the debate. "Mr. Foster the Perfectibilist went on to anticipate "a gradual progression towards the state of unlimited perfection," while "Mr. Escot the Disintegrator" predicted with grim satisfaction, "that the entire species must finally be exterminated by its own idiocy and pettiness." The last chapter was contrasted with stubborn pessimism. More material progress than in the rest of the world and history combined, the very idea of ​​progress was undermined. Even extreme optimism was withdrawn and took on a strangely pessimistic form in the predictions of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Herbert Spencer (1820)-1903), who predicted the perfection of human society, but expected things to get worse before they got better, that is, at the fall of Marx he believed that the consummation Happy could only be achieved through a bloody catastrophe or a neutral country that served in World War I saw, it seemed, humanity being personally led to Armageddon by horsemen of d In the apocalypse, Sigmund Freud, who before the war had identified sexual desire as the motor of human behavior, revised his view by adding Thanatos' death wish alongside Eros as co-ruler of the spirit. Perhaps the greatest apostle of pessimism was Oswald Spengler (1880-1936); If Gibbon wrote the world's most enduring history book, the first volume of Spengler's Decline in the West was his most immediate success. It sold sixty thousand copies in its first year, an impressive number for a demanding work that tormented the reader with dire predictions, difficult allusions, and twisted prose. Gibbon's English was stately and suave throughout, Spengler's German alternately oscillating and vigorous. As Gibbon took his walk through the acacia, Spengler, writing on the eve of World War I and publishing towards the end, walked as if he were walking through a berceau of barbed wire. Instead of the linear and progressive history outlined by Gibbon, he proposed complicated downward spirals of aging and decay for civilizations, which he considered to be analogous to living organisms. Spengler denied being pessimistic, but that's the typical complacency of a critic who suspects that even his own predictions aren't bleak enough. He claimed to know of remedies to reverse the decline, but, as one of his many bitter opponents put it, "an element of sheer despair is unmistakable in the activism that remains for those who foresee the future and are instrumental in its coming." he was buried under shovels of abuse by critics. He saw the story from a bird's eye view, in vivid detail, from a towering height; He anticipated one of the brightest trends in modern historical scholarship by showing surprising and unexpected connections between different aspects of a culture: its science and its politics, its social structure and its art, its music and its religion. But these merits failed to impress or ideologically reconcile the experts (who only noted the flaws).

enemies. Some of them, like Hitler, did not get past the title before delivering a verdict. Insulted by liberals as fascists and fascists as liberals, Spengler died as the reverberations of his scandal faded, in the misery of a pessimist. However, the message from him arrived. Of course, there were still optimists. Some thought that World War I would end all wars and the West would come out of its ditch again. War-weary pessimism was largely confined to Europe and only spread to the far shores of Atlantic civilization when economic collapse struck a decade later. Even on the eastern shores of the ocean, the rubble of the antebellum world initially seemed good to those who had little share in its lost glory: the poor, the formerly oppressed nations, the hitherto underprivileged, political radicals, and extremists. Spengler's great rival among popular world historians, H. G. Wells, published Outline of History in 1920 in praise of progress; He was sexually predatory and tyrannical, but he was the seducer or spokesman for those emancipated by the effects of the conflict. Despite this, in what John Maynard Keynes called it, "the look of a 'bright young thing' meets the lyrics of black despair." it was a song that seemed to sum up the depression by accusing civilization, from its first verse, of making the world worse: "There was nothing left, finished song, to live or love but the blues of our destiny." , pessimism reigned . It spread with the recession and depression. By the late 1920s, the world was singing "20th Century Blues" and the decline of the West was actively anticipated or believed to have begun. "Just wait for the next European war," threatened E.M. Forster's character, the lovable Doctor Aziz, in 1924, eager to dismantle Western supremacy and dismember its empires. he feared but did not feel the impact on a series of "local problems" of which When World War I was the first, the European powers were defeated and the Atlantean civilization disqualified from world domination. Almost before the smoke of World War I cleared, the fall of Western hegemony became clear: Gandhi returned to India in 1915; the Sarekat Islam movement in Indonesia mobilized a mass independence party in 1916; The Pan-African Congress met for the first time in 1919, and that year the Egyptian Wafd was formed. Meanwhile, and for the next generation, the withdrawal of the Western powers from imperial responsibility was prepared with frayed nerves, wasted resources, and mutual infighting. The Atlantean civilization rehearsed and enacted the drama of decadence—rehearsal mixed with acting—in civil wars and self-inflicted economic disasters. Just as the victims of imperialism prepared for freedom, the black poet Aimé Césaire could also do it.

hear "the white world stumbles on great alibis". NERVOUS DISEASES To make the murder even more shocking, Dorothy L. Sayers located the central crime of her postwar crime novel, The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club, during the two minutes of silence observed annually in England to honor the dead on the anniversary. of death. the Armistice. This added sacrilege to the murder and tore off the pity mask of pessimism. These dead, it seems, died in vain. To make his detective more interesting, he turned Lord Peter Wimsey - who in every other way was the true paragon of aristocratic propriety, a studious, sporty, cultured man, lean and pale, without spots or body hair - into a nervous victim of a clash of war , who needed to be roused from nightmares in the trenches by old Batman's assurances of him. War shock was the mal de siecle of the postwar years, but it was just one of countless neuroses caused by stress or unearthed by contemporary science. Every catastrophe of the 20th century in the West has hit the nerves wracked by the last. The tension rose and the effect was intensified by the self-awareness fostered by the growth of psychology, and particularly psychoanalysis. In a way, Freud was both the role model and mentor of the age. In a self-experiment conducted in Vienna in 1896, he revealed his own Oedipus complex. The therapeutic effect seemed to be confirmed in several patients who got up from his couch - or that of his mentor Josef Breuer - and walked more freely than before. Women who just a few years ago would have been dismissed as hysterical malingerers became case studies from which all could learn. Freud generalized from the testimonies of some citizens of pre-war Vienna to shed light on the human condition in general. All the children went through the same stages of sexual development before puberty and repressed similar fantasies or experiences. Hypnosis—or, as Freud preferred, the mnemonic effects on a troubled subconscious of the free association of images and memories—could bring back repressed feelings and alleviate his nervous symptoms. Freud was an unreliable scientist who had promoted the therapeutic use of cocaine without examining its effects and who wanted to subject Leonardo da Vinci and Alexander the Great to his psychoanalytic techniques; but he was a brilliant phrasemaker whose speech became universal. Introspection became a rite in the modern West that defined what culture like self-mutilation or dance or codes of gestures can define another. Repression has become the modern devil and the analyst the exorcist. In urban America, in the second half of the century, the rite of psychotherapy was practiced with communal regularity, by all generations of practically all social classes, in a world that the filmmaker Woody Allen portrays from within, appears in his films and tugs nervously. the threads of your own problems. This is not to say that the neuroses of twentieth-century Westerners were as

unreal, except that psychology has increased their awareness and thus, paradoxically, increased their impact while contributing to their treatment. The material from World War I is impressive because it can be calculated in numbers that take up many lines: perhaps 10 million dead, 30 million total casualties, 9 million tons of shipping, for example. The political consequences are impressive because they can be translated in color on a map: Twelve new sovereign or quasi-sovereign states in Europe or on its borders; Rearranged borders between a dozen more; Three major European superstates were destroyed, overseas colonies rotated and traded. But the psychological effects, which cannot be gauged or mapped, make at least the same impression on the reader of the sources. The dead left gaps that societies tried to fill: they replaced the dead with young or old, men with women, aristocracies with meritocracies. The survivors came back mentally scarred, which is the most satirized theme of communist neurosis in Woody Allen's movies. In this scene from Annie Hall (1977), one of his love stories lost to selfishness, the goal of psychoanalysis, the recovery of repressed memories, materializes when Woody meets and questions his childhood self, played by Jonathan Munk. They could change sensibilities and, through conversation or silence, art or verse, convey the effects of war to future generations, even as harvests returned to normal and cities were rebuilt. It is conventional but sensible to look for evidence in the poetry written on the Western Front. After the planned German KO against France on the Marne was repulsed by reinforcements brought into the field in taxis, the armies of both sides became entangled in impregnably long trenches dug from the English Channel to the Alps. There the poets lived a beneficent life of idleness and danger, trapped with no prospect of any path but up, between earth and sky. For literature, which generally does well after the end of the war, this eroded and devastated landscape was a productive environment. It is often said that the result was realism -bloody and dirty-, like the transformation of Goya's art by the experiences of 1808. Among English poets, for example, three types of voices oppose each other: the heroic rhetoric of those who have never seen the war seen as Thomas Hardy in Men Who March Away; the moving novel by Rupert Brooke, who died before joining the fight; and the frank torment of the poetry of actual experience attributed to Isaac Rosenberg or Wilfred Owen, for example. We hear Hardy's trumpets and "only the monstrous fury of arms" in Owen, or the mouse "rubbing" David Jones's feet; we smell the flowers reminiscent of England with Brooke, we smell the pressing odor of gas or the acrid secretions of fear with the front lines. But our impression is an illusion created by the power of poetry. All the poets provided a romantic and rhetorical framework for the horrors of war, and Wilfred Owen himself similarly evaded the truth, suppressing his own memories of it as much as the son of any Viennese confectioner. already the fact

turning bad memories into poetry fillers and padding them with soothing packs of literary gadgets. The associations with sentiments, kind or sentimental, evoked by most earlier poetic traditions have alienated writers and readers alike. Anyone who tried to write about the war with frank realism found that language filtered out reality. A typical hero, back in the comfort of Blighty, had nothing important to share. The people he met there, just seventy miles, less than a day's journey, from his "stinking world of sticky, dripping dirt," had an understanding based on a universe of non-overlapping experiences; he was fathomless and seemed indescribable in his company. Philip Gibbs and Robert Graves noted that they were "not referring to" what it was like to be on the front lines. As a result, the sending societies were subject to the nightmares and unspoken horrors of the oppressive returnees. It was like having the hero of Kipling's prescient The Man Who Ever Was around every corner. In a world accustomed to Freud's wisdom, unspoken neuroses were the worst. The horrors of those who made the war were met with the guilt of those who lost it. Christopher Isherwood's generation, "suffering from a sense of shame we had not witnessed", continued to wage "an underlying intractable war". French memories of the war were similarly nurtured and transmitted. French psychiatrists en masse blamed the war for conditions that had been known for years. French law developed the fiction of "tacit consent" to treason by those absent at the front. In 1920, the postwar French president retired to a mental institution. Nervous disorders found their way naturally into canvases and collages, as well as print. While governments supported conventional war artists, the art that defined World War I was Dada: outward disillusionment, disrespect for order and tradition embodied in the deliberately meaningless name. In postwar Germany, Kurt Schwitters assembled works of art from the rubble of a shattered world: broken machine parts, fragments of destroyed structures. The visionary painter Max Ernst turned postwar nightmares into terrifying, nauseating dreams of evil, sometimes composed, like Schwitters's work, of ephemeral fragments or fertile for new ideas in the waning years of Tsarism, and though Tatlin was a man an essentially practical city, incapable of je m'enfichisme -he was a merchant sailor and a fervent believer in the possible social benefits of art- he anticipated the techniques of the Dadaists and some of the sources of inspiration from Futurism and Vorticism, building disturbing reliefs from of industrial debris. lightly textured by rubbing the paper over wire or burlap or unplaned boards. In the twelve-tone system developed by Schönberg in the early 1920s, nervous noise in music was "audible." War-related neurotic syndrome was initially mild in the United States. The American economy was the big winner of the war, swollen by reparations

of losers and returns of winners. Here, the optimism lasted as long as the prosperity: the great age of American suicides did not begin until October 1929 and lasted until 1932. The stock market crash and the Great Depression were no less traumatic for being predictable. After the immediate shock of a demobilized postwar economy, America's cities enjoyed seven years of plenty beginning in 1922, albeit without the legitimate stimulus of alcohol prohibited by a 1920-1933 constitutional amendment. The peasants fed the fat years. High production and low prices were the legacy of the war for agriculture. Other sectors suffered from inflation caused by credit. Between 1922 and 1927, annual output per industrial worker grew a staggering 3.5%, while wages rose less than 2.5% per year. Automobiles were mass-produced; Construction launched "Torres al Sol". Paradoxically, as share ownership spread through the ranks of society and the wealthy strata, economic power became increasingly concentrated. Stumblers' Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors Alibis 497s, for example, ousted all midsize competitors from the auto market; Chain stores dominated retail. "Pyramids" of millions of shareholders were scaled by a few giants who controlled preferred shares or manipulated their voters, just as in Europe dictators took control of nominal democracies and ruled with charisma or demagogy. As holdings multiplied and stocks appreciated, a booming market seemed to promise literally universal riches. One millionaire truly believed that "any American could get rich" by investing small savings in the unstoppable upward mobility of stocks. The market heated to incandescence as the nominally super-rich fanned the flames with paper profits: men like Samuel Insull, the utility king, who at his trial claimed with some justification that he had only done what "all bankers and business tycoons did." ”; or the Van Swinbeuren brothers, who maintained control of their railway empire by issuing shares in virtually worthless holding companies; or Richard Whitney, supposedly the coldest hand in the stock market, later revealed to be a fraud, of course. Millions of shares changed hands on Wall Street in 1924, up from 1.8 million in 1929. Prices doubled during the same period from $3 billion in 1926 to $8.5 million in 1929. President Hoover, a uptight ascetic who always mistrusted the rich. He received no thanks for helplessly foreseeing the consequences. In 1926 he warned that "this speculative fever can only take us to the margins of a loss of pressure." Every year since 1927, the founder of the Babson Institute has warned that "sooner or later a collapse is coming...factories will close...people will be put out of work...and the result will be a severe depression." Wall Street calls the stock market trend "a threat to the whole."

Community." Joe Kennedy sold all that summer, his instincts kicking in, he said later, when a shoeshine boy offered him some stock investing advice. At first, the October slump seemed like an extreme example of the usual short-term swings in prices. comedian Fanny Brice, who lost half a million on Black Thursday, invested her last $50,000 on Friday, which more than doubled at 2 a.m. in the morning, but generally between October 24 and November 13, 1929, $30 billion was taken from the total value of US reserves, nearly the entire cost of the US war effort.When another crash occurred on May 30, 1930, recovery seemed impossible.The effects spilled over to the wealthy, sinking the economy in a recession on the other side of the Atlantic and contributing to a series of European bank failures from 1931 onwards.One of the first to take his own life was a former colleague of Samuel In sull, who had shared his fortune since they began as Thomas Edison's secretary and stenographer. Later, in despair, the contralta Augusta Lenska threw herself under a tram because the opera Insull had to close. The president of a cigar company wrestled a waiter onto the ledge of a Manhattan hotel. In a typical example of the cycle of despair, when James J. Riordan, the president of the New York County Trust Company, committed suicide, the news caused a mental breakdown in his corridor. America had joined the other half of Atlantean civilization in a state of nervous disorder. Samuel Insull himself claimed to have attempted suicide three times on the way back, extradited from Europe to stand trial. He was a tragic villain: Samuel helped Insull through the gates of Chicago's Cook County Jail in 1934, shortly before he was acquitted of a $150 million fraud charge. The poor bright kid whose mother had run a withdrawal pension and who got rich through hard work before becoming super rich through Phonusbolonus. At the height of his success, bankers called him with offers of credit: "By the way," said his secretary, "the greengrocer is calling my mother." His fall was not out of malice but out of arrogance. His methods were illegal, but not flagrant enough to warrant a conviction despite the three separate charges. But his obsessive desire to control all of his own companies bankrupted him when he tried to buy back his own shares at prices he could not afford. He was always meticulous with his clothes. One of the most powerful images of the Depression years, when cartoonists and photographers reveled in the contrasts between poverty and wealth, shows him walking out of the Cook County jail gates for one of his trials: suave

Homburg, herringbone coat, white leggings, and polished shoes; Fine and well-groomed beard with an aristocratic step. A pudgy guard in a cap and wool shirt holds the door open, disrespectfully, but with a smile halfway between sympathy and satisfaction. Militant tendencies Giuseppe Pelizza, the Milanese painter, tirelessly searched for symbolic motifs to express great moral and political messages until his suicide in 1907. He tasted religion and nature before turning to socialism for inspiration with greater enthusiasm, but without success. In 1902 he exhibited an enormous painting, fifteen feet wide, and Pelizzas // Quarto Stato. Reading Tolstoy instilled in the artist the belief in the social role of his profession, which he expressed in an article from 1889 -a year before starting this painting- as an educator, uplifter and inspiration for other workers; But only those who were born, raised and lived in the working class could do it, he said. 500 THE T W I S T OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​​​T I V A blueprint for a socialist utopia proposed by Robert Owens of New Harmony, Indiana. Owen's socialism had Christian origins, although the minaret-like towers and central pavilion gave New Harmony a resemblance to Mecca. Symmetry is based on classical models of an ordered life; The grandeur and fantasy recall the tradition of the "Progresspalace" typical of 19th century factory architecture. Compare the even older American utopia (p. 268) and the factory (p. 391). Babar's Célesteville: an ultra-rational utopia of benevolent despotism dominated by the 'Palace of Industry' and the 'Palace of Pleasure', shyly mistranslated in this illustration from the English edition. Babar's own house is the house in the upper right corner with the bay windows that are so ugly for post-war tastes. Despite its obvious similarities to other utopias, Jean de Brunhoff's ideal city, with its orderly rows of round and oblong huts, seems clearly indebted to René Caillié's description and engraving of Timbuktu, the legendary "unreachable city" that arose at the beginning of the 19th century. as an allegory of romantic longing, which Caillié achieved in 1828 disguised as a Muslim pilgrim. The alibis of the setbacks 501 Two masks of tyranny. Eisenstein's paintings of Lenin were appropriate for a phase of revolutionary violence. A dynamic force emerges from the darkness: a trembling and restless figure flickers on the screen. Stalin's image on a giant poster design represents the calm after the storm, reliability for a time of consolidation, a strong bastion of defense: the leader serenely contemplating a peaceful

Future in a landscape of purposeful activities and imperturbable horizons. almost three meters high, which at that time caused only coldness and indifference among the spectators. // The subject of Quarto Stato was a large crowd of workers advancing, the artist said, "like a torrent, sweeping away all obstacles in its path, thirsty for justice." Their march is undeniably relentless, their solidarity intimidating, but except for a Madonna-like woman in the foreground, who seems obsessed with a personal project and addresses one of the brusque leaders leading the march, individually they lack personality and they move the parts of a gigantic automaton, with a mechanical, slow and pulsating rhythm. 502 THE USE OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​T I V The alibis of the stumbling blocks 503 No work of art could better express the extremes of grandeur and weariness that are at the heart of socialism: noble humanity mobilized by monotonous determinism. In the history of socialism, humanity and the nobility came first. They were expressed in the ideals of equality and fraternity proclaimed by the utopians of the Enlightenment and employed in the practices of sharing and collaboration attempted in the first socialist communities in 19th century America. A few surviving fragments of doomed experiments—planners' drawings, propagandists' engravings, and even a few dilapidated but intact buildings—still give an idea of ​​what they once were. They fit into a long and continuing history of painstakingly constructed "mountain utopias" by religious fanatics, as seen in Ephrata, Pennsylvania, where, despite the early Founders' warnings of celibacy, a strict Eden existed from 1728 to 1904; Wooden buildings survive in the style of the prayer hall built according to the plan of Solomon's temple, so "during the construction of the house, neither a hammer nor an ax nor any iron tool was heard." Socialism followed with secular utopias that, according to one of its great idealizers, Etienne Cabet (1788-1856), would produce "true Christianity." The other inspirers of the community, Robert Owen (1771-1858) and Charles Fourier (1772-1837), proposed communal buildings for socialist families, while Cabet preferred individual but uniform dwellings. Owen's design for New Harmony, Indiana, looks like a mosque; An engraving of the site resembles an old English village in a Gainsborough landscape. A Fourierist plan for a "phalanx" of the desert is monumental enough for Haussmann's Paris, with boulevards connecting factories and popular palaces. Some of the clean, desolate homes of Cabet's students survive in New Icaria, near Corning, Iowa. Icarus's kingdom need look no more than the benevolently planned capital of Babar's elephant kingdom. All the planes are geometric and symmetrical, as inadequate to the reality of irregular places as the socialist utopia is to the constraints of real life. Icarus was brought to Earth by Louis Blanc (1811-1882) and Karl

marx; The first convinced most socialists that their ideals could be entrusted to the state and imposed on society; the second instilled in them the conviction of the historical inevitability of their triumph in a cycle of class struggle in which the workers - demoted and inflamed by the ex-La Pasionaria of the bosses - become iconic. His nickname was itself an appropriation of religious imagery in the communist cause. Photographed in the streets of Madrid in October 1936, her image replaces that of the Virgin in a version of one of the traditional devotional processions in a Catholic city. The red star, only visible in the background, takes the place of the cross: the hammer and sickle take on the role of banners for religious associations. 504 THE CHANGES OF I N I T I A ​​​​T I V EXPLOITATION – would confer a decisive advantage if labor wrested control of economic power from capital. The first socialist experiments were peaceful, with no land to conquer except the desert, no human opponents except selfishness and greed. Transformed by the language of conflict and coercion, socialism has become an ideology of violence that must be fought uncompromisingly by those who value property over fraternity and liberty over equality. The mere conviction of final victory helped the socialist leaders of Europe to join hands. In most European countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they created mass organizations for political and industrial action, generally without risking premature revolutionary attempts. The first revolutions in which socialist inspiration played an important role broke out in Mexico and China in 1910-11, where the messages of socialism were silenced by distance and its ranks dwindled by under-industrialization. The influence of leftist agitators in the Mexican Revolution, who published the Regeneración pamphlet calling for insurgency from places of refuge in exile, may have been exaggerated, but it was widely accepted at the time. For example, when drunken bandits threatened to "kill all the rich" in Lagos de Morena in August 1911, one informant reported: "someone has filled their heads with socialist ideas." In Mexico, liberalism was, if ever, the professed ideology of most revolutionary urban leaders, while in the countryside the similarities between socialism, Robin Hood's banditry, and the values ​​of an old-fashioned jacquerie may have been mere coincidence. In China, however, socialism was explicitly part of the inspiration of the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). He rejected Marx's methods but shared his goals. He proposed the distribution of land to the peasants and the nationalization of the big industries: a program of "levelling, not liquidation." When the socialist revolution reached Europe, its power and speed were explosive. She defied Marx's own predictions. The misery they created was not caused by the excesses of capitalism but by the relentless demands of war, though theorists claimed they were one and the same. It was supposed to emerge from powerful and impersonal historical forces, but it was hailed as a feat: godless czars, Lenin and Stalin, with contrasting charisma: the former, the restless and active spirit, immortalized in Eisenstein's work.

choppy cinematography, the second substantive and motionless, controlled by the cool calm of large billboards. The revolutions began in the unevenly industrialized environment of Russia, spread from east to west, and tended to be contained or tamed where industrialization was most mature. In England and France, for example, the advance of democratic socialism seemed to make revolution unnecessary; Throughout western Russia, in the first round of civil wars in Europe from 1917 to the early 1920s, the revolutionaries were defeated and the socialist settlements seduced by war. Militant socialism, however, retained or gained momentum in each subsequent phase of the conflict—the street fighting of the 1920s and 1930s, the Spanish Civil War, World War II—until its energies were slowly exhausted in the hostilities of the newly channeled Cold War. The fighting spirit of those who stayed or became loyal to Moscow can be illustrated by literally millions of individual stories. Perhaps no one has more legendary status than "Dolores" Ibárrurri, an international voice from Moscow for the better part of a century. She was cut as a figurehead. The strange figure of her could have been carved out of hard wood. A little over forty years old, her breasts full of her excited the passion of the republican soldiers. She wowed the audience with her wide eyes. Even her characteristic pose, stooping to declaim, head extended, may have been designed to adorn a lasso. She became the mascot of Spanish communism. She joined the party when it was founded and died in 1989 at age 93, collapsing as fast as the Berlin Wall. She brought him fame and failure, notoriety but no power. The daughter of this well-paid miner came to communism, tainted by the piety and prosperity of her miner's childhood, when she married a penniless revolutionary. She hated her husband, but she adhered to her politics, perhaps as penance for her hatred. She was a frustrated priestess who served the party with the passion of a delegated vocation. Moscow became her Rome, Stalin her potato; Within the communists there was always a Catholic trying to get out. During the Spanish Civil War, the right-wing propaganda "devourer of priests" protected nuns and looted religious images for his famous speeches. Her real name was Isadora. 'Dolores', like the highly exploitable pseudonym of 'La Pasionaria', was a nickname that evoked the concerns of Holy Week. She was the naughty Lola on the left, who engaged in what she described as politically correct sex with a lover twenty years her junior. But her choice of mud-free boots and silk pajamas indicated a fatal tendency toward bourgeois deviance; She later saw him as a traitor to the cause. She was a feminist who was good at knitting and mending the holes in the inspector's jacket. Her revolutionary credentials were combined with old-fashioned values: she was flattered by a gift of perfume and she hated smokers. To some communists she reminded her of a medieval queen, to others of a 16th-century saint. She was Stalin's naïveté, but the creator of his own cult of personality. "They have

"Such a famous mother," she said to her children, "why do they have to misbehave?" She invaded the conflicts of militant socialism and snored through old age—deeply asleep, an octogenarian returnee, in the back seats of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies. During its heyday, socialism, like any growing faith, was vulnerable to disruption by heretics and schismatics. The triumph of Nazi propaganda characteristically projected an image of Germanic masculinity, tense vision, compelling strength, and national recovery from the "wounds" of Versailles; but he also paid attention to the "socialist" image of the party, presenting worker icons and promising "work and bread." The more militant fragments of the Russian revolution exacerbated hostilities within the left, where sects waged their own civil wars while fighting external enemies. Barcelona Year 1937. It was like asking: "Aren't we all Christians?" in the San Bartolomé massacre. Whether fascism was a fragment of socialism, or an independently developed doctrine, or just a flat name for unprincipled opportunism, was the subject of passionate debate. Looking ahead, the distinctions between all forms of violent political extremism will blur. Twentieth-century politics in Europe was shaped like a horseshoe, and extremists on both sides seemed close at hand. In practice, individuals moved between fascism and militant socialism as if connecting channels. Mussolini was a socialist youth leader before becoming a fascist duke. At least until Hitler's kidnapping and purge, many Nazis tried to adapt the party to their name: National Socialist German Workers' Party. Britain's failed man of fate, Oswald Mosley, was a socialist cabinet minister before taking to the streets. An aunt told me that my father, who became one of Spain's most loyal voices for the cause of the Western Allies during World War II, wore a communist card and a Falangist uniform several times in the 1930s. Of course, it was equally possible to draw it. to the fascism of other traditions, but the similarities between the rival totalitarianisms were wide enough to impress those who look back, perhaps even to the era of the Galactic Museum. Guardian. During and after its revision in the 1940s, "fascism" became a dirty word that said nothing of what it denoted except disapproval of the speaker; during his rise in the 1920s and 1930s, his spokesmen presented him with calculatedly dark rhetoric. However, it can be significantly defined. Share the doctrine of the omnipotence of the State with the dominant trend in socialism since Blanc. His celebration of the sanctity of violence resembles the militancy of two strands in the tattered fabric of the extreme left: the anarchist tendency outlawed by Marx and the perpetual fanatics of revolution whose patriarch was Lenin's comrade and rival Leon Trotsky. .

The military model followed by the fascists to organize society is, from one perspective, a model of fraternal community life. Lenin also demanded "revolutionary discipline." In the 1930s, the economic program of fascism, epitomized by Hitler's "work and bread" slogan, included planned reinflation and redistribution of wealth through public works, which was or became orthodoxy. of social democracy. I imagine the guardians of the galactic museum classifying fascism as a variant of socialism, adapted to the needs of a diverse electorate; for it is a verifiable fact that the fascists mobilized both the petty-bourgeois owners and the workers, advocating a policy that basically boils down to "socialism without expropriation." Despite the relatively long eclipse of fascism, the 1990s have probably not yet realized its potential; Amid the ruins of militant socialism in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, classic conditions for fascist revenge exist, and museum owners may see it as one of the most enduring legacies of 20th-century conflict. THE STRUGGLE TODAY The civil wars of the Atlantean civilization were not just left-right clashes, nor just traditional mixed-society struggles - with their wrath. This 1936 Republican poster seems to lack the killer instinct: it mocks the enemy, not devastates it. The ship of the “nationalists” is full of foreigners: Jewish capitalists, fat Nazis, Italian comic opera fascists and, most suggestively in the Spanish context, African Moors. All but the first of these bows got stuck. Franco relied on German and Italian help and the reputation of his North African recruits. The obstacles developed institutions, conservative habits, and liberal orthodoxies to protect themselves from attacks by radicals on both sides. The battlefields were plagued with old feuds that covered the new battle lines. Among them were from liberals to clericalists; local and regional majorities for their ethnic or racial victims; nationalists and imperialists for liberals and separatists; and neighboring nations. Under the guise of a pan-European conflict, the old violence continued; secular hatred took hold of the language, but rarely the forms, of the class struggle. Between 1936 and 1939, for example, the young poets returned their bicycles

Race through the English suburbs to "explode like bombs" in a Spanish war by simplifying it as a scene of fighting between right and left. Most ended up disappointed that the war was genuinely fought between broad coalitions pursuing an introspective Spanish agenda. The "national" coalition included virtual fascists, but tied them to an uncomfortable car full of other passengers: traditional Catholics fighting to save nuns from being raped and churches from being burned down; old-fashioned liberal centralists, who were equally numerous on the other side; romantic reactionaries, armed by the thousands, eager to restore a lineage of the old royal dynasty that had long been excluded; constitutional monarchists who wished to return to the comfortable and lucrative parliamentary system of the previous generation; worshipers of the "sacred unity of Spain" who thought they were fighting to keep the country together; Hispanizadores who supposedly wanted to cleanse the Spanish virtues of foreign contaminants. On the other side were the conservative Republicans, which included both Catholics and secularists, along with all the sects of the left that were fighting each other; liberal anticlericals; admirer of French and English standards of democracy; and right-wing regionalists, who saw the nationalists as the biggest threat and supported the republicans as the lesser evil. Similarly, in France, World War II masked a civil war in which old enemies drew their knives. Here, however, the traditional divisions were more closely aligned with those of left and right. Much of French society never grudgingly accepted the republic created after Germany's final crushing defeat in 1871. The clericalists saw the Republic as a Masonic affair; To royalists it was a matter of bad taste, symbolized by the terrible hat that was removed from a president's head by a baron at the races of 1899. Bonapartists and other authoritarians lamented the cowardly foreign policy record of successive governments. The emblematic "Marianne", marital bearer of the tricolor on the barricades of the 19th century revolutions, was "the whore" of an aggressively nationalist newspaper. The approval of much of this powerful pressure group was ensured by the fame and patronage of a powerful empire in Africa and Indochina; But disloyalty to the Republic was too tied to the hatred of some groups for others to easily fall apart. The extent and persistence of the hatred was illustrated by the Dreyfus scandal of 1894-1906, a slow torture of national humiliation inflicted on each other by competing interests in the pursuit or defense of incompatible French ideals. Alfred Dreyfus was a commendable staff officer, but a doubly misfit: an Alsatian of German descent when Germany was the national enemy, and a Jew at a time when anti-Semitism was raging against the fastest-growing French minority. Intelligence officers conspired with a royal spy, who was also an aristocrat from a traditional military family, to frame the innocent Dreyfus for espionage. When a fellow police officer, outraged by the injustice, leaked crucial evidence, officers refused to deny the crime or even admit wrongdoing. Lobbyists for justice, in turn, have been persecuted. That

The verdict was based on fabricated evidence and justice was denied due to delay. Dreyfus was brought back for a new trial after serving a three-year sentence on Devil's Island, white and battered. His sentence was lightened before he was pardoned; he was pardoned before being officially exonerated. Meanwhile, the conspiracy against him was seen by Republicans as a reactionary anti-constitutional conspiracy. The anû-dreyfusards saw an unpatriotic gang in the Dreyfus hall. The problem, said one propagandist, "is not whether a miserable individual is guilty or innocent, but whether Jews and Protestants own the land or not." The Civil War, which had narrowly escaped 1899, broke out in 1940, when the Antidreyfusards emerged from the decrepit timber frame of fallen France, some of them openly rejoicing. The name "Republic" was dropped from the French "State". A government of veteran soldiers and Nazi sympathizers in Vichy "collaborated" with the Germans against their fellow citizens; Jews and leftists were massacred and enslaved; Germany blew up the economy, looted works of art, and exported hundreds of thousands of French workers. The initially weak "resistance" was transformed with the German invasion of Russia in June 1941. This freed the communists who had earlier been ordered to withdraw from Moscow into the forest. The resistance fighters were now a coalition reminiscent in breadth and fragility of the Spanish Civil War, and included both communists and Catholics. Beginning in 1943, the Fascist militia waged a relentless war in the desert against the Maquis. The Germans fled in 1944, leaving the French by the throat. Perhaps more than any other influence, women's suffrage restored peace and democracy: the votes of widows and spinsters gave power to the Catholic center and an opportunity for a policy of reconciliation. Meanwhile, the young Leon Brittan was mocking, ridiculing or pitying France for "crazed Citroens and dirty toilets". Although the United States became embroiled in the civil wars of Europe, which became the civil wars of the Atlantean civilization, it was difficult for militant socialism to cross the Atlantic. Marx founded the First International in New York, where a publicist "could experience socialism at the price of meat" in 1901. The Stumblers' Alibis 511 socialists enjoyed some local electoral success in the first two decades of the 20th century. In 1920, Eugene V. Debs, a former railroad worker who campaigned to get out of prison, polled one million votes as a socialist presidential candidate. But the language of class struggle never caught on in a country where, even at the height of the Depression, nearly 80% in an opinion poll considered themselves middle class. "What happened to the Socialist Party?" asked one of the deformed but eagle-eyed women in the James Thurber cartoon. Although the European civil war could not be transferred to the United States, American power was potentially decisive in European conflicts. The Americans had rationally unanswerable excuses for staying away. Fascism and communism were equally despicable and un-American creeds; from the moral perspective of Americans collectively unable to admit their own imperialism (see Chapter 11), the imperialist democracies of Great Britain and Great Britain

France no longer seemed worth fighting for. Migrants “made America” to escape the class struggle, not to send their children back to fight it. In strict state policy, America's primary interest was to watch other competitors fight in World War II or, if that proved impossible, to focus on defeating Japan. The rise of the United States would be proportional to the prostration of the rest." What happened to the Socialist Party? In Men, Women and Dogs (1946), Thurber mocked the end of socialism in the United States, but it is a bigger historical problem than is commonly believed, given the close connection of American communal experimentation with early socialism and the high hopes that American socialism was still cherished by idealists in the early 20th century, but emotionally the Atlantic was a narrow sea (see Chapter 13.) In broadcasts and articles, fundraisers and speeches, demonstrations and dances, "hearts and minds," Americans fought in the European wars before they really got in. Hitler is generally credited with making a mistake in declaring the war for the first time in 1942: in fact, he seems to have thought of it himself, but he was only anticipating a foreseeable development.it was not the demands of the g It was not the war that kept America in Europe, but the problems of keeping the peace after it ended. Even before American power began to manifest, German resources already seemed stretched to the limit. Germany fought Britain and Russia simultaneously, while absorbing the calm of its weak Italian allies' wars in North Africa and the Balkans. Once the United States was engaged, only the extent and timing of the German defeat remained in doubt. It was the inevitability of final victory that led the United States to prioritize the European theater; the opening of the continental fronts by the Anglo-American invasion could be presented as a response to repeated calls for help from the brave Russian ally. At a deeper level, it was driven by fears that Russian armies might conquer much of Europe on their own, or that Stalin would abandon others to finish the job and make their separate peace with Hitler. Peace was harder to win than war. Protracted conflicts threaten from three sources: ongoing civil wars in "liberated" countries; Russian desire for security or power on its western borders; and the internationalist idealism of socialist militants - exploited but not really supported by Moscow - who wanted to exploit a "revolutionary situation" across the continent. Depending on the point of view, the viewer may be disgusted by Stalin's greed or surprised by his restraint: the Soviet Union reabsorbed the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but did not attempt to annex Finland; Of the nominally allied countries, Stalin occupied Poland, but withdrew from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; He occupied the territory of the belligerent enemies in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany, but cooperated with the other Allied powers in the administration of Austria and Berlin. In practice, American decision makers appear to have

he was willing to give her more freedom than she took. In March 1946, Churchill announced the fall of an "iron curtain" over Europe, but it was still riddled with cracks and drafts. The civil wars of the Atlantean civilization did not end in this fleeting moment of possible compromise. The fighting centered on Greece, where Stalin had promised Britain "90% supremacy" and where Britain was determined to claim her rights. There was no East-West confrontation, just a civil war resolved by British intervention that disarmed and destroyed the left. In the rest of Europe, economic constraints forced a fragile balance in the following years. Financial aid was the best way to seduce former enemies into dependence. When the Marshall Plan was introduced in 1948 to finance European reconstruction from America and "create social and political conditions in which free institutions can exist", most Central and Eastern European countries already had reparation debts for the lack of alternatives in the Soviet Union. market. . They all became "people's republics" and Soviet satellite states through elections or coups, including Western-oriented Czechoslovakia with a long democratic tradition. Russia's fear of dollar-bought prosperity was evident in the attempt to impose East German currency on West Berlin in 1948-49: the American response included airlifting from Berlin to break the blockade and the formation of the Alliance of North Atlantic to "Defeat Bullying." . through the Kremlin." BARBARISM, FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGY A Europe of Armed Camps and a Heavily Beleaguered Soviet Empire: Like so many others, European civil wars divided Europe. One of Spengler's predictions seemed perilously close to coming true: after the fall of the West, the next dominant civilization will be Russian Like Gibbon's Rome, the victims of these wars saw - or were blinded by - a "triumph of barbarism" motivated more by hatred than self-interest. it came from without, the new barbarism grew from within The analysis of how it happened, who is to blame and what can be fixed must be three phases before the end of the millennium and reflect the difficulties of a culture struggling to recover its sense of belonging to be In civilized conflict, the blame tended to fall on those at or near the top of society.Georg Grosz's caricatures of cannibalistic capitalists empty roaring with the food of e The Hungry are the best-known but most effective images -because more subtle- are, for example, The Arrival of the Jarrow Marchers in London, from 1936, by TC Dugdale, where the hungry are reduced to anonymous bubbles, whether viewed with boredom or contempt. Barbarism, said these artists, did not infiltrate society from below; Civilization had begun to creep in from above. The doctrine of "war crimes" implicitly exonerates the masses by identifying individuals as guilty, most of them in positions of some responsibility. There was

there is a certain irony in this, since at the Nuremberg trials "taking orders" was an improper defense. The experience of war convinced some humanitarians that circumstances of deprivation or conflict could corrupt people not inherently tainted by outrage, such as the inhabitants of Cela's Beehive or Thomas's The Arrival of the Jarrow Marchers in London (1936). dugdale. Dugdale was a dandy who proudly "displayed a colored scarf on his waistcoat" in response to the pale colors favored by designers. He knows the social world in the foreground—the cocktail shaker, the nonchalant tramp in Oxford bags, the inquisitive, lazy, devious young woman—better than the contrasting world in the background, the “Hunger Marchers” reduced to an anonymous blur. the line of troopers became devilish shadows near the lighthouse. The Stumblers Alibis 515 Gad, Sir, Lord Sportm*squirt isn't fair, we should give "the Germans a start pocj Hiis iuar. Aiterai!, ojon last time, you know 9fl RETURN MATCH BUMP David Low's Blimp usually began his remarks by saying :"God, sir, Lord N is right", adjusting his views to a sort of established convention; his medium is the Turkish bath, for which he is always dressed. His pictures are taken from the countryside, that vast piece of the England stretching from Clifton Close to Plymouth Hoe and Eton, and its morality, though distorted by all sorts of prejudices, essentially represents the school's charming 'code' of justice.But, Gad, sir, Low was right: the fair play values ​​undermined British policy and gave Hitler an advantage See also official class pages and did not want to be dragged into the Nazi moral plane, but Dresden became one anyway after a "reali" decision sta" After the war, barbarism seemed alarmed in the perception of comments. Ren is an undisciplined genius who doesn't want to go back. to his bottle. Postwar prosperity did not make people better. Juvenile delinquency, rising crime rates (particularly among the young), brutal manners, rampant excesses in popular culture, urban violence, racist outbursts, declining values, and destroyed homes: these have been headlines throughout the western world. Some of the alarmists may have misinterpreted questions of taste as questions of substance. I remember reading Richard Hoggart's Uses of Literacy and Denys Thompson's Discrimination and Popular Culture when I was a student and suspected that my schoolmates who liked rock music were from Trahison.

Employee. Others were fooled by a natural phase of the demographic cycle: all wars create birth booms, and all birth booms create generation gaps. The youth rebellions of the second half of the century in the Western world differed from the others mainly because of the enormous purchasing power of the young wage workers, which made them extraordinarily ostentatious. In the last years of the 20th century, although the perception of a generally demoralized society is still widespread, the evidence is not conclusive. High crime rates, for example, reflect high standards of incident reporting and classification, not necessarily an extension of the evil. More notable than the persistence of barbaric behavior is the survival of traditional values. More startling than the horrors of mob violence is the extent to which it has been confined to minorities and contained on the streets of most Western countries. We can at least congratulate ourselves on breaking the record for the biggest barbarian in warfare: the state. Many Western states have voluntarily limited their power to kill or abuse their citizens. Human rights movements helped change police habits, particularly in the former dictatorships of Central and Eastern Europe. However, it can hardly be denied that the moral implications of peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy, mass communication and mass education were disappointing. The analysis of war, which tends to blame barbarism for the demoralizing effects of conflict and misery, has been challenged by pessimists who see human nature as incorrigible and by a powerful wave of conservative social philosophers who embrace politically limited power. and are aware of the changes that have taken place. made. The best-known form of debate is trivial: sterile political jokes about whether unemployment is to blame for the crime. However, at a deeper level, the bias in opinion has dangerous implications for the future. Those who start to disapprove of the change may end up blaming it, and if we lose faith in freedom, we may put fascism back in its place. One of the downsides of liberty is that since an unfortunate precedent was set in Eden, free choices for the worst are routinely made. Expecting people to improve under your influence sets unrealistic standards of freedom and ultimately weakens your appeal. The same can be said of the other victims of the disappointment of the late twentieth century: prosperity, democracy and education. Liberty, however, is uniquely recalcitrant to political formation because, in recent years, it has been much more influenced by technological advances than by political decisions. The object of technology is, so to speak, freedom. By replacing or increasing brain and muscle power, it frees people to do what they want instead of what they need to do. No law or constitutional amendment in the 20th century did more for the freedom of ordinary people in the Atlantean world than inventions, to name just a few, such as the internal combustion engine and the mass-produced contraceptive. Still

none of them were clearly charitable. The car rolled around the world gasping and laughing like a frightening fictional fat kid just before the present century. It started out as a rich man's toy but gradually became accessible to people from almost all walks of life in the Atlantean world. The car gave you unprecedented freedom to go where you wanted when you wanted, but it spawned aggressive drivers, required ugly roads, and polluted the world with its toxic exhaust and deafening noise. Contraceptives are often credited with freeing women for employment, but the expanded freedom to choose sexual partners on an unprecedented scale responded to a more fundamental human desire. The effect on the spread and multiplication of sexually transmitted diseases was inconclusive. And, rather than just facilitating family planning, it has probably also contributed to the erosion of monogamy and the unpredictable consequences that await Western countries in the next century, of families modeled on new patterns, composed in most cases by adoptive relatives and single parents. . than the traditional "Kerns". Technological change seems to be replacing single-handed human evil as the focal point of fear of barbarism. The first charges were raised under the mushroom cloud of the atomic bomb, because weapons of mass destruction threaten civilization more radically than any customary brutality. Technology too powerful for existing political controls can accelerate and spread familiar forms of brutalization: satellite pornography overwhelms lawmakers' efforts. As this millennium draws to a close, AI researchers are poised to become the Frankensteins of the next; what Hitler could not achieve with the extermination of the sub-races, the eugenic engineers threaten with genetic manipulation; The complexity of defining life, the dexterity with which it can be prolonged or terminated, has placed terrifying power over it in the hands of medical engineers. Embryos for extermination and experimentation are the "persecuted minority" of a new form of inhumanity. THE ENEMY PREVAILS In a sense, the Atlantean civilization was strengthened by their disputes. Although the world was full of other problems that separated the United States from its European allies and the Europeans from each other, all huddled together in fear of the Soviet empire, oppressed by the threat of communist attack. The last of the "local problems" of the 20th century - so far in 1993 - was the collapse of that empire and the disappearance of the danger. It was greeted suddenly and loudly, but by eliminating a common enemy it left the West without a principle of unity. The vast Russian gloom of postwar Central and Eastern Europe can be understood in two ways: first, as an unsurprising empire—typical of all recorded history of the region (see Chapter 2)—reflecting the natural predispositions of Russia to hegemony: vast populations, countless resources and an impregnable heart. Such an empire had been

predictable for centuries and could have taken shape more than a hundred years earlier, after the Napoleonic Wars, when the opportunity of 1945 was terrifyingly anticipated. On the other hand, it can be argued with equal conviction that Soviet power was a ramshackle, dilapidated and obsolete edifice, incapable of long containing, let alone forever eliminating, the entrenched national and religious identities of the subjugated peoples. His collapse was predicted almost from the beginning, and it can be said that what surprised him was not his sudden death, but his long survival. The bicentennial year of the French Revolution, 1989, was crucial for its dismantling. In June, Poland's Communist Party was overwhelmed by the first free elections since the pre-war period, while in Hungary martyrs of resistance to Soviet rule were being rehabilitated. In October, the Moscow Communist Party officially resigned its leadership. In November the Berlin Wall, the concrete successor to the Iron Curtain, began to fall; On December 22, when the dictator of Romania was massacred after mobs stormed his palace, there was a change of leadership in almost all of the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. At the time, the change was blamed on the economic failures of state socialism and the backlog of democratic "dissidents." None of the analyzes was entirely correct. In a sense, the Soviet empire was a victim of its own economic success. Until the 1970s, communism seemed like "the future that works." Russia had escaped the crisis of the early 1930s and, despite the vulnerability of a command economy to policy-making errors, had found ways to achieve the dismal postwar technical achievements, symbolized by a terrible nuclear arsenal and the spectacle of the alibis 519 of the Stumblers. the Sputniks. In 1960, a Cuban cartoonist drew a Russian spaceship sprinkling stardust while an Earth priest told a stunned catechumen, "Russians can't go to heaven." Throughout Eastern Europe, as in the right-wing dictatorships that survived the antebellum period at the other end of the continent, on the Iberian Peninsula, prosperity created bourgeoisies that the regimes unsuccessfully tried to bribe. Russian surpluses, especially in energy, have subsidized most satellites without impoverishing the national economy. The era of economic success appears to have ended with the Great Depression of 1973, when rising oil prices rocked the energy market and contributed to record inflation. Against the form, capitalism began to work better. The Western world began a collective disgust with the intervention economy that had prevailed since the crisis. This was one of the predictable cycles in the history of economic policy. When recession is the enemy, pundits turn to the stimulus bomb; if it is inflation, classical economics is revived. When a breach in commercial capacity opened up, a moat in front of the Iron Curtain separating luxurious parquet flooring from backstage trinket, part of the troupe huddled backstage or moved to front of house. The satellites escaped economic dependence on Moscow and fell heavily into debt to Western bankers. The American administration of

Ronald Reagan (president, 1981-1988) boldly accelerated the arms race in an attempt to overcome Russia's paying power. In 1985, the Soviet Union was adrift in shallow water, groaning under a creaking hull, out of port and in the wake of the West, piloted by a leadership that, through a mixture of corruption and pragmatism, had left to believe in traditional socialism. rhetoric. Some of the 1989 revolutions were manipulated from Moscow, the final levers of a doomed supremacy. The outgoing East German dictator blamed the Kremlin for his downfall; in Prague, the Soviet secret police organized the outbreak of demonstrations that were fatal for the communists. The conspirators who took over Romania have recently returned from Russia. Moscow was a rational ploy but, under the circumstances, too ambitious. The Kremlin's rear fires became part of a larger conflagration. The dissidents were ready to take over the revolutions they had not started. Most of the new governments of the early 1990s were clericalist or nationalist to varying degrees. The states of the satellites move away from the orbit; Communist Party groups throughout Europe, including the Soviet Union, were disbanded or renamed. The two communist superstates, the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation, collapsed like marble buildings torn by veins. In a way, post-Soviet Europe resembled that of the Treaty of Versailles, with images multiplied in a hall of mirrors. As in 1919, superstates dissolved and frustrated nations returned to independently making empty promises of peace and multiplying the number of small European states easily confused as by recession reflexes. - including some, such as Slovenia and Croatia, Slovakia and Ukraine, which became shared sovereignty after the First World War. Eastern Europe seemed to have slipped directly from the world of Marx to that of the Marx Brothers, with bewildering new states simmering like duck soup. Roughly contemporaneous with the rise of a unifying Western Europe in the form of the European Community, which excludes and claims to compete economically with the United States, the Soviet demise seems to be pushing Europe's center of gravity eastward. Already being discussed are architects' plans to redevelop Berlin in a way suitable to house Europe's potential capital: a nightmare vision of Hitler turned dream city. The hooks of the Atlantic alliance, alternately tightened to the breaking point or dangerously loosened by the turmoil of the century, may finally be slipping. Chapter 17 THE CASE OF FAILURE: THE EDGES OF THE ATLANTIC

Tears for Argentina—Ohn Bull's early childhood—Marianne's middle years—The worm in the apple Oil cans in a ramshackle, trash-strewn landscape, where smoke rose parallel to the exhaust from a distant factory chimney. In a satire akin to estate agent gossip, a man in seven-league boots from a suburban settlement in the same town "stepped toward the station." Buenos Aires was booming, and the image of a miraculously elongated stride seemed appropriate for Argentina. With population and production growth rates unmatched anywhere else in the world (see Chapter 13), confidence soared. The upstart swagger for which Argentina became famous was concentrated in the upper echelons of wealth, epitomized in the foie gras-stuffed chicken served to 1,200 guests at a senator's golden wedding in 1906. Children at school. According to a pledge of allegiance introduced by an educational reform in 1909, the Argentine Republic was simply "the most beautiful country in the world." With "blind faith in their glamorous destiny", the Argentines were encouraged to believe that "they would not know history without a victory". Disappointment is the usual reward of hope. The Spanish philosopher, 521 522 THE TURN OF THE INITIATIVE “The most aristocratic suburb of the future” by Caras y Caretas (March 13, 1909): The confident self-confidence of the rhythm of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 1920s and promotes a market corrupt. José Ortega y Gasset, fascinated by Argentina and believing himself to be a prophet, saw it happen at the end of the 1920s: "The promises of the pampas, so generous, so spontaneous, are often not fulfilled... The defeats in America must be worse." that in another place A man is suddenly mutilated, left out of the water without treatment for his injuries." he knew he had become self-critical and tormented. The most successful Argentine novel of 1931, El hombre que está só y espera, by Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz , portrayed an unknown, evasive, and lonely Buenos Aires, practicing a Lock Your Daughters policy reminiscent of medieval Byzantium (see Chapter 2). Argentina, a country to resist their dreams and efforts.

Cabins by the sea, Cape Indians, a sailboat on the beach, the calm river disappearing in the distance. Despair expressed itself in tears or anger at the loneliness and isolation of a culture torn from its roots and "shaken" in a corner of the world map. "Europeans can hardly imagine how tragic our loneliness is," declared Carlos Gálvez in 1937. The tyranny of cartography, which showed Argentina on the brink of the end of the world, became a symbol of fear of frustration. Today you get maps with Argentina at the top, and the proud manners of soccer star Diego Maradona or playboy Luis Basualdo are part of everyday images of Argentina. Argentina's failure in the 20th century became a historical mystery, like the decline of Spain or the decline of German liberalism: an enigma that any historian could solve and for which each had their own solution. Seen from the perspective of the second half of the century, the dim picture of underdevelopment was depressing in a country that had already claimed the credibility of a potential Canada or Diego Maradona saluting the winning goal in the 1986 World Cup final. Association, Argentina defeating West Germany. His "proud ways" seemed to symbolize the return of Argentina's national ambition, but he proved a tragically flawed hero, weakened by scandals involving alleged cheating and drug abuse. 524 THE INITIATIVE RETURNS Australia, even the US In the 1960s, Argentina was a country of vintage cars, where only half the school-age population completed primary school, and where the capital was surrounded by a growth of 1.5 million shacks. . I remember seeing it when I was a teenager. Buenos Aires was a city of degenerate nobility struggling in difficult times. At Harrods on Florida Street, richly scuffed steam elevators operated by footmen in threadbare uniforms ferried customers between floors of inferior products. On the tables of street cafes, old-fashioned fashion huddled around creaking siphons. Even the graffiti looked woefully dated, screeching dull praise of Perón beneath raunchy films. People complained, with some reason, about the recolonization by an informal empire of multinational corporations: the new corporations, when they did exist, tended to be foreign-owned. In 1966, half of the top 100 manufacturing companies were foreign.

The economic failure was certainly a symptom, and perhaps a cause, of Argentina's enduring disillusionment. It used to be said that the Great Crisis and Depression of 1929-32 was the turning point. The voices of the outraged poor are heard in the lyrics of the tangos of the 1930s: the ironic hymns to filth and money by Discepolin, for whom “Jesús was worth as much as the thief”; "the anger", in a song by Celedonio Flores, "of men who are strong but have to face impotent hunger". Statistics show, however, that Argentina was more resilient during the Depression years than almost any other capitalist country, reducing unemployment and boosting exports. The structural fragility of a dependent economy that produces cheap food for the industries of other countries was repaired with astonishing speed. In 1914 there were 383,000 industrial workers in the entire country; In 1931, Buenos Aires sported the “gray crown” of greasy pollution typical of an industrial metropolis. On the eve of the World War, Argentine workers were almost as productive per capita as the French and far ahead of the Austrians, Italians, and Japanese. The number of people employed in the industry increased to over half a million in the mid-1930s and to 830,000 in 1941, thanks in large part to the development of indigenous textiles. In 1943, the industrial sector surpassed agriculture in terms of production value. Although the 1930s have been dubbed the "notorious decade" by writers who resented the power of domestic capitalists and foreign imperialists, the real "lost moment" in Argentina's economic history seems to have occurred later, during World War II. World and its consequences. Until then, Argentina was disproportionately dependent on Britain as a market and source of investment capital. On the eve of the war, Britain supplied a fifth of the Republic's imports and bought more than a third of its exports. The war crippled this main trading partner and produced no successors; Argentina was forced to feed impoverished post-war Europe with credit to discharge a surplus for which there was noise without demand, need without means. Wheat growers in North America and Australia were after the same market. In 1948, the United States government decreed that Marshall Aid (see Chapter 13) could not be used to purchase Argentine products. Meanwhile, industrial growth, encouraged by governments both conservative and radical in the 1930s and 1940s, literally devoured Argentina's export surplus as new workers consumed meat and wheat. Import substitution worked somewhat: Argentina earned more at home. But it had a negative impact on trade. Starting in 1949, Argentina stopped meeting its beef quotas for Great Britain and the trade balance began to have problems. The real impoverishment of workers occurred in the postwar years under a pro-labor government: average real wages fell 20% from 1948 to 1952. One of the great charismatic politicians of the 20th century, Juan Perón, failed to stem the tide. de costa was born out of wedlock in 1895. his father was an elusive loser, a disappointing senator.

Son who fled to the small farms first in Lobos, then in Patagonia. Juan entered the army, but his career was boring and limited as an instructor at the military academy, where he read a lot but thought little. He gained political experience with the military regime that took power in 1943 while building his own power base through a job that brought him in close contact with union leaders. His greatest asset was her mistress, tactfully turned wife on the eve of the 1946 presidential election. Evita was a radio soap opera star who rose from poverty through talent aided by physical attraction. She was the darling of the shirtless masses, whose hopes and potential she was supposed to symbolize. After helping to mobilize a massive constituency in her favor, she became the power broker of her husband's entourage and a secular Master of Charity. Perón, whose style of leadership had much in common with the European fascist and authoritarian dictators of the 1930s, is credited with a set of incompatible political philosophies. His own characterization of what he called "judicialism" was typically contradictory: "Christian and humanist with the best attributes of collectivism and individualism, idealism and materialism." he promised the businessmen that "workers organized by the state...can neutralize the revolutionary currents that endanger capitalist society." His emphasis on the Catholic origins of his collectivism, with his sincere aversion to violent methods, seems to absolve him of the charge of fascism. But as import substitution policies failed, he increasingly relied on demagogy techniques and the cult of personality to maintain his popularity. In 1950 he became "the liberator" and "the leader"; In 1952, the dying Evita was named the nation's "spiritual head," just in time to become the "shirtless martyr." 526 T W I S T OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​T I VE LEAL INTERPRETER OF THE DECAMISADOS" Eva Perón and the Buenos Aires she helped make. The slogan "The Faithful Voice of the 'Descamisadas' Masses" contains a play on words. Interpreter means " interpreter" " and "actress" - a reference to Evita's telenovela career. The photo of the busy Calle Corrientes was taken in 1958 - more or less the last time, until the last years of the millennium, that Buenos Aires projected

a really contemporary look by European or North American standards, with tram lines, smart cars, modernist architecture and ridiculous billboards. Although his rhetoric and constituency were his own, Perón basically followed the industrialization and import substitution policies of his predecessors. Attempts to exonerate him by blaming his conservative predecessors, or vice versa, have proved equally unsuccessful. The Peronists liked to blame a mythical alliance of foreign exploiters and sycophantic capitalists: cattle magnates who pawned the British imperialists for the people's food. To escape, Argentina had to open the tentacles of the British "octopus". Analysis dominated some of the most difficult work of Argentine intellectuals in the late 1930s. Raúl Scalabrini published scathing denunciations of collaboration in Britain's informal empire, and Mario Scofficio's film Kilometer III showed British railway monopolies thwarting a highway construction program to impose low farm prices. : The stationmaster who helps the farmers to bring the wheat to the market loses his job. Others looked for long-term trends. Some of the most popular explanations have spread the blame among Argentines of all classes and throughout history. Count Keyserling (1880-1946), the Nordic Swami rejected by the Argentine followers of his mystical philosophy for daring to criticize his country, came to blame the Argentine "telluric spirit", something on the ground whose failure was inevitable. This was an analysis worthy of, and perhaps due to, Buffon and de Pauw (see Chapter 8). In what Carlos Gálvez called "the new Babel", even a bad "national character" flattered a people insecure of their ability to forge a common identity among immigrants: Ortega y Gasset pointed out that Argentines, due to "fierce desires, indiscipline , one of the first native analysts of the failure was the "radiographer of the pampas", Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, who, in an influential work of 1933, declared that his country was doomed by birth defects: a combination of cursed geography and hereditary vices. Spaniards include the church, which has been blamed for everything from terrorism to military coups, and an unstable political culture, which the investigator preconceives as attributed to an unconstitutional colonial legacy or the effects of "revolutionary illegitimacy." explanations: Argentines blame themselves; their moral shortcomings are responsible; the weak This is a kind of divine scourge. "Argentina offered rich unlimited power and innumerable opportunities," goes one characteristic story. "The future did not demand any personal sacrifice or responsibility from any Argentine." Sometimes a point error was blamed: gaucho machismo, for example, or the personal anarchy supposedly inherited from Spanish ancestors, or the racial degeneracy supposedly introduced by immigrants.

In this sense, as in many others, the modern history of Argentina is an important lesson for the world. Among newly colonized countries like Australia, New Zealand, and the North American Midwest, with their favorable climatic and soil conditions, it seemed to have shamefully squandered its opportunities. For peoples who can be classified into popular late-20th-century categories such as "Third World" and "South," it seems like a warning of stagnant development that may never mature into a fully developed nation or great power. In the context of other countries bordering the Atlantic, it seems a victim of the decline of Atlantic civilization, excessively dependent on a fragile transatlantic link, in this case mainly with Great Britain. In all three contexts, the tendency to see failure as a moral problem is equally dangerous: it diverts attention from adjustable problems in politics and business and sets in motion self-fulfilling prophecies of doom. In Argentina, the intellectual fear of failure preceded and perhaps accelerated the event. Its vital partner Britain, whose problems were so closely linked to its own, is another case of a country speaking of decline. THE SECOND CHILDHOOD OF JOHN BULL One source of evidence hangs on my living room wall: a series of caricatures drawn by the "conservative anarchist" Max Beerbohm in 1901, when he was trapped in an unpleasant job as a theater critic and bitterly disgusted. with their compatriots. . Max was an aesthetic tabloid who hated vulgarity and philistinism. The hatred was evident in his portrayals of John Bull, the epitome of England, looking at paintings, mocking the muses and condescending to Kipling. England is portrayed as uncomfortably old, gouty, drunk and sleepy. John Bull has worse traits than philistinism: he sucks long-suffering Ireland's ass. He laughs wickedly at the fights between high and low clerics. But he is beyond despicable, pathetic. With cobwebs in his hat, he vaguely remembers the Elizabethan era and the American Revolutionary War. In his role as Europe's New Sick, he only pretends to visit a hospital. He flatters Germany and, presciently for 1901, clings to America's tails. He gives in to an ever-present feeling that he is lost. The muse of memory "pushes the English rose between the pages of history." In a cartoon titled "Saint George and the Dragon - Revised Version", a pair of spurred legs and armor disappear into the dragon's mouth. When the cartoons were published in 1911, Max lamented his cruelty. However, they expressed widespread concern. In the last three decades of the 19th century, frustration or anger at Britain's perceived decline became a persistent quirk among writers, who compared its measurable strengths with those of its competitors, particularly Germany and the United States. This was exactly the time when the British did not draw St. George and the Dragon (Revised Version) by Max Beerbohm, 1901

published 1911. St. George was in popular art the chosen image of English virtues wielding the sword and spear of the British Empire against the dragon of barbarism. Beerbohm's new version expresses the shattered self-confidence of a people convinced of decadence. The world trading nation was at its peak and British imperialism at its peak of prosperity. This success seemed to feed the detractors with its innuendo and enrage the oracles with prophecies of doom. British supremacy was recognized as fragile almost from the start. As the world watched the first great World's Fair at the Crystal Palace in 1851, which showcased the dominance of British industry and ingenuity, The Economist proclaimed the impending dominance of the United States, "ultimately as sure as the next eclipse." Sun". . . Historians have continued the custom begun by contemporaries of dating the decline of Great Britain from the days of its greatest greatness. Rot was in the eye of the beholder. Almost all of the measurable indicators cited to demonstrate the decline have been misinterpreted or, at best, exaggerated. National income continued to rise through the late 19th century and until World War I. All British competitors caught up relatively, but lagged behind in absolute terms. Output per head in Britain declined at the beginning of the 20th century, but recovered dramatically in the immediate pre-war period. The disproportionate level of British foreign investment was blamed for impoverishing domestic industry, but it was also evidence of enormous excess wealth and a means of fostering new markets for the future. Free trade was a strongly contested policy, not least because one of the consequences was an unfavorable balance of trade for Britain, a depressing feature among industrialized countries on the eve of World War II. On the other hand, it was the foundation of British prosperity and the essential background for British revenues from shipping and financial services that more than made up for the shortfall. In terms of levels of public investment and measured results, German education seemed to dwarf British education for much of the period, with dire implications for the future adequacy of the workforce and the future advancement of research. But the strengths of British education, often informally or privately funded, tend to fade from the statistics, and even in the sectors measured there has been a striking recovery to levels close to those in Germany in the pre-war years. English classes have not only improved considerably, but also add up for practical purposes. The value system taught in English schools at the end of the 19th century was condemned as "producing a race of innocents devoted to romantic ideals" and incapable of asserting and defending their power. 'Fair play', that untranslatable English virtue, is said to have doomed Britain to defeat by those who only played to win. But seen from a different angle, the spirit of team play adequately reinforced an Imperial Masterclass. The winding and undulating road of English history started from Plymouth

Ho across the fields from Eton to Clifton Close. When "the regiment is blinded by dust and smoke... a student's voice unites the ranks." Lessons the heroes learned from school histories played an important role in winning British victories or sustaining British efforts in the face of defeat: belief in effortless superiority over foreigners; the cults of "courage" and coldness in crisis; confidence in the chances of triumph of the underdogs; the deification of the talented amateur. The English talent for instilling altruism without castration was brilliantly demonstrated with the founding of the Scout movement in 1907, which fought anemia in Spartan camps. Combining gang spirit and team spirit, they became the "janissaries of the Empire" and, in the Prime Minister's opinion, "perhaps the greatest moral force the world has ever known." However, the doomsayers are not easy to console and their historians are hard to dissuade. Statistics can be endlessly reinterpreted and questioned; The beliefs of moral decadence, of rotten wormwood in the state, are beyond the reach of reason. Scouting founder Robert Baden-Powell, a Peter Pan case of perpetual childhood who became the youngest general in the British Army, was driven by “a greater moral force than the world has ever known. A Boy Scout troop pictured in 1910, two years after Baden-Powell opened the movement's continuing history with the publication of Scouting for Boys and a Northumbrian camp where boys were sent on 'King Arthur's Quest' to Baden- Powell. he's sleeping in a hidden cave in the neighbourhood." The Boy Scouts were not merely a militaristic youth movement: there was a subversive individualism about Baden-Powell's values ​​and an emphasis - reflecting the founder's South African experiences - on the inspiring tactics of the guerrillas and the leader - mixing classes in camps and turning underprivileged children into 'gentlemen', defined as 'anyone who abides by the rules of chivalry' • Fear of British incipient degeneracy, characterized by welfare, barriers of class, luxury, crime, and strikes. At one point, English failure was blamed on the debilitating effects of Empire, the snobbery of the elite, and the idleness of the proletariat. Various unverifiable claims were made at the time and have been repeated to this day: Empire fostered a parasitic bureaucracy and stifled competitiveness in "weak" markets; anti-commercial values ​​hungry industry s of competent managers; Workers similarly responded to the selfishness or indifference of other classes, or refined their own extremes of "idiocy." These moral explanations of the English situation were derived not from observed realities at the time, but from accepted conventions.

a literary tradition. The Bible was a source that prepared its readers to pay a political price for their moral shortcomings. Renaissance humanism had associated the decline of politics - and particularly the fall of that exemplary empire, the Roman state - with debilitating vices: courage weakened by despotism, virtue corrupted by comfort. Britons of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, mindful of their role as modern Rome and Israel, naturally expected the same kind of twist of fate to happen to them. Arnold White, explaining to himself and other Englishmen their ineffectiveness in the fight against the Boers, blamed the selfishness and irreligion of the elite, which, according to him, spread their impropriety throughout society: "the influence of a society without intelligence", idleness, dishonor and dishonesty were the thorns of this highly contagious smallpox. It is difficult to find objective evidence for the particular mistakes that historians attribute to the English in the decline of Britain, but history is made up more of the falsehoods that people believe than of the facts that can be verified. Mindful that Britain was the most industrialized country in the world by any measurable standard, and since the start of the Industrial Revolution, the designers of the British Pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exposition treated visitors to a cardboard cutout of the Prime Minister. in wading bird fishing in front of an idyllic landscape without "not a single factory chimney". The previous Prime Minister's most famous speech equated England with "the country", which resonated with "the sound of the anvil in the country's forge". These were the dreams of an industrial giant born of rural childhood, but the self-image projected by British tastemakers became a reality for others to perceive. The British's own assumptions about the depth of their decline were echoed at home and reflected abroad. A decline is just as worrisome, whether objectively real or merely perceived. During and after the Second World War, Britain fell victim to a self-esteem that incited its enemies and depressed its own people. His heavy movements and punches in danger were those of a "troublesome giant". There were real problems for a country with limited manpower defending a vast and vulnerable empire, for "the first industrialized nation" struggling to keep up with the need for innovation, for a world business leader rising from absolute supremacy. to relative superiority. Early industrialization had left upriver shipyards with steel yards over the flowing ores. The commitment to heavy industry of the "heroic age" could not be easily undone, nor could the untimely labor practices of an experimental age be reversed. Weaknesses in key areas of relatively late development, such as electrical and chemical engineering, were only slowly and imperfectly overcome. Oil, an increasingly important energy source, was in short supply due to dangerously exposed sources. But the recuperative and adjusting powers of British industry were amply demonstrated in the crises of the 1930s and 1940s. The collapse of world power status and the precipitous retreat of the empire was not the result of a long decline - except in the self-esteem - but the sudden consequence

the special circumstances of World War II, which strained the resources of a still mighty power. Even in the second half of the 20th century, Britain's relative decline was only completed in historically inconvenient places where outdated industries could not be replaced, or on the Atlantic shore where oil spills washed ashore due to fortunes. spilled into the ocean. Both sets of difficulties centered on Liverpool, a great city that became the epitome of urban disaster in Britain in the 1980s, a British Buenos Aires, an enemy of its own promise. In the mid-19th century, that promise seemed overwhelmingly great; The 18th-century city, born of the transatlantic slave and wine trade, had faded under layers of the more recent prosperity brought by cotton and lumber. Rebuilt on the values ​​of "busy, noisy, smoky, money-hungry merchants", Liverpool "had no monuments of antiquity, no trace of decay". A popular novelist in 1851 summed up the growth he had witnessed in his day, proclaiming that, thanks to "commerce guided by a wise and liberal policy", Liverpool "compared with some of the proudest cities in the world". The tonnage handled by its port nearly equaled that of London. It acquired slums befitting its splendor: pockets of typhoid, cholera, relapsing fever, and smallpox where, as one tenant put it in the 1860s, "the stench brought down the roof." The intimacy that linked the splendor of Victorian Liverpool with Atlantic shipping and imperial communications can be experienced today in the bar of the Philharmonic Public House on Hope Street, built of tropical wood by shipwrights and surrounded by paintings of exotic flora and fauna. gold and copper. The first half of the 20th century was a climacteric period, but not a period of decline. The centripetal city was fragmented by railways, trams and buses, by suburban sprawl and the incorporation of peripheral cities. The iconic new buildings of the era were the dazzling movie theaters, the hundred "dream castles" built between World War I and World War II, spread out within walking distance enough for residents of the city center and suburbs. With their lavish sets—degenerate empire or dazzling art deco—and their glittering windows looking out on exotic celluloid worlds, movie theaters offered ordinary people a cheap share of some of the spectacular rewards of material advancement. After 1945 Liverpool lost an empire without finding a role. Some escapes were homegrown, such as the Mersey Sound, pioneered by the Beatles in the early 1960s, which helped transform Liverpool into a stronghold of world-renowned popular bands, recruited from underemployed youngsters who had plenty of time to practice. . Miscellaneous 534 USE OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​​​​​T I VE *5 » « * '* <W ! é¿Wfgm -7I ^lì

*! 1 - JM mm WP^ß W ! 1 1 1 The exoticism and paintings of colonial products that adorned the Liverpool Philharmonic appeared more generally in the decoration of the inns. This painted mirror is part of a rich design, loosely imitating French and Dutch rococo prototypes, in Tottenham, Oxford Street, London, designed in 1890. NO WORK 'Grass between the cobbles': Liverpool's devastation photographed for the press French in December 1985. "Is there still hope for Liverpool?" asked the original signature. 535 Sources of aid came from abroad, such as the central government-funded “downtown regeneration” program to address root causes or to cover up the effects of the slum unemployed riots of the 1990s. 1980. local education that made Liverpool Britain's most computer-savvy city' in 1990. But even these impressive activities were either consequences or concessions to decadence. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, the population decreased by a third. In 1981, the residents of the favelas revolted. In 1985, the treasury went bankrupt and a socialist council limited itself to handing out taxi layoffs; The local government had to be suspended to dig the graves and sweep the streets. A 1987 returnee to the empty Docklands found "no people around, no children playing, just desert silence...and grass between the cobbles". THE ROAD YEARS OF MARIANNE Around the same time as Britain, France was home to a self-proclaimed "declining" society, with many domestic critics quick to denounce national morality. During the Third Republic, nationalists accused their compatriots of "almost Muslim fatalism" and "disposition to rape", while psychiatrists "associated nervous exhaustion with a decaying civilization". The hard-won victory in World War I silenced or attenuated these accusations; Until the mid-1930s, France once again appeared on paper as the greatest military power in Western Europe. But when that superiority collapsed and Hitler rearmed, nervous morale appeared in the "naked panic" of the bank queues in 1938. The prostration under the tracks of German tanks in 1940 was credited by contemporary observers with a undeniable integrity and intelligence. , the "moral decadence" of the nation, the "lost brotherhood" in times of war and the "lack of heroism" of the elite. For France, even more precisely than for Great Britain, the year 1870 was the starting point of the feeling of decadence. Although punished in Franco

Prussian War Defeated by an army outnumbered and worse equipped than its own, France remained a great power with unlimited military potential by treaty and an intact overseas empire; but among the political consequences of her defeat was the unification, under Prussian leadership, of a German state with a population that soon exceeded her own. This was a case of relative decay, dramatically centered in time. As an artist, Emile Zola needed a defeat. He inspired the culmination of a twenty-volume cycle of novels that took twenty-two years to write, depicting the social history and morbid anatomy of France through the fate of one family. The Débâcle was intended to be both a "document on the psychology of France" and a Roman vérité humaine describing "battlefields devoid of chauvinism" and "the real sufferings of the soldier". Zola, rejected for a place in the National Guard because of his myopia, brought the aching sense of personal guilt to a story of vicarious experiences. He approached battlefield research with vigor and produced an excellent work on oral history. The liveliest footage of him was provided by a field surgeon. This was the source of the realism that Zola used in the service of symbolism in gruesome hospital scenes and sickening incantations of the rotting dead, gangrenous wounded, and frenzied amputations. The most symbolic moment is revealed to two characters who come across a group of French soldiers who seem to be having a picnic in the open air. Seen up close: Les deux zouaves, raidis, les mains tordues, n'avaientplus de visage, le nez arraché, les yeux sautés des orbites. Le rire de celui qui se tenait le vento venait de ce qu'une balle lui avait fendu les levres, en lui cassant les dents. . . . S'étaient-ils train à cette place, vivants encore, pour mourir ensemble? [The two Zouaves stiffen. His hands were strangely tense. They had no faces: blown-out noses, eyes drooping from their sockets. The smile on the face of the one who held the belly was the result of a bullet between the lips breaking the teeth. . . . Did they crawl to this place, not exactly dead, to die together? Or did the Prussians do it for burlesque: they took it and put it around the table, mocking the famous old sociability of the French? wounds or the evocation of the horrors of war. Unbeatable, that is, in fiction; the true stories of the atrocities and cannibalism caused by the war were even more terrifying. When the book appeared in 1892, it was no longer solely or mainly a denunciation of the decline of the regime that ended in 1870, but of the republic that followed. Readers like Anatole France - then in his forties and still in the early stages of his fame - read

this message within or within it. Nervous insecurity at the memory of defeat was betrayed by nationalists, who denounced her for her outspoken account of French failure or praised her for her brutal record of German atrocities. The historical accuracy of Zola's background has been meticulously debated by critics with uncomfortably shattered memories. She blamed her Italian ancestry for the lack of a patriotic tone. The nation had been caught up in the collective practice of fleeing like Napoleon III. in one of the most controversial images of La Débâcle, that she made up her cheeks to hide her paleness. From one point of view, French insecurity seems to have a very long history. In the mid-15th century, France was the largest, most populous, and most of the time the best united state in Western Europe, with an enviable concentration of natural resources and access to both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Even so, it had been defeated, first by Spain and Portugal, then by the Netherlands and England, for the rewards of imperial expansion. All attempts at continental hegemony were buried: their epitaphs were written in the Treaties of Câteau-Cambrésis (1558), Utrecht (1714) and Vienna (1815). The cultural hegemony established in the 18th century, which had always given comfort to French pride when things went bad economically and politically, was being challenged by Germany even before Germany's political unification. However, after 1870, France seemed to have lost forever the opportunity to fulfill the elusive destiny that geography had suggested and history had denied. United Germany, which had a population equal to that of France at the founding of the empire, grew to a nearly 50% superiority in 1914. Under this alarming shadow, the French succumbed to the same paradox as their British neighbors: fear. to decline in a Period of unprecedented material success and imperial expansion. Sub-industrialization was the specifically French form of the disease of perceived failure (see Chapter 12). The French industry seemed to collectively reflect a lack of seriousness or commitment, epitomized by Jules Siegfried, the highly successful and innovative textile maker who recorded "To Work Is To Act" on his cufflinks but retired in 1880 at age 40. fourth, engage in public service in politics and charity. In fact, by today's standards, post-1896 industrialization in France was as rapid and complete as elsewhere. After that, until World War I, steel production almost tripled and textile production almost doubled. But, as in Britain, the real successes did little to alleviate the fears generated by the success of competitors. A traveler in France may record the occurrence of a relative decrease as he travels from west to east. From the great ports of the Modern Age, such as Nantes, Saint-Malo and Bordeaux, to the industrial cities of the interior, such as Clermont-Ferrand, Lille and Metz, he seems to be traveling in the period between the 18th and 19th centuries. centuries. Sometimes this is the result of development coming to a complete halt in declining Atlantic ports, as in

Saint Malo. Typically, as in Nantes and Bordeaux, development continued at a reduced level into the 19th century, and previous streets and buildings were not obliterated by change. Lille, perhaps the most likely of all French cities, was transformed in the 19th century. The Old Stock Exchange, a surviving wing of the town hall, and the Vauban-built citadel show it made for a remarkable 18th-century French townscape from contrasting vantage points. Lille was photographed along the Boulevard de la Liberté, looking away from the monumental center to the dirty industrial edge of stacks of factories behind the towers. Place de la Carrière in Nancy hides behind 18th-century elegance in an image that blocks out the huge industrial world that surrounds it. k WsàtÊP-'" 'JpÉk "%, ^Ê^UÊÊW WHKfJSKÊfà The Casebook of Failure 539, of which little remains, however. Beyond the gardens, below the citadel, is a neighborhood rebuilt after the War of 1870. It surrounds the Palais Rameau, a "People's Palace" for leisure and culture, and surrounds the Collège de Saint-Joseph, the Eglise du Sacré-Coeur and the Catholic University with its steep Flemish skyline. From here, the Boulevard de la Liberté was pushed southwest through the old town like a precision-machined piston, toward the massive late-1880s Palais des Beaux-Arts in the center and the heavy main square and train stations beyond. This reconstruction reflected a concentrated increase in Lille's fortunes: by mid-century it was a city of 75,000; By the outbreak of war in 1870, it had grown and incorporated its own growing satellites, numbering nearly a quarter of a million people. Of course, whether such a complete and comprehensive reconstruction should be undertaken is a matter of aesthetic and civic judgement, as well as economic feasibility. Nancy is another 19th-century prodigy that emerged in its current form essentially after the Franco-Prussian War, when refugees doubled the size of this still-French Lorraine town. But its heart of elegant 18th-century squares was too ethereal and too tied to bourgeois memories of Lorraine's sovereign past to be obliterated by new developments. So today Nancy has an 18th-century core in a 19th-century shell, and the legacy of its pre-industrial craftsmanship, the elegant iron railings of Place de la Carrière, are trimmed with gold leaf. However, most Atlantic coast cities did not offer the options available in the industrial Northeast. Brest is the exception; It distinguished itself for its role as a naval base. With little to preserve, nothing to lose, and no bourgeois character to assert, it was rebuilt in an ugly and messy fashion. The most representative case is that of Bordeaux, since no French city has had a history so linked to Atlantic trade since it succeeded Nantes in the 1730s.

in all colonial trade, except that of slaves. In about fifty years, the tonnage in its port doubled and its value quintupled. It linked the world's most productive coffee and sugar growing centers in the French West Indies with the world's most active markets in Western Europe. It had the large and diverse immigrant population that is the hallmark of a boomtown, with examples of all sorts of fortunes, from Charles Kunckel, a Dutch Protestant who arrived in 1786 with a capital of £25,000, to the two foolish pickpockets. enough Parisians to steal a policeman's watch on January 6, 1785. In this context, Aubert de Tourny was able to announce in 1746 his plan to make the city he ruled "in four or five years the most beautiful in the kingdom". All these ambitions are too optimistic, and in 1754 Tourny had the image of his Plan de Lattre engraved in Bordeaux. Bordeaux as Aubert Tourny intended it in 1754. The Place Royale is shown in elevation below. Note the blooming romantic touch in the center of the right bank: the effect of a ruined cloister adorning the public gardens. Plans in case you die before finishing the job. However, he had time to re-divide the city according to enlightened guidelines. Replacing the old walls with wide corridors, he began with a delicately baroque oval plaza and extended the symmetry and balance of the Place Royale inherited from his predecessor into the adjacent spaces. The tastes of the next generation were more strictly neoclassical, but the transformation of the city continued in the same spirit. The building that is always said to epitomize the character of illuminated Bordeaux is the Grand Théâtre of the 1770s, which ushered in a new fashion for theatrical buildings, returning to an old Renaissance type: a temple instead of a palace, behind a dense and elaborate colonnade. Bordeaux's prosperity was a casualty of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 1792-1815. Successive bad winds scared away the ships of the Gironde: the revolution of the slaves and the independence of Haiti; the French withdrawal from the New World Empire; the continental system; the British blockades; the loss of more colonies in the peace agreement. In the 1820s, the last phase of the great urban reforms initiated by Tourny was completed in the Place des Quinconces, where the columns dedicated to navigation and commerce looked desperately at the lazy river. The Bordeaux thalassocracy traveled the world in search of new outlets. In 1819, the Emperor of Annam inspected a shipment in Hue; Places in the China Seas were named after Bordeaux families and ships. Senegal and New Caledonia became joint targets. It is difficult to pinpoint a date for Bordeaux's return to prosperity, partly because new projects never stopped, they simply took longer to mature and bore less spectacular fruit than in the previous century. By comparison, the entire 19th century is commonly referred to as the "times de l'immobilisme". In

In 1860, however, three circumstances conspired to restore the city's conspicuous growth: the prolonged and cumulative growth of the wine trade; the eventual fulfillment that year of a long-frustrated project to bring the railway to Bordeaux; and the choice of the port as the terminal of the South American route for sending parcels. The last generation of the 19th century was marred by recessions and ravaged by phylloxera, but Bordeaux's character was changing in an almost continuous process of economic diversification that filled its cracks with new industries and covered its crust with suburbs. In 1912, on the other side of the Gironde, the old Bordeaux was a second city with chemical factories, food factories and construction sites. "A swamp of low houses" surrounded its monumental center. Its development was never fast or wild enough to supplant the urban heritage of the 18th century, but it did set a steady pace of enrichment and growth. While Bordeaux's history is remarkably similar to Liverpool's, it does not reflect the urban decay, economic stagnation and social disaster that befell Liverpool with the decline of the Atlantic. In Bordeaux, walking between the railway buffers and the Atlantic coast, you can feel how the railways attract Atlantic trade, creating new opportunities, of course, and expanding the range of markets and suppliers, but also establishing competing routes that have reduced the importance relative to maritime routes. Until the advent of the railway, there was no alternative to the sea for long-distance bulk cargo, except in selected areas favored by rivers and navigable canals. The system, which reached Bordeaux in 1860, was dense in the quadrangle delimited by Paris, Lille, Mulhouse and Clermont-Ferrand, but timidly extended towards the Atlantic at Cherbourg, Rennes and Saint-Nazaire. The layout of the railroads was determined by strategic and economic considerations, but its effect was in part to drive business away from the ocean. A map of French rail electrification plans in the mid-1950s shows the lasting effects: almost all high-voltage lines run in the north-east. Observed in miniature in France, the same phenomenon on a larger scale pulled the centers of Europe and North America to the east and west, respectively, as the great transcontinental railways took shape. MADE ON THE APPLE They called it the "Empty State Building" for a long time. The skyscraper that has become a symbol of New York was started at the end of the city's wildest era. The 1920s was a decade of rampant consumerism, epitomized by the extravagant life of Mayor Jimmy Walker, whose motto was "Never go to bed the day you wake up" and who was ousted for bribery in 1932. Building the State it coincided with the abrupt end of the Christmas decade with the Wall Street Crash of 1929 (see Chapter 16). The theft saved contractors $20 million, nearly a third of projected construction costs. Saturated with cheap labor and off-the-shelf materials, the building skyrocketed at an average speed of one story.

every four and a half days. Only the tenants were missing. It was not until 1942 that the building reached its full capacity. The designers' hopes of bringing in workers in daily blimps strapped to the roof were dashed by lightning strikes and high winds. Shame and oblivion loomed, but the building suddenly became a hit in 1933, when its pinnacle became the sanctuary for a fictional giant gorilla in the movie King Kong. Like its New York counterpart, the Statue of Liberty (see Chapter 13), it represents the triumph of hope over experience. It only has a foundation depth of two stories, but Manhattan's solid rock foundations supported its 102 stories. Even when it was surpassed as the world's tallest building, it retained the affection of tourists and the imagination of onlookers. The World Trade Center, on the southern tip of the island, is taller but less visible and has never rivaled the Empire State Building. A 1976 King Kong remake that used the WTC for its climax was a flop. As its most iconic building, New York has shown incredible resilience in the face of disasters. Like Liverpool, its early fortunes depended on transatlantic trade, but it also had privileged access to a vast continental hinterland. A great threshold was needed between a deep ocean and a wide land, and in the first half of the 19th century, New York was becoming the incomparably largest city in the United States. The population topped 1 million in the 1850s, when New York handled more than a third of the country's exports and nearly two-thirds of its imports. While space constraints and hydroelectric power limited the growth and variety of industries in the city, the surrounding area filled with businesses that depended on New York's single port, which became the center of a "symbiotic network of specialized communities. The Failure Case Book 543 Civilization at the mercy of savagery. The poster for the RKO stage production King Kong (1933), which dwarfed New York in terrifyingly vulnerable proportions, should be compared with Goya's vision of the danger of war, p. 489. In the last third of the nineteenth century, New Yorkers showed something of the same concern as their French and British counterparts about Atlantic prosperity; The city's leading newspaper became "haunted by the specter of decline" in 1874. An objective measure seemed to support these fears: from 1869 to 1900, New York's share of US foreign trade, and even its share in the Northeast Atlantic, was down a year-over-year, reduced by a rail freight rate structure that favored Philadelphia and Baltimore. But the general expansion of trade, immigration (see Chapter 13), and New York's undisputed role in providing what were later called commercial services to the United States created the New York of the new century: an image of beauty and terror, more dynamic and urban. and diversity are reaching their limits. HG Wells, who saw it in 1906, was struck by "the unprecedented variety, the inhuman power of the thing" and found it "more beautiful than Rome". But he also sensed her fragility, and in a 1908 novel

he envisioned it exploding under air attack in a futuristic war. 544 THE TWIST OF I N I T I A ​​T I V "Air Raid on New York", an illustration from H. G. Wells, The War in the Air (1908): "As the airships sailed by," reads the text at this point , "they broke". to pieces she the city like a child will destroy her cities of brick and cardboard." After World War II, New York may have escaped the relative decline suffered by the centers on the Atlantic side, thanks to the city's rise to a sort of capital of the world, home to the headquarters of the United Nations General Assembly and the Manhattan Security Council... Bolstered by the financial institutions of Wall Street, New York seemed armed against the fate of Liverpool or Buenos Aires. signs of decline soon became apparent.Between 1950 and 1970, one million families left New York in what became known as the "Flight of the Great Whites."Though most of the loss was replaced by blacks and migrants from Asia oriental, the impact on community revenues was catastrophic Population stabilized and then declined By 1975, the city's debt had accumulated $13 billion Although the trusts p rivados stepped in under state rule to mitigate the effects of state bankruptcy, dilapidated public works, and poorly maintained streets became part of the city's popular image. The impetus of a glorious past seemed to lead New York into crisis; In the 1970s and 1980s, tacky real estate speculators Donald Trump and Leona Helmsley made millions betting on urban regeneration. As manufacturing contracted, banking, business services, and computer-based industries grew throughout the world. Ed Koch (mayor, 1977-86) balanced the books and was able to convincingly state that "the future comes here to rehearse" before his government collapsed amid ruined lives, prison sentences, nervous breakdowns, and suicides. corrupt members of his entourage. At a lower societal level, the measurable evidence of deprivation—poverty, social rights, the hopeless scandal of public charities, violence, disease, and mortality—has inexorably worsened. During the Koch administration, the income of the poorest 20% of citizens fell significantly in real terms, while the richest 10% increased by more than a fifth. New York has become the schizoid city depicted in Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities, torn apart by impoverished ghettos where the rich dare not venture. Cheap cocaine fueled an unprecedented surge in violent street crime beginning in 1986. In 1990, when one in four New Yorkers was officially classified as poor by national standards, the city had an annual budget deficit of $1.3 billion. Liverpool and New York went up together and it wouldn't be a surprise if they went down together. But Metropolis is Superman's home and he's used to being saved against all odds. New York has every hope of surviving the Atlantean civilization for a long time. Its information-intensive industries are preparing for the post-industrial age. Even in its less lively moments, it is full of carrion for culture lovers: libraries, museums, galleries, theaters, concert halls,

Studios, publishers and elite schools. No more was allowed to collapse than Venice was allowed to sink. Its banking and corporate services sectors are paralyzed in the global economy: it's one of three or four eyes of the sleepless commercial monster: the others look out from outlets in London, Tokyo and perhaps "spanning" Los Angeles. and scan the world in 24-hour shifts." You must stay where you are: in a complementary time zone. However, the Atlantic position that made and kept New York great has become irrelevant. Aladdin's Swarms - The Roots of the Tree Mikongoe - The Fortress of Monsters - The Monument to Our Struggle - The Shadow of the Banyan - The Fate of the New Europe - The European Reflection Aladdin's Hives Under a Rainy Sky in One In a dilapidated suburb, two wide and squat Mughal style Towers, matte with molding folds, crown a hilltop parapet, with a heavy angular colonnade and a frieze of lion-headed masks.East Disneyland is d dissipated by scenes of decrepit decay.Under the impressive and Heaps of rubble lie in the gloomy arcades of neighboring buildings, supported by beams and terraced walls.Behind a yellowed pediment, what was once an enormous basilica has been demolished but not cleaned. Warning signs and crumbling doors lead across a cracked parking lot, past a rusting bus, into a pitted chapel of a painted chapel outlined on the inside with streaks of sickly green. Lion heads, of which there are dozens, perhaps dozens, have been eroded into pantomime masks: snarling jaws transformed into toothless grins. 546 Life After Empires 547 No emblem could be more appropriate. Because this is Wembley, and these buildings are almost all that remains of the 220-acre site of the great Empire Exhibition of 1924, which celebrated the British Empire at its height to 27 million visitors. Here, King-Emperor George V, in a palace designed "six and a half times the size of Trafalgar Square", alongside a life-size statue of his son made from Canadian butter, demonstrated the range and scope of his power. town in a gesture almost as frugal as the movement of the forehead of Jupiter: it was sending a message by cable to itself, circumnavigating the world via British cables, routed overland only in Imperial territory, before returning to where it started, 28 seconds later.

Today no barefoot monk sings in these ruins, but a new doublet would see new barbarians, hooded and straw hatted or spiked and drunk when a big football game draws the screaming crowd into the stadium. The company Eastern Kayam, which wholesales industrial copies of tribal wares from some of the defunct empire's most distant subjects, is an ironically appropriate tenant for the space. After decolonization came countercolonization. The core areas of Europe's former empires have been invaded by their former victims, and the ecological consequences of the Imperial Era, the effects of migration, disease, and land relocation, are being reversed or diverted. The "ecological imperialism" of earlier times spread the "biological expansion of Europe" to regions far from the imperialist homelands, as European biota altered the environment, European microbes destroyed peoples, European tools devastated landscapes, and European settlers expanded their range to form habitats. White faces dominated where they had never been seen before (see Chapter 14). Some of these changes are irreversible and some of the processes are still ongoing. They focus on the Senegalese breakfast: once a mixture of millet couscous and vegetables, today a slice of wheat bread dipped in a solution of powdered milk and coffee powder. Yams, millet, sorghum, cassava, white corn, beans, and plantains are falling out of a regional ecosystem where they were once staple foods. On the other side of the Atlantic, more Atlantic forest is cut down, hectares for hamburgers. At the same time, the taste for tropical dishes and exotic and Creole cuisines is colonizing the western palate. The demand for crops rich in fiber, starch and protein, little appreciated in their own countries, is being generated by ideas of healthy eating that are fashionable in Europe and America. Again, in the early era of global expansion, the export of deadly diseases was only one route: from Europe to environments where the natives had no resistance; Syphilis, once considered a great exception, is now known to have existed in pre-Columbian Europe, and its appearance in venereal form seems to have been the result of THE MICROCOSM: THE GREATEST EXPOSURE, EVER PLANNED AS IT APPEARS. The Eclectic Empire. In the design of the 1924 British Empire Exhibition, the symmetrical order prevails and reveals an absurd mix of inspirations. Canada's pavilion is described as "Greek Revival style", South Africa's (lower right) is "late 17th century Dutch, stands beautifully carved Maori house". ​The actual size of To display a Prince of Wales carved in Canadian butter seems to be in keeping with the spirit of the exhibition. Life after empires 549 an evolutionary adaptation rather than a transmission from the New World. Today,

AIDS has re-emerged from Africa through the bathhouses of San Francisco and the brothels of Bangkok to threaten North America and Europe. While its impact remains more virulent and seemingly less contained on its home continent, it represents, from one point of view, a cruel form of retaliation that shows green transport carrying a deadly virus to and from targets. Humans tend to dominate whatever ecosystem they are a part of, and colonists are the crucial warriors in any biological conquest. Food and disease have contributed to the reverse direction of ecological exchanges, but human migrants are their main vectors. And since man is, as Aristotle said, "by nature a political and social animal", the counter-colonization that today undermines the white world is inseparable from decolonization: the withdrawal of imperial powers, the weakening of the old elites, the withdrawal of of the invading ruler--who preceded and accompanied him. Empires crumbled as their former victims swarmed, and like the crumbling halls of Wembley, the caverns of the Empire filled with hives of exotic drones. THE ROOTS OF THE MIKONGOE TREE The white male empires of the late 19th and early 20th centuries played their glorious tunes primarily in Africa and South Asia, parts of the world sheltered by hostile environments that earlier white imperialisms could not reach for technical reasons. . In these two zones, the imperial kiosks were dismantled, the wind pressed the metals, the strings ripped, in different rhythms by different forces of destruction: Japanese conquest in Asia, "Wind of Change" in Africa. In a terrifying concentration of energy between 1941 and 1945, self-serving Japanese aggression drove out the white rulers of British Burma and Malaya, French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, and the American Philippines. The United States, ruled by a Democratic Party ever reluctant to embrace or support imperialism outside its own hemisphere, wanted Japanese power to be replaced by "independence" in a future marked by nostalgia. Filter comes across as a repeat of American history. She set a good example in the Philippines, handing over power to an elite group of former guerrilla leaders who at least learned to speak the language of democracy with an American accent. Elsewhere in the region, the colonialists gradually relinquished power again, with varying degrees of disapproval; the British remained in Malaya long enough to impose a post-colonial regime to their liking; the French in Indochina long enough to bury the prestige they restored in defeat at the hands of the Nationalists. The Dutch were too weak to hold on to Donesia, but they kept western New Guinea separate from the new state as "a great and noble task" that "will help to keep alive that spiritual impulse without which no people can survive." Such was the common rhetoric of imperialism in its twilight years: burden and sacrifice, spirituality and survival. Asia was India a special case, endangered but not conquered

Japan was consciously prepared for independence by an imperial government eager to escape the increasingly intractable problems of economic governance, famine relief, and inter-ethnic and intersectional unrest. The nimble solution devised in 1947 - a split between Hindu-dominated and Muslim-dominated states, which remained friendly to waning power - was hailed by a stunned world, despite intercommunal bloodshed that claimed half a million lives before it was finally carried out. borders will be stabilized. In this tricky case, the ingredients of the British formula worked partly: parliamentary democracy; a “national” myth instantly infused like ground coffee into a steaming brew; "Rule of law" overseen by an independent, capricious, and wigged judiciary. The former autonomous maharajas, blackmailed, harassed or bought off by the British, ceded their territories to the new India. The national rhetoric was upheld and apparently believed. What is most impressive is that democracy has never been abandoned, even in India, with almost half a billion people misaligned and in conflict. In the medium term, the example of Pakistan has been less encouraging. After about a generation of independence, the country was defeated in war by India, divided by its own secessionists, and reorganized by military rulers. But the initial success encouraged the British to undertake a series of more or less dignified withdrawals from other parts of the empire. Compared to South Asia, Africa seemed immature for freedom. Except in the borderline cases of the Italian colonies, the distribution of imperial authority had not been seriously disturbed by the ebb and flow of armies during World War II. Independence could be ruled out as impracticable or denied for delay. In London, a new eight-story neo-Georgian colonial office was secretly designed, intended to fill an empty bomb site, before being abandoned in shame. The common assumption of the imperial ruling class - that the natives could not be trusted to rule each other - became a self-fulfilling prophecy, vindicated when independence finally came, by bloodshed and mismanagement and "that rage African, the desire to destroy". In the end, Africa had its equivalent of the Japanese conquests in Asia to push the imperialists into retreat or panic. Those who usurped the Suez Canal Company, Britain and France sent troops "to teach it a legible life after Empire 551 The new project for the British Colonial Office was objected to because it was too large for aesthetic reasons: the projected eight stories would have obscured the view of Westminster Abbey, willingly dug up by German bombs, which in 1953 seemed too big for a declining empire, Cummings added, adding a subtler level of satire than the original style - Georgian, with its overtones of chivalrous poise freshness and aristocratic taste - the cartoonist substituted an Orné Cottage through a suburban doorway, perhaps suitable for the residence of a gentleman gardener Port Said Casino became a field hospital, symbol of violent extermination

an old regime. Nasser urged the capitalists to "dry with rage" and "drink up the Mediterranean." British liberal opinion "thought Nasser was right"; the US government, eager to prove its anti-imperialist credentials, chided its self-indulgent allies, who had come out of the crisis and blinked uncertainly as if blinking with eyes pierced by sand. With every escape impediments are discarded, stragglers abandoned. As colonial powers fled Africa, state tasks such as backpacking deserters were abandoned, leaving settlers, ethnic minorities and former native elites to an often cruel fate. Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan - "protected" territories that were never strictly under European sovereignty - were evacuated in the Year of Suez. After that, the skirts of the Empire were raised with indecent haste. France seemed unable to remain in Algeria or withdraw, caught between native resistance and colonial fanaticism. Realism settled the issue in favor of withdrawal. Throughout British Africa, Resistance heroes, disabled in prison or disgraced, were embellished by the establishment. The insignia of chiefs—the button-tipped cane, the flyswatter, the leopard-skin hats—in most cases passed to random leaders drawn from rural missionary schools or the emigrant middle class, but rarely from ranks of traditional rulers. Kwame Nkrumah, who led Ghana through a long transition to independence in 1957, had "PG" for "Prison Graduate" embroidered on his cap. 1960 was the annus mirabilis of African independence, when fourteen new states, or "nations" as the fashionable jargon inappropriately calls them, emerged, including a vast swath of contiguous territory from north of the Sahara to the Zaire River. Most of the winds of change seemed to be blowing into Africa from abroad. Democracy in Europe, still patchy and imperfect even after World War II, disenfranchised voters who were doubtful or hostile to imperialism, such as the British working class, who "didn't know empire existed." US pressure weighed on imperialist clients. A Cold War northerly wind blew as Western governments attempted morale-hijacking tactics in the face of Russian competition and bolstered domestic opposition movements to dislodge them from Soviet influence or control. For a generation before the empires collapsed, colonial powers and native elites had been unbalanced by the world's "macroeconomic wobbles," like runners in a three-legged race destroyed by a fall. The Great Depression of the early 1930s ended the illusion that colonialism would bring unlimited prosperity. The economic consequences of World War II included the transfer of some forms of production to Africa, particularly rubber and food, with the consequent growth of an ambitious indigenous middle class. There may have been an unspoken fear in the ranks of colonial decision makers to escape the consequences of imperialism's greatest single effect: the demographic revolution brought about by Western medicine. The uncontrollable growth in the number of people in need has obviously made empires unprofitable. Instead of uncontrollably assuming

With rising social costs, it was cheaper to grant independence and help. Empires built on cooperation between newcomers and incumbents (see Chapter 14) collapsed when common interests changed or disappeared. In sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s and early 1960s, internal resistance was generally weak compared to these external influences. Kenya became a notable exception in the mid-1950s with the growing horror of terrorist attacks and the dark bloodlust of secret orgiastic rituals attached to them. Mau Mau—the mysterious and evocative name of their organization has never been explained—originated among the Kikuyu, farmers with no reputation for heroics long oppressed by nomadic neighbors but now matched by guns. It had features of a traditional totemic brotherhood among some African peoples, but its purpose was to kill white men and their "loyalists". With the Kikuyu themselves divided and surrounded by enemies, security was enforced with nauseating oaths that were said to be washed down with potions of human blood and milk, urine, and semen. A descriptive memorandum, according to Urban Colonial secretary Oliver Lyttleton, "came between myself and my appetite." The secular spirits who ruled Kenya seemed unable to refer to Mau Mau except in terms like 'devil' and 'evil' or 'sorcery'. But it was the white man's response, not Mau-Mau's methods, that was irrational. The supposed, and probably real, organizer was Jomo Kenyatta, a foundling who came from the bush on a Scottish mission as a boy and took his name from him. For the sake of anonymity, he assumed the ambiguity. The slipperiness with which he weaved in and out of identities, alliances, and forms of marriage made him difficult to trace and difficult to trust in colonial authorities. Sent to England in 1929 by a Kikuyu squatter society whose insecurity spawned early Kenyan nationalism, he won an assignment as an extra in the film version of Sanders of the River (see Chapter 14), bowing white supremacist, singing: " Yes, Mr. Sandy." A most useful part of his education was obtained in Moscow, where he learned to mobilize men and channel violence. But he never caught Marxism. His closest approximation to an ideological creed was his biased 1938 anthropological study of his own village, Facing Mount Kenya, which extolled Kikuyu virtues in terms closer to fascism than communism. "In the old order of African society, a man was a man," declared the advocate of female circumcision, pictured on the cover in an unconventional portrait of the author, dressed in a fur coat while fingering the tip of a spear. . Beneath the fur, Kenyatta's skin was that of a chameleon. The sophisticated traveler, a friend of Bronislaw Malinowski, Lady Cunard and Prince Paul of Greece, never lost or forgotten the folkloric rhetoric that moved the Kikuyu people. He shared "the roots of the Mikongoe tree." When the former terrorist was released from prison to become Kenya's prime minister, he had no trouble projecting a new image as a do-gooder.

older statesmen who kept a white man in their cabinet and appointed the chief justice who dismissed his own appeal. Even the bush boy didn't look out of place in his best outfit. These skillful transformations provided models that many later African leaders copied. "In the old order of African society, a man was a man." Jomo Kenyatta's 1938 photo of himself may have been considered bizarre at the time, but in hindsight it seems sinister. LIFE AFTER EMPIRE 555 THE FESTIVALS OF THE MONSTERS Throughout the late colonial world, native leaders became alienated in opposition or forced to resist. Gandhi in India, desperate for British goodwill for his self-rule programme, gradually became an advocate of full independence; Unable to influence the colonial masters through collaboration, he turned to "passive resistance" tactics. Ho Chi Minh evolved from socialism to communism and relentless militancy in the hope of uniting the Vietnamese and French in a common citizenship. Bourguiba in Algeria was being pushed into increasingly violent opposition to a regime from which he would gradually accept independence. Senghor, a French official who had created in Senegal the most statist regime in independent Africa, was in favor of a French world federation, which his masters despised. Ravoahangy in Madagascar, which was seeking independence within some form of association with France, was sentenced to death in 1948, although the sentence was not carried out. These catastrophes of colonial intransigence were generally the result of cultural reflexes rather than conscious policies. In part, a legacy of resentment suffused the decolonized world. The continued involvement of the former colonial rulers in the major independent states was the focus of suspicion; but it was inevitable in most places: there were continuities of administrative personnel, teachers, missionaries, businessmen, and technicians; there were squads of young white "volunteer service" workers who provided cheap staff for social and educational projects. Ivory Coast's leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, "had no complexes" about continued dependence on France. The mixed blessings of white capitalists to promote international business or white mercenaries to fight the wars of the new states were available when needed. The aid was denounced as covert colonialism unless it was unconditional; In practice, the ropes were almost always there, often tied in slings. France, Great Britain and the Netherlands tried to create an institutional framework for cooperation with the former colonies. The French idea of ​​union was very specific; Common defense and foreign policies were its defining and impractical characteristics. The British idea of ​​a commonwealth of independent states with a common focus on loyalty to the Crown worked well in a white commonwealth, or white-led dominions, which sided with Britain in world wars but shifted beyond recognition. .

after World War II by the divergent interests of the old member states and the republican status of many of the new ones. The Dutch-Indonesian Union made only token commitments: "cooperation in foreign affairs and defense and, where necessary, financing and matters of an economic or cultural nature"; but it was marred by the apparent mutual hatred of the parties and lasted only a few years. Colonialism persisted in another sense within the borders of the new states, which normally respected the lines drawn on the map by colonial administrators, regardless of the principle of self-determination or the dictates of common sense. In a typical photograph of a British border commission at work in 1903, a long line of porters wander aimlessly through a swamp behind a limp Union flag. Ironically, at the insistence of the newly independent states themselves, these borders were enshrined in international law to prevent endless and destructive border wars. Typical of the delimitation problems were changes to the eastern border of the Congo, which had been defined in 1910 between the British and Belgian colonial rulers in the form of a meridian that neither side could locate on a map; or due to disputes between North African states over the borders drawn between mirages and dunes of the Sahara, where nomads roam and the topography changes due to ignorance or lack of respect for the terms of the treaty; or in the hospitality of the Malawian frontiersmen, for most of the last third of the century, to relatives who fled from Mozambique. The curse of decolonization was the creation of states without history, The British Boundary Commission in action, 1903. The boundaries improvised by expeditions such as this one, drawing survey devices along straight lines, often without regard to geography physical and human, became the only immutable rule. . part of the colonial legacy. Life after empires 557 cobbled together for convenience, without traditional elites or colonial peacekeepers, precariously divided or strangely combined. Hasty preparations for independence rarely produced an educated or financially responsible electorate, but rather dumb democracies that could be exploited by demagogues, gangsters, and thieves. An extreme but suggestive case of gullible voters was Papua New Guinea, where an early presidential candidate was nominated by office cultists who believed, among other strange improbabilities, that "Agatha Christie would rule the country." Elsewhere, the results of inadequate preparation of outgoing colonists included territorial conflicts; identity struggles in unconvincing nations; civil wars: angry outbursts in once-great countries dwarfed by cars and planes; and the rise of charismatic tyrants. AGATHA CHRISTIE Evil Under the Sun The cover of this issue has little to do with the plot of

the book, but it inspired a strange form of cargo worship in Papua New Guinea. Supporters of 1972 presidential candidate Mathias Yaliwan believed that under Agatha Christie's messianic rule, the treasure locked up in the Mount Turu volcano would be released. FONTANA BOOKS 3/6 558 I N I T I A ​​​​T I V CHANGES Even the British success in reducing intercommunal violence in India turned out to be a fallacy. India and Pakistan were doomed to mutual animosity and periodic conflict while fighting long struggles for secession themselves. Wars between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus or Jews and Muslims in Palestine sparked clashes that continued for the rest of the century. Planned federations had to be scrapped in Central Africa and the West Indies in the 1960s. In the same decade, first in the Congo and then in Nigeria, secession was bloodily crushed in the name of the sanctity of colonial frontiers. The principle of self-determination was considered less important than the inviolability of imperial borders and the states invented by the former colonialists. During the second half of the century, wars of ethnic hatred, ideological enmity, and secessionist movements in various combinations produced harrowing stories of destruction and atrocities in Indochina, Sri Lanka, on the coasts of Indonesia and the Philippines, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique. In all these areas, instability was not eliminated until the last decade of the millennium. It was "very good" in Mozambique, portrayed as a land of happiness, freedom and dancing in incongruous European "cheek-to-cheek" style: lyrics by Bob Dylan, the most eloquent of anti-imperialist "protest singers." ", which became popular in the West in the 1960s and 1970s, has still not lost its irony. Rootless states were artificially honored with ancient names. Nkrumah called his state "Ghana", although it practically did not include any territory of the empire of the same name (See Chapter 3.) "Zaire" was replaced by Congo with even less justification—it was probably never a royal name, but was based on a Portuguese corruption of an indigenous word for "river." Does not include location of the historic city-state of Benin. Makeshift identities such as these were difficult, perhaps impossible, to convey to citizens of diverse backgrounds who had never before been encouraged to revisit the group's traditional sentiments. Some leaders became caught up in internationalist-communist or pan-African, under the given circumstances, the worst kind of unattainable ideal, because it was the imperialist perception of Africa as a

Totally from the outside, in a way that is hard for an insider to understand. Many states were linguistically divided and had to borrow the language of the outgoing imperialists as their national language, though the Philippines invented a native alternative to keep it alongside English, renaming a dominant Malay dialect "Pilipino". In other areas, the local vernacular has been elevated to a similar status through a form of cultural compromise: pidgin in Papua New Guinea, for example, Krio in Sierra Leone, and in Suriname, the slang called talkietalkie, or black angel. In Zaire, Joseph Mobutu (president, 1965-) invented a synthesis of riverine languages. Life after empires 559 Identity problems were perhaps most concentrated among colonial minorities caught up in the waves of retreating empire. Their stories contained heroic examples of survival through adaptation, such as those of Jamaicans, Zimbabweans, and white Namibians. There were tragic stories of rejection, such as Eurasians driven out of Indonesia, or Orientals driven out, dispossessed or massacred in much of the new Africa. Poignant cases of demise through assimilation followed, such as the brilliantly depicted Anglo-Indians at the transition to independence in John Master's Bhowani Junction, whose heroine swaps English, Indian and Anglo-Indian lovers according to the fluctuations of her own identity crisis. . By the late 1980s, its people seemed reconciled to their own extinction. Leader cults tended to fill in the gaps left by traditional loyalties. In the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace, donated by Félix Houphouët-Boigny in his hometown of Yamoussoukro, it is larger than St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, which it seems to deliberately rival: the dominating dome and the curved arcade that bordering the plaza are certainly allusions. In the decolonized world, Africa produced the cruelest examples: the messianic delusions of Nkrumah, whose troops chanted "Nkrumah never dies"; the folie de grandeur by Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who declared the Central African Republic an "empire" and crowned himself amid alleged cannibalistic orgies; the bloody madness of Idi Amin in Uganda, who bought adulation with terror; the eccentric paternalism of Dr. Hastings Banda in Malawi, who swept away the opposition with a masterful hitter; the arrogance of the Zairian dictator, who gave "Mobutuism his name" but not his substance, and gave himself a title meaning "the rooster that won't leave a hen alone"; the egotism of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, long admired as a role model for Africa (politically moderate, economically pragmatic, socially benevolent), who was seen as an impressive expense to transform his hometown. Now, golden rams guard the entrance to Yamoussoukro, which contains a cave with sacred crocodiles, a personal Saint-Denis-style mausoleum and the world's largest cathedral. Even the most rational and mentally moderate leaders seemed prone to obsessive tics, like the fanatical austerity of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere or the preoccupation with theoretical polygamy of Sierra Leone's Siaka Stevens. Ghana, Africa's first independent black state, became the "prototype melancholy."

to what would become a common pattern: diminishing returns to resources, military rule, nonperforming debt. Real per capita consumption fell by about a third in the 1960s and 1970s. When Nkrumah was ousted from power in 1966, the masses corrected a common misconception by displaying signs that read "Nkrumah is not our Messiah"; but his policies, which contained a certain noble ambition—dam the Volta, create a tropical industrial revolution—were replaced by another form of gambling, borrowing against the peasants' surplus production. Here, as in most of the decolonized continent, "governments made more mistakes." late 1970s and early 1980s relative to the g resources of the industrialized world The oil-led inflation of the early 1970s destroyed the old economic regime, the primary producer The 1979-1982 recession seemed be a definitive turning point, an opening of a chasm where there was a chasm: in the neutral language of geography, between North and South, or rather, between the former imperialists and their former subjects. In 1982, cocoa reached a Ze on the world market around its 1977 real value. Between the early 1960s and early 1980s, Africa's share of world peanut exports fell from 85 to 18 percent and edible oils from 55 to 3 percent. When Kwame Nkrumah fell from power in Ghana in 1966 and was overthrown by the National Liberation Council, it is not surprising that misery and mismanagement swept the streets where, a few months earlier, the slogan “Nkrumah never dies” had been seen. Protesters eager to bury him carried a coffin painted with a skull and crossbones. 'The worst of the worst': Equatorial Guinea, the scene of Frederick Forsyth's The Dogs of War, inherited the beauties and hindrances of Spanish imperialism: the beautiful bishop's palace, here in the foreground, the soaring towers of the cathedral and 'a society riddled with clan banditry - falls victim to the bosses'. came the twins. Even better than Ghana, the consequences can be traced in the state dubbed the 'worst of the worst', the 'gulag' and the 'armpit' of Africa - the cocoa country that was the setting for Frederick Forsyth's mercenary success story: The Massacre, The Dogs of War The Spanish abandoned Equatorial Guinea in 1968, leaving behind a beautiful colonial capital, exports per capita that were the highest in West Africa and a cacao production of 30,000 tons per year They also appear to have left behind a dangerous legacy of Hispanic-style caciquismo, a society that fell victim to gang rule by part of the heads of the clans. Ten years later, cocoa production was a sixth and coffee and timber production a tenth of their pre-independence levels; Foreigners were expelled and, according to plausible estimates, a quarter of the local population.

he was in exile. The devastation had been wrought by a mad dictator, Francisco Macias Nguema, who impressed voters by keeping the roads as Minister of Labor. For the presidency, he had the support of a coalition of disaffected politicians outside the nominated parties in which he alternately served. His campaign was financed by anti-Francoists in Spain, linked to potentially exploitative international agreements. Once elected, he turned on his supporters, called in Russian "advisors" and began ordering potential enemies into "a bloody country." His paranoia was reflected in his policy of destroying the area around the presidential palace. In 1979 he was overthrown in a family coup, but only the worst excesses of his regime conceded. When the economist Robert Klitgaard first visited the country in 1985, he found no movie theaters or bookstores on the streets, no bulletin boards in schools; Measles was a deadly disease; Cholera seeped from the raw water system; and the ratio of liquor to health food on the market was almost one to one. Even cocoa production did not recover, as formerly employed forced laborers fled their homes. THE MONUMENT TO OUR STRUGGLE It stands outside the main hospital in Addis Ababa, crowned with a Red Star and an Eternal Flame. The huge bronze friezes show a condensed version of African history: a menacingly veiled man on horseback rejects the pleas of starving families; weak adults hold sick children with emaciated limbs and emptied-swollen bellies; In the background, bulldozers are destroying traditional homes while a line of tanks crosses the horizon. The aim is to show the ills of the pre-revolutionary past, but also to summarize the post-revolutionary present. Although Ethiopia had had only a brief experience of colonial rule, its 1984 "biblical famine" made it look like a morass of intractable problems in decolonized Africa. Africa has become a disreputable continent in the eyes of the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, seemed like a nightmare of slumbering sanity, synonymous with ugly economic and political atrophy, where governments' responsibilities for the well-being of people over vast areas seemed to be encroached upon and abandoned by growing Malthusian control. . . Decolonization has left booming populations almost everywhere. It was both a problem and an opportunity that the newly decolonized world shared with other "underdeveloped" areas of Latin America and Asia, whenever improved medicine and sanitation impacted societies that were not prepared to control birth rates. However, in the last third of the 20th century, particularly in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the apocalypse seemed to be replacing politics in managing its effects. In the late 1970s, one of its top officials warned the Organization for African Unity that the continent was "plunging into the dark night" without "the smiles, the joys of life." In 1983, a UN agency predicted poverty of "unimaginable proportions" by the year 2000.

From the 1980s onward, population growth in sub-Saharan Africa was again about one-third that of Latin America or Asia, at more than 3% per year. War, famine and pestilence rode together. Although food production declined in most of independent Africa, it was not general scarcity that caused the famine, but distribution failures and the erosion of what food economists call "rights": access and purchasing power. , as a last resort. Economic mismanagement often contributes to these effects, but the biggest obstacle is war, with the worst famines hitting war-torn areas in Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique. The dead are claimed by starvation, but more often by the disease that afflicts weakened bodies. First the body uses its own fat, then proteins from the heart and muscles; heart rate, blood pressure, and decreased body temperature; The sperm stops pumping, the menstrual blood stops dripping. Bent and destroyed, the victims of the famine are recycled by nature's economy to house vile little parasites before they die. Sometimes they survive through media attention, like the family journalist Peter Gill met on his way to Korem in 1984, over "spectacular curves" that braved rescue vehicles, which "didn't have enough hunger" to be filmed. The African failures in the face of these enemies are real enough, but the successes have been obscured by the first law of the media: bad news crowds out good news. In the year of the Ethiopian famine, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya and Zimbabwe suffered similarly exceptional droughts, but the administration saved everyone from famine. The case of Cape Verde is the most spectacular, since it has the worst climate in the entire Sahel, outdated agronomy and an appalling lack of natural resources; but the judicious use of aid kept famine at bay and, in 1984, protected the population from a drought of unprecedented proportions. All indicators of social progress have improved steadily since independence, and in some areas they have been astonishing: measured child malnutrition was around 8% in the 1980s, while levels in the 1970s were reported in the 1970s. 30 and 40. However, most of Africa's achievements have been put into perspective or downplayed: Burkina Faso revolutionized food production and greatly improved life expectancy and school enrollment in the 1980s through a remarkable "autotune" program. "before the intervention of the International Monetary Fund; but the improvements seem unsustainable under the impact of the global recession. Most of the "adjustments" - which really mean replacing state controls with economic liberalism - have had to be imposed since out of Africa, with modest results so far, of which “perseverance” has been described as “the ultimate test.” Zimbabwe, once exemplary for its “miraculous food production,” fell victim to famine in 1992. Houphouët -Boigny, once praised by the World Bank for his "unique record of real growth", brazenly boasted of his billions in Swiss banks.Tanzanophilia collapsed with the failure of Nyerere's policy of forcibly relocating the workers in 1974. For every Democratic success, such as the subjugation of Kenneth Kaunda

The will of the electorate in Zambia in 1992: there seem to be counter-betrayals, such as Angola's renewed civil war and Kenya's sad descent into malevolent authoritarianism. And any optimism in sub-Saharan Africa is dwarfed by a debt service outflow of more than $10 billion a year, which eats up almost half of the region's export earnings. THE SHADOW OF THE BANYAN The demographic boom in colonial and ex-colonial areas reversed the demographic trend of the second half of the millennium. Filling empty niches in the ecosystems of the conquered countries, the ecology of imperialism had covered depopulated places with descendants of European immigrants. Now the numerical balance has been restored and the flow of migrants has been reversed. In what may be a prescient example, the direction of main migration was reversed between Ireland and mainland Britain even before decolonisation. The settlement of English and Scots at the expense of Irish casualties in the 17th century was outnumbered in the 19th century by the transfer of Irish labor in the opposite direction. Like their younger Pakistani successors, the permanently uprooted Irish nurtured their "comeback myths," poignant in songs like "Come Back to Erin." Religion and nostalgia fortified them against assimilation by continental societies; Thanks to a tenacious individuality, they became a recognizable guy in the variety comedy's human zoo, classified as a jerk. When immigrants from the "New Community" arrived to join them, the owners put "No Colored People" signs on their windows reading "No Irish Required." This was the price of preserving identity. After decolonization, this kind of crosscurrent between metropolis and empire would become normal. As birth rates fell below replacement rates in the former imperial powers, labor from the colonies was welcomed to fill the gap. It was perceived by those willing to acknowledge "racial" differences as a remedy for racial balance: the white world shrank proportionately as the black and brown worlds grew and expanded. It happened quickly, in sync with the dissolution of empires. The first 500 Jamaicans arrived in Britain in the fog in an old troop transport in 1948, marveling at the sight of smoking chimneys and white men doing menial jobs. In 1958 there were 200,000 Algerians living in France, twenty years later four times as many. In Great Britain, immigration from the West Indies reached five figures a year in 1954, in India in 1955, and in Pakistan in 1957. Between 1945 and 1971, when controls were tightened, the number of the identifiable Asian minority in England declined. multiplied by one hundred and was more visible, concentrated mainly in some urban areas. In 566 THE TWIST OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​T I V E, the white retina feared that “English culture” would be “flooded” and Britain would be home to “a brown society” in the year 2000. Now there are 4 million Muslims in France, more than 2 million in Britain and a ruling party MP declared "a threat to the British way of life".

Interracial violence is widespread in France and Germany. In the late 1980s in the Netherlands, the multicultural consensus for which the country was known was denounced as a myth in an effort to accommodate some 800,000 Indonesians, Surinamese, Moluccans and West Indians. Case studies of colonial-era immigrants to Britain probably reveal typical post-war long-distance migration histories. Some resist 'integration', like the Tagore banyan tree, which 'casts its benevolent shadow from its own birthplace'. These are counter-colonists in the true sense of the word, turning parts of the former homelands into patches or parodies of their own homeworlds. Others become "helots" who are transformed by the host societies and transformed over two or three generations into "relatives" who "walk in the park." The communities of Malta and Montserrat show the range of adaptation strategies. The tiny island of Montserrat sent proportionally more people than any other island in the West Indies in the 1950s and 1960s, spurred by the collapse of the island's sugar industry in 1952. There are fewer than 5,000 of them, but they hold together . They got married. They settle in places like Long Ground in Birmingham, named after a Montserrat village, or worship together in Pentecostal churches in Stoke Newington. They share businesses, set up roving credit unions, exchange ideas at Christmas – known as “death” – and are tied to their homeland by money transfers and fear of expulsion. By contrast, the Maltese, of whom there are an estimated 30,000 permanently in Britain, migrate alone and are dispersed. They mingle with the British past, often in a self-conscious escape from an identity tarnished by the 'perverse Ponce stereotype', the bad reputation of suspected Maltese gang leaders who committed the 'un-English crime' of pimping in the 1990s. 1950. The difference between the Montserratians and the Maltese cannot be explained by the color of their skin. Cypriots strive to insert themselves into their own culture, "Ugandan-Asians" renounce theirs. For immigrants looking for a new home, the old colonial ties are a big draw. When Ronnie Knox-Mawer returned from his post as a judge on a South Seas island and was posted to a new branch of the British judiciary, he found his former Indian clerk to be his boss. In 1969, the Nguema refugees in Salamanca surprised a girl who thought they "must be made of chocolate". In the 1980s, uncensored Guinean and Angolan street vendors sold pearls to the milky white tourists of the Algarve: the early-colonial-era truck driving backwards; and the Inner London Life After Empires 567 "KBW" stood for Keep Britain White. The bare wall below the crests of the railway tracks seen by more respectable-looking blacks in September 1952 is in Brixton, a now predominantly black area. 568 THE I N I T I A ​​​​T I V TURN A man deep down seems close to modified ecstasy; otherwise this Pentecost meeting

looks disappointingly tame. A child opens his mouth to yawn instead of prophesying. Boredom or distraction can be seen on most faces. For black communities, where it acts as a social coagulant, Pentecostalism works more as an opportunity to attract the best Sundays and rekindle community spirit than as a spark to ignite tongues of fire. The Board of Education hired a consultant for Bengali education. There are forty hours of Gujerati programming a week in Leicester, dozens of Vietnamese restaurants in Paris, and dozens of Javanese restaurants in Amsterdam. Yet the ocean of migrants is rife with rip currents and rip currents, and amid the shrinking opportunities of the late 20th century, "economic migrants" scoured the globe in search of moorings and work without necessarily unraveling the threads of a special relationship with the former colonies. teachers The Philippines was an American colony, but it came to supply illegal labor to several European countries. The Vietnamese "Boat People," before the humanitarians lost patience with them, were scattered throughout the hospitable Western world. There are communities whose migration history has followed empires back and forth, from Africa to colonial slavery and jobs in Europe; or from Asian homelands to Caribbean colonies or African highways, as laborers or merchants, before rejection or disappointment sent them to a new home in the colonial metropolis. Exported abroad between 1830 and 1916 to replace abolished slavery, Native American communities form the "ruin" of the defunct British Empire. Sometimes the tramps of imperialism Life after empires 569 A postcolonial world illustrated by V. S. Naipaul . A Hindu temple in Trinidad guarded by a lion and a tiger and overseen by Shiva in his childhood. The decorations were probably made by a specialist specially brought in from India, creating one of the strange visual effects of "cross currents and cross currents in the ocean of migration". varied according to colonial goals: displaced Africans include Nigerians from Ghana and Ghanaians from Sierra Leone; There are former Algerian settlers in Martinique who have sent Tamil sweepers to Trinidad, where the paintings in a Hindu temple are renewed every year by an artist brought from India. The unofficial spokesperson for this experienced human accident is V.S. Naipaul, whose novels tell vivid stories of decolonized worlds. He "never wanted to stay in Trinidad." His emigration to England was the fulfillment of a promise written "in the final note of Kennedy's Revised Latin Primer "he was awakened by the nightmare that he was back in tropical Trinidad." Africa and back to the Caribbean through memories that They were crying out for confirmation.

THE DESTINY OF THE NEW EUROPE As the old Europe changes under the influence of counter-colonization, the whiteness of the “new Europe”, long established far from home in the Americas and the southern hemisphere, is being eroded by similar processes. . The most dramatic case is the mental realignment of white South Africans who are forced by demographic logic to admit that their neo-Europe is truly African; but the trend is widespread to varying degrees. When European governments began to restrict entry, Australia abandoned the "white Australia" policy. Since then, the population has doubled in thirty years, and by the 1990s it is divided and distorted by an uncomfortable national debate about whether the country is truly European or Asian (see Chapter 22). The old frontiers of imperialism have once again become frontiers in the current repopulation of the world. For immigrants, Canada is one of the most hospitable developed countries, the United States, due to its long border with northern Mexico, where the population is only slightly mixed, one of the most exposed. Aboriginal people in Australia, Native Americans in the United States, Mapuche in Chile, Maori in New Zealand, and Inuit in Canada are experiencing a demographic renaissance at the turn of the millennium. Some migration also takes place only in the mind, but it can still have a reforming effect. Black consciousness movements in North America, which promoted the rediscovery of African "roots" and even African loyalties, restored, at least in some perceptions, parts of the United States and the Caribbean to the African character that had briefly prevailed in the previous colonial period. (see Chapter 8). Black racial pride was aroused by Marcus Garvey, who "came screaming onto the American scene" from his native Jamaica in 1916; Diverted from a promising start in American politics by a call for "Africa for the world's blacks," he sought to promote that program through explicitly black business ventures. His shipping company "Negro", for example, went bankrupt due to allegations of fraud. Garvey's enthusiasm to return to Africa was replaced by a new, bolder and more realistic mood: the desire to Africanize America in a mental recolonization of part of the white world. In a 1964 Life After Empires formula 571 used by the feared black Muslim leader who called himself Malcolm X, "We African-Americans must philosophically and culturally 'return' to Africa." He helped spawn the "New Ghetto Man" who repeatedly sparked summer riots in American cities between 1964 and 1968. Today, African consciousness in the New World can take absurd but powerful forms, perhaps best exemplified by Rastafarianism, a movement that started in Jamaica. in the early 1930s. Their rituals were to smoke pot and not wash; Among its tenets was the belief that Ethiopia was the home of the blacks of the New World, that the Ethiopian emperor was divine, and that the blacks were the true Israelites. Such stupidity seemed beyond satire.

until an English comic book author invented a white Rastafarian. The black Muslim movement was only slightly less illogical: Christianity was a Rasta man: "It's not political: it really talks about roots." Emperor Haile Selassie's deity was the voice of Rastafarianism until his death from cancer in 1980. "I am one of the twelve tribes of Israel." He told an interviewer in February 1978: "And we're trying to unite people so we can go back to Africa...and Haile Selassie is the conquering lion." See Bob Marley in his own words, ed. I. McCann, p. 48. 572 THE TWIST OF I N I T I A ​​​​​​​​​​T I VE Edward Asner and LeVar Burton in a scene from a television version of Roots, by Alex Haley. In a carefully crafted scene, the hero Kunta Kinte is chained in the hold of a slave ship bound for America. The giant handcuffs pushed into the foreground, with the rings and ropes behind them, frame the visionary face of the young African. The centurion, himself a victim of conscientious qualms, is made up in the Mephistophelian tradition with satanic eyebrows and a goatee.

Beard. The black faith is older than Islam, although neither is essential to black identity, but it has been more dangerously militant. It was founded in Detroit at about the same time as Rastafarianism, a period of prolific black migration from the farm South to the industrial North of the United States, when Wallace D. Fard, a former raincoat salesman, announced his arrival from Mecca. , to "prepare the dead nation of the West for Armageddon." His successor at the helm of the movement, Elijah Muhammad, declared him an incarnation of God, echoing a common heresy on the Islamic periphery (see chapters 3 and 7). He denounced all white men as demons, proclaimed a jihad against the white world, and demanded the surrender of "one or more states" to the Union in exchange for "more than a century of free blood and sweat." The acceptable face of the black Muslim ideal was shown in Alex Haley's 1976 book Roots, which Newsweek magazine described as "a socially significant event" that enjoyed popular success and intellectual acclaim. His achievement was to integrate black Muslim doctrines into American life after the 573 Empire: "I like being in America!" Since Leonard Bernstein's West Side Story of 1957, Hispanics in the United States have grown in number, their ancestry has expanded, and their icons have multiplied. Yet the musical, which adapts the Romeo and Juliet plot to the setting of an interracial love story, remains a classic portrayal of Puerto Rican life and New York gang warfare, and a powerful indictment of the discrimination they face. Hispanic Puerto Ricans. In the number shown here, Puerto Rican women exalt the rewards of being immigrants while their cynical husbands remind them of their humiliations. Dream like a black version of How the West Was Won. Instead of apple-cheeked settlers creating vast lands on salubrious open space, Haley's family of black heroes survived the mephite environment of slave plantations, generation after generation, their members tortured, brutalized, impregnated, bought and sold for the hole. wrong. -means Owner. Eventually, through emancipation, they achieved a dignified position in American society and produced Alex Haley himself, who traced his putative ancestry back to an impassioned and unlikely Muslim slave from the Gambia in the mid-18th century. While the intellectual credentials of black movements in North America are patchy and their artistic achievements mixed, their importance in a counter-colonized world is enormous. The United States seems to be becoming the most notable arena for counter-colonization at the start of the new millennium, partly because of the mental revolution that extended the frontier of African consciousness across the entire hemisphere, and partly because of the demographic revolution. represented by the Hispanic diaspora. It is a counter-colonization movement in the broadest sense: a repopulation of territories seized from the aggressors who pursue their "apparent destiny", a reversion

profoundly similar to the peaceful counter-invasion of European countries by the victims of their empires. The majority of Hispanics in North America are Mexican, a “bronze people with a bronze culture” that long ago did its own mental realignment, rejecting the Spanish portion of its ancestry as guardians of an indigenous past (see the Chapter 11). There are now 25 million Hispanics in the United States. Los Angeles has the second largest Spanish-speaking community in the world. The Chula Vista border fence has so many holes in it that families in Tijuana use the barbed wire to make asados. The fantasy of a bleak, Catholic, Spanish-speaking America in the 21st century will never come true because such predictions are always thwarted by changing demographic trends. But when a Hispanic crosses the border from Mexico—probably an illegal immigrant trudging through the desert at night in a vehicle, like in a Frank Romero painting—“sometimes he asks,” according to a revered Mexican intellectual, “don't you that was it right?" "Forever our country? Am I not going back for this? Is it not ours? You can taste it, hear its language, sing its songs and pray to its saints." Former colonial powers eager to maintain their dominance and exploitation of a formally decolonized world.In reality, the community was born in a more defensive spirit, in which disgust over the bloody internal divisions of the first half of the 20th century played an important role. there is no denying the influence of the backdrop of crumbling empires in accelerating the pace of European integration Today, cartographers are reassigning Europe its place in the world, developing and promoting projections that apply to other concentrated areas and emphasizing the small size of Europe human habitation; Asia includes mature civilizations; North America is praised for its economic power, South America for its rapid development then, the Pacific Rim for its economic promise and achievements. All this competition has reduced Europe's part of the map, but it has also forced Europeans to increase interdependence and s European solidarity. They can no longer afford the murderous infighting of the era of European world domination. The link between European integration and imperial disaster was most evident in Britain, where the Commonwealth membership debate was articulated in terms of the competing virtues of a "common market" and "imperial preference." The preferential trade relations negotiated between the Commonwealth and certain former colonies of its member states are, in a sense, the last practical ties of the empire.

(Video) A Thousand Years of Books - World eBook Library presents The Millennium Collection

The era of decolonization brought institutional turmoil to European identity. The first creative steps to establish supranational structures are generally attributed to Jean Monnet, a former cognac salesman who did wonders in coordinating Anglo-French supply policies during World War II. He proposed a "High Authority" for coal and steel to overcome the Franco-German rivalry. Thus, at the beginning of the European integration process, the European identity was kneaded like a mortar to erase the cracks between the enemies. The European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1951 with six participating countries. In its early years, this European initiative developed all the possibilities and limitations that still characterize it today. Member States would not give up "an iota of sovereignty." The High Authority gave way to a Council of Ministers, which in practice was an international body and not a supranational one. A common defense concept turned out to be unattainable. The Messina Declaration of June 1955 proclaimed "to work for a united Europe through the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market and the progressive harmonization of social policies", but the Treaties of Rome, that in 1957, the desire - sometimes rather slowly - for a common market pushed almost everything into the distant future. Efforts in the 1960s to work towards a "United States of Europe" were frustrated by the strong nationalist vulnerability of the French leader, General Charles De Gaulle, and then slowed in the 1980s by the expansion of the community to twelve member states in 1985, when the feared British Prime Minister Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose nickname "Madame Non" echoed de Gaulle's diplomatic language, took on the role of throwing cold water on euro fever. His emphasis on expanding parliamentary democracy and economic liberalism as preconditions for progress in European integration became prescient as Europe became increasingly homogenized and European institutions converged, not as a result of communal efforts, but as a result of two waves of political and economic conflicts. Realignment processes: first in southern Europe, from 1974 to 1978, when Greece, Spain and Portugal abandoned authoritarian regimes; and again in 1989-92 when most of Eastern Europe followed suit. Seen from within, or by petitioners on the sidelines, the European Community is a great internationalist crusade; Seen from afar, outside its wall of tariffs and immigration controls, it is the last bastion of the retreating imperialists. What characterization will conquer the owners of galactic museums? It's impossible to be sure, but distance seldom flatters the opinions of those in the know. Chapter 19 THE LABYRINTH OF GOD: THE RESURRECTION AT THE END OF THE ISLAMIC MILLENNIUM Face on the Moon - The Cycle of Rebirth - Signs on the Path

— The Eye of \slam The Face of the Moon Sattareh Farman Farmaian has survived four revolutions, each one more traumatic than the last. She was born among the roses of Shiraz, one of the many daughters of a cadet prince of a decadent dynasty. Although he claimed not to know the exact date, it must have been shortly before the 1921 coup, when Colonel Reza Khan, a former game warden who was reportedly chosen by the British to take over the country because of his authority to command, took over post power in Persia, height took over in a culture where tall men inspire fear. Her mother's servant, who blamed fate for the bad watermelons she brought from the market, symbolized the inhibitions that made Persia "backward"—impoverished, timid, and dependent on Britain, Russia, and moody, drought-stricken . Reza Khan blamed Islam for the "fatalism and inertia" that kept dung-cooking fires burning in central Tehran, on streets lined with cattle where dirty, hairy dervishes hawked cures for baldness. The example of Atatürk's Turkey suggested that secularization would be a modernizing and progressive influence, creating cities with avenues and highways. Persian intellectuals called for "a wise doctor for a sick country," but Reza Khan's only life - man and boy - was in Tehran's Maidané Aminés-Saltah square, waiting for the steamrollers of Reza Khan's Pahlavi. The army; he was better at giving orders than writing prescriptions. He became a frenzied razor of medieval cityscapes, a savage builder of ingenious Western-inspired ventures. He leveled the world of the infant Sattareh, humbled the old dynasty and crowned himself Shah. He destroyed his family property, the harem of many of the houses in which he lived, and threw the occupants "like maggots from a corpse which he dismembered." Revolutions are easy, reforms are hard. The secular institutions of Persia offered no resistance to Reza Shah; However, religion proved to be ineradicable, although its formal power could be abolished and its external symbols stifled or contained. Persia was no different from other countries or Islam from other religions in this respect. It was a common mistake of 20th century intellectuals to assume that God is dead and that religion must go. The pious of all religions collectively protested against the onset of a crisis, denouncing the growth and spread of disbelief, for nothing stimulates religious reaction like the fear of pagan revenge. Orthodox Christianity, for example, was ridiculed, tormented, and domesticated longer in 20th-century Russia than Islam was in Iran, but when the regime collapsed, the clergy, writhing under blows on the road to the communist test, he stood up. up fully armed with spiritual powers, after more than seventy years of diligent secularization. The failure of the Soviets to promote secular culture in the Union's Islamic republics was reflected in the growing desperation with which propaganda and scholarship operated.

he mocked the Qur'an and denounced Islam as civil. The more subtle and insidious pressures on the religion of materialism, consumerism, and humanism in the United States were followed by a religious revival strong enough to help "born again" presidents enter the White House and restore" three lowercase letters, GOD" in political speech. . . Islam is just as hard to suppress as other religions and perhaps harder to get out of politics. It is a political religion; his name implies both a way of life and a belief system; civil society and the community of believers are antagonistic in Islamic language; Muhammad's Precepts should have been a sufficient civil code in their time, and are treated in some Islamic countries as if they still are. In almost all Muslim societies, at all times in history, governments have sought some form of legitimation religious, even in some cases where non-Muslim rulers invaded from outside. In Sudan - where the Mahdi's grandson was prime minister until 1989 - the British, who supplanted the Mahdist theocracy, prided themselves on having "closed holy sites" and "subsidized and supported men of religion". Although Islam has been banned from political life since the 1920s, it has remained a powerful moral force in Turkey, while in other parts of the Muslim world, where secularization has been attempted, it has been abandoned. In Sattareh Farman Farmaian's Persian childhood, Reza Shah first needed the support of the mullahs. After they helped him establish himself, he turned on them and tried to drive them out of their vantage point of political and social influence. He forbade self-flagellation and introduced veils that made prostration in prayer difficult. The name "Iran" or "Land of the Aryans" that he imposed in place of "Persia" was itself a proclamation of an identity that he shared with the non-Islamic peoples of India and Europe. But the sense of the Quran's transcendence that every Muslim learns in childhood has survived, and with it the traditionally inspired reverence for holy men. Sattareh's mother, who always added more meat and butter to the rice when a mullah ate at her house, warned that God would curse the shah for his impiety. By the time secularization was reversed, after some fifty years of fairly consistent efforts by successive governments to marginalize Islam, Iran had undergone two more political revolutions at the behest of the British. The first deposed Reza Shah in 1941. The second, bribed by the CIA, overthrew Sattareh Farman Farmaian's hero, the nationalist Prime Minister Dr. Shah. Reza Shah's son, Mohamed Reza Shah. His self-image was projected through a book of official photographs titled Majesty in Power. Pages shimmering, emotion hidden behind lugubrious rite, gray hair and steel blue eyes, he posed uncomfortably upright in his buttoned suit in thick gilt chairs. The family, grouped together like the outlines of a magnetic field, gave him a human touch constantly corrected by hieratic postures, careful gazes, and emotionless expressions.

The lavish decor, too extravagant for good taste, was dismissed in his insincere assertion that "even if the furniture in my palaces suggested otherwise, I really wish I could sleep on the floor." An apologist's account of life in his court reveals what kind of man he really was: an opportunist determined to maximize oil revenues; a bully who takes pleasure in intimidating respondents; a misogynist who liked expensive prostitutes and recommended sex therapy for his fourteen-year-old heir; an autocrat corrupted by vanity and isolated by the sycophant. He established a rewarding routine of ritually summoning the British and American ambassadors. This convinced him that his dynasty had ended the era of dependency on Iran, while flattering the self-esteem of the ambassadors. Drooling like a schoolboy over weapons catalogues, he spent the proceeds of a global energy boom (or, more accurately, an oil revenue boom fueled in large part by the Shah's idiosyncratic decision to quadruple its price in 1974) to increase his propensity for the armed forces. give up. He continued the policy of secularization, but with a disdain that, from the mullahs' point of view, was worse than the fearsome hostility of his predecessors. He thought that he ruled in "France from Asia" a people "like the Americans". He claimed to "fervently believe in Islam" and to have had childhood visions of the messianic "Hidden Imam" of the Shia prophetic tradition. He increased his pride more than his piety and gave him a snobbish path to God, around the flanks of the Muslim clergy. "I felt," he explained, "that a Supreme Being was guiding me." He shared the former monarch's dream of "passing Persepolis in triumph" and reportedly spent $100 million to celebrate the glory of Cyrus the Great's empire, which he believed was revived in his own time and person in 1971. Of contradiction, he also saw himself as a revolutionary leader, imposing profit sharing, giving women the right to vote, promoting rural education, and transforming large estates into small-scale agriculture in what he called the "White Revolution". What sounded like a land reform project in the tradition of the French Revolution or Sun Yat-sen was, in practice, an expropriation of religious foundations. Shortly after the proclamation of the White Revolution in 1963, seminarians protesting in the sanctuary city of Qom were shot dead by police. A small but relentless faction of mullahs from the holy city, largely ignored at first, began preaching and plotting to overthrow the shah. The oil boom of the 1960s and early 1970s paid for enough social gains to quell the riots and enough men and weapons to put them down. When the boom ended and economic problems mounted, the shah's isolation from bad news shielded him from knowledge of the problems and prevented him from finding solutions. The Most Dangerous Opposition - God's Labyrinth 581 "Isn't it daring to be king and ride triumphantly through Persepolis?" The camp behind the ruins was built to house the shah's guests in celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the accommodation of the Persian monarchy: an upstart dynasty that bought respectability from ancient origins.

The ruins in the foreground became the setting for a Cecil B. de Mille Hollywood extravaganza, with thousands of soldiers parading in pastiche Bronze Age uniforms. more convincing alternative government - seemed to stem from the nationalist tradition bequeathed by Mossadeq. But from the perspective of the Islamic revolutionaries, the nationalist leaders were infected with distorted heresies such as modernism, westernism, and secularism. Without the means of their own to mobilize a revolution, the nationalists could only come to power by collaborating with the shah or joining forces with successful insurgents. A military coup would have been convenient for them, but nobody carried it out; the secretive Communist Party was credited with posing a formidable threat, but its reputation was exaggerated, its help unsavory, and its reliability questionable. The only potentially revolutionary initiative came from the mullahs of Qom. The gradually increasing success of its main propagandist, Ayatollah Khomeini, was the reward for perseverance. Although he hated other forms of modernization, he understood the techniques of mass communication and embraced one of the basic tenets of advertising: a simple message gains credibility with repetition. Khomeini's message was that the Shah's regime was the work of the devil, meaning literally Ayatollah Khomeini in a huge illumination towering over a festival podium in Nice. The image is affectionate: with a scruffy tummy, a fatherly beard, generously spread palms, an attitude in the tradition of comic fun. But something of the self-image of the revolutionary leader is also captured: the hieratic state, the scowl, the fierce words, the political wisdom that the world evokes. The images of corrupting Western influence disperse as it approaches. Bottom right, pornography and alcoholic beverages are evoked in a Persian rug. Mocking is obviously an antidote to real fear. that it was a religious duty to destroy. Iranian culture is rich in anticlerical humor; In a country where arguably the best way to kill a mullah is to encourage him to overeat, Khomeini's apparent incorruptibility gave him authority. He was bolstered by his almost insane belief in self-righteousness. Broadcasts from him from exile urged some of his listeners to await the imminent arrival of the hidden Imam and to see Khomeini's image on the face of the moon as a sign of God's favor. Radio talks combined the techniques of pulpit speaking with the power of the catchphrase. They were distributed via bootleg tapes and acquired a cult following without detection by the Shah's secret police or the world press. Khomeini wrapped his message in a political program of magnetic naivete: he divided the world into "oppressors" and "dispossessed"; His Islamic Republic would be a welfare state that would enrich all his believers and where the necessities of life would be free. Ironically, this view seems to have been influenced by the welfare models in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula that Khomeini professes to abhor.

like realms of darkness; In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, where populations were small relative to oil revenues, universal benefits could be distributed lavishly, but such indiscriminate generosity would never be possible in Iran. Khomeini also managed to defeat the program of nationalism. The future foreign policy of the Islamic Republic would be openly xenophobic. This was reminiscent of the old nationalist theory of "negative balance" - impartial resistance, that is, against all foreign influence - and reflected the mood of Iranians, outraged by the wealth and exhibitionism of the Shah's American collaborators abroad. Thanks to the immediacy of the message and the mastery of the medium, Khomeini made the 1979 revolution through oratory almost unaccompanied by him. His eloquence filled the streets with protesters eager to be martyred. He paralyzed government and business by calling strikers and castrated the military by encouraging deserters. The revolutionary rivals of the fundamentalists were neutralized or hypnotized. But actions were as necessary as words, and when the revolutionary threshold was crossed, unshaven cadres, long trained in underground cells, were waiting to organize committees of public safety; Islamic "freedom fighters" occupied the rooftops. The origin of the armed workforce was revealed at the dawn of revolutionary success, when Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, appeared on the balcony of the Alavi School to receive Khomeini's public embrace. Meanwhile, the victims of the revolutionary judiciary were being shot in a death camp on the flat roof above. Sattareh Farman Farmaian did not see Khomeini. When she was brought in for questioning as a former regime collaborator, there were "no facilities" for women at the headquarters, and guards who did not know her gender kept her at the gate day and night. She had founded and directed the Tehran School of Social Work and was known for befriending the dispossessed. The accusations against her included "killing millions of babies" by advocating contraception and supporting Zionism by attending a technical conference in Israel on the shah's orders. She was exonerated by a conscientious judge sitting on a gun box in a tent within earshot of the executions. When asked to return to her position, like most of the professional elite, she chose to flee the country. THE CYCLE OF REBIRTH Among the Batak of Angkola, in the highlands of North Sumatra, Muslims and Christians share compassion in common clans without sacrificing piety. Christians pledge not to raise pigs; The Muslims showed mercy to their Christian guests while they were eating. Muslim figures attend performances by Christian pastors, and children from both congregations exchange cakes on their respective festivities. In today's world, this ideal of a multicultural society seems increasingly unusual. Antipathy between Muslims and Christians helped bury Beirut in rubble, turning the ruins into a sniper nest. The Death Squads of the Iranian Revolution

it focused on demonstrably identified enemies: Baha'i, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews. Muslims in the Patani region of southern Thailand resisted "ethnocide attempts". Self-proclaimed crusaders and mujahideen waged wars of extermination in Mindanao and East Timor, Ngorno-Karabakh, and South Sudan. "Pakistanis" were beaten up on English streets and burned mosques in German cities. Muslim anger and Christian misunderstanding met in riots and demonstrations sparked by an arrogant fatwa of death against a novelist wrongly accused of slandering Muhammad. In the dark days of World War II, the intellectuals of Travnik, Bosnia, would gather in Lufti's Bar to console themselves by saying that "everything will be as before and by God's will it always was." Not this time. After the ethnic cleansing, Lufti's Bar will not reopen. Militancy and violence are as different as barking and biting. In the Christian perception, however, the sharp fangs appear whenever the revival of Islam opens its mouth to howl. Muslim speakers use symbolically violent imagery traditionally drawn from the wild and difficult times of the Prophet. For properly biased readers, the Qur'an encourages a worldview that can easily be mistaken for dualism, in which societies are divided into "the house of Islam" and "the house of darkness," people in the "parts of Islam." "of Satan and God. . The conflicts of conscience in every man extend to the fight against heretics and unbelievers; Like the concept of the Christian crusade in earlier times, Muslim leaders routinely exploit the concept of jihad to justify their wars. In the 1980s, it was claimed that the Iran-Iraq war was blessed by leaders on both sides who "turned the war into a great blessing". One man's holy war may be another man's terrorism: the image of Islam is tarnished in the West by association with the work of kidnappers, suicide bombers, assassins and kidnappers employed by "revolutionary Islamic" regimes or by liberation cells and gangs hired or supported by Palestinian women. In the eyes of Muslims, Christianity is an equal but different ogre, bleeding from the guilt of imperialism and inevitably tainted by an anti-Islamic history. Christian sympathy for Zionism is interpreted as raw hunger stealing another bite from a former Muslim country. The indifference of the Western powers while Muslim Bosnia was being divided and dismembered in 1993 was easy to characterize as evidence of Christian complicity or conspiracy. In this alarming scenario, the world of Angkola can only be reproduced in small patches, where local realities exorcise atavistic ghosts. On a global scale, Islam and Christianity are doomed to continue to feel the threat of each other. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Western public opinion and decision makers struggled to resist fears that the revival of Islam could be a threat to world peace. The rattle of that snake rang as loud to some ears as the rattle of fascism and communism at the turn of the century. In 1977, a coup in Pakistan replaced a decidedly secular government with a self-assured Islamist one. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran triggered a

vast fiefdom of restless loyalty to Western values ​​and turned it into a partisan state of terrible power, ruled by a terrifying open theocracy. As in May 1981. Tradition triumphs over technology, Islam over the evil of secularism. In a photo taken in May 1981, Afghan mujahideen show the charred hull of a captured Soviet tank to the press. However, under the ideology of holy war, their struggle reeked of traditional tribal and regional warfare, from which Western volunteers returned disillusioned, having been led to believe that spiritual values ​​were paramount, or at least that was what the mujahideen saw. , as part. of a global fight against communism. At the beginning of the decade, the Afghan mujahideen launched their holy war against communism. In 1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamic fanatics. In 1983, Sudan joined the ranks of proclaiming Isl